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
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# **The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights & Democracy 1978-2012**

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by  
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A thesis submitted in a partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

In Department of International Commerce, The Graduate School,  
Pukyong National University

November 2015

# The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights & Democracy

1978-2012

A dissertation

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
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# List of Abbreviations



CIRI	Cingranelli and Richards
EMPRIN	Empowerment Rights Index
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HSE	Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IEEPA	International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977
IES	Imposition of Economic Sanctions
MPC	Modest policy changes
NIS	Newly Independent States
OFAC	Office of Foreign Assets Control
OPEC	Organizations of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PHYSINT	Physical Integrity Rights Index
PTSA	Political Terror Scale the Amnesty International
PTSS	Political Terror Scale the State Department
RCD	Regime change & democratization
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization

# Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Prof. Eun Chae Kim for the continuous support of my Ph.D study and related research, for his patience, motivation, and immense knowledge. His guidance helped me in all the time of research and writing of this thesis. I could not have imagined having a better advisor and mentor for my Ph.D study. Besides my advisor, I would like to thank the rest of my thesis committee: Prof. KiSoo Kim, Prof. Kang Cheon, Prof. Choi Tae Young, and Dr. Ra Hee Ryang for their insightful comments and encouragement, and also for the hard question which incited me to widen my research from various perspectives. Also I thank my best Korean friend dear Mr. Daniel. Last but not the least, I would like to thank my Mother.

# The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights & Democracy 1978-2012

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## Abstract

One major concern in the international economic sanctions is the potential problem of consequences of sanctions results. This paper seeks to explore the consequences of economic sanctions results (successful, positive, minor & failed outcomes) on the target countries human rights and democracy. We analyze the sanctions implemented by U.S.A & U.N based on the dataset of policy results index and the sanctions contribution results index qualitative analysis in Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott [HSE 2008] by Probit-Statistical Method. The Imposition of Economic Sanctions (IES) includes 2675 cases in 71 countries during 35 years, since 1978 - 2012. This analysis evidence of consequences of economic sanctions results suggesting that sanctions played only a minor role in reaching the outcome. We reject the hypothesis that the sanctions and consequences jointly have no impact on Human Rights and Democracy, In other words, our judgment in these cases is that sanctions did not contribute importantly to the sender's goals. When the government does not absolutely respect democracy, if sanctions are imposed, that country will be drawn more towards violation of human rights and democracy. Therefore we cannot easily reject the hypothesis that the sanctions and their consequences jointly have no impact on Human Rights and Democracy.

Keywords: economic sanctions; consequences of sanctions results; human rights; democracy.



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# 1. Introduction

All types of sanctions have been widely used by the U.N. since the end of the Cold War. The purpose is generally not to punish the individual state but to modify its behavior. Sanctions are often considered to be a legitimate, more peaceful alternative to war. Do sanctions impose increase or decrease government respect for human rights in countries targeted with economic sanctions? Economic sanctions fail between 65-95% of the time in achieving their intended goals, Dursun Peksen, 2011 [31]. The idea of human rights protection, historically, has been considered as a domestic matter but the world is still mired in widespread violations of human rights. Gross forms of torture and execution remain commonplace. If economic sanctions weaken the target regime's coercive capacity, human rights violations by the government should be less likely. If, on the contrary, sanctions fail to attenuate the coercive capacity of the target elites and create more economic difficulties and political violence among ordinary citizens, the government will likely commit more human rights violations. We focus on competing views of why sanctions might improve or deteriorate human rights conditions.

According to Gary Hufbauer, Jeffery Schott, and Kimberly Elliot (hereafter HSE), economic sanctions have been used in international relations. Sanctions technique was used in ancient Greece. The most celebrated early use of economic sanctions occurred in 432 B.C. when Pericles issued the “Megaran decree” limiting the entry of Megara’s products into Athenian markets. The subsequent refusal to lift the Athenian boycott of Magara helped to trigger the Peloponnesian War I In the increasingly integrated global economy of the twentieth century, economic sanctions have become a popular tool of

statecraft, particularly in the United States in the 1990s. In 1919, Woodrow Wilson believed that the “economic, peaceful, silent deadly remedy” of economic sanctions could be used by the League of Nations to police international society II Albert Hirschman shows how states tried to minimize their vulnerability to the interruption of strategic imports while maximizing others’ need to trade with them. According to HSE, 165 cases of economic sanctions were launched between 1914 and 1998, of which 115 cases involved the United States, and of which 68 cases were unilateral U.S. initiatives. In addition, the Russian Federation employed economic sanctions in more than 35 occasions from 1992 to 1997 as a way of extracting political concessions from the Newly Independent States (NIS). The United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions only twice in the first 45 years of its existence, against Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977.

