Thesis for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Media Ecosystem Shift:

The Role of Media in Peacebuilding of the

Great Lakes Region of Africa

by

Lukengu Kapuku Dieudonné

Department of Mass Communication

The Graduate School,

Pukyong National University

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미디어 생태계의 변화

아프리카 오대호 지역의 평화 구축을 위한 미디어의 역할

Advisor: Prof. Yong-Ho Kim

by

Lukengu Kapuku Dieudonné

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Approved by:

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(Chairman) Prof. Nam In-Yong

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(Member) Prof. Yong-Ho Kim   (Member) Prof. Lee Sang-gi

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(Member) Prof. Lee Sang-Ho   (Member) Prof. Lee Joon-Ho

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Acronyms

ABAKO	Association des Bakongo
ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
AFDL	Alliance des Forces démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo
ANC	Armée nationale congolaise
APL	Armée populaire de Libération
APR	Armée patriotique rwandaise
ARPTC	Autorité de Régulation de la Poste et des Télécommunications du Congo
ASADHO	Association africaine de Défense des Droits de l'Homme
AZAP	Agence Zairoise de Presse
BALUBAKAT	Association générale des Baluba du Katanga (Sendwe)
BCNUDH	Bureau conjoint des Nations Unies aux droits de l'homme
CSAC	Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel et de la Communication
CONAKAT	Confédération des Associations tribales du Katanga
DTT	Digital Terrestrial Television
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo

ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
FAR	Forces armées rwandaises
FAZ	Forces armées zaïroises
FLNC	Front pour la Libération nationale du Congo
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ITU	International Telecommunications Union
MIBA	Société minière de Bakwanga
MLC	Mouvementt de Liberation du Congo
MNC-K	Mouvement national congolais
MNC-L	Mouvement national congolais
MONUSCO	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilite du Congo
MPR	Mouvement populaire de la Révolution
OZRT	Office Zairoise de Radiodiffusion et de Television
PSB:	Public Service Broadcasting
RCB	Radio Congo Belge
RCD	Rassemblementt Congolaise pour la Democratie
RNB	Radio Nationale Belge
RTNC	Radio Television Nationale Congolaise
SADC	Southern African Development Community

UFERI	Union des Fédéralistes et des Républicains indépendants
UMHK	Union Minière du Haut-Katanga
UNPD	United Nations Development Programme

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Abstract

The media is one of the institutions of socialization in modern societies. As such, they can help to create or solve the problems of the society in which they operate. The conflicts in the Great Lakes region have attracted less media attention, given the scale of the conflict and its consequences for the Congo and globally. This study has set out to provide analyses of one of the most complex and difficult conflicts in the world. Qualified as 'African world war'. The 1998-2003 Congo conflict was analyzed in order to understand the role of the media in building peace. As we found, in the context of the 1998-2003 war, the Congolese media ecosystem is 'Bi-cephalic' or 'bipolar', evolving in a logic alternating between confrontation and conciliation. The media in this ecosystem are 'auxiliaries' of political power and participate in the public diplomacy of foreign countries that have interests in Congo and the Great Lakes region. This study established the relationship between political power, media, and (de) escalation of the conflict. This research has shown that during the first period, the public media RTNC, subservient to the political power of Kabila, was in confrontation with the international media, influenced by international policy on the conflict in Congo. Enriched with this knowledge of the evolution of the media ecosystem in times of conflict, this study proposed the integration of third media's logic, capable of bringing balance to the ecosystem. The 'third media' principle consists of improving or integrating new media types that can take into account the high conflict realities of the Congo and the sub-region, as exposed in this study

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Context

In just over 120 years of history, from Radio/TV broadcasting to the Internet and social network, the media and communications technologies have experienced tremendous development. Became an integral part of modern life, the media and new technologies currently constitute a technological ecosystem in their full-fledged.

An ecosystem that has managed to develop to reach the extremity of the world and allowing people to learn and communicate.

Today, by laying the last words of this thesis, thousands of km far from the Congo, people know through the media and the internet that the government has decreed an emergency law to fight against the armed groups that scour the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), to restore peace. The media, in their current technological development, provide information on what is happening in Ituri, Beni, Butembo, Goma, Uvira, regions of the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo. This region has experienced an unprecedented humanitarian disaster in recent decades. From the beginning of the 1990s, several media channels covered news on various conflicts and security issues in the Great Lakes region. The violence of the events prompted us to reflect on the role of media ecosystems in times of conflict. We want to know how the media, institution of socialization, could participate in and provide peace in these societies devastated by conflicts and wars.

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The existence and use of mass media allowed access to information that took place out of sight. With the media, the public from all horizons of life can be informed about everything going on, if and only if the media is present in the confidentiality of the unfolded events. In addition, this is not new. During the second world and the cold war, the mass media were used to inform the public about the violent events characteristic of the war. More and more, nations saw in this instrument of mass communication a means of persuading the public to adhere to their policies, which at times can be an outlaw.

Media experts are unanimous, saying that it was also through media that the Nazi power succeeded in persuading millions of Germans to wage war on the world. Hitler's propaganda machine was amplified and empowered by radio (Bytwerk, 1998). The USSR exercised strict control over its media system to popularize communist ideology. The United States has used the radio to counter propaganda against Communist ideology, believing that the media are powerful in influencing opinion and audience behavior (The Information Warfare Site, 2004). The "borderless" nature of radio waves allowed Americans to carry out this media war, even within Russian and Cuba territories, even though these broadcast messages can be blocked through technologies.

Well-documented research has demonstrated the role of mass media in inciting violence and intrastate conflict (Seaton, 1999, p. 46). At the same time, it used to disseminate symbols and discourse of a discriminatory nature, emphasizing stereotypes and prejudices, differentiating from one another. The violence in the former Yugoslavia

and the genocide in Ruanda, with their corollaries of desolation, are well studied and documented for types. (Thompson, 1995; Chrétien, 1995).

The media were used effectively during the two Gulf wars, or the whole world, especially American opinion was persuaded of the necessity of this war. The media were used to inform world opinion; the majority convinced and campaigned for the success of the First Gulf War, which had as its primary aim the restoration of the sovereignty of Kuwait. (Merouche, 1991).

It is a proven fact that the media have played a significant role in conflicts and wars. However, it would be interesting to explore how the media, an institution for socializing our modern societies, could actively contribute to the promotion of peace in the context of conflict resolution. This is the main reason for this research.

The study on the role that the media can play in peace processes is recent. This orientation of the role of the media in peacebuilding is opposed in the context of war. It is evident and logical that to build peace; one must first have experienced war. War and peace have therefore been two logical phenomena in human societies since the dawn of time. To do this, the populations have always used several tools to decide to resolve conflicts and build an environment of peace. Generally speaking, communication, whatever its form, has often been an indispensable tool for achieving conflict resolution and peace. Because to make war or peace, there must be at least two.

In African or ancient societies, dialogues were the instrument of communication par excellence between people and communities in conflict. To succeed in building peace, they had to use this rudimentary means of communication—an elementary but

effective means, and which is still proven today. In Africa, the public used to talk about the palaver tree' (Simon, 1980). A tree under which meetings were also held to resolve conflicts and build peace.

Diplomacy is another tool for resolving conflicts in our modern societies (Darnton, 2020), structured and organized according to the principles of nations and states. Statistics show that the United Nations has deployed more than several diplomatic (MacQueen, 2011) conflict resolution missions. These communication tools, often mixed for efficiency reasons, can be decisive in this context, even if they do not always guarantee success in peaceful endeavors.

The media, also, like other instruments, can also participate in building peace in post-conflict societies. Speaking of the role of the media in the conflict in order to understand the constituent elements of the process that can lead to peace, Shinar (2003) conducted a study: the role of the media in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process since the Oslo accords (2003). He finds that the media take part in this conflict, which has a cultural and identity character, has internalized the restrictions of the public discourse of peace and reconciliation, which characterizes Israeli society. A speech often opposed to the discourse of transforming conflict to achieve peacebuilding. Shinar (2003), from a normative perspective, considers that the media can play an active role in the construction of peace, given that it is a major actor of socialization in our modern societies.

The media as actors, catalysts, and possible instruments that can play a role of peace in a society is a field of study to be exploited. This academic field is recent.

Indeed, the studies of peace in the media, called peace journalism or peace media have antecedents in media education. Galtung (1965) can be recognized as a pioneer in this field. We will expand on this in the following pages. However, at this point, recognition should be given to the studies of peace journalism by other authors (Lynch, 1996; Sparre, 1998; Bläsi, 2003; Wilhelm Kempf., 2007)

In general, the common point of their research focuses on two perspectives on the role of the media in the construction of peace. On the one hand, they insist on the sociological and psychological impact of media discourse in a society in times of conflict. And on the other hand, they base their arguments on the possibility that the journalist has, in his work of media coverage, to make an ethical choice by resorting to the discourse of the media content of the approach of war or violence, an approach to peace, and this in the three different phases of the conflict, i.e., before, during and after the conflict.

Although rich in a peace proposal, proving to transform society in conflict into a community that can experience the opposite, and this thanks to the intervention of the media and journalists, these researchers do not address the approach of power dynamics in modern societies, knowing that the media is not the only instrument of power. They can also be influenced by it. Indeed, an organization functions in the dynamics of power struggles. The influence of political and economic power can positively or negatively affect the media and journalists.

This is, therefore, an essential fact that might be taken into account so that the media can effectively play its role in the peacebuilding process. This study will seek to

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understand and analyze the context of the conflict in the Congo. It should be emphasized at one point that our aim in this study is not published the peace media and journalism approach in principle alone ideal in terms of approach, but rather to consider it, alongside other media engagement such as freedom of expression, media pluralism, editorial independence, as carrying a specific necessary principle, which can be used within the framework of the role that the media can play in the construction of peace.

1.2 Setting out the Research Problem for the Study.

The Second Congo War, 1998-2003, was viewed by analysts and conflict specialists as Africa's world wars due to its impact on the African continent. This conflict has had repercussions not only on the Democratic Republic of the Congo but also on Africa. Because in its course, the Congo has been transformed into a battlefield involving several African actors, including eight African armies, officially active in military operations zones and diplomacy. These conflicts have known ten peace agreements with the assistance of the international community in general, particularly those of the countries represented in the Security Council. However, its peace agreements, for the most part, have not been implemented until a favorable period.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is the second-largest country in Africa in terms of area, at 2,345,000 km2. It is also the largest French-speaking country due to its population, more than 100 million inhabitants. Some land is rich in natural and mineral resources. Experts estimate its mineral potential in 1000 billion dollars, but paradoxically, it ranks among the poorest countries in the world, or 152nd in terms of GDP per capita. […]. At the time of the conflict, which is the subject of this study, the

country was last in terms of human rights (122nd), freedom of the press (122nd), and freedom of expression (123rd), respectively. (Vásquez and Porčnik, 2018) It is thus necessary to consider in our analysis about the media-specific aspect of this period in the DRC.

When analyzing this conflict, two periods mark two essential turning points in the conflict. August 2, 1998, was the official start of hostilities, announced by the media. A period qualifies as an escalation of the war, which, in the long run, cost the lives of millions of people and which ended with the assassination of the president. He was speedily substituted by a new president whose political path was different during the conflict compare to the late president. It was in his power that the peace process was accelerated and implemented up to a particular stage of conflict resolution and reconciliation. While taking office did not mean the end of the conflict, it nevertheless marked an essential step in the transformation of this deadly conflict, allowing to glimpse the passage of military and murderous conflict, embodied by violence, has another type of conflict which this time would be political, embodied by dialogue. This transformation does not mean the end of the conflict (Vayrynen, 2010), but the complex evolution of the conflict (Shinar, 2004) in which the media, or rather the configuration of the media ecosystem of that time, played a role in the foreground as underlined by several studies that in the context of conflict, political, cultural, economic are related to and influence the media (Vayrynen, 2010; Shinar, 2004). Media activities, as well as the composition of the media ecosystem, constitute an essential component in the course of the Congo conflict 1998-2003, which deserves to be studied in order to understand their role in this specific case.

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The composition of the media ecosystem of this period, of which the fundamental bases are still applicable today, consisting essentially of official media, local media, and international media, with a dominant tendency of official and global media, might be contributed to the (de)escalation of the conflict through their discourse on the conflict, seeking to inform the public about the issues at each stage of the crisis. These media, therefore, played their role of informing about the conflict. This information is undoubtedly contradictory, given the context of conflict between parties to the crisis. This media ecosystem will be reconstituted in the following chapters. It is defined as a space for military and political communication and public diplomacy. It was expressed, allowing confronting the vision and ideas of various actors engaged in the conflict through interactions of political discourses, agenda settings, and media framing of the crisis. The challenges of which remain the mastery of the political interpretation of the situation. (Wolton, 1989, p. 30). Indeed, the media discourses of the conflict, inspired by the politico-military world, would help analyze and understand the points of view of the various actors engaged in the conflict. Indeed, the media discourse relate to national and international politics provides and allows a representation of the conflict and the actors often opposed by their vision and objectives. Hence, when the media in attendance are, to some extent, influenced, the media become active participants in the escalation of the conflict. The media space of the Congo might become an 'arena' in which the various national and international actors involved in the crisis might clash on issues relating to war or peace.

In this context, the media might play a dual role; on the one hand, it will be considered a channel or a mediator, and on the other hand, as an actor fully involved in

one side of the parties in conflict. Such a function in the context of conflict makes the media representative associates of the parties in conflict. This creates a 'double-dealing' of the media. (Borrat, 1989, p.16).

The media and journalists will inform the public according to the logic of media; on the one hand, the will be a supporter of a camp and mediator of society on the other. Depending on whether political, economic, cultural, or identity influence takes precedence over the media, the media align themselves according to the forces they are subject to or allow themselves to be controlled.

Nevertheless, if it is true that the media and the journalists can play these two functions in the context of conflict, but when it comes to building peace, could the media modify their trajectory and their discourse by positioning themselves in favor of peace? If the answer is yes, the next question is to know under what conditions? This is the main reason for this study.

1.3 The Purpose of the Study

This study builds upon and seeks to explore and analyze how media can play the role of contributing to conflict resolution and reconciliation in a post-conflict country in other to prevent and sustain peacebuilding initiatives.

The relationship between political (national and international), the media, and conflict (for war or peace) should be analyzed in this study. This research has therefore chosen to deal with the issue of the Congo conflict 1998-2003 through the prism of political influences at the national and international level, given the transnational and manifest dimension of the conflict, media framing, as well as war/peace journalism

approach. The aim will be to explore how internal and external forces interacted with the media operating in the Congolese media ecosystem, creating confronted (destructive) and concord (constructive) power relations at the origin of the escalation or de-escalation of the conflict. It will help us to determine the limits (of the current ecosystem) and the available media potential that can be used in the building of peace. All these are factors to be taken into account in order to define the contribution of the media in the peacebuilding of the Congo. Therefore, the purpose of this study has two-fold:

1. To explore and analyze media frames used during the coverage of the Congo conflict to understand the dynamics of the Congo conflict that might help to get insight that will be needed to suggest media roles for peacebuilding;

2. To explore and analyze the role played by the media in the conflict (de)escalation, resolutions, and in building peace, in order to understand limits (in terms of involvement or not) and potential (in terms of resources needed forward) with a view to draw a media ecosystem model that might prevent conflict and contribute to peacebuilding.

To achieve the purpose, this study seeks to answer three major questions divided into sub-questions and hypotheses. The first set of questions and hypotheses concern the exploration and analysis of media coverage of the conflict, as framed by the international media. To answer it, we resorted to the quantitative method, by borrowing the model of war / peace journalism frames. This will allow us to answer the question

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of how the conflict 1998-2003 was covered by the media and what are the implications for our research purpose.

The second set of questions and hypotheses is on the one hand a supplement (in terms of analysis of the frames on the conflict) and on the other hand, they (the set) seeks to answer the question of knowing what are the forces and influences in the Congolese media ecosystem which determine the role of the media (active or passive) and the potential of these media to play an active or passive role in sustaining peace. in other words, starting from the crisis under study, we sought to understand not only the role of the media in this crisis, but also the balance of power which influence or not the media, if the media are active or partisan, independent or dependent and under what conditions? This allows us to gauge (extending and limits) the implication of the media in conflicts (through frames analysis) and to understand to what level the Congolese media, in their current configuration, can sustain the peace building.

The third set, which is an essential question, is how the media can effectively play a central role in sustaining peace in Congo. The analysis of conflict management (with the understanding of the conflict provided in chapter 2 on conflict mapping), the analysis of forces and influences in the media ecosystem, allows us to understand the characteristics of the conflict, the role of media, as well as their limits in the peace building process. It is on the basis of this information that the third set of questions intervenes in order to propose, on the basis of the elements included in the two previous sets, a model of media or media ecosystem that could contribute to build and sustain peace efficiently and sustainably.

In trying to achieve the above purpose, the study set research questions and hypotheses, as Following:

1.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses

H1: The war journalism frames would be featured in significantly more Congo conflict news stories than the peace journalism frames.

RQ1: To what extend western media use war and peace journalism in their coverage of the Congo conflict, and is there a significant difference in framing between the two media?

RQ2: What are the most salient indicators of war and peace journalism in western media news coverage of the Congo conflict, and how do the indicators differ between the two media?

RQ3: What are the salient indicators of language frames in the western media news coverage of the Congo conflict? Is there any significant difference in the indicators of language frames between the two media?

RQ4. Does news coverage of the Congo conflict by western media significantly differ, concerning war/peace journalism and language frames, in the period before and after 2001?

Research questions and hypotheses of the second fold

RQ5: how do western and Congolese news programs frame the Congo conflict?

RQ6: To what extent are constructive and destructive frames used in western and Congolese news programs?

H2: The influence of political power (internal and international) on the media creates a "media bi-cephalism" or 'media-bipolarity' in the media ecosystem, on the edge of the tensions.

H3: If these influences clash, the media also collide, suggesting conflict escalation, and if these influences take up, the media align, suggesting de-escalation.

RQ7: what media support can be provided in media ecosystem to contribute to the conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Congo?

1.5 Methodological Considerations

Following the two chapters, whose function is to contextualize the object of study, the research proposes two analyses of media contents (radio, Television news programs and newspaper articles) and in-depth and interviews of selected people (journalists and key persons of media). Details of the methodology used for the two analyses are explained in the respective sections. However, it is appropriate here to present the main lines of the methodology and the corpus of this research. In order to reflect the broadening of the media mechanisms that accompanied the process of conflict and reconciliation, the two corpuses of this research consist of samples of texts from three media. The National Congolese Radio Television (RTNC) of national scope and the BBC and Le monde newspaper, media of international scope, but with a solid anchorage in the Congolese media landscape, which means that in this study, these international media will be considered as an integral part of the Congolese media ecosystem.

To answer to the research questions and hypotheses of this study, we considered various communication research methods and techniques and chose those that optimally allowed us to collect the most pertinent data. Hansen et al (1998) pointed out that researchers should not only consider which is the most appropriate method for the study of their chosen topic or problem, but also what combinations of research methods will produce a better and deeper understanding of it […] (p. 1). This study used namely; quantitative and qualitative methods. Using content analysis, in-depth interviewing, as well as a focus group.

1.6 Significant of the study

This research builds upon and seeks to contribute to the emerging interest in the roles of the media during conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes.

This thesis is the culmination of a student journey in the more than 20 years. In academic prerogative as a third year student in information and communication sciences, we were doing a professional internship at RTNC, the National and public media in the Newsroom called 'Infos Radio'. This internship allowed students to observe the relationship between political and economic power and the media. Besides, this period was defined by the conflict, which is the subject of this research. It is again in this internship as a journalist that I will observe another relationship between politics (internal and international), public media, and conflict.

As I said earlier, the 1998-2003 war was the deadliest after World War II. The war mobilized many resources from the Congo, Africa, and the international community. For example, until these days, 20 years later, the MONUSCO (Mission de

Nations Unies au Congo) force of 20,000 soldiers, is stationed in the Congo, operating on a budget of one billion dollars a year. On the African level, this war put in campaign eight African armies that came to fight the ones backing the legal government, the others backing the rebel groups. Internally, this conflict was at the root of the disarticulation of the country's economy, the plundering of natural resources by neighboring countries and multinationals (UN's report, 2001), in complicity with certain Congolese. It is also a war whose outbreak is at the origin of massacres and rapes to the point of making the Congo the capital of rape in the world.

Paradoxically, despite these gloomy pictures, which the media prefer in terms of violence and sensationalism, this conflict is among the crises the least covered by the international media. The war in the Congo is a conflict that has mobilized a lot of energy, but little media attention. Regarding the media, the relationship between conflict and media, especially public and international, had caught my attention. Indeed, a political influence (internal and international) has developed on the media in relation to the media coverage of the conflict. The political influence was palpable in the newsroom of the RTNC, where journalists make news, on the one hand. On the other hand, the coverage of the international media (VOA, RFI, and BBC) on the conflict, broadcasting in the Congo, was similar to the evolution of the crisis on the international and diplomatic level, on the other hand, suggesting some acquaintance. Therefore, it would be interesting to understand the impact of these political influences (internal and international) on media ecosystem in relation to this conflict.

Because, the analysis of the Congolese conflict raises several questions related to economic, political, identity, geopolitical, territorial, geographic, ethnic, security as well. To answer them, a single perspective would not be enough to tackle the issues in its complexity. Yet we can appeal to sociology, political science, or geostrategic and geopolitics to understand the stakes of this war unleashed in the Congo, but whose shock wave is spreading in the sub-region and the international arena. The media as a prism of analysis is just as important. Modern societies live in an environment teeming with media and new technologies (Peri, 2004). The conflict (de)escalation and resolutions in these types of societies would undoubtedly pass through this institution of socialization. Understanding and mastering media and communication issues in the period of crisis, in conflict resolution and reconciliation, becomes fundamental in order to master the dynamics of conflict and of this societal transformation.

This study, therefore, should be seen as a contribution to understand the dynamics of conflict by analyzing the evolution and role of media in a conflict context, and thus contribute to the improvement of media activities, by integrating factors that might contribute to strengthening the media ecosystem, in order to make it capable of intervening in all phases of the peacebuilding process.

In addition, the study is meant to assist the government and media practitioners alike in their quest to develop a more coherent, consistent, and comprehensive policy framework that will streamline the functions of the PSB system within the democratization and development objectives formulated by the constitution, which is the emanation of the will of a people. Historically, the RTNC has almost invariably

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invoked the concept of 'public service' to justify his existence. However, several studies indicate that the publicness of RTNC might be questioned for several reasons. In part, this study is motivated with this observation in mind. In addition, we think that The RTNC in the PSB framework will contribute substantially to peacebuilding, especially in providing content that addresses the politico-ethnic related issues, which is one of the main sources of conflict in Congo.

1.7 Structure of the Study

This thesis is organized into four chapters. After the general introduction, which sets out the research problem and briefly describes the methods and techniques, the first chapter is dedicated to describing the case study, Congo conflict 1998-2003. In order to present the complexity of the Congo conflict issues, three elements will be presented. The second will briefly describe the map of conflicts in Congo across time, in order to get the whole picture of the place of conflict in Congolese society. This will help to define the nature and characteristics of structural conflicts, in order to start establishing a structural related- conflict map. the second will be relate to the historical origin of the conflict 1998-2003, as well as the causes, triggers, (de)escalation, and consequences in the long run internally and internationally.

Finally, the third element concern exclusively the UN's resolutions of the conflict and the issues of peace by reviewing the attempts to resolve the conflict since the Lusaka agreements in 1999 and the 'dialogue inter-congolais'

The third chapter is related to the evolution of the Congolese media ecosystem from embryo to his modern development

In The fourth chapter, this study explores how the Congolese media ecosystem participate in conflict escalation through national story of DRC.

The fifth chapter describes the theoretical framework of the research, outlining the elements useful for understanding media role in the conflict. As underlined previously, the theoretical framework is structured around two perspectives. The first part develops the theoretical contributions related to the study of conflicts and peace (Peace and Conflict Studies). A second part deals with war/peace journalism and media framing, in order to understand the media participation to the conflict through framing employed for broadcasting, political (internal and international), and public purposes.

The sixth and seventh chapters are related to the research design and technique applied in the study. It consists also in the analysis of the first corpus of this research, composed of international media news. This analysis consists of a content analysis of the media framing of the western media on The Congo crisis. The exercise consists of a content analysis from a body of broadcastings and articles (editorials and news) in order to reconstruct the main key ideas present in media discourse across periods of the conflict. The main ideas are captured from the conflicting politico-military context following the 1998's trigger and armed group back by Rwanda and Uganda attempting to overthrow the government of Kinshasa through armed actions.

The main purpose of this part is to describe the way in which the western media covered the conflict, as well as the different trends relating to national and international politics and the media shift framing observed during the two presidencies. This

approach aims to draw up a list of sensitive political and diplomatic questions linked to the resolution of the conflict as they are reflected in the media discourse of the West.

The eighth chapter aims to describe and understand forces influencing the media and their influences in the process of transformation and peacebuilding initiated since the Lusaka agreements in 1999, and whose implementation is observed in the second period with the new power. Attention is focused on the attempt to resolve the conflict, led by the international community, the new Congolese government, foreign countries (Uganda, Rwanda), and rebel forces, backed by the foreign armies between 2001 and 2003. The object of this part is to extend to the media the understanding of the impact of internal and international influences on the course of the conflict, through the frames available by the media. The aim is to understand the mechanisms influencing the media, which can cause a shift in media polarity (from bipolarization to polarization, or vice versa), thus leading to the (de) escalation of the conflict and to what follows. The comparison of media and the two periods of presidency aims to identify the forces operating in the media ecosystem, to know their function and their supposed impact on the conflict progress or on its transformation into a peace process.

The ninth and tenth chapter were dedicated to the analysis data collected in research field, in order to experience the realities of the field in relation to the object of our research. The interviews carried out were codified, analyzed in order to understand the functioning of the media during the war of 1998-203

The eleventh and final chapter titled 'toward a media ecosystem model to promote peacebuilding' is dedicated to the drawing of a model of the media ecosystem

that might apply in the context of Congo and countries that faced conflict related-situation, in order to have media that can contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

CHAPTER II

CONGO CONFLICT

2.1. Introduction

In order to present the complexity of the Congo conflict issues, three different analyses of the conflict will be presented as follow:

The first will briefly describe the map of conflicts in Congo across time, in order to get the whole picture of the place of conflict in Congolese society. This will help to define the nature and characteristics of structural conflicts, in order to start establishing a structural related- conflict map. The second will be relate to the historical origin of the conflict 1998-2003, as well as the causes, triggers, (de)escalation, and consequences in the long run internally and internationally.

Finally, the third element concern exclusively the UN's resolutions of the conflict and the issues of peace by reviewing the attempts to resolve the conflict since the Lusaka agreements (1999)

Figure 1 map of the 1998-2003 Congo war

Source:wikipedia

2.2. Mapping Conflict in Congo

Since his independence on 30 June 1960, the Congo has been and still is the scene of several majors' crises that threaten his national integrity, unity, and common living of people and political, social, security, and economic harmony, in terms of civil wars, secession, plundering of natural and mineral resources, coup d'état, rebellions, invasion, political crises, etc. This chapter aims to draw a critical conflict map that characterized the history of Congo during the 60 years of the accession to international sovereignty, emphasizing the conflict motivations, their consequences, and the main direct and indirect actors.

2.2.1. The critical conflicts in the DRC between 1960 and 1990

Between 1960, the date of the Congo's independence and 1990, a period of democratic openness, the DRC experienced wars and critical crises, threatening its existence as a state and nation

2.2.1.1. The secessions of Katanga and southern Kasai (1960-1963)

In 1960, Mr. Moïse Tshombé, one of the influential politicians of the Congo independence, Governor of the rich southern province of Katanga, and President of the political party CONAKAT (Confederation Nationale du Katanga) undertook to rebel against the governmental leadership of Leopold Ville and led Katanga, a province rich in copper and even the economic lung of the Congo at the time (Khonde et al., 2009). Politically, his party, Conakat, supported him and won against the opposing party of the Balubakat. Economically, Tshombe is supported by the Union minière du Haut-

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Katanga (UMHK), a powerful mining company, still under Belgian management, associated with the Société générale de Bruxelles) despite the independence of the Congo.

Frustrated at not having a preponderant place in the new and first government of the Congo, led by Prime Minister Lumumba, while his part and his province of origin is the main provider of the national economy, Tshombe proclaimed the secession of the rich province of Katanga. A young state, which only lasted for 3 years, from July 1960 to January 1963. a politico-economic and identity crisis supported by Western power (Belgium, USA, France), who did not see in Lumumba, Prime Minister of a united Congo, an ally ready to preserve their economic, security, and geopolitical interests (the cold war influenced the decisions of the global leaders of the time).

As soon as the secession was proclaimed, an identity conflict broke out. Under the leadership of Tshombe and Godefroid Munongo, the Katangese persecuted and drove out the Kasai people who had come to settle in Katanga. Most of them returned to the Kasai, notably to the town of Bakwanga, now Mbuji Mayi (Khonde et al., 2009).

Once the Kasaians are driven out, Katanga will experience another internal crisis, of an economic and identity character, thus creating a cleavage between the north, mainly Lubakat, agricultural and without viable infrastructure, but having the largest mineral reserves, and the industrialized south, with large infrastructure, and mostly Lunda and Yeke ethnic groups (Khonde et al., 2009). Ideologically, the north Lubakat was pro-unitarian (for the unity of the Congo), and the south was for secession. So that the leading figures of the secession were Tshombe, of the Lunda ethnic group

(or former kingdom), and Munongo, of the Yeke ethnic group, both from the south. From this north-south divide, a violent civil war broke out, opposing the north "unitarist" against the south "secessionists" (Lanotte, 2010). The secession of Katanga was the first biggest and major crisis after the independence of Congo. a politico-economic and identity crisis that affected negatively the economic, political, and national unity of the DRC and whose effects have crossed the generations of governments and political regimes till day.

In August 1960, just a few days after the proclamation of the secession of Katanga, Albert Kalonji, Member of Lumumba's party, the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC), from which he left to create the Mouvement National Congolais-Kalonji (MNC- K). Exploiting the north-south kasai divide major ethnic conflict between the Lulua and the Luba peoles, Mr Kalonji proclaimed the secession of South Kasai, another rich mineral province of Congo.