However, during the 1990s, the Security Council imposed comprehensive or partial sanctions more than 16 times. These unprecedented activities have generated substantial discussion of economic sanctions in policy and academic circles. Negative sanctions are measures of enforcement, which follow violations of law. They are penalties, which indicate the limits of permissible conduct and encourage compliance with known rules. Margaret Doxey defines economic sanctions as “penalties threatened or imposed as a declared consequence of the target’s failure to observe international standards or international obligations.” M. S. Daoudi and M. S. Dajani define economic sanctions as “punitive actions initiated by a number of international actors, particularly a world organization such as the League of Nations or the United Nations, against one or more states for violating a universally approved charter, as inducements to follow, or refrain from following, that particular course of conduct and conform with international law [29].

In the 1920s and early 1930s, in line with the concept of enforcement of international law, economic sanctions meant League of Nations sanctions. According to HSE, there were only five cases of economic sanctions in total employed by the League of Nations: against Yugoslavia in 1921, Greece in 1925, Paraguay and Bolivia in 1932, and Italy in 1935. Although UN sanctions have recently become quite common, it would be unrealistic to limit the economic sanctions label to UN enforcement measures, or to measures imposed by any international body against its members [29]. It is important to establish a more precise definition of economic sanctions, which now feature so prominently in state practice for other purposes. Essentially, economic sanctions imposed by a state, a group of states, or an international organization become a form of power exercised to influence other countries' behavior or policy, which does not necessarily violate international law. For example, Johan Galtung defines economic sanctions as "actions initiated by one or more international actors (the 'senders') against one or more others (the 'receivers') in order to punish the receivers by depriving them of some value and/or to make the receivers comply with certain norms the senders deem important." Makio Miyagawa has a similar definition [25].

In their seminal work, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, HSE define economic sanctions as "the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations. 'Customary' does not mean 'contractual'; it simply means levels of trade and financial activity that would probably have occurred in the absence of sanctions [15]. Based on her literature review, Donna Kaplowitz defines economic sanctions as "economic or financial prohibitions taken by one or more countries – the senders – to punish another country or countries – the target – or force change in the



target's policies, or demonstrate to a domestic or international audience the sender's position on the target's policies." Obviously, both objectives can also be sought simultaneously, that is, to change the target's behavior and to provide valued symbols to domestic or international constituencies [11]. Economic sanctions, sometimes synonymous with "economic coercion," are distinct from economic warfare (strategic embargo), economic inducements, and trade war, in terms of forms, purposes, and occasions. In essence, economic sanctions, according to David Baldwin, are only one category of economic statecraft, which refers to influence attempts relying primarily on resources which have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money. Economic warfare (strategic embargo) seeks to weaken an adversary's aggregate economic potential in order to weaken its military capabilities, either in a peacetime arms race or in an ongoing war. Economic warfare represents a long-term approach to dealing with adversaries while economic sanctions usually have immediate political goals. Economic inducements involve commercial concessions, technology transfers, and other economic carrots that are extended by a sender in exchange for political compliance on the part of a target. "Economic inducements" are also called "positive sanctions." Trade wars are disputes over economic policy and behavior instead of political/security goals [11].

## **1.1 Motivation**

This paper examines case studies (relationship between impose of sanction and decrease human rights violations and Improving of Democracy) and sanctions results (successful outcome, positive outcome, minor outcome & failed outcome), and we asks whether



sanctions improving the variables of human rights and democracy of the target countries or has harmful consequences.



## **2. Economic Sanction**

### **2.1 Definition of an Economic Sanction Case**

Defines economic sanctions as actions that one or more countries take to limit or end their economic relations with a target country in an effort to persuade that country to change one or more of its policies. By definition, a sanctions must:

- A. Involve at least one sender state and a target state.
- B. Be implemented by the sender in order to change the behavior of the target state.

Actions taken by states that restrict economic relations with countries for solely domestic reasons therefore do not qualify as sanctions. Sanctions may take many forms including actions such as tariffs, export controls, embargoes, import bans, travel bans, freezing assets, cutting foreign aid, and/or blockades. For the purposes of this dataset, all sanctions cases may only include one target state. If a sender(s) makes a threat against multiple targets, a new case is created for each individual target. The sanctions cases are assumed to begin when the sender either makes a threat about the possibility of sanctions or imposes sanctions with no previous threat. A threat may or may not be specific; it must only declare that sanctions are a possibility against a target state. Threats may be initiated in several ways, such as verbal statements by government officials, drafting of legislation against a target state, or the passage of a conditional law stipulating that sanctions will be imposed if certain target behaviors are not changed. In several instances, sanctions are imposed as a result of legislation designed to monitor the behavior of target states.