This secession arose from various factors almost identical to those which led to the secession of Katanga, that is to say political, economic and identity reasons. The support of the Belgian company la Forminière (Société minière de Bakwanga), another mineral company like the UMHK and responsible for the exploitation of diamonds in the province (Khonde et al., 2009). Mr. Kalonji will forge an alliance with secessionist Katanga. It is supported by the Belgian company Forminière. As a result, Belgium retains, as with Katanga, control of Congo's mineral reserves and of a large part of the country's economic apparatus. In reaction to this secession, the Lumumba government receives aid from the USSR, after Belgium's refusal to support it. The repression by

Congolese troops in Bakwanga was bloody. There will be several hundred deaths, and numerous massacres of defenseless civilians, including women and children.

Furthermore, the Kasai secessionist with Kalonji was short-lived, and the south Kasai will not experience the autonomy demanded from the central power of Leopoldville.

2.2.1.2. The rebellion of Kwilu Kwango region and in the Haut-Congo area (1963-1964)

The political and physical elimination of Patrice Emery Lumumba had become the hallmark of most rebel groups after Lumumba's death. Several Lumumba's supporters took refuge in neighboring Congo Brazzaville (Khonde et al., 2009), where they founded the National Liberation Council. (CNL) whose main goal was the conquest of power by armed means. Other partisans conquered Stanleyville (now Kisangani) and there proclaimed the People's Republic of the Congo, with Antoine Gizenga, the former deputy prime minister of Lumumba, as President(Lanotte, 2010), obtaining significant support from Kwilu. -Kwango, where the former Minister of Education of Lumumba, Pierre Mulele, Léonard Mitudidi, and Thomas Mukwidi organized a rebellion against the central power (Lanotte, 2010). In early January 1964, the rebellion broke out in the province, especially in the region of Idiota and Gungu. The rebellion spreads over the entire region inhabited by the Pende and Mbunda ethnic groups from which Mr. Gizenga and Mr. Mulele originate.

Faced with the ineffectiveness of the national army, President Kasavubu, under Western pressure and with the backing of the Binza group, had to call for help

Mr.Tshombe, returned from his exile to form a government of "public safety" (Khonde et al., 2009), with for mission to resolve the economic crisis of the country and to control the various armed rebellions swarming in the country.

He obtained the absolute majority in the legislative elections of spring 1965(Khonde et al., 2009). It was therefore a serious threat to President Kasavubu in the political balance through elections. Presidential elections were announced for March 1966. President Kasa-Vubu decided to dismiss his Prime Minister in October 1965 on the pretext that he had fulfilled the mission. It was through this a new political crisis that General Mobutu took advantage of to carry out his coup d'état on November 24, 1965, which once again pushed Tshombe into exile (Khonde et al., 2009).

2.2.1.3. The geostrategic wars of Shaba I and II (1977-78)

In March 1977, the "Front National de Liberation du Congo" (FNLC), invaded the rich region of Shaba, the actual Katanga, supported by the government of Agostinho Neto of Angola, a pro-USSR, which faced an Angolan rebellion (UNITA), supported by Mobutu, pro-Western(Khonde et al., 2009). A geopolitical conflict, inspired by the reality of the Cold War. Named the "tigers", this rebel force of around 1,500 men from eastern Angola conquered this rich province without much difficulty. The Zairean army, inadequately or not at all prepared, had no alternative but to retreat (Lanotte, 2010). One of the goals of this rebellion was the continuation of the vision of independence for the province of Katanga, as it was in the time of Tshombe. In fact, the FNLC was made up of the former "Gendarmes Katangais", nostalgic for the secessionist vision of Katanga.

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Aware of the weakness of the Zairean army, Mobutu resorts to international aid. In April 1977, he obtained military support from Morocco of around 1,500 men, with logistical and air support from France (Lanotte, 2010)

In about two months, the FNLC rebellion linked up in Angola, because it was defeated by Mobutu's military strategy, through a counter-offensive by the Forces Armees Zairoies (FAZ) and soldiers from Morocco. Following this war, the Mobutu regime severely reprimanded the population of the part formerly occupied by the FNLC, accusing it of complicity in this rebel movement (Egmont Institute, 1988). This led to a massive exodus of refugees to Angola and political and economic instability in the rich region of Shaba.

In 1978, the FNLC tried to repeat the same feat as in 1977. Called 'Shaba II', this second invasion of the former "Ex Gendarmes Katangais " was not successful. For France and Morroco intervened again.

However, Laurent Desire Kabila will integrate into the AFDL rebellion in 1996, and in the Congolese army, once become president of the DRC, certain "tigers" fighters.

2.2.2. The wars of the 90s and 2000s: wars of identity crisis, geopolitical and economic depredation

The years 1990 and 2000 would have forever marked the history of conflicts and wars in the DRC. This period is consecutive to the change of geopolitical paradigm, product of the end of the cold war.

2.2.2.1. The first DRC war (1996-1997): the extension of the genocide in Rwanda and the regional war against the Mobutu dictatorship

several studies show that the 1996 conflict in DR Congo is on the one hand a domino effect of the conflict and genocide in Rwanda in 1994, and on the other hand of the desire of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi to perpetuate war in the Congo for various reasons, notably political, economic, security and international geopolitics(Khonde et al., 2009). The late Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana refused to apply the Arusha accords in August 1993 that allowed for the establishment of a transitional government with the Tutsis of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). In April 1994, the successful attack on the plane in which President Habyarimana died, is considered the trigger element of the outbreak of the Rwandan genocide. During the conflict, Paul Kagame's RPF will have ascendancy over the Hutu extremists, the Interahamwe militias, and the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR). After about three months of the war, the RPF conquered the capital Kigali, as well as power, on July 17, 1994(Reyntjens, 1999; De Villers, 2005).

This Rwandan conflict leads to a wave of displacements of approximately 2 million Hutu refugees, among which are the Interahamwe and the ex-FAR, who crossed Zaire's borders with arms and munitions. For two years, from 1994 to 1996, the international community will deal exclusively with the humanitarian aspects of this population settled in the refugee camps. The security aspect was neglected by both the Zairean government and the International Criminal Court (Khonde et al., 2009).

In October 1996, the AFDL rebellion invaded the eastern part of Zaire. A facade rebellion that we know historically to be an instrument of the war of aggression of Rwanda, Uganda, associated with the fighters of the Banyamulenge, Tutsi ethnic groups, as well as opponents and Congolese rebel groups, who oppose the regime of President Mobutu. Led by Laurent Desire Kabila, the AFDL attacked the Rwandan refugee camps in the Kivus, with the military support of Rwanda, on the pretext that these camps housed certain Interahamwe militias and ex-FAR responsible for the 1994 genocide. This was followed by massacres, killings of thousands of refugees, as well as a great humanitarian catastrophe (Khonde et al., 2009). Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) were unable to lead a counteroffensive. Despite the military and diplomatic efforts of Mobutu's government to counter the aggression, the AFDL succeeded in overthrowing Mobutu's power on the 17th may 1997, and proclaimed Laurent Desire Kabila, president of the DRC.

According to De Villers (2009) it should be noted that "Kabila did not take power, but was placed in power" by neighboring countries, particularly Rwanda. This reality of Kabila's power was observable by the confiscation of the state apparatus (government, public administration, army and security apparatus) by the Rwandans and certain leaders of the Tutsi ethnic group. This state of affairs will be the basis of a palace war, which will inevitably lead to the second war, which is the object of our research.

2.2.2.2. The 1998-2003 conflict

As we are going to deepen the analysis of this crisis in the following, it should be noted summarily that the war of 1998-2003, which is the subject of this study, is a

complex war because of the multiplicity of actors and 'interests. a conflict started in DR Congo to involve almost the whole of Africa in a series of violence, to the point of counting millions of deaths and the establishment of an international system of predation of the natural resources of the Congo. A deeper analysis is intended in the following chapters.

2.2.2.3 *The third Congo war (2004-2009) or General Nkunda's challenge to the democracy* of the DRC

Unlike the two-armed conflicts of 1996 and 1998, of national and international scope, the third war (2004-2009) was limited only to the Kivu region. a region rich in minerals (especially coltan and gold), in which a system of trafficking and plundering of natural resources is organized and maintained by armed groups including the CNDP, rebel groups of Rwandan origin, predominantly from Hutu ethnic, rebel groups from Uganda and even from Congo (Mai Mai) (Khonde et al., 2009). However, the main cause of this third conflict remains the identity issue. The new rebellion estimated that the issue of nationality of Tutsi and rwandophons was not resolved during the inter-Congolese dialogue (Khonde et al., 2009). Frustrated, a certain high rank of the army and the combatants and soldiers, originating from the Tutsi ethnic group, revolted against the power of Kinshasa (Khonde et al., 2009).

In 2003, with the end of the war, the RCD-Goma integrated the central government and its military branch merged with the Congolese national army (FARDC). Raised in the grade of general in Kinshasa, Laurent Nkunda Batware refuses this promotion of the national army and took the way of rebellion in North Kivu (De

Villers, 2005). In June 2004, he was accused of war crimes, because of the atrocities recorded during the capture of Bukavu. In 2005, the military justice issues an international arrest warrant against Laurent Nkunda for "war crimes and crimes against humanity", without being prosecuted. In the same year, the United Nations put him on the list of those subject to international sanctions, although his presence has been reported in Uganda and Rwanda (Khonde et al., 2009).

In January 2006, Laurent Nkunda founded the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), an armed group supported by Rwanda (Lanotte, 2010). He engages in hostility against the government of Kinshasa. Under pressure from the international community, Rwanda withdrew its support for the CNDP, which resulted in the collapse of the rebel movement. Defeated by the Congolese army and dismissed from his post in early January 2009, Laurent Nkunda took refuge in Rwanda where he was officially arrested.

Otherwise, Bosco Ntaganda, general in the Congolese army, founded the M23, another rebel group operating in the Kivu region, and is mainly composed of ex-rebels, originally from the Tutsi ethnic group, integrated into the DRC army after the signing of a peace agreement with Kinshasa in 2009. In April 2012, Bosco Ntaganda was accused of having orchestrated a new rebellion. Thanks to a mutiny in the army, the general recruited more than 300 soldiers, originating from the Tutsi ethnic group. This rebellion had again set North Kivu ablaze and caused instability, insecurity, and the plunder of natural resources.

In October 2013, the Congolese forces, supported by the UN intervention brigade, launched an offensive against the M23 military position. More than 3,600 Congolese soldiers were deployed in the conflict zone.

In November 2013, following this counterattack by the Congolese army, M23 combatants were removed from the positions they occupied in North Kivu. The losses are according to the Congolese army estimated to be hundreds of death in the ranks of the M23. The government of the DRC and the M23 signed, on December 12 in Nairobi, a peace agreement that confirms the dissolution of this rebel movement, of which most of the combatants were integrated into the national army.

For his part, Bosco Ntaganda fled and took refuge in Rwanda where he surrendered to be transferred to the international criminal court to be judged.

2.2.3. The Second Congo War or the "African World War."

2.2.3.1. Origin, progress, and consequences

After the overthrow of Mobutu in power in Mai 1997, the new president Laurent Désiré Kabila broke the alliance with Rwanda, Uganda and the Tutsi soldiers who had helped him to overthrow his predecessor. In July 1998, the latter decreed the expulsion of the Rwandan troops stationed in the DRC since 1996(Reyntjens, 1999). The alliance with its former allies then broke for good. On August 02, 1998, his former allies rose up against Kabila's power in a rebellion movement. A rebellion of circumstance called 'Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie' (RCD) supported by the Rwandan (Rwandan Defense Forces, RDF) and Ugandan (The Uganda People's Defense Force, UPDF) armies. Rwanda justifies its aggression by its legitimate right to defend its

territory from the Forces Democratique pour la Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) and Interahamwe, the genocidal Rwandan who succeeded to settle in Eastern Congo after the Rwandan genocide of 1994, and constitutes, according to Rwandan government, a threat of Rwanda peace(Lanotte, 2010). Uganda and Rwanda also blame the Congolese president for not having been able to neutralize these criminals, even worse to sustain and arm them against their respective countries. In October 1998, another rebel movement was born in the northwestern part of the country, specifically in Equateur province, the 'Movement de Liberation du Congo (MLC), supported by Uganda (Lanotte, 2010).

In their offensive, these rebel groups backed by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, succeeded in conquering nearly half of the territory of a country as large as Western Europe (about 2, 4 million km^2), thus establishing autonomous governments in the parts under their control. The country is thus "balkanized" in three main parts; the Eastern and the Northern parts controlled and led by the rebellions, hailing a de facto political, economic and administrative autonomy and trading and exchanging with the aggressor countries. The western and southern parts remained under the administration of Kinshasa government.

As a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Kinshasa government received military supports from four African countries, Angola, Zimbabwe, Chad and Namibia. Seven armies of African countries are thus engaged in this conflict. Two militaries coalitions therefore clash on Congolese soil (Khonde et al., 2009; Reyntjens, 1999).

Moreover, the Libya, South Africa, Tanzania, Congo Brazza, Zambia, Senegal, Gabon, Cameroon, RCA and Sudan joined their diplomatic efforts in the pursuit of peace and reunification of the country.

Described as the African World War, this complex conflict takes many forms depending on the interests of the forces involved. Called, rightly or wrongly, a war of aggression, of rebellion, ethnics' war, the expansionist war of Rwanda and Uganda, a war of balkanization, of plundering of natural resources. Conflict that will cost the lives of more than 2.5 million lives with millions of internal and external refugees (Khonde et al., 2009).

Succeeding President Laurent-Desired Kabila who was assassinated on January 16, 2001, Joseph Kabila the new president adopted an opposite approach to the later president, whose relations with the UN and western players were typified by tension and diplomatic confrontation. From his investiture, he committed to a foreign and internal policy of improving relations with Western countries, the United States, France and Belgium in particular, and the United Nations, the Security Council, as well as other parties to the conflict. Between 2001 and 2003, all foreign armies officially disengaged from the conflict. The Lusaka agreement, formalizing the return of peace and reconciliation, implemented with the aim of organizing an 'inter-Congolese dialogue', reconciling the government, rebel forces, political forces and civil society (De Villers, 2005; Lanotte, 2010). As outcomes, a government of "national unity" was put in place, and the country reunified in all aspects (geographically, politically, economically, administratively, and militarily).

Furthermore, in comparison to other wars and major conflicts, the 1998-2003 Conflict has some particularities:

First, its mortality rate: this conflict is ranked as the deadliest conflict after that of World War II, with 2, 5 million deaths (IRC survey, 2007).

Second due to its geopolitics: A conflict that involve the intervention of seven African armies, whose four supported the government of Kinshasa (Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, and Tchad) and three backing the rebel groups (Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda).

Further, the conflict provoked an intense broom of diplomacy involving the whole Africa, African Union, the United Nations, the Security Council as well as the largest United Nations intervention force with 20,000 soldiers in order to bring peace (MONUSCO, 2020). A war in the image of the Balkans, which saw the DR Congo Balkanized geographically, administratively, militarily for almost five years. However, efforts and commitment produced resolutions, peace agreements and the reunification.

2.3. The 1998-2003 UN's resolutions, agreements and MONUC/MONUSCO

The 1998-2003 war mobilized many resources at the national, regional and international levels. This mobilization attests to the complexity and scale of what has been called the 'African World War'. During this period, 19 UN's resolutions were taken with the aim of promoting peace in the DRC. The majority of resolutions were taken for the creation of MONUC, for the modification of its mandate and the extension of its mission.

This resolution, which some qualify as the 'mother of resolutions' taken in the context of the 1998-2003 conflict and thereafter, calls for a 'ceasefire' and the creation of mechanisms capable of resolving the conflict and restoring peace to DR Congo. despite certainly maintained vagueness to define the nature of this conflict and not clearly identify the aggressor armies which are Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi (to a certain extent) (Kabungulu-Ngoy, 2000), this 'mother resolution' would have the merit of having triggered a peace process, imperfect certainly, but in which some responses to the crisis can be observed.

As result of this conflict, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1234 of April 9, 1999, which calls for "the immediate signing of a ceasefire agreement". A resolution, supported by the charter of the United Nations in their articles 36 and 52 which stipulates that

'The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.'(UN chart art.36, para 1)

'The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties'(UN chart art.36, para 2)

Concerning Regional Agreements, paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 52 stipulate:

'The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local

disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council. (UN chart art.52, para 2)

'The Security Council shall encourage the development of the pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council'(UN chart art.52, para 3).

This is how the Lusaka Accord was signed on July 10, 1999, on the one hand, and MONUC / MONUSCO finds its place of existence, on the other.

Indeed, Resolution 1234 of April 9, 1999, of the Security Council asserts, "the current conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo constitutes a threat to peace, security, and stability in the region" of the Great Lakes. MONUC then, derives its legal basis from Articles 39 and 40 of the UN Charter, which stipulates:

 "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. "(UN chart art.39); and "In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable [...] '(UN chart art.40)

Indeed, the MONUC, renamed MONUSCO, was created by Security Council resolution 1279 of November 30, 1999, linked to resolution 1234, in order to develop

plans for the observance of the Lusaka ceasefire signed in July 1999 between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and five States of the region (Angola, Namibia, Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe), and the disengagement of foreign forces in the theater of operations, and to maintain communication with all parties to the agreement (Kabungulu-Ngoy, 2000). Through a series of subsequent resolutions, the United Nations Security Council will extend MONUC's mandate to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and assign several other related tasks (MONUSCO, 2020).

The resolutions of the Security Council and the 1998-2003 peace-related agreements, call for a 'ceasefire' and the creation of mechanisms capable of resolving the conflict and restoring peace to DR Congo. despite certainly maintained vagueness to define the nature of this conflict and not clearly identify the aggressors, which are Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi (to a certain extent) (Kabungulu-Ngoy, 2000), these international mechanisms for peace would have the merit of having triggered a peace process, imperfect certainly, but in which some responses to the crisis were found and have an effect currently.

2.4. Conclusion

In conclusion, according to the above analyses, it emerges that the DRC has experienced several major wars and conflicts during its existence as a modern state. From colonization to this day, through independence, this 61-year-old nation has faced multiple conflicts of several types. From the analysis of the history of conflicts in

Congo, four major characteristics of recurrent conflicts emerge, even if there is a relationship between them. There are:

1. Political related conflict;

2. Economic related conflict, essentially related to the struggle for the appropriation/expropriation and exploitation of natural resources;

3. Identity related conflict, i.e. tribal and ethnic, and;

4. Intra / inter-state and international related conflict, related to geography (Geopolitics), in terms of secession, self-determination, and balkanization.

The characteristics of the major conflicts noted in this chapter can be found, for the most part, in the crisis of 1998-2003 alone. This attests to the complexity of this conflict, which is the subject of this study.

CHAPTER III

CONGOLESE MEDIA ECOSYSTEM: FROM ORIGIN TO PRESENT

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, we will discuss the evolution of the Congolese media ecosystem. Here we will be talking about modern media, namely the mass media. This precision is important insofar as the other types of media have always existed in African societies during colonization and after independences. It will therefore be a question of modern media such as the newspapers, radio, television, and to a certain extent the information and communication technologies. Moreover, for an understanding, this chapter will use the historical method in order to grasp the evolution of the ecosystem in time and space. It is not only a question of chronological succession but also much more of the development of the media in relation to its political, cultural, economic, international, and technological environment.

3.2. From Congo Independent State to the Independence' (1885-1960)

3.2.1. Print Media

Since 1885, printing has been the first media used in the Congo. This printing press was of several categories such as the religious, official, the information printing media. The religious printing press was a media used by catholic and protestant missionaries to evangelize the Congo. In the beginning, missionaries were printing in

Europe and the USA. Nevertheless, from 1885 it notes the installation of printing in Mudingungu (Bas-Congo) in 1885, in Bolobo (Bandundu) in 1895, in Makanza (Equateur), Katanga in 1911, and in Kasai in 1930. (Thierry and Amuli, 2013; Mubangi, 2007)

The official print media were publications of official documents informing about certain activities of colonial officials. Government reports, decrees, and edicts are among the examples of this type of print.

The print media were a means of mass communication to inform about the news of life in the colony. It existed media intended to inform abroad about life in the colony, or for foreigners living in colonies, as well as the Congolese able to read and write. This type of media had varied content such as political, cultural, commercial, and entertaining. Free or paid, this information media operated according to newspaper criteria such as profit, subscription, general information, but with a limited freedom of expression and information. For, they were subject to the colonial press law. Indeed, the decree of August 6, 1922, of the Governor-General of the Congo, related to the ordinance-law of March 5, 1922, relating to the press, drastically limits freedom of expression and information in Congo. The five Articles stipulated:

Art. 1 - The introduction into and circulation in the Belgian Congo of newspapers or periodicals published outside the Colony, in any language whatsoever, may be prohibited by order of the Governor-General.

Art. 2. - The publication in the Belgian Congo of any newspaper or periodical may not take place without the prior authorization of the Governor-General. This authorization will always be revocable.

Art. 3. - The introduction, the publication, the putting on sale or the distribution of newspapers or periodicals, knowingly made in violation of the prohibition pronounced by application of the first and second articles, will be punished with a penal servitude of six months maximum and a fine of 2,000 francs at most or one of these penalties only.

Art. 4. - The same penalties shall apply to the introduction, sale, distribution, or exhibition of writings, drawings, engravings, paintings, emblems, or images liable to infringe the respect due to the Belgian authority.

Art. 5. - This ordinance will have the force of law.

(Bulletin official Congo-Belge, 1922)

This law drastically restricted freedom of expression and information for political and colonialism reasons. In fact, in a colonial context, the colonial power ensured the circulation of information in general and in particular the information of a 'subversive' purpose that could negatively affect the colonial rulership and vision and system of exploitation.

The printing press of that period pursued certain visions and responded to several imperatives, in particular the evangelization of indigenous peoples, informing foreigners (settlers, missionaries, and other groups of foreigners) of the evolution of life

in the colony and in their country of 'origin, mainly Belgium, as well as vulgarize colonial policy in terms of rules, information, decrees, and colonial rulership.

During colonization, the law of the press had not evolved much according to the media ecosystem of the country. The media law concerned the print media rather than broadcasting. For there was no specific law on broadcasting. The reason could be in the fact that at that time, most of the radio stations were the property of the State or of the few private (Missionary and companies) participating in the colonial vision of Belgium on the Congo. Except the decree of 23.06.1960 promulgated by King Baudouin that established the obligatory deposit of four copies of newspapers within one month before publishing, the press law was limited to the press (Newspaper, magazine, periodic, book). However tacitly, the colonial political was applied to the radio broadcasting in the Congo-Belge.

However, in the editorial perspective, several orientations of the newspapers are emerging. The media ecosystem has extended with newspapers of other trends. Newspapers from political parties such as 'Congo Dietu' from ABAKO (Alliance des Bakongo); 'La Nation Congolaise' by PUNA, 'Independance' by MNC (Mouvement National Congolais). To this must be added the newspapers of trade unionists and churches (Protestant and Catholic), which began to publish articles of a political nature, oriented towards claiming for more freedom of expression, more political rights and especially for the emancipation or even the independence of the Congo

3.2.2. Radio

In the field of broadcasting, the first radio station to broadcast in the Congo was 'radio Leo', owner of the congregation of Jesuit fathers, in 1937. An entertainment radio station mainly focused on broadcasting Congolese music.

The period of the war gave rise to the implantation of new transmitting stations. In 1940, the General Government created an official Radio Congo Belge station (RCB). Following the Second World War, during which Nazi Germany had invaded Western Europe, Belgium used this first state radio, of which the Congo was one of the country-broadcasters (Gotovitch and Aron, 2008) for War purposes. This state radio was as mission to inform the public and run propaganda in favor of the allies, and against the Nazi domination over the Europe. Also the Radio was intended to thwart Nazi propaganda and to participate in the war effort. It is for the very first time that the mass media are used for war and conflict purposes, in order to resist the German Adversary.

The use of airwaves, for political and wars reasons, arouses, early the interest of the political power, which sees in the mass media an auxiliary and an instrument of information necessary to the achievement of the political and international relations objectives. In other words, the Congo, as a colony, was used by Belgium for colonialist political purposes, but turned outwards, in order to support a defeated Belgium, dominated by Germany and its allies. The first state radio was created with the role of broadcasting war information and sustaining war efforts.

After the war, between 1944-1948, the Radio Nationale Belge incorporated the official radio broadcasted from the Congo Colony to create the "Radio Congo- Belge

pour les Indigènes" (1949-1960). At the dawn of independence, several radio stations were born in several large cities of the country. Cities such as Lubumbashi (1955), Bukavu (1956), Leopoldville (1959), etc.

3.3. Media: From Independence to Mobutu regime (19960-1990)

Between 1960 and 1965, the DRC had experienced a tumultuous media development in the image of political instability. Several newspaper titles created before independence continued to appear after independence until they disappeared in the rhythm of political conflicts of which President Mobutu was the only one who reigned for 32 years, after having put all his political opponents out of the political system by a coup d'état.

As their colonial predecessors, the Congolese ruling political class legislated more on newspapers than on radio (see Ordonnance-loi du 28-octobre 1970_Liberté de la presse). At the independence, the 'Radio du Congo Belge' (RCB) becomes 'Radio Nationale Congolaise' (RNC). Moreover, most radio and newspapers did not survive the emergence of Mobutu's new regime. From the beginning of the 1970s, the pluralism that characterized the Congolese media ecosystem gradually gave way to the monopoly of the state media. Narrowed by the dictatorial regime, the media ecosystem was constituted by the media 'auxiliary' of political power, in the service and image of political regime. The media have become instruments of confiscation of freedom of expression and information, dedicated to the glory of the President and the propaganda of his power. It is the 1981 ordinance-law on freedom of the press in Zaire, in its article 2, which mentioned the mass media (Radio and Television) by recognizing cartoonists,

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translators-editors, reporters-photographers, filming operators. Sound and news casting operators, working on behalf of one or more news organizations, as professional journalists**.** (Journal officiel, 1981; 2 Avril 1981. – ordonnance-loi 81-012). It is the 1996 law on the media, which will determine the exercise of the mass media as a whole. That is to say newspapers, magazine, radio and Television, etc., evolving in the public sector, private, with commercial aim or not.

During the Mobutu's regime, the media ecosystem was essentially made up of state media, auxiliary to political power. The 'Agence de presse zaïroise' (AZAP) was the main national source of information reference for the Newspapers and broadcasting, which gave the media of that time the same editorial orientation, depending on the perspective of political power. The 'Office Zairois de Radiodiffusion et de Television' (OZRT, current RTNC) was the only TV broadcasting throughout the country, with some foreign shortwave radio stations, as well as a few handpicked FM radio stations. The information ministry being the active arm of government to control the entire ecosystem according to the vision of the Mobutu regime.

3.4. Liberalization of the media market until 2000s

The 1990s were characterized by the end of the state media monopoly and democratic openness for media pluralism and freedom of expression and information. To this purpose, the media ecosystem has been enriched with new titles of newspapers, from the majority and the political opposition. There was also a proliferation of radio and television stations, owned by private individuals, politicians, and journalists, with varying editorials. However, despite this media plurality, there has been a tendency to

control these media by political and economic powers (Mubangi, 2007). Indeed, the media in the Congo are struggling to free themselves from these powers due to a lack of financial independence. This dependence on political and economic power, for fund issues, costs the media their freedom and their societal position of the fourth power. Without funds, journalists engage in corrupt practices, commonly referred to as 'coupage'. Practices that contradict their ethics. For its part, the RTNC, supposed to be a public service media, is placed under the control of the Ministry of Information. Thus constituting to serve as an 'auxiliary' power for the regime.

3.4.1. From 1997 to 2003

At the change of regime by Kabila father and son, there was a violent and significant regression in the exercise of journalism in the Congo. Indeed, at its accession in 17th may 1997, the new power 'Alliance of Democratic Forces for Liberation' (AFDL), proceeded to a media cleansing. For instance, in terms of public service, the RTNC was brought back to a regime of strict control by the Minister of Information. Several private media, such as TKM (Tele Kin Malebo) have been closed or even decommissioned for the benefit of the state media. Freedom of expression and journalistic work, in terms of rights and freedom had experienced a significant regression.

It is in this media environment that the conflict that is the subject of our research took place. The media ecosystem was characterized by a strict control of the political power, not hesitating to use coercive means, such as violence, the imprisonment of the

journalists, the shutdown of the media, in order to compel all the media to the will of the Kabila's political power.

3.4.2. From 2003 to nowadays

At the term of the inter-Congolese dialogue, an initiative for reconciliation and peace, after the 1998-2003 war, the Congolese media ecosystem had experienced a reconstitution and innovation in its development. Among the quaintness, the constitution, in its article 24 stipulate:

'All persons have the right to information. The freedom of the press, the freedom of information and of broadcasting by radio and television, the written press or any other means of communication are guaranteed, under reserve of respect for the law, for public order, for morals and for the rights of others' (Art.24, para 1) and 'The audiovisual and written media of the State are public services the access to which is guaranteed in an equitable manner to all the political and social movements. The status of the media of the State is established by the law which guarantees the objectivity, the impartiality and the pluralism of opinion in the treatment and diffusion of information' (art.24, para 3)

The constitution acknowledged the freedom of media, the freedom of expression and information, as well as the end of state media to public service media. Thus introducing RTNC into the PSB regime. In addition, a media regulatory body, called the 'Conseil Superieur de l'Audiovisuel et de la Communication' (CSAC) supposed to be independent of political and economic power, was created for the first

time, to regulate the media ecosystem, according to the principles of justice, democracy and rights (Mukandilwa, personal communication 2020).

However, several voices protest against the tendency of politics and economic powers to tower on the media ecosystem, seeking to influence the RTNC and the media regulatory bodies. The President of UNPC asserted that the 'RTNC as Public institution' is like the 'a direction of the Ministry of Information' (K. Tshilunde, Personal Communication, 02 March 2020). For, with this status, the RTNC depends on the Ministry of information.

Otherwise, the law on the freedom of the media and information, supposed to carry out the will of the Congolese constituent, has contradicted the constitution by granting to the minister having information in his attributions, a power of authorization on the functioning of the RTNC, a media whose constitution recognizes the quality of PSB.

3.5. Media ecosystem storming the ICT and the internet.

it is by the inter-ministerial decree of April 25, 2015, defining the new technological shift of media environment this decree involve the recovery by the government of the analog frequencies granted to television channels and ban on the importation into DR Congo of analog Radio and TV receivers. This technological shift follows up the government commitment made during the Regional Radio communication Conference held in 2006 in Geneva, under the Agreement of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to acquire the Digital Terrestrial

Television (DTT), by migrating from analog to digital technology use in the media sector.

In 2020, the DRC has migrated to DTT, with more than a hundred television stations for the city of Kinshasa only. However, many of these media are not very viable and lack professionalism. The lack of funding is also a bottleneck in the effective functioning of these media evolving in this new environment. In 2021, a report by the Ministry of Information and Media had identified 111 TV channels, whose 44 not fully achieve the administrative requirements for legal and professional running. 32 channels are in process of installment payment and 12 channels have to barely withdraw the essential specifications before the official opening of the media" (Ministry of Information and Media, 2021).

Furthermore, with the development of the internet and social networks, several media in Congo are using online technologies. The first wave was of the already existing media, evolving in off / online and the second wave is of the online media, which evolve only through the internet.

3.5.1. Off/online media

With the increasing use of the internet, several media (Newspapers and Radio/TV broadcasting) in Congo have undertaken to use this technology. Several websites have been created for this purpose. Newspapers such as 'Le Phare','Le Soft', 'Le Potential', 'L'avenir', to name a few, have started to publish the content of their newspapers on the internet. The internet facilitates on the one hand more freedom of expression, because of its technological uncontrollable nature by a repressive

government, and on the other hand the access of information to a large audience and users globally.

At the same time, Radio and TV stations also began to use the Internet for wide distribution. A media investment used today by several media through other technologies such as applications downloadable to mobile phones. Besides, with the increased use of social networks, several Media channels have their own official Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter accounts to make live broadcasting or downloaded broadcasting produce offline. Media such as RTNC, Top Congo, Radio Okapi, and many others have adopted and integrated these technologies into their mode of running.

3.5.2. Online media

In 2017, the Association of Online Information Media in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MILRdc) was created. An association bringing together and organizing the media running through the internet, social networks, and the use of mobile applications. Existing before 2017(i.e., since 2016), media such as Actualite. cd, 7 sur 7.cd, Internews, Zoom-eco.net, etc. It is a first for the Congo media ecosystem, which took the media legislation in DRC by surprise. In fact, the law on the exercise of media freedom in the DRC did not take into account the emergence, management, and functioning of online media from a legal perspective. It was only in 2018 and for political reasons of control essentially and the repression of the media, that the minister signed a decree, amending the 1996's law on media exercise in DRC, in order to regulate the online news media. A decree denounced by the corporations of journalists and organizations defending the freedom of expression and information rights. The

decree, in fact, envisages content censorship and limitation related to the creation of the online media, restricting advertising, an essential source of funding for these media, and conditioning their creation by prior self-authorization from the Minister of Information and Media(ministerial decree, 2018), instead of the CSAC.

The fear of the political power controlling the online media turned out to be true during the general elections of 2018. Indeed, the government, through the minister of information and media, in agreement with the 'Autorité de Régulation de la Poste et des Télécommunications du Congo' (ARPTC), cut the internet signal, for political reasons, thus depriving internet users of access to the online information related to several political issues.

3.6. Media Ecosystem under Political and Economic Pressures

At independence, the new African political leaders inherited a media system that he strives to use without rethinking. Media structures subject to the policies of colonial domination without the colonizer. The media system simply changes owners but keeps intrinsic value because there is no initiative or vision for changes.

Indeed, from the accession of African countries to international sovereignty, the new political leaders have resorted to the media like their colonial predecessors for reasons of political propaganda. These regimes have made these media their ally of power. A media ecosystem characterized by propaganda, making the journalist a profession of informing and persuading public opinion to adhere to the political ideology of the regime. Since 1965 when Mobutu took control, until the liberalization of Media market, a result of the end of the cold war, the media ecosystem in Congo is

essentially dominated by the single party, a media ecosystem (newspaper, radio-television included), controlled and in the service of power. He uses it as an instrument of political propaganda vis-à-vis the population. The state-owned media operate like that of the colonial era, functioning in the same principles of the 'auxiliary of political power.

Indeed, as in the colonial period, a period during which the colonial powers had to exploit the country according to colonial policy, media under Mobutu regime ran to sustain dictatorship purposes.

The media ecosystem has thus been used to convey information in a country as large as Western Europe, with a population mass estimated at several tens of millions of inhabitants. Believing in media power in a logic of media effects, president Mobutu, himself a former journalist, has developed a media ecosystem capable of informing the entire population via national radio (OZRT) throughout the country, thanks to a national system, essentially radio and then television, operational, controlled and dependent on the only party in power. (Kisangani and Bobb, 2016).

With a small opening facilitating the creation of newspapers, the Congolese media ecosystem of the time was governed by a regulation resorting to self-censorship or censorship, called the censorship commission, responsible for evaluating information to control they are not opposed to the 'Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution'(MPR) ideology (Kisangani and Bobb, 2016). . During this period, it is the official media, in the pay of the power, which disseminates the information of the

official sources, for the majority conforms to the official voice of the country's institutions.

Qualified as pure information or cooking over low heat or even 'raw facts, raw news, neutral information this type of news media makes the journalist a 'herald' of political power, which will dominate the Congolese media ecosystem for a while.

3.6.1. Economic Power Conquers Media Ecosystem

The Congolese media ecosystem is evolving more in terms of quantity than quality, in terms of addition rather than improvement. The liberalization of media market in the 1990s caused the proliferation of private media (newspapers, radio, and TV).

Called 'spring of Media,' this period has shaped the Congolese media ecosystem differently: in terms of form: The Congolese media ecosystem has been enriched with several media categories and of varied origin and nature. We will mainly note the state media (RTNC), the private media, and the associative / community media, as well as international media. The RTNC, public or official channel, belongs to the Congolese state. Formerly called OZRT, this channel lost its monopoly in the 1990s, which means that it now operates in a competitive media market (Kisangani and Bobb, 2016).

However, it remains under the supervision of the information ministry. It has not undergone a major reform that would correspond to its destiny as defined in the Congolese constitution of 2006. It thus continues to play an auxiliary role of political power but in a competitive market.

As for them, they benefit the freedom to a certain extent. The functioning of private media responds to certain imperatives, including the economy. However, In DRC, the media in general struggles to play their role of the fourth estate. One of the major reasons for this difficulty is the lack of adequate funding for these media.

Indeed, the lack of funding exposes the media and Journalists to unethical practices such as 'coupage'. Thus, Media and Journalists lost their independence Vis a Vis of the economic power.

This dependence of the private media on economic power has also made Media, as for political power, an 'auxiliary' of economic power, subject to the source provider of funds, which for the most part are people who exercise political power. The political power, far from being limited to the public media, takes advantage of the weakness of the Congolese media ecosystem to constitute itself funder and owners of the media. Thus, this ecosystem has within it several media and newspaper titles belonging to holders of political power and political opponents.

Some justify this grip of political power (politicians) on the media ecosystem by the lack of political will of each government in affairs to initiate the reforms required by the constitution to pass the RTNC public channel from the status of official media, depending on the government to public service broadcasting, as also required by law. Because the current state of the RTNC, public channel, does not facilitate the perfect access of the other voices contrary to the official voice (Kisangani and Bobb, 2016). For, mistrust has already won the other voices different from the official voice. The

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label of public establishment in itself evokes a certain restriction on the part of the government.

As in the private media sector, community and associative media are seriously control by the diktat of political and economic power. Only a few community media, funded by international NGOs, are exempt from the influence of political and economic power (Frere, 2009). However, the 'community' character of certain media can be exploited for political purposes in certain community conflicts.

3.7. Media Ecosystem Integrating international Media

The DRC, like most African countries, is covered by the airwaves of the international media. On FM, shortwaves, or satellite, these media, well organized, well structured, and well-financed (compared to their African counterparts), have a large African and Congolese audiences and even constitute in several countries notably in the Congo, the top of the most followed channels.

These international media escape (through the technologies at their service) the censorship applied to several African countries. Moreover, even if they are censored in FM, the shortwaves and the satellite allow their diffusion almost uninterruptedly in the Congo. This permanent presence in the waves of the Congo (through technology, regulation, and local representation in terms of reporters) makes these international media an integral part of the Congolese media ecosystem.

Moreover, as the theories of the media and international relations indicate, most of its international media obey the logic of public diplomacy, having among other

objectives to broadcast the foreign policy message of their countries of origin to other countries, and in particular to African countries. A problem of dissemination and broadcasting that needs to be considered in the context of conflict and war, which affects the arena of international relations. Which is also a subject of this research.

3.7.1. International radio stations to conquer the African audience.

On the eve of independence, African countries have been the target of international broadcasters seeking audiences to achieve their foreign policy objectives on the continent. Two categories of countries have been stepping on this media enterprise to conquer Africa: the former colonizing countries, which, already broadcasting in their colonies, have adapted their programs to the new reality of independence.

Great Britain, with the British Broadcast Corporation (BBC), already present in its colonies since 1940, broadcasted, from 1957, programs in Swahili, Hausa, and Somali, and French in 1960. France with Radio France International (RFI) began its broadcasting programs on the African continent in 1975. (Tjadè Eonè, 1984)

Portugal, with its overseas radio station, will also add, to its programs in Portuguese intended for Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa such as Angola and Mozambique, programs in English for East Africa, from 1960. On the other hand, the USA with Voice of Africa (VOA) inaugurated its broadcasting program in English, French, and Swahili between 1959 and 1962.

Russia with Radio Moscow started broadcasting in English, French, and Portuguese in 1959. China with Radio Beijing inaugurated its broadcasting program on

the African continent in 1959, broadcasting in English, French, and Portuguese. All of them were the main antagonists in the context of the cold war, thus making the Africa media ecosystem a field of their conflicts and public diplomacy (Tjadè Eonè, 1984).

Evolving, for the most part from a public diplomacy perspective, these international media and the media originating in Africa after independence became African's media ecosystem. African media often broadcast under dictatorial policies, characterized by censorship and propaganda. The international media rapidly became news sources and information alternatives, which allow African audiences to form their own opinion of the various information within its scope.

Speaking on the matter, the director of the BBC, Mr. Wilkinson, in 1972, suggesting that the media in general, and radio in particular, allow audiences in Africa to bypass official censorship policies in force in most African countries, through the access of international media, from "Moscow or Beijing," and thus being able to "form their own opinion." "In doing so, he can compare the BBC's programs, for example, with those of his own [national] radio station and may wonder why he can hear news about his own country on the BBC even before he gets it. To hear on national radio"(Wilkinson, 1972).

Since Africans are becoming audiences of international media, the international media constitute an essential part of the media ecosystem under construction in Africa. They (media) constitute the information environment (Tjadè Eonè, 1984) of African audiences in general and of African elites in particular. Well-funded and equipped, compared to their counterparts in African countries, the international media such as

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BBC, VOA, RFI, for instance, have become, depending on the case and circumstances, counterweights, alternatives, or sources of news and information to official and national African media. However, their public diplomacy perspective sometimes arouses criticism and mistrust of the same public (Tjadè Eonè, 1984)

3.7.2. International TV broadcasting in the African media ecosystem

The development of international TV channels aimed at Africa constitutes the technological extension of the same policy of promoting the foreign policies of global powers in the continent. From the 1980s through to satellites, the media ecosystem of African countries was enriched by receiving the signal from these increasingly invasive and unidirectional media. The MacBride report, pinpointing the media divide between the countries of the West and those of the South is eloquent on this matter (UNESCO, 1986).

Whether it is information or entertainment media, these media offer African audiences a variety of programs and news, allowing them to form their own opinion on the political, economic, and social affairs of their countries and other nations.

Furthermore, with the end of the cold war and the push of the democratization movement in Africa, several African countries, including the DRC, are undertaking several reforms and regulations adapted to this global media reality.

The 1996's media policies, fixing the modalities of press freedom in Zaire (now Congo) recognizes that `` The extent of the innovations to be made in this domain as in others described above, therefore, requires the pure abrogation of the old law, and its replacement by a new one that meets the requirements of the current socio-political

context of our country and the rest of the world" (p.6). As the media space has become unbarred and accessible to information access, the law on press freedom published in 1996, in their articles 50 and 51, respectively, stipulate that.

[translate]' Within the meaning of this law, audiovisual communication is the making available to the public by radio or cable, optical fibers or other processes, sounds, images, documents, data, or messages of all kinds. Audiovisual communication is accessible. Any natural or legal person has the right to produce, transmit, receive all audiovisual communication products as listed in the previous article and to participate in the subject to public order, the rights of others, and good morals. '(p.19)

The global powers have made the media essential instruments of their foreign policies in Africa. Called public diplomacy media, these media offer several programs, including information devoted to events and African issues, to persuade the public in African countries to adhere to their political vision on African issues.

Having had media access in Africa, through globalization and regulations, international media become, because of this openness, components of the African and Congolese media ecosystem. The public diplomacy of the United States, Great Britain, France, China, Russia, and Europe provides audiovisual channels and media space, programs intended for African audiences.

Thus, according to their interests, these global media can provide media coverage of events and issues worldwide via cutting-edge technologies, content, and a network of correspondents.

3.7.3. Made easy through technology

From printing to the internet, via radio (AM, FM and internet), TV (analogy, digital, satellite, internet), the international media have become essential and inseparable from the media landscape of the countries of Africa. We are talking, on the one hand, of radio broadcasters from colonies such as the BBC, broadcasting in colonies, and on the other hand, radios of global powers whose transmitters, located mostly in the West, were turned towards Africa. Thanks to terrestrial technology, in AM or FM, the African countries were thus watered by the media programs from the West. There are broadcasters like BBC, VOA, RFI and BW. Global powers have taken advantage of these technologies to become an integral part of Africa's media universe. Already during the colonial era, radio was used to convey colonial ideology for colonial purposes

Information about the colonies was present through strategically and politically established radio waves. The colonized were already overwhelmed by the waves that provided them with local information from the colonialist perspective.

Even after the independence of African countries, with satellite and internet technology in option, the international media continued to develop, being part of the media ecosystem of African countries. In 2016, the BBC recorded 111 million audiences (radio, regular television, daily Africa live, and bbcafrica.com) per week in Africa (BBC, 2016). According to Pemberton, editor-in-chief of BBC Africa, Africa is the world's largest BBC audience, reaching 320 million audiences. To say that in

Uganda, for example, 1 in 5 adults consume BBC content every week, and 65% of Sierra Leone's population is from the BBC. Public. (BBC, 2016).

On the side of French-speaking Africa, France with its France media world network, constituting RFI, France 24 confirms their success in several French-speaking countries such as the DRC, Ivory Coast, Congo, Mali, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gabon and Senegal. In 2019, 92% of the population of large cities in French-speaking Africa followed RFI and France24. With a worldwide FM network of 156 transmitters, 115 of which are in Africa, the RFI estimates that Africa has 70% of its international audience (TNS-Sofres and le monde, 2019). According to these statistics, the RFI is the most followed radio station in French-speaking Africa, or 37.2% of the general population, and 72.4% of the elite African leaders. After several years of broadcasting in Africa, it is among the top 5 most followed radio stations, all radio stations combined (Afriscope, 2019). France 24, for its part, is the main TV followed by the population of this part of the world to form their own opinion on the main news of the world, i.e. 40.2% (Africascope, 2019). 77.2% of audiences made up of African elites and leaders claim to follow this TV channel every week (afriscope, 2019).

Since its first broadcast in Africa from South Africa in 1956, the Voice of America (VOA) has since then evolved and integrated the media ecosystem of African countries. Using all the technological means at the forefront of innovation and made available to it, this radio, an instrument of American foreign policy, covers entire Africa's landscape with an estimated audience of 25 million weeklies.

Moreover, like international radio, international TV channels penetrate the African media ecosystem. these media, for the most part, are part of the public media strategy of global and former colonial power like France for French-speaking countries (AFP, France 24) and Great Britain for commonwealth countries in Africa, (with BBC). These media, well-funded and equipped, continue to hold sway over the African media ecosystem, supported and carried out today by New communication technology.

Media France monde is an example of this domination and media integration of the West on the Congolese and African media ecosystem. Indeed, as a state-owned holding company, Media France Monde supervises and coordinates the activities of the most media of France public diplomacy, including France 24 and RFI. France 24 claims the coverage of more than 32 million households in sub-Saharan Africa (TNT and satellite including), where the Congolese media Television, for instance, struggles to broadcast efficiently, having a lesser digital and local audience, compare to France 24.

3.7.4. Part of African media ecosystem through Languages

With the strategy of African Languages Services, the international media have become embed, or even integrate into the African media environment, thus becoming a constituent of the media ecosystems in Africa. Language, this communication tool that brings together and makes possible the exchange of knowledge and information, makes the international media more present, integrated, and constitutes one of the important pillars of the media ecosystems of African countries. After more than 90 years of broadcasting in Africa, the BBC provides content in Somali (3.6 million),

Hausa (23.3 million), Kinyarwanda / Kirundi (3.2 million), Swahili (17.2 million), Arabic, English, and French, across the African continent (BBC Media Center, 2016).

On the French side, the same linguistic policy has been applied to perpetuate the presence of these media in Africa and continue to inform this part of the world precious to the political, economic, cultural, and diplomatic ambitions of the major world power countries. RFI broadcasts in Swahili, Hausa, Manding, as an African language whose speaker's number millions. To this must be added French, English, Arabic, etc., making this international radio station the most listened to the radio in largest cities in French-speaking countries (France Media Monde, 2020), being a global media, but integrated into the media ecosystems of African countries such as the DRC.

The VOA had already established its language policy for content intended for Africa around 1962 with Swahili, spoken in five countries of the continent including the DRC, the VOA estimates its audience in these countries at 15 million weeklies. Hausa in 1979 (spoken by more than 60 million people mainly distributed in three countries in Nigeria, Niger and Ghana), Kirundi / Kinyarwanda in 1996 with a weekly audience of 57% of Rwandese and 46% of burundees.

3.7.5. Strategy of Office, Correspondent, and reporter

With the press agencies, which collect an impressive amount of information via an efficient network of correspondents and embassies, the international media manage to provide information on Africa, which sometimes access the local media do not know. The policy of reporters, sometimes in conflict zones, to which local African media journalists do not have access, constitutes another essential element of information

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intended for African audiences. As an illustration, the coverage of most conflicts in Africa is available more by correspondents and reporters of the international media than by local ones. The coverage of the Congo war, in terms of scale, for example, was more broadcasted by foreign media than Congolese. One of the reasons was the ability of the BBC, VOA, or RFI to access the information of the various protagonists in a country geographically and broadcastly Balkanized at the local level. The information on the assassination of President Kabila on January 16, 2001, was first announced on the airwaves of the BBC, VOA, and RFI only a few hours after the tragedy, or news on AFDL rebellion, which ousted Mobutu from power, just as the 1998-2003 war, were available through the RFI and BBC, and VOA than in local or African Media. The Congolese media little informed about the unfolding of hostilities across the country, only relaying the news of these international media. Such media facts conquer audiences in search of information on serious issues on which their survival and of their nation depends.

This study, with updated statistics, confirms that the international media, in the African context in general and the Congolese in particular, are constitutive of the media ecosystem of African countries, well before the independents of African countries. International media are solidly established and broadcast in African societies through their well designed and implemented media policy of establishment, made possible through a particular network and modern broadcasting technologies, providing contents in Africa and African languages. An operational network of journalists and correspondents endowed with the means for their tasks. They (the international media) are therefore a predominant factor when analyzing and exploring the media ecosystem

in Africa, even at the local level. Despite their 'foreign' character, this international media is an integrated part of the local African media environment, just like the local media, evolving in the same media ecosystem. Therefore, this study considers western media operating in Congo as part of Congolese media ecosystem, as like local media.

3.8. Conclusion

It should be noted that in its historical evolution, the media in Congo struggles to play its role as an independent institution of socialization and to stand out from political and economic powers. From a historic perspective, the media ecosystem of Congo, as a whole, has been seen as an "auxiliary" to other powers. Whether structurally or cyclically, politics and the economy leash most media and journalists, in all media sectors (public and private). As most international media which treat information from the perspective of public diplomacy of their country, the state-owned media in Congo depend essentially on the current government, and the private and associative media are subject to political and economic influences on the structural and cyclical level, translated in the form of censorship, press offense, self-censorship, see media closing or cutoff of a channel signal. There is also the "coupage", the coinage of articles, as well as the pauperization of the journalist. This dominion of political and economic powers, through the existing laws and institutional constraints, as well as the problem of media funding, limits the media in its role as a major institution of socialization. A limitation, which is not without consequence in perspective of major conflict such as war (interstate, intrastate, ethnic, see political conflict)

CHAPTER IV

THE ROLE OF MEDIA DURING SOME MAJOR

CONFLICTS IN THE CONGO.

4.1. Media use for politico-tribal purpose: The expulsion of the kasaians from Katanga:

In 1993, a discriminatory discourse widely spread through media in Katanga related to the 'Katangese identity' and against the people of Luba ethnic, arose in the Shaba province, the called Katanga nowadays. The natives reproach foreigners, but especially the people of Kasai, for taking advantage of their province more than the natives. They accuse the Kasaians of occupying major positions of responsibility in companies, especially at GECAMINES, of behaving as in conquered territory, (Mwembu, 1999). The Kasaians are accused of having allowed the colonizers and Mobutu to establish their domination in Katanga, to exploit its wealth, and to expropriate the daughters and sons of this land and the province's wealth. People of Kasai were charged to be the big beneficiaries of colonial civilization "through a certain accumulation of wealth, way of life, education, evangelization and access to the best health centers" [...], as well as 'tribalism of the Kasai' (Mwembu, 1999) a community that does not want to integrate but rather seeks to create a kind of 'state within a state' (Mwembu, 1999). Foreigners with an identity fighting the Katangese identity. A

discriminatory perception and discourse exploited by politicians, popularized by the media of Katanga.

Indeed, President Mobutu had forged an alliance with UFERI (Union des Fédéralistes et Républicains Indépendants) , a political party, very popular in Katanga, to thwart Mr. Tshisekedi, by appointing as prime minister Mr. Nguz A Karl i Bond in place of Tshisekedi (Mwembu, 1999). This political tension, mixed with tribal tension, created a cleavage between the two peoples. With tacit permission from Mobutu, Mr. Kyungu wa Kumwanza, Governor of Katanga led a campaign of hatred against the Kasaians. A campaign accompanied and supported by the media broadcasted in the province (Vinckel, 2015). Indeed, during an official mission in Katanga in August 1992, Prime Minister Ngunz and Governor Kyungu held a meeting during which the Governor made a speech inciting hatred, encouraging the Katangese to violence against Luba ethnic, which they called the 'insects'. A speech widely published and disseminated by the media of Katanga including the OZRT (Vinckel, 2015). Certain newspaper like Ujamaa, newspaper of Lubumbashi titled "The Kasaïens must leave", "These dogs without collars" (JED report, 2000) A speech followed by violence and expulsion of people from Luba.

As consequence, a campaign that has been successful. For it has been followed by violence and serious human rights violations. There was the expulsion of more than 780,000 from the Luba tribe to the two Kasai, thousands of deaths, especially children, and the expropriation of properties, furniture, houses, and buildings (UNHR, 2010).

4.2. Media as an Instrument of War: The AFDL 1996-1997

As soon as the AFDL declared war against the power in Kinshasa in February 1997, Mobutu's government banned all public demonstrations and ordered the censorship of all media coverage of the AFDL rebellion by the public and private media. Whether it was radio, TV stations, or newspapers, censorship had become a media norm by this time. In February 1997, following the broadcast of television footage of a meeting held by Laurent Desire Kabila, in Goma in the EAST of the DRC, Mr. Kin Kiey Mulumba, and Minister of Information decreed the closure of the radio station (Kisangani and Bobb, 2016). In addition, private TV, for broadcasting political programs and news that the government considered subversive. The Minister of Information also prohibits the dissemination of any information on the rebellion supported by Rwanda and Uganda, from any other source except that from the Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Defense. It observed that following this rebellion, which overthrew Mobutu's power, political power has hardened vis-à-vis the media and journalists, banning them, thanks to the structural means of the Congolese media ecosystem(Kisangani and Bobb, 2016), namely censorship and the state of emergency, to carry out their work, thus subjecting the media to play the role of auxiliary of political power.

One month before Mobutu's fall, in April 1997, following the broadcasting of international media reports on the advance of rebel groups towards Kinshasa, news broadcasted in territories still under government control, the Minister of Information withdrew the accreditations of foreign radio and TV correspondents who report the

related news. The minister announced restrictive measures on future accreditations. To this purpose, he set up an ethics committee.

It should also be noted that during their conquest of power, by seizing cities, Kabila's rebellion took control of the provincial branches of the state-owned media. The new rebel administration managed these public and private media in the areas under their control, thus Balkanizing the Congolese media ecosystem. On the one hand, there was the Western part media ecosystem, mainly from Kinshasa, controlled by the government, and on the other hand, the Eastern media ecosystem, controlled by the rebel administration, whose armed forces continued to fight to overthrow the government of Mobutu.

The day after the inauguration of President Kabila on May 26, 1997, the new Minister of Information, Mr. Rafael Ghenda dismissed the leadership staff of the 'Office Zaïrois de Radiodiffusion et Télévision' (OZRT), which became the RTNC, and banned several journalists to work within this state-owned media company. He also calls for measures to ban advertising, an essential source of media funding, on all private TV and radio (Kisangani and Bobb, 2016).

In June 1997, the government decided to close and nationalize 'Radio Tele Kin Malebo' (RTKM), a private Radio/TV channel owned by a journalist and form the dignity of the Mobutu regime, Mr. Ngongo Luwowo. In their policy of repression of the media, the new government became by imposition, a 40% shareholder in all private channels broadcasting in Congo, and prohibited several FM radio stations from rebroadcasting programs of foreign broadcasters such as RFI, Radio France, VOA, and

BBC (Kisangani and Bobb, 2016). Foreign media had a considerable quota of Congolese audiences, especially that of Kinshasa. For, international media broadcasted in Congo were more professional and were part of the diversity of the Congolese media ecosystem that the Congolese used to follow since the liberalization of the media market in 1990.

In a few months of power, the new Kabila regime had undertaken to submit the entire Congolese media ecosystem to its power. The RTNC, state-owned broadcasting throughout the Congo, was now run by managers at its command. TV, radio, and newspapers in the provinces were controlled by the government representatives in the provinces, and private audiovisual channels, with the exception of community and associative media (belonging to religious communities), were monitored, censored, and exploited. This political vision of making the media an auxiliary of the political power is expressed by the US department report on human rights practices in 1997 on DRC, in these terms:

'"Incidents of harassment, intimidation and detention of journalists declined immediately after Kabila overthrew Mobutu, but increased toward the end of 1997. The increased harassment and arrest of journalists continued unabated into 1998' […] of the many journalists who were arrested and detained, few were tried; most were released after a few days. However, several journalists were sentenced to jail terms by the special military tribunal or the State Security Court (see Section 1.e.). Charges in these courts were usually for treason or offenses against state security" (US Department of State, 1999)

4.3. State of media in 1998-2003

From the end of 1998, relations between President Kabila, Museveni of Uganda, and Vice-President Kagame of Rwanda, as well as the Tutsi political and military authorities present within the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC) have strongly deteriorated. Accusing each other, the Rwandan and Ugandan authorities, and the authorities of allied Tutsi and Banyamulenge, reproached President Kabila about tribalism, because of privileging his Katangese clan. In addition, they accused him of complicity, because little regard to the insecurity issues in the country, caused by ex-FAR / Interahamwe, and the Mayi-Mayi militias attacking Rwanda and the Tutsi, as well as his refusal to commit to recognizing the Banyamulenge as Congolese (UNHC, 2010). For his part, President Kabila reproached Rwanda and other Tutsi and Banyamulenge authorities in his entourage for behaving in the Congo as in conquered territory, killing, assassinating, and expropriating the Congolese of their properties (RTNC, 1998).

In July 1998, following rumors of a coup d'état prepared by the Rwandan and Ugandan authorities and some of his ruling AFDL allies, President Kabila relieved Rwandan General James Kabarebe of his duties as Chief of Staff of the FAC and ordered the departure of the RPA soldiers stationed on Congolese territory (RTNC, 1998). He appointed in his place General Kifwa. On 02 August 1998, In RTNC Goma, the commander of the 10th battalion of the FAC, Mr. Sylvain Buki rejected President Kabila's authority and announced that Goma was now under the control of the Congolese National army and Rwanda Defense Forces (RTNC Goma, 1998). The 10th

and 12th battalions had been present in Goma and Bukavu respectively at the start of the rebellion and had thrown their military support to the rebels (Jeune Afrique 1-7 Sept. 1998, 16). Soldiers from the Tutsi ethnic group and some Congolese soldiers based in the East of the country mutinied and launched, with the help of the RPA, the Ugandan army [Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDF)], of the Burundian army [Burundian Armed Forces (FAB)] a rebellion aimed at overthrowing President Kabila. A military engagement whose magnitude will be qualified as an African world war.

4.4. Media, Pre, and post-election crises

Since 2006, the year of the start of the 5-year cyclical electoral process, the DRC has experienced major electoral conflicts, which often ended in violence, which the media took part in escalating. In the 2011 presidential election, several human rights NGOs accused certain media, exploited by ruling politicians and the opposition, of participating in the escalation of violence during and after the elections. A tense election period during which more than 24 people died in clashes with the police and the security services (HRW, 2011).

NGOs had observed a significant increase in interference with freedom of expression and information, reflected in the assassination of a journalist, ten arrests of journalists, thirty-three journalists questioned by the security services, twenty-eight journalists harassed or mistreated, and twenty-nine journalists who received threats. Except for one journalist belonging to the RNTC questioned by the security services, all the journalists' cases were affiliated with either community or private radio, television, and newspapers. Media that belong to the political obedience of the

opposition (JED, 2011; carter center, 2011). One of the main criticisms at the base of this media repression by the political power was the speech, described as arsonist by Mr. Tshisekedi, candidate for president of the republic, self-proclaimed president of the republic, and asking his supporters to arrest Mr. Kabila his electoral challenger. A calling relayed by certain media whose the RLTV which seen his TV channel signal cut off and the media offices sealed (Carter center, 2011).

with a CSAC incapable of fulfilling its regulatory mission during the election period, the minister of information represses in his own manner the pro-opposition media, which he considered to violate the law, and on the other side the opposition, which used the media at their disposal using a political discourse of a victim of the regime's repression, calling their supporters to resistance, to protest, causing escalation.

Otherwise, On the side of power, there is an almost total ranking of the public media such as the RTNC, supporting Joseph Kabila, the outgoing President and candidate for President of the Republic. This Discrimination was decried by NGOs (Carter Center, 2011, JED, 2011), thus violating the rule of the public media use during the electoral period. a negative media position that only fueled the discourse of violence between protagonists engaged in the 2011 electoral cycle, which had caused people death and post-electoral violence which plunged the country into a deep political crisis of 'legitimacy' of the reelected president.

during the 2016 electoral cycle, which ended in January 2019, there was a media repression from the Minister of Information and the ARPTC, who did everything to cut off national and international media signals such as Canal Congo TV (CCTV), Nyota

TV, Radio France Internation, du, BBC FM, as well as internet and social networks (Amnisty Internationale, 2017; TV5 monde, 2019). The objective is to prevent freedom of expression and information during the period of pre-and post-electoral political crisis. A media repression that fueled the political discourse of the opposition and was one of the causes of the protests ends in violence and the people died.

Moreover, during the post-election protests of 2019, MONUSCO and BCNUDH called for effective measures to prevent speeches and messages inciting hatred, during political activities, and widely relayed by the media. These United Nations organizations note that between May and December 2020, there were allegations of 30 probable cases of hate speech and messages, of which 16 were identified as proven cases of incitement to hatred, hostility, or violence. Taking the form of ethnic attacks, especially the Luba ethnic that the newly elected president Tshisekedi belongs to, these messages come mainly from leaders and activists of political parties, and political partisans, but also from civil society actors and the Congolese diaspora (MONUSCO, 2020; BCNUDH, 2020)

They have been disseminated within the framework of political or partisan activities, during private or public meetings, and during interviews and media reports of political activities, and widely exchanged and discussed on social networks and mobile messaging applications [. ..]. This context of political competition has significantly fueled the dissemination of these hate speeches through media (MONUSCO, 2020; BCNUDH, 2020)

4.5. Conclusion

Throughout its history, the media ecosystem of Congo has been much solicited for several reasons, especially for political reasons, in a perspective tending to serve as an auxiliary of political power. In addition, each time this ecosystem interacted with his societal environment, especially in the context of major crises (political, electoral, and ethnic); it was more to play a negative role as defined by the political leadership in place. The media's role as an institution of socialization for the promotion of peace remains a media aspect to be conquered.

CHAPTER V

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS

5.1. Conflict and conflict management

The description of the role of the media in conflicts falls within a scientific framework relating to research on conflict and peace. This scientific framework explores and analyzes the actions of violence and non-violence, the mechanisms and dynamics of conflicts in society, in order to understand the ins and outs of the process that can lead to conflict resolution, security, and improvement of living conditions (Dugan, 1989). Conflict and peace are two opposing concepts, one of which cannot exist without the other. To understand them, we will define them successively.

5.1.1. What is peace?

Peace is a difficult concept to define because it is a state that is recognizable by its absence, like freedom and justice. This is why, for recognition, Johan Galtung, a pioneer of peace studies, along with other scholars, coined the terms "positive peace" and "negative peace" (Galtung et al., 2002). Positive peace means the simultaneous presence of several states in the same society, such as equity, freedom, justice, harmony. States making it possible to overcome the cultural and structural violence of the conflict. "Negative peace," on the other hand, can be like the absence of war or other forms of conflict and violence. Peace is first and foremost chosen, circumstance and

time considered in society as a lack of competition. In contrast, a conflict would be the absence of peace.

Conflict can be understood as a predictable relational social fact that occurs in a society among social actors (Hamelink, 2011). It arises when there is a disagreement between individuals and social groups operating in one social system. In the history of human societies, conflict is essential to human life, leading to social and political change (Del Rey, 2007). Dahrendorf (1958) emphasizes that conflict is a necessary and inevitable element in any process of change. It is one of the essential factors on which a company can capitalize to progress and develop.

The conflict ultimately turns out to be a factor in stimulating social and political change and, therefore, in stabilizing a society if the conflicting parties negotiate fairly and in good faith. The existence of hostility might be not, therefore, opposed to peace, but on the contrary, constitutes a factor of transition between two situations of relative stability. This research chooses a definition of peace as "positive peace," which results from this transitional stage transforming the nature and context of the conflict by promoting a culture of peace.

Conflict can therefore be seen as an element of dynamism that can lead to political and social change, creating stability. Social actors can equitably negotiate peace. Conflict situations should serve as the basis for a transition to peace. This research is, therefore, part of the logic of "positive peace," which is the result of the transformation of a conflict situation into a situation of peace through the mechanism of dialogue.

5.1.2. What is conflict?

The academic analysis of armed conflicts turns out to be complex, and it is thus necessary to clarify the use of the word conflict in this research. By conflict, we mean the pursuit of incompatible goals by different individuals or groups of individuals. The term "conflict" allows the analysis to be circumscribed on the opposition between at least two opposing actors in vision or objectives. Rahim (1992) defines conflict as an "interactive process that manifests itself in incompatibility, disagreement or dissonance within or between social entities" (p. 16). Wall and Callister (1995) perceive conflict as a "process in which one party perceives its interests to be opposed or adversely affected by another party" (p. 517).

Similarly, Fisher et al (2000) conceives conflict as "a relationship between two or more parties… who have or think they have incompatible objectives" (p.4), Which amounts to saying to find oneself in a situation of conflict, there must be at least two, individuals or groups, evolving in independence and incompatibility, looking in different directions. By integrating the various elements of this process, conflict is also considered to be the result of the following situation: "the incompatible needs, differing demands, contradictory wishes, opposing beliefs, or diverging interests which produce interpersonal antagonism and, at times, hostile encounters" (Bonta, 1996, p. 405).

Reactions to conflicts vary across cultures and societies. Lemish (2010) asserts that "societies guided by collectivist traditions - mainly in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East - view conflict as a threat to social order and seek to restore harmony and honor to the world. Within and between groups" (p. 54). This is to say that in these types of

cultures and societies, conflicts have a negative connotation, so they should be avoided, as they will harm the harmony of the community.

However, most Western societies perceive conflict as necessary for progress and development and assume its inevitability due to social interactions (Lemish, 2010). Although conflicts are inevitable, they could negatively affect the smooth running of a modern society in search of stability, economic growth, and political and security stability. Because conflict can act as a restraint of development and economic growth. (Lang, 2009).

Conflict is not necessarily synonymous with violence. Although conflict can exist without violence, violence can be the result of the conflict. Galtung (1969) suggests that violence is all that causes "human beings to be influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realization falls short of their potential" (p. 168). Violence is the application of force, brutality, and hostility which actors involved in the conflict adopt as a means of domination (Follett, 1940). In other words, violence works to create fear and allow the control of power.

The conflict can be violent or non-violent. To distinguish them, Galtung (1969) suggests that violence is anything that causes "human beings to be influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realization falls short of their potential" (p. 168). From this perspective, violence is primarily internal. Nevertheless, it is also coercive in that brutality, force, and hostility are used to achieve domination. Violence is therefore exercised as an instrument of power over others.

By its nature, there are two types of violence which are personal, i.e., visible through its physical effects in terms of real damage, and structural, i.e., invisible and characterized by inequality, social injustice. (Galtung, 1990). For his part, Howard (2004) suggests that personal violence can also be cultural violence in the context of racist, hateful, xenophobic, gender-discriminating discourse.

Despite the 'violent,' hostile, and frontal nature of conflicts (Fisher, 1977), some research suggests that these types of conflicts can be managed through a constructive and strategic approach to conflict (e.g., Fisher, 2010).

Moreover, conflict management focuses on the positive aspects of the conflict while reducing the negative dimensions (DeChurch and Marks, 2001). The long-term goal of this approach is to work and promote the nonviolent aspect in order to achieve positive results in conflict (Kuhn & Poole, 2000). This involves acquiring management rules applicable in conflicts to curb or defuse crises by providing solutions to the problems that undermine individuals or groups of social actors operating in a well-defined society.

Conflict management is, therefore, a set of appropriate strategies that intervene to stop this process by proposing solutions (Lemish, 2009). In addition, Lemish (2010) proposes approaches to conflict management in these terms "key elements - the emergence of conflict, non-violent or violent confrontation, negotiation and signing of a hoped-for resolution agreement, implementation of the agreement and reconciliation efforts, in some societies."(P. 54). Conflict management efforts have the potential to contribute to positive development and change among social actors in conflict when the

approach is fair, tolerant, competent and humane, (Lederach, 2003; Weeks, 1992; Lemish, 2009).

Moreover, the use of arms as a mode of conflict management, often adopted by modern states, may or may not be effective. The violence-appropriate format in media portrayal and media coverage of violence in conflict does not always provide viable resolution methods (Lederach, 2003). The approach to violence violates the fundamental principles of conflict management. It can lead to negative consequences such as damage to property and human life and the perpetuation of the conflict. Effective conflict management strategies address conflict by ensuring a mutual and concerted understanding of the conflict context and underlying issues by all parties, actors, and the public (Lederach, 2003; Weeks, 1992; Lemish, 2008). Conflict management approaches consider the consequences of various possible conflict resolution strategies before determining the appropriate approach, attempting to implement the agreements reached (Götz & Lemish, 2004; Lemish & Sclote, 2009).

Conflict management has the potential to transform conflicts over time. According to this approach, conflicts cannot necessarily be resolved. However, by providing alternatives, they could be managed in such a way as to reduce the risks of unproductive escalation (Lederach, 2003; Lemish, 2009). Transformation focuses on creating constructive change through in-depth structural analysis of an event. It seeks to end an indecisive conflict and build a new event in which people can participate and experience (Lederarch, 2003; Weeks, 1992).

5.2. Media and conflict management

The media have the potential to influence public perceptions by suggesting important issues (McCombs and Shaw, 1972), as well as by emphasizing a specific aspect of realities (Entman, 1993), having the potential to contribute to the escalation of the conflict (Gardner, 2001). As Peters (2001) puts it, "in conflict situations, there is the risk that the media will be used for political and undemocratic purposes to inspire, provoke and support fear and hatred" (p.312). Therefore, the media can play the role of political actors, allowing themselves to be controlled by politicians with different agendas, for the most part, thus putting the media in an auxiliary posture of power.

It is, therefore, necessary to seek to understand how the media can play a role in the peacebuilding process. Spencer (2005) stresses that without tolerance and understanding of "the other," the journalist cannot provide objective and balanced information on the conflict. He highlights the CNN effect to highlight the impact of live media on diplomacy and foreign policy (Livingston, 1997, Robinson, 1999). He, therefore, suggests that the media can play, in this context, a vanguard role in a conflict by informing the public in real-time.

The "CNN effect" is an essential aspect of media and conflict management. By definition, the CNN effects approach recognizes the effects of media coverage of "real-time" events (Harmon 1999). This suggests the impact of a 24-hour news cycle in which real-time news is essential. The CNN Effect sums up the process by which continuous information about crises or conflicts can have a capacity to influence political decision-making. The CNN effect is attributable to media coverage of topics

important to the public. The Cable News Network has been seen as influential in bringing images and humanitarian issues to the forefront of the public, thereby influencing foreign policies.

The CNN Effect thus sums it up, the process by which continuous information about crises or conflicts can have a capacity to influence political decision-making. Primarily centered on television, the press also contributes to the CNN effect in two ways: on the one hand, by providing a framework for the subjects dealt with and, on the other hand, by informing managers about the perception of events by the public (Bahador, 2007).

Policymakers have criticized this method as being prejudicial and contrary to the more thoughtful judgment of foreign policymakers, forcing them into unforeseen actions, which may be regrettable (Strobel, 1996). The CNN effect affected the dynamics of media coverage, immediately alerting the public to situations. "The public hears about an event in real-time before the State Department has had time to think about it. Therefore, the State Department is responding before we have had time to think it over. This is how we determine foreign policy now - it is driven more by the daily events reported on television than ever before" (Ammon, 2001; Pearce, 1995).

However, some researchers dispute the influence of the CNN effect, opposing the example of media coverage of the 1994 US operations in Somalia. (Livingstone and Eachus, 1995). The various media reports on US military operations. McSweeney (2011) relays the negative effect of the CNN Effect approach taken by a journalist who

captured the gruesome naked image of an American soldier killed and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, leading to the disengagement of states -United.

The perspective of the CNN Effect suggests an approach to war journalism, seeking violence and the sensational as an angle of excellence for coverage, and characterized by a "here and now" reporting format, an emotional language. This type of journalistic approach can prove effective in the context of the fourth estate media, capable of influencing government actions through information (Jakobsen, 1996). The CNN Effect approach has been primarily characterized by news coverage, which can convince policymakers. They adopt a military interventionist approach, which can be detrimental to their national interests (Jakobsen, 1996; 2000); conflict management goes beyond professional journalism criteria such as presenting facts (who, what, where, when). It includes multiple explanations and interpretations by various stakeholders, fairness, and balanced reporting of multiple opinions (Lemish, 2006; 2009).

Some media scholars perceive the media as a possible platform for achieving long-term change in society and active agents in the process of targeted change towards conflict management (Bandura, 2004; Johnson, 2001; Lemish and Caringer, 2012; Schaeffer, 2006). Howard (2004) lists eleven unconscious roles of the journalist:

Channel communication; educate; confidence building; correct misperceptions; making them (on the other side) more human; identify the underlying interests; emotional outing; frame the conflict (to allow de-escalation); to save face, build consensus; developing solutions; and encourage a balance of power. Based on these

roles, the global media can influence policymaking by exploiting their relationships with the government and the public. Although the media does not have the power to influence policy directly, the public can act in a way that leads to policy change. The power of the press is therefore rooted in its potential to control, to some extent, public opinion (Bennett, 1994; Nacos et al., 2000). As potential agents of change, Galtung (2002) suggests that the media take a proactive and selective approach to conflict when reporting on conflict, adopting the peace journalism approach.

The media's approach to reporting on conflict often emphasizes the negative aspects of conflict and reduces opportunities for peacebuilding. This new approach could affect the public's perception of society, individual results, and their relationship with other social agents (Lang, 2009).

Therefore, this study proposes emphasizing peacebuilding strategies in media reporting as a step towards conflict management. Although journalists are not mediators, their platform gives them access and can affect conflicts as mediators (Baumann and Siebert, 2001). By adopting conflict management strategies and promoting peace in media reporting, the media play a crucial role in de-escalating and informing the public, allowing them to pass their judgment on the outcomes of society, thus challenging the status quo to change policy (Gardner, 2001; Wolfsfeld, 1997; Luthans et al., 1995). This study, therefore, proposes to know the role that the media can play in the Congo from the perspective of peacebuilding.

5.3. War Journalism versus Peace Journalism

The previous chapter explored the concepts of conflict, peace, conflict management and resolution, and conflict transformation and reviewing the literature about that concept. This chapter discusses the idea of peace journalism and its growth amid the prevailing trends and practices in war journalism. It also examines critical perspectives on peace journalism and the criticisms addressed against it. The theoretical framework of peace journalism has been reviewed in the context of journalism and conflict and peacebuilding studies.

5.3.1. War Journalism

Hamelink (2011) asserts that Conflicts are "a central part" of human societies. (Tehranian 2007) argues that the media are "an active part of any conflict." Therefore, Conflicts should be reported because they are part of the "ebb and flow" of society (Lederach, 2003), and they offer "a clear opportunity for human progress" and "transformation" (Lynch & Galtung, 2010).

Indeed, conflicts are important stories that structure foreign news (Galtung & Ruge, 1965). Galtung refutes this general and old conception news process that conflicts should be perceived as synonymous with 'violence,' when '[re] port out a conflict is framed in time between the onset and breakdown of violence, and limited in space. On the battlefield, the arena' (Lynch & Galtung, 2010, p. 6).

Such 'grotesque simplification' conceives conflicts as a game between two opposed parties fighting to win the game, ignoring the hidden aspects of the conflict

that concern the people's requirement for peace. Lynch and Galtung (2010) argue that 'there are never only two parties [teams], never only one ball, the field is tilted, not even, and the numerous parties are not necessarily playing the same games with the same balls' (p. 6). They continue by arguing that 'Some parties are not playing at all, are only around hoping for some spoils to pick up' (p. 6). Such a perspective marks the first step towards 'war journalism' (Galtung & Ruge, 1965).

5.3.1.1. Attributes of war journalism

Concerning War journalism approach, Galtung argues, has a pro-violence bias by focusing on the events in a conflict and their physical details, such as the number of people who die or the nature of the weapons used. It does not analyze the processes that lead to conflict, including its causes, outcomes, and impact on society, nor does it consider the "cultural" and "structural" aspects of violence. Additionally, war journalism tends to view conflict as defeat or victory for both parties engaged in the conflict. From this perspective, "violence" and "victory" constitute two essential characteristics of war journalism; the other two aspects are "propaganda" and the importance of the "elites" (Lynch and Galtung, 2010, p. 12), as shown in table 5.1:

Table 1. War journalism and peace journalism model

VIOLENCE-WAR/VICTORY JOURNALISM	CONFLICT/PEACE JOURNALISM
1.VIOLENCE/WAR-ORIENTED	**1.CONFLICT ORIENTED**
Focus on conflict arena,	Explore conflict formation,
2 parties, one goal (win), war	X parties, y goals, z issues
General zero-sum orientation	General 'win-win' orientation
Closed space, closed time,	Open space, open time;
Causes and effects in the arena,	Causes and outcomes anywhere;
Who threw the first stone;	Also in history/culture;
Poor in context	Rich in context
Focus only on visible effect of violence	Focus also on invisible effects of violence
(killed, wounded and material damage)	(trauma and glory, damage to structure/culture)
Makin wars opaque/secret	Making conflict transparent
'Us them' journalism propaganda, voice for 'us'	Giving voice to all parties, empathy, understanding
See 'them' as the problem	See conflict/war as a problem
Focus on who prevails in the war	Focus on conflict creativity
Dehumanization of 'them'	Dehumanization of all sides
More so the worse the weapon	More so the worse the weapon
Reactive, waiting for violence to occur before reporting	Proactive: reporting also before violence/war occurs
2.PROPAGANDA-ORIENTED	**2.TRUTH ORIENTED**
Exposed 'their' untruth	Exposed untruths on all sides
Help 'our' cover-ups/lies	Uncover cover-ups
3.ELITE-ORIENTED	**3.PEOPLE –ORIENTED**
Focus on 'their' violence and on 'our' suffering; on able-bodied elite males	Focus on violence of by all sides and suffering over all

Give names of their evil-doers	Give names to all evil-doers
Focus on elites peace-makers, Being elite mouth-piece	Focus on people peace-makers Giving voice to the voiceless
4.VICTORY-ORIENTED Peace=victory+ceasefire	**4.SOLUTION-ORIENTED** Peace=non-violence+creativity
Conceal peace initiatives before is victory at hand	Highlight peace initiatives, also to prevent more war
Focus on treaty, institution, the controlled society	Focus on the structure, culture the peace society
Living for another war, return if the old flares up	Aftermath, resolution, reconstruction, reconciliation

Source: (Lynch & Galtung, 2010, pp.12-14)

5.3.1.2. Journalism and peace journalism model

War journalism can be seen as a metaphor of `` the warrior's logic of a world of states pockmarked against each other, with the national and inter-state conflict and war being issues of the state and statesmen, not to be touched by the common folk '' (Lynch & Galtung, 2010, p. 17). Structurally, according to the professional rules of the journalist, that requires "balance" and "objectivity." It shows his preference for "violence" as opposed to "context" as content; it focuses more on "elites" rather than "the people" as sources of information and aims to find a "victory" rather than "solutions" as result of the conflict. In this logic, it might be seen as a propaganda tool for the state and companies (Herman and Chomsky, 2002).

Jowett and O'Donnell (1999) define propaganda as 'the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist' (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1999, p. 6). Tuchman (1978), in its study on propaganda, asserted that 'News is the ideal vehicle for this because it weaves images and piece of information to flesh out anyone supposed fact, one gathers a mass of supposed facts that, when taken together, present themselves as both individually and collectively self-validating (p. 72). In this perspective, War journalism could be seen as 'propagandist' because it drew its resources from journalism and the 'communiqués from the top military command' (Lynch & Galtung, 2010, p. 17).

In the modern society that made media and new technologies become an institution of socialization, 'we are immersed in war propaganda; our media relations, our much-medialized existence perhaps, is saturated in it' (Lynch, 2010, p. 81). The elitism, in the war journalism approach, is based on the idea that negativism sells and what elites say is worthy (Galtung, 1998). Lynch and Galtung (2010) assert that 'War itself is negative and particularly newsworthy if it happens to elite persons in elite countries or at least to elite buildings' (p. 22). News relating to crises, or coming from the elites of society, have more precedence than those coming from the victims of economic problems and conflicts.

Likewise, maintaining a "balance" in media coverage of conflicts is often seen as keeping in mind what one side has said against the other. This approach neglects to

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give "voice to the voiceless" who are victims of conflict to express their need for peace (Lynch and Galtung, 2010).

At the same time, it could also be a cover-up for a media strategy to stay away from anything controversial and be in line with the authority/majority deep culture' (p. 55). Lynch and Galtung (2010) underline the fact that Balance should also follow the 'before, during and after phases of the conflict; about covering 'remote conflicts' and having more interest in 'all goals of all parties. 'More important and more positive is to balance violent action with peace action' (Lynch & Galtung, 2010, p. 55).

Objectivity is another fundamental principle of modern news coverage, which refers to the genuine root of reporting. It is 'the value of fairness' and 'the ethic of restraining your own biases' (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005, p. 203).

Bell's (1998) experience of reporting the Bosnian ethnic cleansing in 1994–95 as a BBC correspondent guide the reporter to criticize the BBC's standard for reporters to be objective and impartial. He argued that I am no longer sure what 'objective' means: I see nothing object-like in the relationship between the reporter and the event, but rather a human and dynamic interaction between them. As for 'dispassionate,' it is not only impossible but inappropriate to be thus neutralized – I would say even neutered – at the scene of an atrocity or massacre, or most manufactured calamities (1998, p. 18).

Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) are critical of the journalists' advocacy of objectivity. For them, journalists are already engaged because it is their task. Nor can they be objective – they only see an aspect of reality, especially on the battlefield; they cannot have the whole picture. This is why they question how the journalist can claim

to be reporting the truth – an aspect of reality, probably, not the entire picture. In addition, a partial reporting of the fact often misrepresents the image as the whole. It is about making 'choices' in terms of 'what to report, and how to report' in conflict context (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005, p. 5). These choices 'create opportunities for society to consider and value non-violent responses to conflict'. Objectivity then is not the issue. 'Selection is the issue, the criteria applied and the codes and the context in which the event is placed and interpreted' (Lynch & Galtung, 2010, p. 52)

5.3.2. Peace journalism

Peace journalism is a set of conceptual and practical tools intended to equip journalists to offer a better public service' (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005, p. 5). It is a journalistic approach that works 'in a way that encourages conflict analysis and a non-violent response in society' (Mogekwu, 2011, p. 247). Tehranian (2002) defines peace journalism as an attempt 'to transform conflicts from their violent channels into constructive forms by conceptualizing news, empowering the voiceless, and seeking common grounds that unify rather than divide human societies.'

Comparing war and peace journalism, the pioneers of peace journalism argue that if war journalism is the 'low road journalism,' peace journalism is the 'high road journalism'; if war journalism approach could be understood using the analogy of sports journalism, then peace journalism is trim with health journalism (Lynch & Galtung, 2010). It is a new approach journalism practices against the old way (war journalism) of journalism: 'Peace journalism is a serious, inquisitive, professional reporting making conflict more transparent' (Lynch & Galtung, 2010, p. 17).

5.3.1.1. The 'logic' of peace journalism

In the previous section, several approaches to peace were discussed, in particular: it is an ideal and a process (Barash, 2000; Hawkins, 2011). It is elusive but something to aspire to in its relationship to war, peace can be both positive and negative (Galtung, 1996). In its equivocation, peace can mean "everything for everyone" (Lynch, 2013, p. 46). In the context of media and conflict, it evokes the values of non-violence, truth, and justice for all parties (Galtung, 1969; Lynch, 2013; Rees, 2003).

However, peace journalism 'is not peace advocacy,' for 'that task is better left to peace workers and activists' (Lynch and Galtung, 2010, p. 17). There is a challenge in the term 'entirely intended,' which lies in choosing between the two approaches of journalism: …war journalism and peace journalism are two different ways of covering the same set of events. They are two discourses, two points of view, based on cognitive and normative presumption. Both are based on media covering…both described reality [….] the contrast is that peace journalism assumes the advantage of reality […] their task is to disclose, clarify, and show reality to allow others to draw normative conclusions. (Lynch & Galtung, 2010, p. 52)

The rationality of the peace journalism approach lies, then, in his positioning within the media. Lynch (2010) asserts that if we want to 'take issues with power relations in the media domain, it is in that domain that we must work' (p. 81). In this regard, Peace claimed as 'an organizing principle for journalism, a discursive practice with a remit to report the facts' (2013, p. 50). The logic of the peace journalism approach then, according to Lynch (2013), lies in its 'insurgent approach' against the attributes of

war journalism (Table 2.1), giving it the course of peace, truth, public, and resolution. For a while, 'the news content is governed by the structures in which it is produced […] we do not have to accept that it is fully determined by them' (p. 38). These 'insurgent forms' allow peace journalism to afford the 'cues and clues, to alert readers and audiences' to the covered significations of propaganda and news (p. 38).

This does not mean that peace journalism does not report on violence; it does, but 'violence by all sides, and the suffering of all sides' (Lynch & Galtung, 2010, p. 12). It tries to 'depolarize by showing the black and white of all sides, and to deescalate by highlighting peace and conflict resolution as much as violence' (p. 16).

'The truth aspect in peace journalism holds for all sides, like an exploration of the conflict formation and giving voice to all sides, not only two, and people not only to the elites', they argue (p. 17). It 'introduces other truths because it is based on a different way of reporting violence and conflict' (p. 3). Peace journalism also is 'solution-oriented, highlighting peace initiatives, and in the aftermath of violence, efforts to promote resolution, reconstruction, and reconciliation' (Lynch, 2013, p. 39).it 'people-oriented give 'deep meanings, root causes, and social contexts' in conflicts (Lynch & Galtung, 2010, p. 15-17). Peace journalism's rising also lies in its potential to find 'news' in peace when war has become a 'routine, terrible but repetitive, monotonous, plainly boring' (Lynch & Galtung, 2010, p. 18). Consequently, 'War and peace are texts, whether they are events, depends on the context' (p. 19).

5.3.1.2. Criticism against peace journalism

Several researchers criticized and objected the Peace journalism in its conceptual and structural aspects. Some pertinent criticisms are discussed in the following.

The first is related to 'peace' losing its 'journalistic objectivity' principle (McGoldrick, 2008). Kempf (2007) depicts the peace journalism approach to 'throw the baby out with the bath-water (p.156). He predicts that if perceived as a form of advocacy in the newsrooms, it would jeopardize journalism in the journalistic community (Kempf, 2007, p. 156). Moreover, such perception would put its 'potential "trust bonus" in danger (p. 156) which is the basis above which the public stands, believing new stories from journalists. For Kempf (2002), objectivity, impartiality, and neutrality are ways of reaching accurate media coverage of events and issues. Lynch (2013) argues that 'Peace is notoriously polysomic, to the point where it can sometimes seem to mean all things to all people' (p. 46).

Loyn (2007) contests and object 'peace journalism' approach in favor of 'good journalism.' He points out that there is nothing that peace journalism could achieve which good journalism did not. He criticizes especially the concept of the essential goal of news. It is 'desirable' as it acts as a useful vaccine against the relativism of attached journalism' (2008, p. 54).

Shinar (2007) points out the two aspects where come from criticism on the peace journalism approach. First, its peace journalism's drift from 'the media principle of objectivity and the second aspect relates 'to the function of war as a source of media

inspiration and exploitation of audience feelings.' He argues that 'War provides visuals and images of action. It is associated with heroism and conflict, focuses on the emotional rather than on the rational, and satisfies-news values demands' (pp. 5-6). The two aspects have fueled the debate 'that goes far beyond the orthodox of objectivity' (Shinar, 2007, p. 205).

The peace Journalism approach is also criticized for its 'structural constraints' in assuming linear media effects (Fawcett, 2002; Hanitzsch, 2008). Fawcett (2002) argues, in the study on 'conflict frames' for sectarian events in Irish newspapers, that 'peace journalism isn't news. Hanitzsch (2008) argued that the peace journalism approach takes 'an overly individualistic and voluntarist perspective' of the media's structure and political economy. He further argued that 'a peaceful culture is a precondition of peace journalism rather than its outcome' (2008, p. 75).

Further, in referring to peace studies, peace journalism `` ignores '' the media realities of organizational value, ownership, market forces, political and socio-economic interests, and the rating culture in structuring and making news. Peace journalism thus requires "structural reform" to become more effective (Tehranian, 2002; Shinar, 2007; Hackett, 2006a).

5.3.1.3 Counter-arguments

The arguments on peace advocacy and objectivity have been discussed above. However, some additional counter-argument requires our attention.

Robie (2010) asserts that most peace journalism suits an individual's approach to a conflict situation and complain good contextual journalism. Ross (2009), for its

part, affirms that 'peace journalism does not involve any radical departure from contemporary journalism practice.' (p. 74)

To counter-argues the criticism related to the 'structural constraints' and lack of peace journalism oriented studies, Lynch (2013) showed up studies which demonstrated that peace journalism could be used, asserting that 'Crucially, such studies always find that some Peace Journalism is route, on some counting – and if there is some, it is appealing to wonder how there could be more (p. 44).

5.5. Theoretical framework of peace journalism

Lynch and Galtung (2010) assert that 'Peace journalism is not, in itself, a theory' (pp. 26-27). Its 'Theoretical propositions are implicit in it' that relate to 'peace, conflict, and violence as well as communication and its effects; various 'structural constraints that shape the message (Tehranian, 2002; Hackett, 2007; Hanitzsch, 2007). Lynch and Galtung (2010) add that 'the theoretical proposition implicit in peace journalism is that familiar structural forces such as market, ownership, routines of journalism and professional values, should be seen as the governing, rather than determining the content of news' (pp. 26-27).

This section explores various theoretical framework models for peace journalism from the perspectives of peace, conflict, and communication.

5.5.1. Peace Journalism in the light of conflict theories

Peleg (2007) argues that intractable litigation "generally requires the third party to mediate with the conflicting parties or at least facilitate their interaction" and that the

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role of the third party is to "stimulate positive mutual motivation to reduce conflict." (P. 27). He proposes that peace journalism take on the role of the third party in its facilitation capacity: allowing antagonists to get to know each other maintain understanding and empathy focus on human creativity and ingenuity to resolve issues. Conflict and focus on truth-oriented, people-focused, and solutions-driven journalism to accelerate peace. (2007, p. 27).

To demonstrate his view, he considered peace journalism from the perspective of the triangular construction of conflict as given by Mitchell's Situation-Attitude-Behavior triangle (1981) - similar to Galtung's (1969) triangle ABC (of Attitudes - Behavior-Contradiction) - and the spatial escalation model of conflict given by Schattschneider (1983). Mitchell's model views conflict in terms of the situation in which the conflict is placed with the interests of the conflicting parties; the psychological attitudes of antagonists; and their behaviors about their actions

The spatial escalation theory highlights conflicting parties, arguing that they are 'more occupied in communication with the environment and fortify their relative position by attracting other parties to join forces with them to outweigh the opponent' (Peleg, 2007, p. 44). Media then become 'the communication channels', and journalists 'carry the message 'made according to their 'talent and style' (p. 44). Peleg analyzed three conflicts – the conflict in Northern Ireland, the Israel Palestine conflict, and the conflict in the Basque country – within these two models to 'demonstrate the putative merit of peace journalism as a third party in conflict' (p. 27).

He found that in Mitchell's model, peace journalism can play a positive role by balancing news about 'all sides' and stories and placing conflict issue within 'historical context' in the situation top; it can avert 'volatile' speech, tagging, and generalization in the top posture; and it can be preventive by rising 'awareness of cores and hub of potential violence to prevent them before they erupt' (p. 48). His figure (2007, p. 33) is shown in figure

Figure 2 Peace journalism application in Mitchell's Triangle dimension

(Source: Peleg, 2007, p. 45)

Concerning the model of spatial escalation theory, he highlights 'the contribution of media is crucial, and this is where the transformation from regular,

sensational, and contention-prone journalism to accountable, even-handed, and rigorous peace journalism is most desired' (p. 46).

Figure 3 Role of media in 'escalation of conflict' theory dimension

(Source: Peleg, 2007, p.45)

Peleg (2007) asserts that the media assume "a heavy responsibility" by playing the role of "a channel of communication between the belligerents and the attentive crowd" (p. 52). Their way of informing the parties in conflict, as well the public could precipitate or prevent hostilities.

5.5.2. Conflict transformation

Lederch (2003), in his theory of conflict transformation, asserts that the situation of armed conflict between states or intra-state has at its root changes in relationships. A friendly relationship has been changed for the worst. Therefore, conflicts could be resolved by working on the relationship between the antagonists. 'A transformational approach seeks to understand the particular episode of conflict not in isolation, but as embedded in the greater pattern' (Lederach, 2003).

Several scholars endorsed the model of conflict transformation from the perspective of conflict resolution. Tehranian (2002); Shinar (2003b); Shinar (2003b); Ross (2007), Lynch and Galtung (2010) and Shaw (2011), suggesting that it is essential to transform 'the images of the self and the other' in the context of long-term insoluble conflicts. Transformation might occur wherein 'the groups engaged in conflicts achieve a fairly accurate understanding of each other.' Ross (2007) highlights the 'focus of image transformation as vital to resolving all conflicts regardless of whether essentialist or not' (p. 72).

5.6. Peace journalism, media framing and political context

Framing is a relevant theory for examining peace versus war journalism, as it demonstrates how frames are constructed and integrated into media coverage. Entman explained that framing is selecting certain aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in a communication text to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral assessment, and recommendation processing time for the item described. (1993: 52). Tankard et al. (1991) described a media frame as "the central

organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration" (: p.3). Frames require selected key ideas to promote them to reinforce a particular interpretation, through a process of repetition, exclusion, and consolidation, in order to provide a dominant interpretation that is more easily perceived by the audience. Likewise, the peace journalism framing defines the problem, diagnoses the causes, finds invisible effects of the conflict, and suggests peace resolutions (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005).

In the light of the theory of framing, peace journalism can be seen from two perspectives: the first, as an instrument to develop a specific frame, and the second, as a type of frame named 'peace framing.' This means that the implementation of the model of peace journalism is a means of coverage (framing), and the result has a particular approach directed towards the 'peace frame' (Nicolas-Gavilan, 2011). Peace journalism frames have value in promoting peace in a conflict, with an emphasis on non-violence resolutions.

Moreover, Wolfsfeld (1997) considers that the "political context is the best way to understand the role of the media in political conflict. He considers that the contest of the parties to the conflict for overpowering the media is just another aspect of the general fighting between the political opposition (Wolfsfeld 1997). The struggle of the parties in the conflict is focused on promoting their views through the media to prevail in the news. This struggle takes place at two levels called: the structural and the cultural dimension. (Wolfsfeld, 1997).

The structural dimension consists of the fact that an antagonist appears in the media, gets media coverage. The second aspect, which is the cultural dimension, refers to the attribution of significance to a fact to make it comprehensive to the Public who has access to media. In other words, conflicting parties attempt to promote their agenda on the story so that the media present it as such to the audience. This battle for meaning attribution can be conceived in terms of building frames: conflict among the frames that the antagonists attempt to promote and the frame that the media finally present to the audience as specific realities (Entman, 1993). Building a media frame is an interactive process that requires adapt in two variables:

Professional value and placing the events in a cultural context. Professional value refers to explaining a complex story within the media setting, a limited setting. To do this, it must respect the limits and requirements of the various news media. Nevertheless, the construction of this framework is not only limited by space but also by the previous frameworks used in the conflict coverage. In other words, the construction process is understood as an attempt by journalists to find a narrative that connects the news of information to existing frames in the media. It must also be taken into account that the public lives and interact in a specific cultural and political environment.

Accordingly, he considers that "the attempt to find a narrative fit should not be seen as a mechanical process, but rather as a cultural process in which the journalist places the events of the day in meaningful context" (Wolfsfeld 1997 p. 36). There are elements that contribute to the construction of the media frame. It is "While events

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normally serve as a starting point for the construction of media frameworks, the attempt to find a narrative fit is also influenced by professional considerations and policies. These considerations help define the range of existing frameworks, the search for information and events, and how the frameworks are applied to a particular conflict" (Wolfsfeld 1997 p. 36). He defines three major factors that affect the choice or construction of a media frame. Factors such as facts, professional considerations, and political environment. This means that media framing is constituted with the nature of the news and events and issues processed, the need to create a newsworthy, and the need to create a story that. Resonates politically in a certain culture. This study also relies on framing produced by media in a politico-military conflict context.

5.7. Theoretical Framework of this study

Taking into account the complexity of the object of our study, which is the role of the media in the construction of peace, we decided to resort to a multidisciplinary analysis, in order to better understand the different contours of the subject and to bring global and appropriate responses.

In this perspective, this study is firmly anchored in the framing approach (media frames and war / peace journalism frames). That is allowed us to understand the implication of the media in the conflict in term of escalation and de-escalation, as well as in the attempts of the resolution of the conflict Indeed, the use of the frames in relation with the Congo conflict is a sufficient source of information which allows us to define and determine the role (passive or active, partisan / non-partisan, dependent / independent) of the media. Because frames are media expressions that attest to their

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involvement on the matters. The role of media in a conflict or peace process is expressed through 'framing.' Indeed, the nature of the role played by media largely depends on the framing of the media. That is why Peleg (2007) asserts that the media assume "a heavy responsibility" by playing the role of "a channel of communication between the belligerents and the attentive crowd" (p. 52). Their way of informing the parties in conflict, as well the public could precipitate or prevent hostilities.

We used the conceptualization of conflict and conflict management. This enabled us to define the characteristics and to specify the terms of reference of the type of conflict under study. It is also a question of exploring and analyzing the management of information (media) in times of conflict. Conflict (especially armed and violent) is a particular context in a society which involves many actors and which requires special management of information. we therefore sought to understand how the various actors, as well as the media, managed information in terms of sources, news, constraints, with their implications on peace, escalation or de-escalation. This irrevocably leads us to the analysis the involvement of forces and influences in the media ecosystem. To do this, we have resorted to the political model

CHAPTER VI

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

6.1. Introduction

In order to answer the research questions, we looked at several mass communication research methods and techniques and we chose the ones that optimally helped to gather the most relevant data. according to Hansen et al (1998), "researchers should not only consider what is the most appropriate method for studying the topic or problem they have chosen, but also what combinations of research methods will produce a better understanding of it. And more in-depth" (p. 1).

In this chapter, we discuss the research design and justify the choice of the methods and techniques used which are: content analysis, in-depth interviews, and focus group interviews. In accordance with the requirements of studying human subjects, we also explain some ethical considerations.

6.2 Research design and techniques

The approach of employing a variety of techniques in research is called 'triangulation' and is a key organizing principle that I employ in this thesis (Jensen & Jankowski, 1991; Hansen et al., 1998; Patton, 2002; Fortner & Christians, 2003). Patton (2002) identifies four basic types of triangulation, namely: data triangulation (the use of a variety of data sources in a study); triangulation of investigators (using multiple

investigators or reviewers); theoretical triangulation (use of several perspectives to interpret a single data set); and methodological triangulation (the use of multiple methods to study a single problem or program) (p.247). Hansen et al (1998) also suggest that "triangulation can be done in various ways - across time, space, personnel, environments, organizations, methods and researchers" (p.45). This study made a choice to use "methodological triangulation" by combining quantitative and qualitative techniques (Mike et al., 2009; Cookman, 2003; Lindlof & Taylor 2002). Patton describes quantitative methods like those requiring the use of standardized measures so that different perspectives and people's experiences can fit into a limited number of predetermined responses categories to which numbers are assigned (p.14). He states that the main advantage of quantitative research methods is that they can be used to measure the reactions of many people to a limited set of questions, "thus facilitating comparison and statistical analysis. «Data aggregation" (p.14.). Wimmer & Dominick (2006) argue that one of the main advantages of quantitative research is that the use of numbers allows greater precision in reporting results (p.50). Similarly, Mike et al. (2009) assert that the main objective of quantitative research is to "create, develop and refine theory through systematic observation of hypothetical links between variables" and one of the key roles of the researcher is "to be an accurate analyst of data" (p. 4).

Moreover, Patton (2002) highlights the qualitative research methods as those that allow the researcher to study chosen questions in depth and detail (p.14). For Wimmer & Dominick (2006), the principal benefit of qualitative research consists of being more resilient than quantitative research, it allows researchers to "see behavior in a natural setting" thus increasing a researcher's depth of understanding of the

phenomenon 160 under study (p.49). For their part, Mike et al. (2009) assert that qualitative researches seek to "create, extend and refine theory by observing and interacting with people in their natural environment to uncover rich explanations and unique cases" (p.4), for, the role qualitative researcher consists of being 'careful and reflective observer" (p.4). Wimmer & Dominick (2006), highlight the principal disadvantage of qualitative research methods is the limit size of the sample, limiting the generalization. In addition, reliability of the data can also be an issue since one relies on "single observers describing single events" (p.49). In qualitative and quantitative approaches, Kumar (1999) highlights the centrality of sampling. He considers sampling as "the process of selecting a few (a sample) from a larger group (the sampling population) to become the basis for estimating or predicting a fact, situation or result concerning the larger group" (p. 148). Several researchers assert that samples can be selected on a probability basis or not (Gunter, 1991, p.215; Wimmer & Dominick, 2006, p. 92; Hansen et al., 1998, p.240-241). Gunter asserts that a probability sample is chosen according to mathematical guidelines depends on whether the chance for the choice of each unit is known (p.215). He asserts that a non-probability sample often relies on the fact that respondents are convenient to access, available, and ready to participate. He identifies two principal methical kinds of nonprobability sampling as "purposive and quota" (Ibid; Wimmer & Dominick 2006, p. 92). Gunter (1991) define a "purposive sample" as the one whenever "respondents are selected according to a specific criterion", while a "quota sample" is a "selection procedure whereby participants are chosen to match a pre-determined percentage distribution for the general population" (p.216). While acknowledging the significance of "quota sampling", this study depends

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on "purposive sampling". Patton (2002) argues that the power and the logic of purposeful sampling lie in choosing information-rich cases for in-depth study: "Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the inquiry" (p. 230). Among the fifteen "targeted sampling" techniques he proposes, I have used the "snowball or chain sampling" (pp. 237-238).

Patton (2002) and Jensen (2002) both describe "snowball sampling" as an approach in which initial contact with an informant generates further contact. Patton states that the "Snowball" gets bigger and bigger as we accumulate new cases rich in information:

In most programs or systems, a few key names or problems are mentioned more than once. Of particular importance are those persons or events recommended as valuable by a number of different informants" (p.237). In this study, I deployed this technique to generate informed contacts for in-depth interviews among media professionals.

The logic of "criteria sampling", on the other hand, is to examine and investigate all cases that meet a predetermined significance criterion (Ibid.). While most quantification specialists agree that determining an adequate sample size remains one of the most controversial aspects of sampling, Wimmer & Dominick (2006) suggest several criteria to use, concluding that matters given resources, the larger the representative sample used, the better (p. 125).

Additionally, Patton states that there are no specific rules for determining the sample size, for qualitative research: "The sample size depends on what you want to know, the size of the sample. Purpose of the research, what is at stake, what will be useful, what will have credibility, and what can be done with the time and resources available" (p.244)

6.2.1. Content Analysis

As a research technique, Berger (2011) describes content analysis as "the systematic classification and description of communication content according to certain usually predetermined categories" (p.205). He points out that the technique may be used in the study of quantitative or qualitative data (Ibid.). Like Wimmer & Dominick (2006, p.154), he highlights the steps that a researcher ought to follow such as ensuring measurable scoring units and having a systematic coding system (p.209-211). In their discussion of discourse analysis, Jørgensen & Phillips (2002) point out that the corpus of materials should be varied and could include advertisements, transcripts or interviews (p.78).

In this study, the corpus for analysis comprised of radio, Television transcripts from RTNC and BBC radio, as wells as le monde newspaper. I selected those video and article from internet, depend on available. I retrieve articles from official websites of the media. For BBC and Le monde. In the case of RTNC. This channel does not have an online archive service like other media. Therefore, it was during my descent on the ground that I requested and obtained some videos, talk shows, news that addressed the

issue of conflict. Among the fifteen "targeted sampling" techniques he proposes, I have used two in this study, namely: "snowball or chain sampling" (pp. 237-238).

Patton (2002) and Jensen (2002) both describe "snowball sampling" as an approach in which initial contact with an informant generates further contact. Patton states that the "Snowball" gets bigger and bigger as we accumulate new cases rich in information: In most programs or systems, a few key names or problems are mentioned more than once. Of particular importance are those persons or events recommended as valuable by a number of different informants" (p.237). In this study, I deployed this technique to generate informed contacts for in-depth interviews among journalists and key media experts. I used my trainers when I was doing my journalism internship in 1999 at RTNC. It was through a trainer that I was in contact with other journalists who also put me in touch with their colleagues' journalists. With regard to key persons, I proceeded in the same way, but through another contact closer to myself. These people are influential authorities in the Congo media sector. I therefore resorted to an influential person whom I knew personally. It was through him that I met one, who in turn put me in touch with another media authority.

Additionally, Patton states that when it comes to qualitative research, there are no specific rules for determining the sample size: "The sample size depends on what you want to know, the size of the sample. Purpose of the investigation, what is at stake, what will be useful, what will have credibility, and what can be done with the time and resources available" (p.244)

In addition to the sampling technique, Reinard (2009) as well as Wimmer & Dominick (2006), stress that researchers must ensure that their data are obtained reliably and reliably to improve validity. Reinard states that in quantitative research validity is "the degree to which a measure actually measures what is claimed" (p.127). On the other hand, Wimmer & Dominick refer to another form which they call "external validity of all, I selected a

The material obtained from RTNC covered the 9 months I undertook fieldwork from December 2020 to September 2021.

6.2.2. Interviewing

Weinberg (2001), Patton (2002), and Silverman (2004) are one of the most widely used research data collection methods because it is the best way to find out from people what cannot be directly observed. Patton states, "Interviews yield direct quotations from people about their experiences, opinions, feelings, and knowledge" (p.4). To capture views from a variety of information-rich actors, I used a technique several scholars call in-depth interviewing (Patton, 2002; Silverman, 2004; Wimmer & Dominick, 2006). For Wimmer & Dominick (2006), in-depth interviews are commended because they are usually longer, more detailed, customized to individual respondents, and can easily be influenced by the interview climate (p.135). This research determines the choice of whom to interview through an initial "purposive sampling" of information-rich, respondents and I subsequently used the "snowball" approach to reach more respondents. To formulate the questions, adopted what Patton (2002) calls a "standardized open-ended interview guide" whereby all interviewees in

the same category are asked the same basic questions in the same order to compare easily the responses while organizing the data (pp.342-346). To enhance preparedness of the interviewees, I typically sent out the interview guide in advance along the letters seeking the interview.

Concerning the interview appointment, I put myself at the disposal of the concerned, and I left them the latitude to fix the place and time of the interview. Before starting recording, I informed the interviewee that the conversation would be recorded with his permission. All of them agreed for recording.

6.2.3. Data analysis procedures

In qualitative research, Patton (2002) asserts that there are mainly two strategies for collecting field data. In the "case analysis" procedure, the researcher writes up a case study for each interviewee or each unit studied (p. 57). The "cross-case analysis" procedure, however, allows the researcher to bring together answers from different people to common questions or to analyze different perspectives on central questions (Ibid.). Patton adds that although these strategies can be used separately, in most cases they are complementary (p. 492). When I conducted the in-depth interview, interview guides were used to aggregate respondents' views on proposed questions. At the time of the analysis, however, I adopted the technique of "cross-case analysis" whereby I developed principal themes in which the views of the interviewees were highlighted. The themes were drawn from the literature review and informed by the research questions.

With regard to quantitative method, we used the SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Scientists) computer software, for descriptive statistics in frequency tables and cross-tabulations. I also used the Pearson's Chi-square correlation coefficient to determine if variables were statistically significant

6.3. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have presented and justified the choice of triangulated research methods such as content analysis, interviews and in-depth interview, make possible through my fieldwork. I have laid out the research design explaining the value of purposive sampling. In the data analysis procedures, I have justified the use of a 'cross-case analysis' to treat qualitative data, and SPSS, by analyzing the quantitative data. To ensure that the research process met the criteria of academic inquiry and that the data met validity and reliability.

CHAPTER VII

FRAMING THE AFRICA WORLD WAR

7.1. Introduction

The quantitative method has been used on the international media to the detriment of the local media for an essential reason. The context of the conflict under study had, in term of media coverage and use, Balkanized country. Geographically separated, each media outlet on one side and the other was limited in media coverage of the conflict. Only the international media had access to the various parties engaged in the conflict (Government, Rebel groups backed by foreigner countries, government of countries engaged in the battlefield). This posture of the international media made it possible to collect information and point of views from each side engaged in the conflict. The qualitative part of this research, in the next section, will allow us to have more information on the role of the media from national perspective

This study relies on framing theory and the war and peace journalism model (Galtung 1998-2002) to explore how the so-called 'African world war' 1998-2003 has been framed by western media.

7.2. First fold: Research questions and hypothesis

Several studies on war/peace journalism rely on Galtung's (1998, 2002) framework. Some studies have attempted an empirical analysis based on this

framework (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000; Lee & Maslog, 2005; Neumann & Fahmy, 2012). Previous studies have analyzed conflicts based on the war or peace journalism approach to determine the dominant frames. They found significant dominance of war journalism frames in their conflict-related researches (e.g., Lee & Maslog, 2005; Siraj, 2008; Neumann & Fahmy, 2012, Yousaf et al., 2018). For instance, Yousaf et al.'s (2018) study on media framing of Indo-Pakistani revealed that the elite press of the two countries predominantly used war frames. While the dominance of war journalism frames has been established in several studies, the indicators supporting either war or peace journalism differ across studies. For instance, Siraj's (2008) study on the coverage of the Pakistan-India conflict found that the most salient indicators supporting war journalism showed an emphasis of "here and now" followed by "differences-oriented," "partisan oriented," and "use of demonizing language." (p. 13). In a study on the framing of the Somalian conflict, Workneh (2011) found that "visibility of effects," "elite orientation," "dichotomy of sides," and "demonizing language" were the most salient indicators of war journalism in the US and British newspapers coverage of the crisis.

However, in the peace journalism approach, Siraj (2008) found "solution-orientation," "causes and consequences," "multiparty orientation," and "non-partisanship." as the most salient indicators. With another order of importance, Lee and Maslog (2005) found 'avoidance of demonizing language,' 'non-partisanship, and 'multiparty orientation' as the most prominent indicators (p. 320).

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While the above studies are insightful in drawing hypotheses about war and peace frames, there has been a lack of literature concerning the types of war and conflicts, especially in the Africa context. As all conflicts and wars are not of the same kind, the specificity of the conflict understudy could widen the scope of war/peace journalism and framing. Therefore, based on the preceding discussion, this study's research questions and hypotheses are suggested as following:

H1: The war journalism frames would be featured in significantly more Congo conflict news stories than the peace journalism frames.

RQ1: To what extend western media use war and peace journalism in their coverage of the Congo conflict, and is there a significant difference in framing between the two media?

RQ2: What are the most salient indicators of war and peace journalism in western media news coverage of the Congo conflict, and how do the indicators differ between the two media?

RQ3: What are the salient indicators of language frames in the western media news coverage of the Congo conflict? Is there any significant difference in the indicators of language frames between the two media?

Media framing of conflict and issues consider the representation of sources and tones. Previous studies have found varying Studies on sources and tones have shown favoritism towards war journalism, with media reports dominantly emphasizing elite sources (Bennett & Klockner, 1996; Hallin, 1986; Vartanova & Smirnova, 2012) and adopting negative frames (e.g., Skewes & Black, 2006). Knowing that several and

various actors engaged in the Congo conflict, this study considered sources, tones as indicators that may characterize news coverage of the Congo conflict. Hence;

RQ 4. Does news coverage of the Congo conflict by western media significantly differ, concerning war/peace journalism and language frames, in the period before and after 2001?

7.3. Method

This study uses the quantitative content analysis method to understand how western media framed the 1998-2003's Congo conflict. Content analysis has been widely used in multidisciplinary studies such as behavioral and social sciences. Content analysis is appropriate and useful in analyzing mass communication research to understand meanings (Lombard et al., 2002).

The content analysis uses scientific rigors to engage in empirical analysis. In mass communication, several studies have analyzed news content on different types of media and platforms (newspapers, Radion, TV, internet, and social media). Content analysis has been applying to analyze various topics (e.g., Lacy et al., 2010; Haigh & Heresco, 2010; Armstrong & Boyle, 2011). While applied in several types of supports such as textual, visuals, video, film, and movie. (E.g. Zeng, & Akinro, 2013; Fahmy & Al-Emad, 2013; Zeng, Agwaziam, & Xiao, 2014).

A quantitative content analysis (CA) was employed to study news coverage Congo conflict 1998-2003. The study also used John Gatling's model for War and Peace

journalism for research. The categories are constructed according to the model's guidelines, and the war and Peace journalism are classified based on this model.

Three media (BBC and Le monde) were selected for the study because of their international readership and audiences. Moreover, they were chosen to represent the two major linguistic zones in Africa: 'English' and 'French.' The coverage period was from August 2, 1998 (the beginning of the conflict) to June 30, 2003 (the official ended of the conflict). Because the study period extends approximately three years before and three years after the new president Kabila assumed office, it provides a symmetrical structure for using his presidency as a variable that could affect the framing of the "Congo conflict." Techniques and criteria for selecting stories an online search was conducted using keywords including 'Congo war,' 'Congo civil war,' 'Congo war,' 'Congo conflict,' 'Kabila.' The search in total retrieved 233 articles. Only 209 were selected as sample of this study.

7.4. Unit of analysis and coding procedure

Inter-coder reliability is critical to content analysis. It is the first proof of the reliability for encoding (Kolbe & Burnett, 1991; Singletary, 1993). Lombard et al. (2002) suggest that inter-coder reliability is "the term for the extent to which independent coders evaluate a characteristic of a message or artifact and reach the same conclusion" (p. 589). The purpose of the Inter-coder reliability is to define uniformity and clarity of content analysis coding instructions among coders. Neuendorf (2002) asserts, "Without the establishment of reliability, content analysis measures are useless" (p. 141). Krippendorff (2004) points out the fact that "in content analysis,

reproducibility is arguably the most important interpretation of reliability" (p. 215). Inter-coder reliability, therefore, tests the strength of a research data analysis process.

The unit of analysis for this study were news stories on Congo conflict 1998-2003 found in the sampled news media (news, reports, and interviews). The categories were operationalized as follows:

John Galtung's war/ peace journalism model was presented in 1986, 1999.

7.4.1. Languages

Language communicates meanings. In this study, Language included victimizing language, demonizing language, or emotive language.

A. Uses victimizing language versus Avoids victimizing language. consists in using a language which puts more emphasis on the suffering, the misery of the people, in order to present them as victims; or whether the article avoided victimization which presents the people as, for example, capable of defending or taking charge of themselves, despite the problems inherent in the conflict.

B. Uses demonizing language versus Avoids demonizing language: The researcher examines whether the journalists use language that presents a group in a negative, pernicious or evil way. e.g., aggressors, rebels, killer, looter, murder, etc.; or avoids demonizing language and uses titles, names of actors in the conflict, or precise descriptions of the group. E.g. President of RCD Goma; the auto defense movement.

C. Uses emotive language versus Avoids emotive language: The researcher examines whether the news or articles use language that provokes strong emotions or

sensationalizes the crisis; or whether the articles avoid emotive language and adopt a temperate language

The use of language was assessed as favorable, unfavorable, or neutral.

7.4.2. Interceder reliability

The unit percentage for calculating inter-coder reliability varies across studies. Lacy and Riffe (1996) recommend 30 units of materials for intercoder reliability, while Wimmer and Dominick (2003) suggest 10 to 25% materials. Siraj (2008), in their study on newspaper coverage of the Pakistan-India conflict over Kashmir, coded 10% of the total sample size. Lombard et al. (2002) recommend a combination of multiple indices to test reliability. This study follows the acceptable level of inter-coder reliability coefficient of Lombard, Snyder-Duch, & Bracken (2004), (Lombard et al., 2002), and Krippendorff (2004), who applied a coefficient of .70 or greater as adequate for calculation.

Therefore, to ensure the reliability of this study, we choose two coders to do the coding for all the media contents under study. They were instructors at the Department of sciences of information and communication at National Pedagogical University, Kinshasa.

Based on 21 articles randomly selected outside the sample size, this study tested for reliability. The researcher coded 11% of the articles separately (11 articles BBC and 10 articles from Le monde). The researcher considers percent agreement and calculated for reliability using SPSS Cohen's Kappa's score from .76 to 1.0. Reactivity .87, Emphasis .85, Visibility of war effects .87, Elite orientation .87, Goal oriented .78,

Differences .77, Good vs bad dichotomy .87, Party orientation .76, Partisanship,

Victimizing language .89, Demonizing language .77, Emotive language .79

respectively. (See Table 7.1). Data analysis was done using IBM SPSS Statistics for

Windows, version 25.0

Table 2 intercoder reliability

Variable	Total Agreement	Total Disagreement	% Agreement	Scott's Pi
Media	21	0	100	1.0
Reactivity	19	2	90	.87
Emphasis	20	1	95	.85
Visibility of the effects of war	20	1	95	.87
Elite vs People orientation	20	1	95	.87
Goal orientation	20	1	95	.78
Différences	20	1	95	.77
Good vs Bad	20	1	95	.87
Party orientation	19	2	90	.76
Partisanship	20	1	95	.89
Victimizing language	19	2	90	.89
Demonizing language	19	2	90	.77
Emotive language	20	1	95	.79

7.5. Results

We conducted a content analysis to analyze the frames adopted by western media during the coverage of the conflict. Focusing on two critical periods of the conflict: before (1998-2001) and after (2001-2003) from the beginning of the conflict in 1998 until the assassination of the president in 2001, and the coming to power of the new president in 2001 to the official end of the conflict in 2003, three years for each period. This period is considered a pivot in the resolution of this complex conflict.

Coding for occurrences of war and peace journalism frames was used to test the H1 and to answer RQ1. The unit of analysis here was the articles. Table 1 contains the basic descriptive statistics of the distributions of war/peace journalism and neutral frames across the western media.

In the entire sample of news items (N 209), 117 items (56, 0%) were framed as war journalism, and about 90 items (43, 1%) were framed as Peace journalism, and two items (1%) were neutral.

We verify the hypothesis. The results support this prediction by revealing a significant difference between the war journalism and the peace journalism approach, $\chi^2 = 201.020$, df=1, p = .000. Both BBC and Le monde produced a significantly war journalism frames compared to peace journalism ($x^2(1, N = 117) = 106.017$, p < .001) and ($x^2(1, N = 90) = 95.001$, p < .001) respectively, in their coverage of the conflict within the period investigated

Distribution of war and peace journalism

Media	war journalism	peace journalism	neutral
BBC	61(52.1)	48(53.3)	1(0.5)
Le monde	56(48.9)	42(46.7)	1(0.5)
N	117(56.0)	90(43.0)	2(1.0)

* Percentages approximate newspaper total.

χ^2= 201.020, df=1, p = .000.

The BBC and Le monde have almost the same proportions of war journalism frames of 55, 6%, and 56, 6%, respectively. This result showed no significant difference in the framing of war and peace journalism between the western media. Excluding the neutral items, the difference was reflected x^2(1, N = 207) = 201.020, p < .001). To identify the salient indicators of war journalism in the western media, the coding to war journalism approach (Table 7.3) was analyzed. Distribution of approaches to war journalism was done across ten indicators adopted from the war/peace journalism model (Gaturg, 1995), which include 'reactive,' 'visible effects of war,' 'elite oriented,' 'zero-sum-oriented,' 'differences-oriented', 'Here and Now,' 'two party-oriented,' 'partisan' stories, 'dichotomize-oriented,' and 'stop reporting' (see McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000). While Distribution of the approach to peace journalism was made across ten frames of peace, journalism also adopted from the Galtung Model. The frames include 'proactive,' 'invisible effects of war,' 'people-oriented,' 'agreement oriented,' 'causes and consequences, 'avoid labeling Good vs. Bad. 'win-win oriented,' 'multiparty oriented', 'non-partisan,' and 'stay on aftermatch' stories (McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000).

Table7.3: Distribution of Approaches to war and peace journalism   across western Media

		BBC		Le Monde	
		N	%	N	%
	reactive	3	2.7%	1	1.0%
	Visible effects	30	27.3%	44	44.4%
	Elite-oriented	99	90.0%	91	91.9%
War Journalism	difference oriented	55	49.5%	56	56.6%
	focused on here and now	50	45.5%	40	40.4%
	Dichotomizes good and bad,	51	46.4%	63	63.6%
	Two-party orientation	45	40.9%	46	46.5%
	Partisan	25	22.7%	43	43.4%
	Zero-sum orientation	32	29.1%	39	39.4%
	invisible effects of war	16	14.5%	16	16.2%
	people-oriented	10	9.1%	10	10.1%
	agreement-oriented	33	30.0%	41	41.2%
	causes and consequences of the conflict	24	21.8%	36	36.4%
Peace Journalism	Avoid labeling of good guys and bad guys	46	41.8%	35	35.4%
	Multiparty orientation	39	35.5%	31	31.3%
	Non-partisan	74	67.3%	55	55.3%
	Win-win orientation	25	22.7%	19	19.2%
	Stays on and reports aftermath of war	1	0.9%	16	16.2%

Table 4

The frames were coded deductively, using content analytic variables based on their predefined meanings in the peace journalism model (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000). This is to ensure consistency of methodological approach and interpretative framework. Coding verifies the extent to which the frames occur in the contents examined. The presentation here is based on the three most salient indicators of war/peace journalism approaches in each western media. In BBC, the salient indicators supporting war journalism were Elite-oriented 99 stories (92%), followed by

difference-oriented 55 stories (50%), and dichotomize-oriented' 51 stories (46,4%). In the same media, the most salient indicators of peace journalism are non-partisan 74 stories (67, 3%), followed by avoiding labeling Good vs. bad 46 (41, 8%), and 32% multiple party orientation with 39(35, 5%) respectively.

Le Monde produced 56 war journalism stories. Out of the 56 stories, the most salient frames were elite-oriented with 91 stories (91, 9%), followed by dichotomizing Good vs. bad with 63 stories (63, 6%), and difference-oriented with 56 stories (56, 6%), respectively. In the same media, the most salient indicators of peace journalism are non-partisan with 55 stories (55, 6%), followed by reporting area of agreement with 41 stories (55, 4%), and causes and consequences 36 stories (36, 4%), respectively.

The RQ2 also asks if there is any difference in war/peace journalism indicators between the two western media.

Results showed that in terms of salient indicators of war journalism, both BBC and Le Monde share common salient indicators but in a different order, except for 'elite-oriented frames, which is the most salient indicator of the two western media. However, in peace journalism, results showed differences in terms of frequency between the two western media. While for the BBC, the most important indicators were avoid labeling (41, 8%) and multiparty (35, 5%), for Le monde reporting area of agreement (55, 4%) and causes and consequences were among the three important indicators. However, the two media have in common 'non-partisan' (BBC 36, 4% and Le monde, 55, 6%) as the most salient indicators of peace journalism.

RQ3: ask about the indicators of war and peace journalism languages

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Results show that in BBC, in term of frequency, 'use demonizing language' took 47,3 % of the occurrence of 'war journalism languages' in the coverage of the conflict within the period investigated, followed by 'use victimized' (31%) and 'Use emotive languages' (20,9%). In the same media, in terms of frequency, the indicators of peace language were: 'avoid demonizing words' (42%), followed by 'avoid victimizing words' (37, 3%), and 'avoid emotive words (37, 3%) respectively.

Le Monde, in terms of frequency of war languages, produced 61(61, 6%) of 'use demonizing words' 61(61, 6%), followed by 'use victimizing words'43 (43, 4%) and use emotive words 40 (40, 4%) respectively. In the same western media, the occurrence of indicators of peace language was 'avoid victimizing words' 41(41, 4%), followed by 'avoid emotive words' 41(41, 4%), and 'avoid demonizing words 35(35, 4%) respectively.

Table 7.4: Distribution of war and peace language across western media

	N	Percent	N
Uses victimizing language	35	31.8%	43
Uses demonizing language	52	47.3%	61

Uses emotive language	23	20.9%	40
Avoids victimizing language	41	37.3%	41
Avoids demonizing language	47	42.7%	35
Avoids emotive words	41	41.4%	82

Table 5* Percentages approximate newspaper total.

(χ^2 = 4.316, df=1, p. = .038)
(χ^2 = 9.404, df=1, p. = .002)
(χ^2 = 1.188, df=, p. = .276)

Results showed that the 'use demonizing words' (χ^2 = 4.316, df=1, p. = .038) and 'use emotive words' (χ^2 = 9.404, df=1, p. = .002) respectively were significantly different among BBC and Le monde. No significant difference was found for 'use victimizing words' between the two media (χ^2 = .375, df=1, p. = .540).

Indicators of peace language showed significant difference for 'avoid demonizing words' (χ^2 = 1.188, df=, p. = .276), and no significant difference for 'avoid victimizing words' (χ^2 = .375, df=1, p. = .540) and 'avoid emotive words' (χ^2 = .375, df=1, p. = .540), among BBC and Le monde.

RQ4. Asked about the significant difference in news coverage of the Congo conflict by BBC and Le monde, concerning war/peace journalism and indicator of language frames, before and after 2001.

To examine the developing patterns of war journalism, peace journalism, and peace/war languages over the two different periods, which 2001 is the critical period in terms of change in the presidency office (Table 4), we conducted an X^2-test. The presentation here is the sum of the two western media.

Before 2001 with the late president, 102 news items were recorded in the sample period, among which 102 items (87, 2%) contained war journalism frames, 11 items (12%) of peace journalism frames, and 0 for neutral frames. After a shift of power, the proportion changes considerably. To 79 items (87%) of Peace journalism frames, followed by war journalism frames 15(12, 8%) and neutral frames two items (see Table 4). The results of the Chi-square test that was conducted to compare war/peace journalism frames of the two periods were statistically significant (χ^2 = 111.447, df=1, p =.000). The results showed that change in the presidency office was associated with framing in western's coverage of the Congo conflict.

We conducted an X^2-test to find differences, if any, about western's media coverage of the conflict concerning war/journalism languages before and after 2001 (see table…). Result showed significant difference during the two-period time with 'use demonizing language (χ^2 = 78.966, df=1, p =.000), use victimizing languages (χ^2 = 42.119, df=1, p =.000), emotive languages (χ^2 = 29.440, df=1, p =.000).

In addition, results showed significant difference of the indicators of peace languages with avoid victimizing words (χ^2 = 79.347, df=1, p =.000), avoid emotive words (χ^2 = 74.363, df=1, p =.000), and avoid demonizing words (χ^2 = 95.267, df=1, p =.000) respectively. The results revealed that western media coverage of the Congo conflict varied significantly during the second presidency. Results showed that Western media used significantly more indicators of war language and fewer indicators of peace language during the period before. While they used significantly more indicators of peace languages and fewer indicators of war language in the period after the new

president took the place of the late president, suggesting a shift in the framing of Congo conflict.

7.6. Discussion

The study supports previous studies on war and peace journalism that have found the dominance of violence and conflict (Wolfsfeld, 2004) dominating media coverage, especially among western media (Lynch, 2007). Nevertheless, also the emergence of peace journalism approach consideration in the coverage of conflict (Wolfsfeld, 2004).

In this study, Western media coverage of the Congo conflict was reported as a war journalism approach across time, confirming the prediction in the first hypothesis. Based on the nine indicators of war and peace journalism and six language frames, the present study indicates a remarkable shift of framing in coverage of the conflict. The war journalism approach and war language dominated the coverage of the conflict during the first presidency. In contrast, the peace journalism approach and peace journalism language dominated the news coverage of the same conflict during the second presidency. Implications were drawn from the dominant representations of the variables considered in this study as well as narratives.

The elite-oriented frames constitute the most dominant frames across time of investigation, even in the second phase of the conflict. The peace journalism approach dominated the media coverage. The news stories focused on the elites, interviewing, citing, and quoting mainly government leaders, officials, representatives of rebel groups, and other main actors in the conflict as the primary sources while using less

sourcing from the grassroots level and independent origin. The cause might be the poor mobilization of resources exert for media coverage of the conflict. The media resources might be limited due to the lack of interest of western media to cover this conflict. A limited media resources compared to the complexity of the ground. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a country as large as Western Europe, poorly connected because of a glaring lack of road and telecommunication infrastructures, whose internet and mobile phone penetration rate was very low at that time. Reporters might have confined to the main actors of the war, thus limiting their sources of information.

7.6.1. Language

Lee and Maslog (2005) considered language from three perspectives: languages that demonize, victimize, or are emotive. They suggested that the war journalism approach supports all three forms of language, while peace journalism avoids all of them. This study found high use of all three language styles, hence supporting a high use of the war journalism approach before and the high avoidance in the period after, suggesting a shift in the framing of Congo conflict by both western media. The use of demonizing language was the most salient indicator of war journalism in BBC and Le Monde.

The news stories with demonizing language had labels to put down government officials, rebel groups, and countries involved in the conflict, especially Rwanda and Uganda. Words such as 'born killer,' 'invaders,' 'aggressors,' 'dictator,' 'rebels,' etc. For instance, BBC published that 'the television said the "Rwandan Tutsi invaders" were "born killers," among whose first victims were the Congolese people' (BBC, August 9,

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1998). The second phase of the conflict was dominated in 'avoiding the use of demonizing language,' suggesting that a more significant number of the news stories by BBC and Le monde attempted to highlight efforts to manage the conflict for peace purposes.

7.6.2. A shift in media framing

The significant shift from war to peace journalism framing, as well as from war to peace language in western media's coverage of Congo conflict, after the change of power might have indicated a pivotal point shift in western public diplomacy and Congo's foreign and national policy to resolve the Congo conflict.

Indeed, from the beginning of the conflict until the assassination of President Laurent Desire Kabila, the relations between the Congo and the international community were frontal. One of the significant causes of confrontation was the absence of condemnation and the refusal of the UN's Security Council to qualify the Congo conflict as a 'war of aggression of which Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi were 'foreigner aggressors' (Livre blanc, 1999). The UN's perspective of the conflict was instead a rebellion, suggesting a problem between Congolese. Another cause of confrontation in the international scene was the disagreement about the UN's interposition force. These major's questions made the late president the main obstacle of the peace process initiative on the international scene. Several news stories of the conflict used in this study present the late president administration as an obstacle to peaceful resolutions and ambitions from the global and western countries. Further shreds of evidence are observed in the use of war journalism language, which 'use demonizing word' was one

of the most salient indicators during the first presidency. Some news stories published in BBC and Le monde newspaper titles -- 'Kabila 'bombs rebel towns,' 'Kabila rejects Lusaka accord,' 'Kabila feels the heat,' or 'Kabila: the mess,' 'President Kabila threatens to bring the war to Rwanda,' 'Laurent-Désiré Kabila violates the embargo imposed on Libya by the UN'-- are evocative of negative coverage of the first phase of the conflict, dominated by the war journalism approach and war languages.

Furthermore, in his news on Saturday, February 3, 2001, titled: 'Kabila urges new peace effort,' the BBC news says: Joseph Kabila's assassinated father (the late president), Laurent, was widely viewed as creating obstacles to the Lusaka peace process. The new president is trying to overcome them. Western media underlined the change in power as a critical point that might lead to conflict resolution. BBC and Le monde newspaper differentially portrayed the new president, compared to the late president. On Sunday, February 4, 2001, BBC News published an article titled: 'Kabila returns from peace offensive.' The BBC redaction wrote: Mr. Kabila's address to the UN Security Council. He urged the warring sides to sit down around a table with him to talk peace […] Mr. Kabila told the UN Security Council that his country had suffered too much. It was now vital that the peace process should be revived. He called for a precise timetable for the disengagement of the warring parties within his country and a 5,500-strong UN force deployment. UN ambassadors appeared impressed by the new leader's statement; although several countries made it clear that, they now want to see real progress on the ground.

This portrayal of the new power could be seen as a new coverage perspective of the conflict, oriented towards peace journalism approach and peace languages, and an opportunity for the international community to set in motion its logic of conflict resolution challenged by the previous regime. A Le monde's article published on April 29, 2001, titled 'Joseph Kabila, the unexpected successor,' Stephane Smith journalist wrote:

'By closing, Friday, April 27, his first hundred days in power, Joseph Kabila preserved the founding myth of his regime: after the murder of his father-president (the late president), in constant conflict with the international community, the heir son took over in perfectly reconciling the nationalist discourse that the Congolese want to hear with the demands of the Western powers for a pacification, under the auspices of the UN, of the country-continent in Central Africa'.

In the Congo conflict context, western media could be seen as a public diplomacy tool of western power, especially from members of UN's Security Council, British and France in this case, to achieve, according to their vision, the peace process and bring back peace and reconciliation. The public diplomacy of France and British in this conflict could derive its substance from the foreign policy of these two countries towards Africa. Indeed, the Congo conflict was qualified of the 'Africa world war.' It directly implied eight African armies, including those from countries members of the commonwealth (Uganda, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Namibia) and Francophonie (Burundi, Rwanda, Thad). DR Congo is the biggest francophone country nowadays. Such conflict could not leave western countries indifferent because it directly affects

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their foreign policy on Africa. Western media could have played public diplomacy role in accompanying the efforts and diplomatic strategy for peace. For instance, on Wednesday, 23/01/ 2002, the BBC published an analysis titled: 'Congo peace remains elusive. The analysis was related to a joint peace mission of UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and the French Foreign Minister Huber Vedrine. Interviewed by BBC, The French Foreign Minister states: 'France's aim on this joint trip had been two-fold. One was to present a united front to the main parties involved in Congo, to show them they could no longer play off the two former colonial powers in the region […]'. In his analysis, BBC wrote:

'[…] it seems the two ministers had agreed in their joint audiences with African leaders of the past three days to work in tandem. If in Congo - France traditional allied - the French delegation was to take a tougher line; in Rwanda, where Britain's ties are strong, Mr. Straw was the one to push hardest'. In the perspective of Western African policy and public diplomacy, it is then notorious that western media might shift in their framing of the Congo conflict from a war journalism approach to peace-oriented coverage of the conflict for public diplomacy purposes. By moving and emphasizing the peace journalism approach, it may be implied that the western media attempted to raise support towards the New Congolese government and the new national and foreign policy efforts for conflict resolution. The UN's peace resolution and western power's initiative to bring peace by bringing all parties in the conflict in the peace process of the UN resolutions and the Lusaka agreement were the frameworks planned for the end of the conflict. This shift might have contributed to sustaining the peace process of the Congo.

CHAPTER VIII

MEDIA ECOSYSTEM CONFIGURATION AND ROLE IN THE CONGO CONFLICT:

8.1. Introduction

This section aims to understand and verify the role of the media in the course of the conflict, in term of destructive (escalation) or constructive (de-escalation) frames, as well as resolution of the conflict and reconciliation. This analysis is carried out taking into account the media environment in which the conflict took place. It is question here of answering the research questions 5 and 6, and to verify the hypotheses 3 and 4

8.2. Second fold: Research questions and Hypotheses

Based on the constructive journalism approach, this study analyzes the frames on the Congolese conflict as broadcast in the media (BBC, Le Monde and RTNC). We thus pose two research questions, which address the content of the frames used between 1998-2003, taking into account their destructive or constructive character to determine (de)escalation. Starting from the normative idea of balanced coverage, we assume that the news programs in the different channels offer diversified perspectives on conflicts. Therefore, we ask the following:

RQ5: How do western and Congo media news programs frame the Congo conflict?

The development of the Congo conflict can be subdivided into two periods, which is constitute of war and negotiation. Given the media's preference for violence, we therefore expect to find fundamentally destructive frames on conflict that deal with blaming each party and highlight recommendations for problem resolution. Thus, constructive frames might play a minor role. Therefore, we request the following:

RQ6: To what extent are constructive and destructive frames used in the news programs of the Western and Congolese media, and is there any difference in term of time?

H2: The influence of political power (internal and international) on the media creates a "media bi-cephalism" or 'bipolarity' in the media ecosystem, on the edge of the tensions.

H3: If these influences clash, the media also collide, suggesting conflict escalation, and if these influences take up, the media align, suggesting de-escalation.

8.3. Method

The present research uses qualitative content analysis to identify the dominant frames that structure news coverage of the Congo conflict 1998-2003 by three media (BBC, Le Monde, and RTNC). Rather than taking the path of predefined frames, this study thus used the advantages of qualitative research applied to the complexity and variation of the frameworks provided in reports, press conferences, and shows (Altheide, 1997; Cassell & Symon, 1994).

8.4. Sample

We conducted the comparative content analysis of the selected news programs of the three media, assuming that these thematic areas should gain the maximum attention of Media. We examined all relevant video clips of news, special programs, shows, and interviews about the Congo crisis, broadcasted and published from 02 august 1998 to 30 June 2003. Three media (BBC, Le monde and RTNC) were selected for the study because of their international readership and audiences.

Moreover, they were selected to represent the two major linguistic zones in Africa: 'English' and 'French.' The coverage period was from August 2, 1998(the beginning of the conflict) to June 30, 2003 (the official ended of the conflict). Because the study period extends approximately three years before and three years after the new president Kabila assumed office, it provides a symmetrical structure for using his presidency as a variable that could affect the framing of the "Congo conflict."

Table 6 Titles and dates of News stories

RTNC		Titles	Date
	1	The troubled role of the DRC's neighbors in the war in the east of the country	11 August 1998
	2	President Laurent-Désiré Kabila on the aggression of Congo	7 January 1999
	3	Kinshasa: Civil Front of Popular Resistance	07 august 1998
	4	the war of aggression in the democratic republic of the Congo	15 December 2000
	5	massacres and genocide "behind closed doors"	17 January 1999
	6	press briefing on exploitation of natural resources in democratic republic of Congo	19 November 2001
	7	Press conference by president of democratic republic of the Congo	11 November 2001
	8	la guerre en RDC enjeux économiques	03 May 2001
	9	Kabila Promises to Hold Dialogue with Rebel Groups	01 February, 2001
	10	President Kabila calls for unity and dialogue	05 January, 2002

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Techniques and criteria for selecting stories an online search was conducted using keywords including 'Congo war,' 'Congo civil war,' 'Congo war,' 'Congo conflict,' 'Kabila.' The search in total accessed and retrieved 250 media contents (news, video programs and articles). We randomly selected 30 news programs, 10 for each media, including 5 news programs for each period of the conflict. 10-news program for RTNC, 10-news program for BBC and 10 articles for le Monde.

Table 7 newspaper titled

Le Monde		Titles	Date
	1	M. Kabila « the mess »	07 août 1998
	2	President Kabila threatens to bring war to Rwanda	08 août 1998
	3	Joseph Kabila, the unexpected successor	le 29 avril 2001
	4	DRC: Joseph Kabila accelerates his reforms	05 avril 2001
	5	In the Congolese bush, rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba urges Kabila to negotiate	08 février 2001
	6	Joseph Kabila is expected in the United States at the end of the week	31 janvier 2001
	7	Allies "and" enemies "of Congo-Kinshasa engage in" systematic looting "of its wealth	23 mars 2001
	8	The looting of the Congo continues, according to the UN	21 novembre 2001
	9	Joseph Kabila, "model" president	04 février 2004
	10	In search of the pacification of the country	14 août 2003

8.5. Coding procedure

We Followed Mayring's (2014) approach that identifies frames that emerge through an iterative process. In addition, we combined the principles of openness and systematic methodology (Kohlbacher, 2006). The analysis inductively generates thematic frames by systemizing and condensing frames uttered in the selected content.

Thus, criteria for emerging frames were operationalized using Entman's framing approach. According to Entman (1993: 52), a 'frame' consists of a combination of four elements, which are: a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/ or treatment recommendation for the item described.' In the operationalization, the 'problem definitions' are considered the most critical frame element because they 'often virtually predetermine the rest of the frame' (Entman, 2004: 6). Although Entman's framing definition has been criticized for lacking conceptual clarity (Borah, 2011), his definition fits our analysis framework, as applied often in communication and media studies. Through an iterative process, the chosen content was coded by two university instructors majoring in mass communication using the frame elements as the main categories. Emerged frames were grouped and were used as new categories (Lichtenstein et al., 2019). At the end of the process, we built frames into frame groups based on their thematic content. According to the emphasized frame elements, we finally differentiated between constructive and destructive frames. (Lichtenstein et al., 2019).

As a result, four newsgroup frames were created: (1) Local situation; (2) International arena; (3) Local Politics and; (4) International Politics.

8.6. Results

In analyzing the sample of 20 western and 10 Congolese news programs, we found 14 different frames for Western and 12 frames for Congo. The news programs include two main focuses: frames on the locale situation and frames on international arena between Congo and International community (UN & Security Council,) and other

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countries. For both strands of the News programs, frames are grouped by their problem definition and distinguished according to the other three frame elements, if available – the situational causal interpretation, the personal causal interpretation and the problem treatment – and assigned to one of the two time periods of the Conflict (Before and After Kabila).

We finally structured the frames into frame groups based on their thematic content.

8.6.1. Before Kabila (period I). Time of war and agreement

Within the broadcasting news and discussions about international and national tensions surrounding the Congo conflict, frames refer to issues in international and national relations that might lead to escalation during the first presidency, from the conflict trigger in 02 august 1998 till the assassination of the president in 17 January 2001 (period I). Most of the emerged frames addressed this event in conflict manner and provide a broader story line for interpreting increase in confrontations between actors in the conflict. The frames are summarized into two groups that deal with (1) Local situations, (2) International Arena

8.6.2.1. Frames on Locale situation.

Frames on politics in Congo

Among the Congolese (RTNC) broadcastings, three frames address the political destabilization of Congo as an issue. A political view is expressed by the frame **'freedom fight against'** Hima-Tutsi hegemony that blames President of Uganda,

Yoweri Museveni and the vice-president of Rwanda Paul Kagame (became president since), as well as the former Tutsi allies of the president Kabila, to intent to balkanize the eastern part of Congo, in order to create a new mono-ethnic country, constituting of the Hima-Tutsi ethnic group (Yerodia, abdoulay Ndombasi, Minister of foreigner affairs, august, 1998). According to President Kabila the extension of territories (in the benefit of Uganda and Rwanda) is another motivation of the war […] the Hima-Tutsi empire need territories. They want Congolese territories' (RTNC, 1998). The frame blames Uganda and Rwanda for disregarding the ethnic diversity of Congo, discriminating against, and killing the Congolese population. The frame calls for IC intervention and population to resist the aggressors. Using the frame 'freedom struggle against Hima-Tutsi hegemony.'(RTNC, 1998).

Table 8 Frames on Locale situation.

Group frame	Frames in International Media	Frame in Local Media
Politics	Allied insurrection; Kabila regime; Free freedom; Free media	Freedom fight against Hima-Tutsi hegemony; Western media propaganda
Economics	Stabilize Congo; Economical disarticulation	Mineral of blood
Human Interest	Ethnic minority threat	Human distress
Military	War Bill, Updating position	National war effort

The frame **'western Media propaganda'** criticizes mass media of Europe, broadcasting in Congo for actively adopting a one-sided perspective of news coverage about the Congo conflict, demonizing L.D Kabila and spreading anti-Kabila regime propaganda.

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In the international opponents of the Congo media ecosystem, the frame **'allied insurrection'** refers to the disagreement within the executive power and blames president Kabila for nepotism, monopolizing all the powers, restricting political space, freedoms and of violating human rights (Ernest wamba dia wamba, president of RCD movement, 17 august, 1998).

According to Wamba dia Wamba, president of 'Rassemblemnt congolais pour la democratize'(RCD), the reason for the rebellion is that Kabila is accused to use power for 'corruption, concussion, nepotism, patronage, arbitrariness, etc.' [...]. Adding to the RCD's president declaration, Bizima Kahara, former foreigner minister of president Kabila, now fighting against his regime said that unfortunately, things that we agreed with Kabila when we were in Goma, when we started our movement. We, members of his government realized that Kabila was liar, tribalism, a nepotism and they were no way Kabila could corrupt everybody in Congo. That is the reason why we decide to leave. (BBC, 17, August, 1998). As problem treatment, this frame calls for negotiation to clear up their divergence and ask Kabila to respect the deals.

The frame **'Kabila regime'** refers to the august 1998 trigger conflict. It blames the government of 'anti-democratic,' of 'dictatorship'. It stressed that Kinshasa lacks legitimacy, leadership and disregards human rights. (Remy Ourdan, le monde, 19, august, 1998). The frame called for democratic reforms and political openness through political dialogue

The frame **'free-freedom'** refers to the violation of human rights, freedoms of citizens and freedom of associations. It blames both sides, the government and rebel

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groups, for violating human rights principles. As a solution, the frame calls on conflicting parties to respect human rights and urges the UN to investigate on human rights violation and UN's Security Council to take sanctions against violators.

The frame **'free-media'** refers to the violation of press freedom and media shutdown. It blames both sides, government and rebel groups for using coercive force and arresting journalists and members of civil society for their opinion. As a problem treatment, this frame, the frame calls on conflicting parties to reopen median and free journalist. It urges the UN to investigate on press freedom violations and UN's Security Council to take sanctions against violators.

Frames on economics in Congo

RTNC

A similar view is expressed by the frame **'mineral blood',** which emphasizes the illicit exploitation of the Congo's natural resources and its consequences on Congolese society at the cost of human lives, condemning child labor. It also highlights the financing of the war because of trafficking. It thus allows the perpetuation and the violence of the conflict, within the country (RTNC, 1999), through the cycle of trafficking, money, gun purchases, and violence.

As problem treatment, the frame calls the international community to identify the traffickers, find ways and means to stop this illegal exploitation, and destroy this sector with global means that escape the Congo.

The frame **'stabilize Congo'** asserts that the august 1998 trigger conflict and the subsequence instability, in term of 'country separation,' could lead the Congolese economy to collapse. 'The war suffocates the moribund economy of Congo-Kinshasa. State revenues are mainly spent on the war effort' (Fritscher, 20/03/199) It blames Rwanda and Uganda's armies for sabotaging civilian infrastructure and pillage of administrative and financial resources (stealing and imposing taxes, banks) in part under their control. The frame calls for the preservation of public goods.

The frame **'economic disarticulation'** explains the weakness of the Congolese economy through corruption and conflict economic issues and highlights the necessity of stabilizing Congo's economic structures (Thomas Sotinel, Le monde, 06/09/1998). 'And Central Bank Governor Jean-Claude Masangu warned the war was threatening to derail monetary reforms, with disruption of imports and exports pushing inflation ever higher. «We had a programme of rebuilding the country. That programme has now been turned upside-down," Mr Masangu said. «Our priority today basically is to fund the war, and that war has a devastating effect."(BBC, 19/09/1998) 'IT blames President Kabila and his government for lacking political vision in the country's economic leadership.

Frames on human interests in Congo conflict

Further, along with the discussion and media coverage on political, military, and economic issues in the Congo conflict, media problematize the struggling of the population due to violence in the escalation of the 1998-2003 Congo conflict. As an

issue explanation**, the frame ' human distress.'** the frame emphases on issues such as famine crises,' rapes, summary executive, refugees issue, child labor issue in the mines, etc. BCC reporter said that The MSF discovered that in zones most affected by the war, adults and children were dying far faster than they would in peacetime. […], it was down to malnutrition and disease, looting, and violence. In Basankusu, near the front line, 10% of adults had died over a 12-month period - a mortality rate five times higher than normal. During the same period, a quarter of children under five years old died - again, about five times the rate in peacetime' (BBC correspondent Richard Black, 20/12/2001).

The frame avoids blaming a single side in the conflict and call for dialogue, reconciliation and peace.

In the BBC media, the frame **'ethnic minority threat'** refers to the complexity of Congolese ethnic mosaic, calling, throughout the conflict, to protect civilians, especially from the Tutsi ethnic (BBC, 13/08 1998). The frame calls for protecting vulnerable people by securing them and provide shelter for them.

Frames on military issues in Congo.

RTNC

The frame **'national war effort'** refers to the august 1998 trigger of conflict and highlights the coordinated mobilization of the ruler party in collecting resources for the 'war efforts' (Mwenze Kongolo, Minister of Justice, 02/09/1999). The frame calls for supporting military forces engaged in the frontline through civilian mobilization,

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recruitment for military service, and persuading the public and private companies to participate in 'war fund', made available by the government.

BBC and Le Monde

In the economic perspective of the Congo conflict, the frame **'war Bill'** Refers to the weakening of the Congolese economy and blames the government of Kinshasa with its military allies for making financial arrangements through the irregular cession of mines in order to pay the countries fighting alongside the Congolese government. BBC reporter said that 'The cost of fighting Congo's civil war has had a devastating effect on the economy of the entire region. Many of President Mugabe's woes in Zimbabwe can be traced directly to his involvement here' (BBC, 24/01/2001). The frame calls for transparency and publication of contracts and mines attributed to certain countries such as Zimbabwe.

The frame **'updating position'** refers to the august trigger conflict and highlights military operations. It informs, especially, on military progress on the ground and the falling and recovery of towns and villages by the different military forces (government army or rebel groups back by foreign armies) engaged at the front. The frame was used throughout the conflict to determine the political-military sphere of influence of each belligerent nationally. It allows audiences to know the extent of influence of each belligerent geographically and administratively.

Table 9.4. Constructive and destructive frames in Locale situation

	Frames in International Media	Frame in Local Media
Constructive frames	Stabilize Congo	Mineral of blood; Human distress
In-Between	Economical disarticulation; Free freedom; Free media; Updating position	National war effort
Destructive frames	Allied insurrection; Kabila regime; Ethnic minority threat; War Bill	Freedom fight against hima-Tutsi hegemony; Western media propaganda

8.6.2.2. Frames on international arena on Congo.

Frames on International Politics

The frame **'war of aggression'** refers to the august 1998 trigger of conflict and engages in blaming Uganda and Rwanda military presence in the east of Congo. While this military presence is condemning by Congolese government. During an interview in RTNC, president Kabila asserted that 'it should be remembered that it is countries member of the UN and the African Union [Uganda, Rwanda] that invaded Congolese soil' (RTNC, 27/11/1998). The frame accuses namely President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, president Paul Kagame of Rwanda, as well as Pierre Buyoya of Burundi, of violating international rights by ordering their troops to cross the Congolese borders and to commit abuses. As treatment, the Congolese government asks the United Nations and the UN's Security Council to condemn the three incriminated countries according to the charter of the United Nations.

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Table 10 frame group

Frame Group	International Media	Local Media
International Politics	Peace Obstacle	War of aggression; Double standard; Shadow of balkanization
National Politics	XXXXXX	XXXXXX
International Economy	Mining of Conflict	Plunder of Congo

Adding to 'war of aggression,' **the frame 'double standard'** is used about the international community and accuses the security council of the united nations of partiality on the question of the aggression of the Congo by the foreign armies, refusing to condemn this aggression according to the charter of a united nation. The frame compares the Congo to the aggression of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, where the Security Council condemned Iraq and ordered it to leave Kuwait immediately. The president of the DRC declares, during a conference organized on the sidelines of his official visit to Belgium and broadcasted by RTNC, on November 25, 1998 the following:

It should be remembered that' these are member countries (Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi) of the UN, members of the OAU which, with their armies, invaded Congolese land. In the case of Kuwait, as everyone knows, the Kuwaitis were not asked to talk to the Iraqis. We have all seen an armada to go and restore order! In our case (Congo aggression), they (international community) tell us: negotiate with the aggressor.

'…'as a solution, the frame asks IC to amend this injustice by officially recognizing and condemning Ruanda and Uganda as the aggressor.

The frame **'balkanization shadow'** refers to the threat of the division of Congo, especially its eastern part, in several republics and blames the presidents of Rwanda and Uganda, as well international (American and British) lobbying of proceeding to the division of the country into several autonomous territories, in order to make them independent states in the future. It stresses that the successive wars in the Great Lakes region are part of this plan (Freddy Mulumba, Journalist and vice-president of 'Groupe de Presse le Potentiel, 2000). during an interview relayed by the RTNC, president Kabila declares: "the threat of the loss of our sovereignty and our independence; and we called on the Belgian authorities to exercise their leverage with other decision-makers in the international community and in particular the European Union in order to ensure respect for the rights of the Congolese people; to demand the withdrawal of the occupying troops from our territory " (RTNC, 25, November, 1998).

As a problem treatment, this frame calls for resistance and unity of Congolese people against the project and ask international community to condemn the starting of the project from the presence of foreigner military in eastern Congo.

Frames on International Economics

These Frames are part of the central issue of the 1998-2003 Congo conflict. It defines Congo's weak economy and illegal exploitation of natural resources as the main problem of the crisis. It refers primarily to the august 1998 trigger conflict but is also used throughout the crisis.

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RTNC

The frame **'plunder the Congo'** argues that the august 1998 trigger of conflict and the subsequent instability of Congo in general, and the eastern regions in particular, is motivated by neighboring countries and multinational companies to take control over the natural resources of the Congo. During an interview in RTNC, the president Kabila argued that 'aggression, you know, has an economic motivation. All this looting in the east [of the Congo], mines, coffee, gold.' (RTNC, 25/11/ 1998). The frame blames neighboring countries (Ruanda, Uganda, and Burundi) and multinationals for illegal trade and traffic. The aggressors of the Democratic Republic of Congo had planned how the map of the region should be

Redrawn in order to plunder its riches. Therefore, UN's experts concluded in their report that "The main motives for the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo have become access to five critical resources - colombotantalite, diamond, copper, cobalt and gold - as well as control and trade. Of these materials. "The riches of the Congo arouse agreed that is difficult to resist" (Professor Ntumba Luaba, 2001). The frame highlights International Community's responsibility on the matter. Well organized criminal, aided and protected by senior Ugandan and Rwandan officers, loot the mineral wealth of the DRC [...] Uganda and Rwanda, control in the regions they occupy, more than 70% of Congo's mineral and forest wealth, thus creating a market for illegal transactions in which arms dealers, traffickers and the military come together (Okitundu, 1999). As problem treatment, this frame asks the international community

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to condemn the actors at the origin of this plundering and impose UN's sanctions on countries involved in this international plundering of Congo.

BBC& LE MONDE

The frame **'mining conflict'** which has its counterpart in RTNC refers to august 1998 trigger and highlights the international networks, which was formed around the riches of the Congo. The frame explains the illegal exploitation of companies. Unlike the RTNC, which names the neighboring countries of illegal mineral transaction. It accuses foreign backers of both sides of pillage. The commercial activities of the aggressor countries in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) go beyond the category of "illegal exploitation" to reach that of "systematic pillage", the final recipients of which are, in their order of economic importance, the following countries: The United States, Germany, Belgium and Kazakhstan. "(Bassir Pour, le monde, 2001). The extent of the plundering of the riches of the Congo by countries" not invited "but also by countries" invited "by the authorities in Kinshasa, which transformed the former Zaire into a regional battlefield. The 'mining conflict' frame highlights the fact of illegal exploitation beyond the borders of Africa, establishing global links of countries and companies engaged in the traffic. As solution treatment, the imposition of sanctions on companies and countries that were carrying out large-scale illicit exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Table 11 Constructive and destructive frames on international arena

	Frames in International Media	Frame in Local Media
Constructive frames	XXXXXXX	XXXXXXX
In-between	XXXXX	XXXXXX
Destructive frames	Peace obstacle; Mining of conflict	War of aggression; Double standard; Shadow of balkanization; Plunder of Congo

8.6.3. After Kabila (period II). Time of agreement toward peace and reconciliation

Within the broadcasting news and discussions about international and national tensions surrounding the Congo conflict, frames refer to issues in international and national relations that lead to de-escalation after change in power (period II). Most of the emerged frames addressed this event in peaceful manner and provide a broader story line for interpreting decrease in confrontations between actors in the conflict. The frames are summarized into two groups that deal with (1) international politics, (2) national politics.

International politics on the conflict

International media, the frame **'New Kabila'** refers to the new power in contradiction to the former, willing to implement the peace agreements leading to reconciliation and reunification of the country. It encourages the new regime to implement the agreements and resolutions of the United Nations that the old regime was unable to apply.

In national media, the frame **'belligerent'** refers to parties in conflict in national perspective. It acknowledges the 'national' character and the Congolese nationality of all so-called rebels from Rwanda (RTNC, 26/01/2001). The frame highlights the 'Congolese-Congolese' aspect of the conflict, emphasizing the need for dialogue between Congolese, in order to find solutions to peace in the Congo.

The frame **'heading to peace** 'refers to calls for dialogue and reconciliation. It relays the message of civil society movements, calling all layers of the population for peace. Appeals which result in walks to support peace initiatives and memos addressed to the belligerents and to the United Nations. It focuses on stability and the return to unity of all parts of society, once divided by war. We highlight the responsibility of the belligerents to free administrative, political, religious entities and openings of communication routes, in order to reconnect the country again and facilitate the movement of people and their property. All media (national and international) apply this frame across this second period. For instance, in his publication entitled: 'Joseph Kabila, the unexpected successor', the journalist of the world how that: Certainly, Joseph Kabila, calling for peace and democracy, allowed the United Nations to deploy their peacekeepers. He also authorized the "facilitator" of the inter-Congolese dialogue, former Botswanan president Ketumile Masire, to resume his good offices'. (Le monde, 28/04/2001)

In all media the frame, the frame **" inter-Congolese dialogue '** refers to refers to a national consultation framework for reconciliation between Congolese. It includes

a causal interpretation that is not limited to the political actions of only one side in the conflict, but addresses Congo as well as other actors engaged in the peacebuilding initiatives. All media (national and international) apply this frame across this second period. For instance, in his publication entitled: The inter-Congolese dialogue launched the transition but did not remove the pitfalls', the journalist of the world how this: 'The day after the signing in Sun City (North) of a "historic" act launching the transition Congolese, many problems remain to be resolved. At the end of nineteen months of negotiations, the process was officially launched which, under the presidency of Joseph Kabila, should lead the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), within two to three years, to free and democratic elections. - The first since independence, June 30, 1960' (Le monde, 03/04/2003).

Table 12 Shift frames

Frame group	International media	Local media
international	New Kabila	XXXXXX
national	Head to peace; Inter-Congolese dialogue	Belligerent, Head to peace; Inter-Congolese dialogue

8.7. Discussion

In general, politics (domestic and international) occupy the head of the lists of frames used in this corpus about Congo conflict. At the same time, in the side of Congolese government, there is a fierce struggle to denounce 'injustice' whether or not the international community refuses to sanction according to the united nation charter

on the 'intangibility' of borders, violated by Rwanda and Uganda. Frames such as 'war of aggression' 'double standards' 'the Balkanization shadow' attest these 'injustice'.

Indeed, the RD Congo was invaded by the foreign armies, identified, but not sanctioned according to the texts of UN, thus provocation a frustration and an outcry on the part of the power of Kinshasa, which had to defend itself. In addition, this might contribute to escalation. An invasion reminiscent of that of Kuwait in 1990, on the one hand. On the other hand that of the former Yugoslavia, and whose consequences in terms of geographical and administrative division, recall the balkanization. However, in the Western media, the focus was more on the internal rebellion, suggesting that the conflict was between Congolese.

The commitment of the international community to bring the resolution of the conflict in its own way was contested until the end by president Kabila to the point of being treated as an obstacle. The 'peace obstacle' frame from western media raises it well. This attests to the confrontation between politicians (internal and international), which has become an axe of the escalation of the conflict, reflected through frames used by these media.

The frames used by the media highlight the economic dimension of the conflict. Whether local or international, these frames remind us that a new economy is developing in the midst of the crisis. An economy that can be described as an economy of war. Frames like 'plunder of Congo' 'mining of blood', thus testifying of violence from economical interest in this conflict.

This economic violence, suggests that the conflict of 1998-2003 gave rise to an economy of war based on the interests of actors from several horizons, creating an illegal network of transnational exploitation that complicates peace initiatives.

There is also the difference of frames on the same subject. for example, in the field of international economy, when the RTNC speaks of exploitation in terms of 'plunder of Congo' frame, the western media speaks rather of 'mining of war' or the 'war bill' frames, insisting on contracts mining exploitation signed between Kinshasa and the foreign armies who came to his invitation. Especially Zimbabwe. Differences that might participate to escalation of the conflict.

Moreover, the analysis of the frames shows a demarcation between the two characteristic periods of the conflict, of which 2001 marks the change of regime. This period has seen the media on all sides generate more 'constructive frames' that refers to a climate of de-escalation of frames. A period during which the media seems to agree in their way of framing the conflict.

The change of regime would be at the base of this framing shift, contributing to the de-escalation, and thus confirming politics influence on all the media under study. Indeed, the corpus of our research attests that the coming to power of joseph Kabila has been followed by several resolution of the questions that divided the late president with the international community and other actors in the conflict. The implementation of Lusaka agreement, the deployment of UN's military forces au Congo, are non-exhaustive example of shift of politics. A decrease of tensions (local and international) that might be leading to de-escalation, a starting point of peacebuilding process.

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The configuration of the Congolese media ecosystem.

As we observed in the context of the Congo conflict 1998-2003, the Congolese media are 'two-headed' or 'bipolar', evolving in a logic of confrontation-conciliation. Escalation and de-escalation depend on this 'bi-cephalism'. As we have observed, in the context of this conflict, the media ecosystem is made up of two blocks: international media like the BBC and the world (which were part of the corpus of this study) and the RTNC, in the limits of our field of study. The media in this ecosystem might be seen as 'auxiliaries' to political power. This "auxiliary" to a certain extent cancel their power to inform according to ethics. They are therefore reduced to a protocol role or a sounding board for political influences, both nationally (with the RTNC) and internationally (with the BBC and Le Monde). This configuration allows us to understand the role of the media in the context of our study, a configuration between power and media, determining in the course of the crisis and in the escalation or de-escalation of the conflict.

From the first period of the conflict: the time of war

During the period of escalation and violence of the conflict, Media 'bi-cephalism' or 'bipolarity', characteristic of Congo media ecosystem, has evolved into the center of escalation dependent on opposing political influences. The study showed that during the first period, the public media RTNC, subservient to the political influence of Kinshasa, was in confrontation with the international media, influenced by the international politics on the conflict in Congo. This international politics, embodied by the international community, the United Nations and the countries' member of the

Security Council, sought to resolve the conflict in terms that were opposed to the politics of Kinshasa.

Some major elements of opposition: Qualification and nature of conflict

Qualified as a war of aggression by Kabila, the international community initially rejected the term "aggression", preferring that of "rebellion". Although in the long run, she tacitly accepted, she did not go in the logic of condemning and sanctioning the foreign armies, by applying to the letter and, according to justice and international law, the Charter of the United Nations. The international community preferred to impose negotiations by distinguishing between the rebels and the aggressors. These two opposing political postures characterized this period, favoring escalation. This opposition was observed in the frames developed in each media. They (frames) testify to Bi-cephalism and the confrontation of powers in the media field. Media frames such as' genocide ', war of aggression' ... as opposed to 'rebellion' 'ethnic minority threat', recalls this media bipolarity, created by the politics and might contribute to the escalation of the conflict.

The presence of the UN's interposition forces

As the 'correct' characterization of the nature of the conflict is lacking, the rest of the conflict resolution process becomes untenable. During this first period, the resolutions of the United Nations, in particular the use of an interposition force had failed. Main reason: the opposition between the two politics. This confrontation is observed in the media of the Congolese system by the escalation of the language of war in the media, also evolving in the logic of confrontation. The frame such as 'double

standard' vs 'peace obstacle', testifying of this logic of effective political confrontation via interposed media. This makes the media, in the context of the 1998-2003 war, major and active actors, engaged in the conflict, thus participating in the escalation.

The time of peace

With the advent of a new political power, composed of the same political backbone, our study observed a media de-escalation leading to the resolution (to a certain extent) of the conflict. This study revealed a "shift in terms of media frame" from war to peace frame, from 'destructive' to 'constructive' frames. From 'aggression' (in RTNC media frame in the first period) frame to 'rebellion' frame (in the second period). However, the de-escalation might not come by the willing and initiative of the media, but through the force of the politically tuned. Indeed, this second period is characterized by the "reconciliation" between international politics, influencing the international media and national politics, influencing the RTNC, public channel. All of them, evolving in the Congolese ecosystem. The shift in politics in the sense of "accordance" could cause the shift in the conflict used frame. This could allow the de-escalation of the conflict.

Drawing 2: framing

Congo conflict

(CHANGE)

IN POWER

POLITICS

INTERNATIONAL ==≠= NATIONAL

POLITICS

INTERNATIONAL === NATIONAL

ESCALATION

DE-ESCALATION

MEDIA

FRAMING

War Frames

Destructive frames

Peace frames

Constructive frame

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CHAPTER IX

FRAMING THE CONGOLESE NATIONAL RADIO AND TELEVISION (RTNC)

9.1. Introduction

This study planned to conduct a 'focus group' to question journalists working in the Congolese media and having proven experience in this field. We wanted to question them on their role as journalist and reporter in the conflict and peace process. The COVID19 Pandemic arranged for it to be turned into an interview with the same persons. By this interview, this study wanted to know the role of the journalist of the public media as well in the conflict as in the promotion of peace, referring to the period 1998-2003. A period that we have two, depending on the presidents who have succeeded the office.

Out of ten journalists targeted, only four accepted an interview. In view of the sensitivity of the interview, anonymity was strictly enforced. Only one journalist accepted, anonymity or not.

Profile: Journalists of the RTNC, national channel having covered the conflict of 1998-2003 as a reporter, journalist or as authority of directions (radio and / or Television news).

9.2. Reporting the 1998-2003 conflict

9.2.1. Sourcing

'Concerning the sources of information on the conflict, which is an indispensable area for the journalist to claim some merit and professionalism. The public media journalist has been stripped of this instrument, which allows him to frame information by appreciating some realities.

" Regarding sources of information on the conflict, access was not easy. Rather, you had to take into account what they bring to you. Either by the army spokesperson or by the Minister of Information.'

First, the question of the role of the RTNC, public channel, and journalist was discussed. The status of the RTNC and the journalist subdue them to the diktat of the government. As such, the RTNC is more of a sounding board for political power, especially the government. It was experienced throughout the 1998 conflict. Not only did the government exert pressure on all media in general, but in RTNC.

'It was worse. It had nothing to do with journalism as we have learned it. Political and military manage the information and news related to the conflict'

'We could not write the paper and broadcast on the conflict matter without the permission of the authorities. So you failed to conform yourself…the news process on the conflict had become very sensitive. Sometimes, it was better to deal with news of other matter than on the war, at risk to be disqualified.'

9.2.2. The role of journalist during conflict

During the 1998-2003 period, the journalist who worked in public media has been transformed into a pure propagandist, being under pressure and depending on the sources provided:

'The work of the journalist at that time of conflict, during L.D Kabila regime, was not shining because we could not work as we learned the duties of the journalist. We followed a diktat procedure, accomplishing whatsoever authorizes tells you to do. Ethics and professionalism were not on the field, nor in the newsroom. Just obey, take and broadcast.'

In their role of 'propagandist,' journalist was asked, by pressure from the hierarchy or by patriotism, to defend politics and to speak well of the army at the frontline. Another journalist to add:

"Concerning the angle of treatment of information on the international community, the rebels and the foreign armies which invaded the country, I say to you, hand on the heart that we always took account of the country. Although we knew that thing goes bad in the frontline. However, all we could do was talk about the bravery of our army. And sometimes threat the international community as interference in the country's affairs."

Another journalist to continue:

"Yes, there was indeed a contradiction between our ethics and the processing of information on the conflict. Deontology meant nothing to the belligerents. The journalist could only write what he was ordered to write."

'The treatment of information on the conflict was political because everyone was afraid of losing either a job, ending up in prison or even being labeled a 'threat.' Yes, processing information at that time can be called 'hard'. It is to the extent that the journalist himself was called upon to engage in self-censorship when dealing with information, especially on the conflict issues'

9.2.3. The role of the hierarchy in the work of the journalist

Internally at RTNC, the authorities were transformed into a 'censor' of information on the conflict. Everyone had to scrupulously respect the 'war-related editorial line', which was the government's vision of the conflict and its actors:

'Concerning the media treatment of the conflict. There was always pressure. When you write your paper, you must immediately submit it to the administrative authorities for approval. Should the paper be accepted or not? If they (authorities) say yes, you broadcast. Otherwise, you unship it.'

9.2.4. Peace promotion: two presidents, two opposed ways

About promoting peace during the conflict of 1998-2003, the journalists distinguish two periods. That of the assassinated president Kabila and that of his successor, Joseph Kabila.

'In L.D Kabila's time, the treatment of media information on the conflict was more war-oriented. The RTNC was in a media logic of war because the alliances of LD Kabila with those who brought him to power had already been broken. We couldn't talk about peace with them.'

'After the death of L.D Kabila, until then, there was a confrontation. However, after his death, during joseph Kabila's reign, our editorials changed how they handled information about the conflict. We had changed, at the will of the new power, towards the promotion of peace and dialogue, why not reconciliation between us and the neighboring countries that we accuse of backing the rebels.'

With the new power, the public media journalist submitted to the exercise of another diktat: that of reconciliation because it was the political will of the new regime.

'There is exactly one significant difference in the treatment of the conflict between two periods [...] in terms of dialogue and peace. During the period of Mzee Kabila, one could not speak of dialogue nor peace. While in the time of Joseph Kabila, it was more dialogue and peace with the neighboring countries, and why not even with internal rebellion.

9.2.5. The role of RTNC in the peace process

I was speaking of the inter-Congolese dialogue, which was the result of the Lusaka agreements, which provided for a reconciliation of the belligerents and the geographic, administrative, and military reunification through power-sharing games. The public media does not seem to be involved in the process as a completely apart act. It is status as a state media, making it an 'auxiliary' of political power, weighs it down.

'The national channel RTNC has not played a positive role. She has not been professional and neutral in the handling of the information nor the conflict resolution process. Nevertheless, his negative role was not his initiative. But rather people who had the power of decision.'

"The participation of the RTNC in the process, in the success of the inter-Congolese dialogue? I have some doubts. The RTNC has always evolved in the logic of political power. Even during negotiations between belligerents, it was unable to play its role of 'church in the middle of the village' to speak resolutely of peace as an actor in the socialization of Congolese society.'

'In reality, all these politicians and belligerents used it as a dissemination medium, not as a major actor who had to contribute to the peacebuilding. Moreover, there were not even specialized programs where we could talk about peace. We had not professionally organized the public debate to invite people and the population to participate by democratic expression in the peacebuilding. The evidence, even today, of what is happening on the conflict in the east. This shows that the RTNC did not play its role of informing the minorities, organizing the framework for communities' dialogue, to contribute to resolving the conflict.'

There are differences in approach between RTNC and other media when tackling the roots of conflicts to propose solutions. The newspaper devotes itself to approaching the origins of the conflict and giving avenues of solution. The RTNC is superficial on conflict issues. By fear? Lack of initiative or vision? Perhaps'

'As proof, the RTNC did not organize real debates on conflicts. Give access to the various opinions in terms of debates. Again, there were no well-written programs to respond to this peace imperative. The few programs on the subject were the personal initiative of journalists in unsuitable programs. We talk about it superficially. However, to provide an adequate framework for discussion that did not take place.

In the light of these interviews, it emerges a certain number of the realities around this conflict

1. The role and status of the journalist.

During the period 1998-2003, the public media journalist was a 'journalist under orders', whose work was subject to hierarchical constraints, even sometimes coercive. Propaganda was the only means of media expression under penalty of being sanctioned.

2. of information source:

The management of information sources, and by ricochet, of the agenda setting and frames, was also controlled and ordered. Two essential sources: The Minister of Information and the spokespersons of the army.

3. Framing war/peace.

The change in power, which took place in 2001, has a lot to do with the change of frames, from war to peace frames. Passing message of peace and dialogue, which was the political option of the new power. However, it should be noted that in the case of the RTNC, the media coverage of the war or the peace had only one initiator: 'political power'. In other words, setting agenda or framing peace was part of the will

of political power. As if to say that, the media only played the 'auxiliary' role of political power.

9.3. Discussion

The results of media framing and the interview of journalists conducted at the RTNC to understand the elements influencing the news during this period of the conflict and how they contributed to peace initiatives, brought interesting results. Indeed, as we found in media framing analyses, the Public media journalists interviewed have inanimate to say that in the advent of the new power, the orientation has been given to avoid verbal escalation and to inform more about dialogue and peace. Ditto, for the international media, our quantitative and qualitative analysis noted a shift between the two periods. The emerged frames are from war, to peace, from destructive to constructive frames, using a peace-oriented media discourse in the second period of the conflict.

The role of the media for peace

Peacebuilding is a long-standing business. It requires adequate media support. Which raises the question of whether the media 'bi-cephalism' or 'bipolarity' analyzed in the Congolese media ecosystem had the potential to play this role. All things considered, from the preceding analysis, it emerges that the media, 'bi-cephalism' and influenced, have a potential for peace, but limited to de-escalation level, and depending on the concordance between national and international politics. We need to ask how media can go beyond de-escalation through the other stages. Because, peace is a long-

standing business with several stages. De-escalation is one of the first stages to build peace.

1) The internal and external influence on the media (especially the RTNC) is unbounded. It hides the potential of the media to engage in their own initiatives as a tool of socialization of modern societies, in order to provide solutions to peace. Solutions that only the media could bring. For example, create a public space for discussion, with a view to involving the whole society in the dialogue in the perspective of finding solutions to the conflict at the community, local and national level. It is therefore critical to integrate in the media ecosystem, supports that could transcend or significantly reduce the influence of political on the RTNC, for example.

2) Nature and intrinsic structure of media

In the context of this study, in times of conflict, the media in Congo evolve in a 'two-headed' or 'bipolar' logic. An evolution, which alternates confrontation and conciliation, escalation-de-escalation. In addition, their editorial line is not designed to promote peacebuilding, although we must recognize their ability to 'de-escalation'. The solution would therefore be to integrate, by either creating or improving, suitable media and production programs. Thus, create a "third media", aiming not to annihilate other media, but to balance the ecosystem in order to allow the media to play a leading role in the construction of peace. The intervention should be done according to a peace related-planning in local, national and regional perspectives.

Drawing 3: Policy Control of Information during Conflict

CHAPTER X

MEDIA EXPERT'S ANALYSIS ON THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN PEACEBUILDING

10.1. Introduction

In this interview, we interviewed key persons of the Congolese media system to get their opinion and experience on the role of the media in peace building. The interview focused more on the national channel RTNC, although the results can be extrapolated to other types of media.in the renderings, we have combined the interviews to form a single element of understanding.

10.2. Profiles:

1. Kitutu Oleontwa: former CEO of RTNC

2. Primo Mukandilwa Bwami vice-president of CSAC (the authority of regulation)

3. Kasonga Tshilunde, President of UNPC (national corporation of journalists)

4. Oscar Kabamba, chief in charge of TV program (RTNC)

10.3. Interview.

To the question of knowing the major reasons which repeatedly cause conflict in the DRC. 'There are several sources of conflict in the DRC. With reference to the 1998 war, there are several factors in particular: the political aspect, there is the question

of identity or ethnicity; there is also the economic aspect. But there is also the weakness of the state in fulfilling its regal functions of effectively securing its population and its borders.' (O. Kitutu, personal communication, 19 august 2020)

'The weakness of the state in terms of security, corruption and mismanagement of political power with the various dictatorial regimes that we have known, are part of the factors which favored the conflict in the DRC'. (B. Mukandilwa, personal communication, 24 January 2020)

To the question of knowing the ways and means promoting of peacebuilding, an interviewee answered:

'The Lusaka agreements and the inter-Congolese dialogue have been for a lot in the pacification of the country. However, much remains to be done. As you know, today killings continue in the EAST of the country. The sun city dialogue allowed us to reunify the country, to have a new constitution and to set up the functioning of the institutions as it is done in modern nations.' (B. Mukandilwa, personal communication, 24 January 2020)

'Now, with what is happening in the east of the country. I think that what is happening in Ituri is the consequence of the abrupt end to the process of pacification and disarmament of armed groups. you will remember that at the time, we sounded the alarm on the facts that in Ituri and Beni, the process of disarmament and reintegration of former rebels was not really supported as in other parts of the country'. (B. Mukandilwa, personal communication, 24 January 2020)

In terms of solution, 'the military solution has its advantages and its limitations. I think that we must combine several initiatives and solutions, in particular dialogues with the communities to break the gap. That we speak frankly by resorting to a sincere dialogue, as under the 'palaver tree'. (B. Mukandilwa, personal communication, 24 January 2020). However, there is also the sub regional aspect. As you know, it is often the eastern part of the country that continues in a cycle of endless violence. When we talk about recurrent rape as 'a weapon of war' or 'rape world capital'. All this is in the east of the country. The 'peace' deal is only possible if we also have a global vision of the problem. In addition, the countries of the great lakes are part of the problem. On this subject, it is more politics and diplomacy that prevail. Nevertheless, we must also see how to involve the communities inside and on different sides of the borders' 'conflicts are also in other parts of the country. We have known the kamwena nsapu phenomena, or the Bakata Katanga, or the ethnic conflicts in Yumbi, or the Bundu dia Kongo in the Bas Congo. We can clearly see that the Congo is threatened in its unit. Hence, we really have to make 'peace', reconciliation and conflict resolution, permanent activities. Everyone (government, civil society, opposition) should get down working in this area. Do not wait for conflicts to erupt to come quickly and see how to put out the fire' (O. Kabamba, Personal communication, 25 February 2020).

Regarding the role of the international community and United Nations agencies in encouraging peacebuilding initiatives. One respondent replied:

'First of all, I would say that the question of peace in the Congo should first and foremost be a matter for the Congolese themselves. It is true that we need partners like

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the international community, the United Nations. These should support national efforts'. (B. Mukandilwa, personal communication, 24 January 2020). The united nations have had their representation here for a long time. However, their presence became remarkable following the conflict of August 02, 1998. They accompanied the process according to the resolutions of the United Nations. 20 years later, an evaluation would be required. Which is certain, which contributes a lot to the maintenance of peace. I think that we cannot talk about the problem of peace in the last 20 years without talking about the contribution of the United Nations and MONUSCO. Of its works, but also of its limits and mistakes. (B. Mukandilwa, personal communication, 24 January 2020)

Mass media, conflict and peacebuilding

To the question of knowing what the mass media in the Congo should do as a contribution to peacebuilding, in order to intervene as a major institution of socialization in the recurring problems of violence and conflict, particularly in the East and elsewhere. How the media in the Congo address also the issues of peace, dialogue reconciliation in the country?

'The efficiency of the media in our society is a structural problem. It is not just about peace and conflict. Nevertheless, of all the problems of the Congolese society in which the media evolve. The problem of the media in the Congo we know them. There is for example the interference of the politics, economic problems. Because the media sector is very poor. I do not know what the poverty in our sector can do. At the internal level of our profession, there is corruption with 'selling news'. Today, there is the

invasion of our profession by people who have not learned journalism. Facing this state of affairs in our media environment, you understand that the Congolese society, especially the political power, must do something. Because it is the political power which has the main responsibility to organize our society' (K. Tshilunde, 02 March 2020).

'For example, the responsibility of the president of the republic. He is the guarantor of the proper functioning of the institutions. It is a question of affirming these things, by resorting to constitutions and regulatory texts. We have them in this country, especially in the media sector. Above all, there is the constitution. He must [the president] play his role, fulfilling his prerogatives, and allow the media to play his role.' (B. Mukandilwa, personal communication, 24 January 2020)

'We, media professionals always talk about peace and reconciliation. Nevertheless, is talking about it enough? Talking about it may be the beginning of a solution. However, peace is a long and long-lasting great enterprise. It requires resources. Look for example, me who is responsible for TV production of the national public channel. With everything going on in the east of the country. How many production projects for peace are lying around in the drawers?' (O. Kabamba, Personal communication, 25 February 2020)

'Media productions in a vast country like the Congo is very expensive. It takes many resources. Today, money is lacking, and donors are very rare. Media productions, this requires human, material and financial resources. However, in our case today, we have a problem. We have the human resources. But material and financial resources are

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sorely lacking.' (O. Kabamba, Personal communication, 25 February 2020).'You know, for example, to produce, I need vehicles, I need cameras, I need consumables. I need an assembly bench. I need money and men. Today, we at the RTNC, we work in difficult conditions'[…]

'Often to get around these difficulties, what do we do, we make productions on the TV sets, with guests on site. However, the media production as such, i have problems sending journalists and even to Kisangani to produce work. You have problems sending journalists to do a job for me in Lubumbashi, Goma or Mbandaka. If the production had resources, for example i could send people to Beni. Go talk to those who are going through the war. Sometimes it is one-off production with donors. However, we need the structural. Like peace to make it, you need to organize. It takes time. In addition, resources are needed for the media to participate effectively in peacebuilding. (O. Kabamba, Personal communication, 25 February 2020)

'What is valid for the RTNC is also valid for all the media in Congo. In the Congo, there is no media, which has all the resources of its policies. All media in the Congo are faced with the same financial difficulties. Access to the funding necessary for the journalist's work is sorely lacking.' (O. Kitutu, personal communication, 19 august 2020).

To the question of knowing the opinion on journalists who work for politicians and community:

'The relationship between politics and media let us talk about it. The great difficulty of the journalist and the media in the Congo, as elsewhere, has always been

the influence of politicians. Not only in the public media sector, even in the private and community media. At the RTNC, for example, journalists have the status of civil servants. At the RTNC, journalists do not act by themselves. They act through the Minister of Communication and Media. It is negative for press freedom (K. Tshilunde, 02 March 2020). 'But there are also politicians who own media. Here too, as in the RTNC, journalists are sometimes reduced to members of political parties. It is negative. The same is true in community and community media. In the selection of journalists, they demand belonging to their community and their religion. Intra-community selection discriminates, which may be detrimental in the long term. In the event of conflict, it is media escalation between the communities (B. Mukandilwa, personal communication, 24 January 2020).

'The journalist's work requires respect for ethics. This does not mean that journalists cannot be in politics or belong to a community. We all belong to communities. What I am going to say, what ethics requires the media and journalists to be professional. Nevertheless, we must also recognize that it is not easy. Especially when these different groups decide to put pressure on their members [journalist] in order to resort to his expertise for reasons which are opposed to his ethics' (K. Tshilunde, 02 March 2020).

'To the question of what to do with hate media:

'From memory, our Congolese media landscape, we have no hate media, as the world has experienced in other countries. However, there was hate speech against one or some ethnic groups. Speeches conveyed by the media. Speeches of which the

journalists were not direct authors. But this does not exonerate him from their responsibility to ensure that the media do not become a means of expression of hatred' (B. Mukandilwa, personal communication, 24 January 2020).

'There are, as you know, in our legal arsenal, provisions for this. Moreover, when that happens, the law will determine the responsibilities of each other. It can be from a simple call to order till the closure of the media, or even criminal court.' (B. Mukandilwa, personal communication, 24 January 2020).

To the question of how the media in the Congo and journalists can address the issue of peacebuilding, reconciliation in Congo:

'With all that we have known and continue to experience as conflicts, the problem of peace in the Congo is a vast subject which requires major conferences and even several researches as you are doing. For my part, as a journalist and director at RTNC, it is to make RTNC a PSB channel. Freed from the shackles of politics and endow resources for its public service mission. It will be a contribution to the peacebuilding process. To be at the service of the public in my opinion it is work for peace.' (K. Tshilunde, 02 March 2020).

'As a journalist and responsible for a corporation of journalists, I will suggest two proposals:

Training of journalists in the popularization of peace. I think this is a dimension that is missing from our training. Additional training, as we have had on journalistic ethics, on the freedom-responsibility combination of journalists in matters of information. That would be an asset. There is of course as a second proposition, the

adequate financing of the media. This also goes to the effectiveness of the media in the peace process. With the resources, we will be able to deal seriously with the problems of the company. And peace, especially in the east is part of it' (K. Tshilunde, 02 March 2020).

I have already said it. The media is production. Media content comes from production. Moreover, production requires many resources as I noted. Conflict is for us a subject with wide and varying content. There is so much that we can do to promote peace through media production. However, resources are lacking. Ideas and production projects on peace exist. We can even conceive more. That we give resources to the media. . (O. Kabamba, Personal communication, 25 February 2020).

CHAPTER XI

TOWARD A MODEL OF MEDIA ECOSYSTEM TO SUSTAIN PEACE BUILDING

11.1 Introduction

Nothing shows that media supports alone can stop conflicts or implement sustainable peace. However, everything indicates that media, as a tool of socialization, has an important role to play in contributing to the success of peace implementation. Therefore, media supports have to be situated within the framework of other efforts in relation to peace building.

This chapter attempts to draw a model of media ecosystem that can sustain peace in Congo, and by ricochet in Africa. Indeed, by referring to the history of conflicts in the Congo, particularly that of 1998-2003. Considering the role of media during this crisis, through the various dominant frames provided by media. Taking into account political power relations (internal and international), influencing the media at the origin of the frames that can lead to the escalation or the (de)escalation of the conflict, as well as responses from In-depth and Interviews, we propose the following:

RQ7: what media support can be provided in media ecosystem to contribute to the prevention of conflict and build sustainable peace in Congo?

11.2. The autopsy of the existing media ecosystem and the potential of the media to promote peace

The Congolese media ecosystem was characterized by a bi-cephalism or bipolarization, thus creating tensions in terms of confrontation and collaboration. The reason is on the one hand the hyperactive politicization of the RTNC and the paralysis, by the political of the rest of the media, making the media an 'auxiliary' of political power. On the other hand, the influence of international politics on the western media, operating in the same ecosystem.

This 'auxiliary' position of media, in alignment of political influences obscures the potential of the media to intervene in the vision of peacebuilding. As the study shows, in the context of conflict, the media can play, the role of (de)escalation depends on the condition of political influence. Contrary to the western perception that the media can inspire policies to resolve conflict through to the weight of public opinion, in Congo and Africa it is different.

As this study demonstrated above, in current state of media in Congo, the only step that the media can take in the construction of peace is to contribute to de-escalations. However, peacebuilding is a multi-step and long process. Hence, we must go beyond by broadening the potential of the media to actively participate in the promotion of peace. Moreover, that would necessarily require a shift of the media ecosystem.

11.3. Beyond the current media ecosystem: current limits, source of inspiration for a new model

First, it is not a question of preventing other media from operating according to their editorials, but rather of seeing how to intervene in the ecosystem to endow the media with the potential to become active in promotion of Peace.

Before proposing a model, based on the findings of our study, remember that there is no perfect model of media intervention for peace purpose. However, we believe that our diagnosis of the recurrent conflict situation in the Congo has enabled us to have elements, which, once well integrated into the ecosystem, might add to the current system, potential that has not been developed yet.

Our model revolves around three essential elements. Remember that we draw these elements from the results of our research and interviews conducted with journalists and key people working in the media field in the Congo.

Our model revolves around four essential points:

1. **Contents:** The structure of the conflicts in the Congo, in order to adapt the content targeting structural conflict situation.

2. **(De) politicization and Depolarization,** in order to give free rein to the potential of the media

3. **The third media** in view of diversified the ecosystem

4. **Regulation**, for the control in view of the cohesion of the ecosystem

11.3.1. Contents: Targeting structural conflict situation.

As we have seen in this study, most conflicts in Congo are structural and require structural responses. Hence the importance of involving the media ecosystem, in some of its components, in the promotion of peace. This study identified 5 structural factors relate to structural conflicts in the Congo, to address in peace related-media content

Geopolitics issue

The Democratic Republic of the Congo has nine borders that it has to learn to manage. In the history of conflicts in the Congo, this geography was at the origin of several crises. Moreover, the Congo is a member of several African organizations such as SADC or ICGLR. It would be useful to integrate the media to broadcast in the sub-region for peace purposes. For example, the ICGLR for the media in its operation. It would therefore be interesting to create a TV Radio media intended to promote peace, security and development in these different regions covered by this organization.

The ethnic and tribal identity issue

As we have demonstrated in the previous pages, the history of conflicts in the Congo is strewn with crises and violence relate to identity and ethnic groups. In a country made up of more than 450 ethnic groups and tribes, this structural problem should be taken into account fairly.

This is why the transformation of the RTNC into PSB would be an answer to solve the problem. To this might be added a national media policy. this study suggests, on the one hand, creating peace-oriented community media, broadcasting in areas

deemed to be conflicting and beyond, as well as intervening in the already existing media (especially community and associative). An intervention based on the promotion of peace.

Land and Geographic issues

The recurring threats of cession should be part of the content of the Congolese media in order to address the problem internally in general, but in particular in the regions where the problem arises regularly. The land problem (secession, delimitation, self-determination) is a major factor of conflict in the DRC as we have seen from the origins of this nation to this day through the conflict under study. A conflict-prone sector, which the media should focus on to promote peace between communities

Political and economic issues.

With the resurgence of illegal exploitation of natural resources with its corollaries, associated with opacity in legal exploitation. It is necessary to enrich the Congolese media content by programs of information, education and incitement to the exploitation of the mines in a legal manner. Media could be useful in informing the artisanal miner, for example, on legal circuits, prices of minerals on the stock exchange, etc.

11.3.2. (De) politicization and Depolarization

We have observed that in the event of a major crisis such as the one, which is the subject of this study, political power exerts an almost generalized influence on the media system, with the exception of the international media, which have means of

circumventing this influence. Which creates the 'media bi-polarity'. This involves diluting or reducing political influence by:

On the public level: by changing the RTNC, public channel from the status of public media to public service broadcasting (PSB). This change will answer two essential questions

- detach the public media from political control

- Help to tackle the issue of the minority, which is a structural problem at the origin of conflicts in the Congo and Africa.

Indeed, the PSB's philosophy advocate the inclusion of minorities. The DR Congo in its national composition is a country made up mainly of minorities. Such a media fully performing its functions could help address this issue through appropriate programs.

11.4. The third Media: For more balance in the ecosystem

The third Media consists in integrating other media players to avoid the Media 'bipolarity' or 'Bicephalism', by diversifying media. The third Media consists in integrating other media players for more balance of the Ecosystem, by promoting Media plurality. However, this plurality has to transcend the inclination of political power to control the media. To do this, it is recommended to create media with the essential objective of promoting peace, evolving in a special regime.

11.4.1. The Geopolitical Media for peace

The DRC is a country geopolitically located in the Heart of Africa, linking Africa from north to south and from West to East. A country sharing borders with nine neighbors. To the north, there are Central Africa and South Sudan. To the west, there is Congo Brazzaville. Angola and Zambia on the south, and to the east with Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. These countries with the Congo belong to different sub-regional organizations, created for political, trade, exchange, peace, and economical purposes. For Central Africa, there is the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). There is the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and in the Central-West-EAST, there is the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region ICGLR. Characteristics of Conflicts in the CIRGL Region. This belonging might be used in the context of peace, by exploiting the available potential of media.

It is therefore in this perspective that it might consider creating and integrating peace-related media into (sub) regional structures, dedicated to peace and security of countries belonging to these organizations. The advantage of this demarche is those sub-regional organizations would be to make this 'common media channel' a common center of expression of sub-regional communities. The ICGLR, for instance, which one of the main goals is to prevent and resolve conflicts and promote peace and security in the region, might use this type of media to support it in achieving its purposes. The advantage of this type of organization is that they have already identified differences and the nature of recurring conflict in the region. The integration and functioning of the

media into the structure would be a major asset for information and communication between communities on the issues and factors promoting peace in the (sub) region.

In addition, the media intended for the promotion of peace could be an essential element in this cross-border mechanism, because it can contribute to the information and the vulgarization of the peace-related policies and initiatives at the population level. Indeed, most regional organizations in Africa are more elitist than popular. This creates a gap with the grassroots where conflict resolution and peace strategies and initiatives are supposed to be implemented. The geopolitical media could play the role of a platform for discussion, information, and communication to promote the ideals of peace and security.

furthermore, The creation of media adapted to the vision of the ICGLR, for instance, particularly its main vision of promoting dialogue, peace, and security, could strengthen it in its role and assist its daily management structure, to strengthen its institutional capacities. Such media could also play the role of a permanent public sphere, accessible to all to encourage different populations and communities to dialogue.

Nature

The geopolitical media, in the example of ICGLR, could be essentially a media adapted to the challenges of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Peace-oriented, characterized by a social responsibility and peace journalism approach to promote and build peace in the region. A platform that brings together the political elites and the populations for a frank dialogue concerning various issues in general and in particular

the problems that are the seeds of major conflicts, in order to encourage peace initiatives. Solutions are generally formalized in treaties, protocols, and other agreements concluded between different countries-members.

Ownership

The type of media should belong to a sub-regional structure like the ICGLR, transcending national political influences and joining different people together, through technology. Integrated as a support tool for the achievement of the objectives of peace and security of the structure in the sub-region of great lakes. It might be managed by a representative team of all the countries of the ICGLR, for instance. A team trained in the perspective of the peace journalism approach, social responsibility, and development. These media could function through a direction representing all countries, but working in order to pursuit only the objectives of peace and security as defined by the organization Charter and agreements.

Content

The content of these media could be exclusively and/or essentially security and Peace-oriented, characterized by peace-oriented programs, security for the restoration of confidence, and the peaceful coexistence of communities. Information and other programs might be produced and broadcasted in the official languages retained as the language of exchange in this sub-region.

Funding

Each state member could make an equal financial contribution as a fund for the installing and daily running of this regional broadcasting and media system.

11.4.2. National Media for peace

As we have demonstrated in this study, the media in the Congo are auxiliaries of political (local or international) and economic power in times of peace or war, playing the role given to them by other powers. The goal here is to create a media ecosystem in which the media escape, to a certain extent, the influence of other powers, thus giving a certain autonomy to the media to act effectively, by fully deploying its potentials with a view to sustaining peace.

The current media ecosystem is deficient in the area of conflict resolution and peace. The only level of peace it can achieve is de-escalation. however, peacebuilding is a long-term, multi-step process, requiring appropriate supports, in a country characterized by a high potential for conflicts in political, identity (inter-ethnic conflict, tribal war), geographical (balkanization, secession, land conflict) areas. In the current societal environment, solutions to conflicts depend more on political power than on other forces such as the media. The ideal is therefore to create a media ecosystem, capable of playing the role of an alternative or complementary power in conflict resolution and sustaining peace

11.4.3. PSB for peace: From state-own media to public broadcasting service

This study demonstrated that the media in DRC were "auxiliaries" or dependent to political power at the origin of the "bipolarity" of the media ecosystem, which determines the escalation or de-escalation of the conflict. This type of ecosystem, made up of a "state-owned media" in nature and international media influenced by countries of the international community, could not go beyond de-escalation, since peace is a long-standing endeavor. Hence, it is necessary to resort to the type of media capable of supporting the enterprise of peace. Aware of the limit of "state-owned media" in supporting the entire peace-building process, it would be worthy to "shift" from state-owned media to Public service Broadcasting.

Les advantages de PSB to sustain peace in society.

As Avery (2004) has highlighted, the tenets of public service broadcasting are 'the principles of universality of service, diversity of programming, provision for minority audiences and the disadvantaged, support of an informed electorate, and cultural and educational enrichment (Avery, 2004). The PSB has specific missions that might be used in the construction of peace. There are essentially two missions: serving as a platform for dialogue, accessible to all, and promoting the national identity and culture. Unlike the 'state-owned media' that emphasize more on political and selects voices of expression that must have a pro-government tendency, the PSB, by its very essence, gives free access to all the voices of society. This aspect of public service is a necessary asset for dialogue, an essential ingredient for the promotion of peace. In the

context of conflict, it is important to have a framework and space for discussion, available to all communities and in an equitable manner. For PSB has been conceived, from a media perspective, to give voice to the 'voiceless' and to facilitate dialogue on national and social issues such as development and peacebuilding (UNPD, 2004). Therefore, this aspect of PSB could be useful in the context of Congo and Great lakes regions where several conflicts occurred and peacebuilding is still a quest.

Moreover, the other aspect concerns national identity. As underlined above, the DRC, like most countries in Africa, is a mosaic of cultures, languages, tribes, ethnic groups. It should be remembered that the DRC is a country made up of more than 450 ethnic groups and tribes. As such, it can be qualified as a body of ethnic minorities. This diversity is often the source of recurrent inter-ethnic and tribal conflicts, as we have observed in the history of conflicts in the DRC. It would therefore be sound to give to this multitude a national identity, and the sense of belonging to the same community called 'Congo'. This would help reduce tensions between people. The PSB by its missions can also play the role of promoting tolerance and understanding among diverse [ethnic or community] groups (UNPD, 2004, Wallensteen, 2019), and facilitating dialogue among the community to prevent conflict or to sustain peace process in a post-conflict society (UNPD, 2004).

The PSB is, therefore, a type of media that could sustain peace initiatives and contributes to peacebuilding in the Congo and the Great lakes region.

Legal basis for the operation of PSB in the Congo

The 2005-11 constitution, in his article 24, stipulates:

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'The audiovisual and written media of the State are public services the access to which is guaranteed in an equitable manner to all the political and social movements. The status of the media of the State is established by the law, which guarantees the objectivity, the impartiality and the pluralism of opinion in the treatment and diffusion of information. (Art.24, Para, 3)

According to the Congolese constitution, the RTNC subscribes to the logic and functioning of PSB. However, until these days, the will of the Congolese constituent is illegally undermined by the political power through ministerial decrees as we have shown, that brings the RTNC back into a regime of dependence on political power. Which keeps this public channel in a position of 'auxiliary' to political and economic power. Thus limiting its potential as a platform for democratic and public expression, as well as taking minorities into account. It is, therefore, necessary to give RTNC its status as a public media, to free itself of political and economic influence. Which will restore its full media potential, so that it might fulfill its public service missions, in which are attached certain aspects that can sustain peace in the Congo.

The RTNC, a public channel with the PSB philosophy, will provide the country with a needed framework for dialogue in a heterogeneous society. This type of society needs permanent exchange between communities. the public service media will therefore be able, at its initiative and within its prerogatives recognized by the constitution, to inform, educate, organize media platforms for dialogue and peace between political actors, ethnic groups, tribes, and communities and fully play its role of 'church in the middle of the village', as its motto indicates so well.

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11.4.4. Inter Community media: a solution transcending communities

The African Broadcasting Charter defines community radio [media] as "a type of broadcasting for, by and in the service of the community; its ownership and management are representative of this community; it is non-profit and has social development as its object ".

Community media evolves more in the status of a development media, providing local information, than in other fields such as peacebuilding. It would be necessary to promote [inter] community media with a 'conflict resolution' and 'peacebuilding' purpose, displayed in their organization and programming, installed and broadcasted in conflict endemic regions relate to communities, ethnic groups, and tribes.

In addition, some studies have shown that in times of community or ethnic conflict, some community media avoid talking about the conflict. Others, on the other hand, for reasons of belonging, use community media to the detriment of the others, favoring the conflict escalation.

Therefore, the question of the organization and scope of community media must be considered. This is why this study proposes the promotion of 'inter-community' media (Radio TV) to sustain peace and respond to conflicts that are generally of an 'inter' ethnic, 'inter' tribal, and 'inter-community, nature and extent.

In fact, in conflict-affected regions and endemic conflict regions, for instance; dialogue, de-escalation, and peacebuilding initiatives and policies should be considered and included as vital and survival needs for communities, as critical as for the need for

development, democracy, and education. Building inter-community-related media in this perspective might help to join communities to maintain links between them.

Operation of 'inter-community media'

Furthermore, the purpose is to create a media serving at least two communities, especially when these communities have a history or have recurrent conflict. This 'inter' community should be considered in several manners.

- In media administration: in terms of worker representativeness (journalists from different communities without discrimination).

- In terms of content: encompassing information and communication relating to different communities, and taking into account equitable and inclusive participation of communities in the programming.

- In terms of the public sphere: giving access to all to discuss and dialogue on 'intercommunity' issues in general, and potential conflict crisis in particular.

- In terms of funding: by having an intercommunity fund. It might promote a sense of sharing a common [media] heritage. For, participation in the construction of a common good could contribute to inter-community cohesion.

11.4.5. Peace-related Media intervention of International organizations

Creating a radio TV channel depends on the mandate of the United Nations. It must have as its principal purpose the promotion of peace and development to some extent. The superiority of the United Nations over the states might solve the problematic of national political control. In the case of the DRC, an experiment was carried out with

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okapi radio, a radio channel operating in collaboration with the 'hirondelle' foundation and MONUSCO. The problem with the 'okapi' model is how it would survive after the departure of MONUSCO. It might lose its political protection from United Nations, and then become vulnerable to political and economic influences.

The main idea is to have media dedicated to conflict resolution and peacebuilding under UN's mandate. For in the context of conflict, such a media would be able to transcend the constraints of political and economic order. Which would constitute on the one hand an additional media voice in the ecosystem and, on the other hand, an independent and dedicated voice for the promotion of peace.

11.4.6. Media diversification

In terms of diversity, Congolese media ecosystem has deficit in the area of media (in term of peace-related media content and channels) focused on peace. Media that have the aim of promoting peace between communities, for instance. The gap might be filled by the integration of the 'peace journalism' in the already existing media channels (preferably community and associative) and / or the creation of media fully peace journalism oriented, which is lacking in the Congolese media ecosystem.

## 11.5. Regulation: for the Control of broadcasted content and the cohesion of the ecosystem

Political influence (especially at the internal level) also affects the structure of media regulation of Congo, as our interviewee has so clearly pointed out. It would be suffice to let the regulator do its task, according to the constitution and legal texts.

Above all, to equip regulator in term of material and knowledge on peace journalism. Here, it will be a question of empowering, in order to be able to control all the media ecosystem and prevent all kinds of conflicting media programming and messages such as stereotypes, hate or discriminatory messages.

MODEL OF MEDIA ECOSYSTEM TO SUSTAIN PEACEBUILDING.

Drawing 4:

CONCLUSION

The media are one of the institutions of socialization in modern societies. As such, they can help to create or solve the problems of the society in which they operate. The conflicts in the Great Lakes region have attracted less media attention, given the scale of the conflict and its consequences for the Congo and globally. This study has set out to provide analyses of one of the most complex and difficult conflicts in the world. Qualified as 'African world war'. The 1998-2003 Congo conflict was analyzed in order to understand the role of the media in building peace.

As we found, in the context of the 1998-2003 war, the Congolese media ecosystem is 'Bi-cephalic' or 'bipolar', evolving in a logic alternating between confrontation and conciliation. Escalation and de-escalation depend on this media 'bi-cephalism' or 'bipolarity', as we have found, the media ecosystem is made up of international media such as the BBC and the world (which were part of the corpus of this study) or the RTNC. , within the limits of our field of study. The media in this ecosystem are 'auxiliaries' of political power and participate in the public diplomacy of countries (France and England) that have interests in Congo and the Great Lakes region. This 'auxiliary', to a certain extent, fight and suppress their mission to inform, and thus prevents the media from fully and independently playing a role of prevention and promotion of peace, the political and economic powers, reducing them to a role of a sounding board.

This study established the relationship between political power, media, and (de) escalation of the conflict. Indeed, this study has shown that during the first period, the

public media RTNC, subservient to the political power of Kabila, was in confrontation with the international media, influenced by international policy on the conflict in Congo. This international policy, embodied by the United Nations and the Security Council, managed the conflict on terms that opposed Kabila's vision.

Qualified as a war of aggression by Kabila, the international community initially refused the term "aggression", preferring that of "rebellion". Although in the long run, She tacitly accepted, but did not follow the logic of condemning and sanctioning foreign armies, by applying literally, and according to justice and international law, the charter of the united nations. The UN's Security Council preferred to impose the logic of the negotiations by preferring rebellions perspective, instead of aggressors. These two opposing political postures characterized this period, thus promoting escalation through the media. This opposition has been found in the frames developed in each media. They (frames) testify to the ''bicephalism' or 'bipolary' in the Congolese media ecosystem and the confrontation of powers in the media fields. Media frames such as 'genocide', war of aggression '[...] as opposed to rebellion' ethnic minority threat ', recalls this media 'bi-cephalism' created by politics, might contribute to the escalation With the lack of authority of the international community to determine the nature of the conflict, the process of resolving the conflict became difficult.

During the first period, the resolutions of the United Nations, in particular the use of an intervention force, had failed. The main reason is the opposition between the two policies. This confrontation is observed in the Congolese media ecosystem by the language war and the logical implication of the RTNC in the dynamics of the war

escalation, also evolving in the logic of confrontation. This logic of effective political confrontation by the media interposed makes the media, in the context of the 1998-2003 war, major and active actors, engaged in the conflict, and thus participating in the sustainability of the conflict.

Furthermore, with the advent of new political power. Our study found a media de-escalation leading to the resolution (to some extent) of the conflict. This study observed a 'shift in terms of media frames' from war to peace frames, from war languages to peace languages. From the frame of aggression to rebellion. This de-escalation did not come by force of the media, but rather by political force. Indeed, this second period is characterized by the "reconciliation" between international politics (influencing the international media, evolving in the Congolese ecosystem), and the national politics of the new power, (influencing the RTNC, public channel). The shift in politics in the direction of "agreement" has caused the shift in the media frames of the conflict. Which might have enabled the conflict to de-escalate.

The result of the focus group, conducted at the RTNC to understand the factors influencing the news during this period of the conflict attests to this result. Indeed, the journalists interviewed unanimously declared that with the advent of the new power, the orientation on the treatment of information on the conflict was given to avoid verbal escalation and to speak more of dialogue and the peace. Ditto, for the international media. This quantitative study revealed a shift between the two periods. The international media frames went from war to peace, using a peace-oriented media discourse.

Peacebuilding is a long-standing business. It requires adequate media support. This raises the question of whether the media 'bicephalism' or 'bipolarity' observed in the Congolese media ecosystem had the potential to play this role.

Overall, from the previous analysis, it emerges that the 'two-headed' and influenced media have limited peace potential to de-escalation, depending on the agreement between political powers.

Enriched with this knowledge of the evolution of the media ecosystem in times of conflict, this study proposed the integration of third media's logic, capable of bringing balance to the ecosystem. The 'third media' principle consists of improving or creating new media that take into account the high conflict realities of the Congo and the sub-region, as exposed in this study. the 'third media' has not as a mission to annihilate the other media, but to balance the forces to avoid the media 'bi-cephalism' and to integrate into the ecosystem a media dimension less used, that is to say, the committed media and dedicated for peace, capable of intervening in all stages, i.e. prevention, peacemaking, and peacebuilding.

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APPENDIX 1: SAMPLE OF INTERVIEW GUIDE

Interview (Back Translation)

Greetings,

This interview is part of our doctoral research on 'Media Ecosystem Shift: The role of media in peacebuilding of the great lakes region of Africa'. Case of the 1998-2003 conflict in the DRC. We need your experience as a journalist during this period, in order for us to understand how the media and journalists covered this major event in the history of Congo and the sub-region. The information collected within the framework of this study is intended for research only, and could be stamped with the seal of anonymity at your request.

We thank you for your participation.

Dieudonnee Lukengu

Doctorant en journalisme et communication de masse

Pukyong National University (Corée du Sud)

Email : dlukengu@gmail.com

……………………………………………………………………………………

I. General questions

• Could you present your professional career and your responsibilities in your channel during the period of conflict 1998-2003?

• In general, and from a historical perspective, how do you analyze the media coverage of conflicts in Congo since 1997? How do you analyze it in relation to your channel and to others? Is it positive, negative, favorable, unfavorable? Do you think there is media out there that addresses the issue of conflicts in the DR Congo in an objective, professional manner?

• How would you rate the media coverage of the conflict of August 2, 1998 (Eastern War with Rwanda Uganda and the RCD and MLC rebellion) to June 30, 2003 (official end of the conflict)? Partisan, professional, objective and why?

II. Journalistic practices in your media channel during this period (1998-2003)

1. Do you think the media coverage (from collect to diffusion) of This Conflict (1998-2003) was rational, professional, emotional, political, unrestricted and objective? Why?

2. How would you describe your role as a journalist (and your media channel) during the conflict? Neutral, professional, conflict resolution oriented journalist for peace, or other considerations?

3. Did this period of conflict put a strain on your ethics and your profession? If yes, explain.

4. Can the information process (from collect to dissemination) on the 1998-2003 conflict be qualified as difficult? Was there a conflict between your ethics and politics (government and belligerents) and the reality on the ground? Explain and give an example if possible.

5. Was there pressure on the News treatment of this conflict? If so of what order? (Political, hierarchical, even social). Explain

6. From a historical perspective, according to you, during the reign of President L.D Kabila the News treatment of this conflict was more oriented towards peace or towards war? Was it more oriented towards the peaceful resolution of the conflict or towards confrontation? Explain

7. How would you describe your work as a journalist during this time of conflict? Was it a special time? What had changed compared to the 'normal' period.

8. The relationship between media and politics in the DRC is easily observable, especially with the public and private media. Some say that politics has its hands in your job as a journalist. Have you observed this political influence at a certain stage in the processing of information on the conflict? How would you describe it? What was she from? (Ministry of information, the presidency and security forces and others, hierarchical or others)? Discuss it over.

9. Did the ideology of the conflict (according to the parties to the conflict) influenced media coverage (from collect to dissemination) of the conflict? If yes, how? If not, how?

10. Regarding the sources of information on the conflict (government, army, police, rebels, foreign forces, civil society and others), were they easy to access. Were there conditions for access and dissemination? Explain.

11. What was your angle of treatment with regard to the rebellion, the foreign armies, and the international community? Looking back, do you think the treatment was objective, non-partisan, and professional? Could you give details for each party to the conflict?

12. with a divided country, compare (in terms of pressure, freedom, access to sources, to broadcasting) your work as a journalist or as a media channel in government and rebel zones? What was the routine in the newsroom during this time?

13. How did you go about informing your audience in rebel-controlled areas? And what was the message (resistance, reconciliation, peace…). Explain.

14. Looking back, how would you describe the work journalist in this time of conflict?

III. January 2001-2003

15. After the death of President L.D Kabila, a different approach was observed on the part of the new President Joseph Kabila on the diplomatic and internal political level, crowned by the reunification of the country. Do you think that this political posture influenced the treatment of information on the conflict? How? 'Or' What? Did you adopt another angle of media treatment adapted to this new political dynamic? Explain

16. What could RTNC achieve in a journalistic setting that other media struggled to achieve in the context of a country divided by war?

17. Do you think that the RTNC as a public media 'was a necessary link in the Congolese media landscape for peace? Why?

18. What sets your media channel apart from other media (international, commercial or community) in the media coverage of conflict, conflict resolution and peace?

19. How would you rate your contribution as a journalist in the process of peace, reconciliation and reunification of the country?

20. What kind of influence do you think your media channel had over the government, the opposition, and the rebels, regarding the content of the public debate on peace, dialogue, reconciliation and reunification of the country?

21. In your opinion, was there a difference in approach between your channel and other media (international media and local private media) when it comes to addressing the roots of the conflict and its resolution? Explain.

22. Do you think that your media channel has played a positive, negative or neutral role in the resolution of this conflict and the reunification of the country? Explain and give some examples

APPENDIX 2: SAMPLE OF INTERVIEW REQUEST LETTER

Back Translation

To the CEO of RTNC. Kinshasa Lingwala

Democratic Republic of Congo

Concerns: Scientific research

I hereby come to your senior person to request an interview as part of my doctoral research.

Regarding myself, I am a PhD student in Mass Communication Department at Pukyong National University in South Korea. It is in this context that I seek your expertise in order to allow me to have the reliable and accurate information for the writing of my thesis, which is entitled:

'Media Ecosystem Shift: The Role of Media in Peacebuilding of the Great Lakes Region of Africa'

Sincerely.

Kinshasa 02/20/2020

LUKENGU KAPUKU. M.A

APPENDIX 3:

Personal Communication with Media High Ranging Personalities.

Profile

	Names	Profession	Date	Duration
1	Kitutu Oleontwa:	Former CEO of RTNC	2020/08/19	60:39
2	Primo Mukandilwa Bwami	Vice-president of CSAC	2020/01/24	69:38
3	Kasonga Tshilunde	President of UNPC	2020/02/21	25:00
4	Oscar Kabamba	Chief in charge of TV program	2020/02/25	17:10