Examples include yearly determinations of whether a country is engaged in nuclear proliferation, drug trafficking, or the support of terrorism. The sender conducts routine investigations of the behavior of a target on an annual basis. If this is the case, the initial passage of legislation is considered to be the start of the sanctions case for countries that are violating the conditions needed to avoid sanctions. Alternatively, in situations where countries that are in compliance in the period in which the law is passed but later violate the law, the case is considered to begin after the target violates, and the sender issues a protest or imposes sanctions.

## **2.2 Anatomy of an Economic Sanction Episode**

Analysts of economic sanctions vary widely on how they define the relevant actors and on what specific tools may be counted as economic sanctions. A sanctions episode has a time dimension that must be defined. Any assessment of the utility of economic sanction depends critically on the standard against which it is judged.

## **2.3 Senders and Targets**

HSE use the term ‘sender’ to designate the country or international organization that is the principal author of the sanctions episode. More than one country may be engaged in the campaign, but usually a single country takes the lead and brings others along. The leader may enlist support through bilateral consultation or less frequently through an international organization, the League of Nations, the United Nations or the Organization of American States, for example. In a few instances, two countries, or a country and an international organization, may share leadership, and in these cases both are listed as

sender countries in Appendix. HSE use the term ‘target’ to designate the country that is the immediate object of episode. Sanctions may be aimed at two or more countries, for example, the Second World War sanctions directed against Germany and Japan. The lessons of a sanctions episode can also and importantly be intended to deter the leaders of other countries who might be contemplating objectionable policies similar to those of target, for example, engaging in terrorism undertaking a nuclear or biological weapons program, embarking on a military adventure. However, my thesis focuses on the analysis of the Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights & Democracy on the response of the targets.

## **2.4 Types of Sanctions**

International sanctions are actions taken by countries against others for political reasons, either unilateral or multilateral. Success may depend, to some extent, on whether the sanctions hit a sensitive sector in the target country’s economy. There are several types of sanctions. Senders commonly use seven types of sanctions: (1) Trade Sanctions; (2) Financial Sanctions; (3) Asset Freezes; (4) Diplomatic Sanctions; (5) Military Sanctions; (6) Sport Sanctions; (7) Individuals Sanctions. These sanctions are sometimes used alone but more often in combination.

### **2.4.1 Trade Sanctions (Economic Sanction)**

Through trade sanctions, sender countries seek to limit their exports to and/or their imports from the target country and wish to control certain products or technologies, for example, nuclear materials and selected chemical and biological precursors. When sender

countries impose only one of trade sanction, either alone or in conjunction with financial restrictions, they more frequently use export controls than import controls. One reason is that sender countries are more likely to enjoy a dominant market position as suppliers of key exports, especially military equipment and also sophisticated capital goods. A second reason for the emphasis on export sanctions, and one peculiar to the United States, is that the Congress has given the President. Exports may be stopped readily through the mechanisms of the Export Administration Act, whose authorities have been maintained by executive order issued under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA). Trade controls (both goods and services) by the sender include one or more of the following elements:

- A. Quotas on exports/imports;
- B. Restrictive exports/imports licensing;
- C. Limited or total export disruption (embargo);
- D. Limited or total import disruption (boycott);
- E. Discriminatory tariff policy (including denial of most favored nation status);
- F. Restriction or cancellation of fishing rights;
- G. Suspension or cancellation of trade agreements; and Bans on strategic goods and advanced technology exports.

#### **2.4.2 Financial Sanctions (Economic Sanction)**

Financial sanctions are imposed by delaying or interrupting publicly funded loans or grants or, in extreme cases, by freezing all assets of the target country. The most common type of financial sanction is the interruption of official development assistance. Although export-import bank financing, multilateral development bank loans, and other forms of official and private credit have been linked to political goals from time to time, the majority of cases involve the manipulation of bilateral economic and military assistance to developing countries. Suspension of aid or technical assistance by the sender includes one or more of the following elements:

- Reduction, suspension, or cancellation of credit facilities at concessionary or market rates;
- Reduction, suspension, or cancellation of technical assistance, military assistance, development assistance, and training programs; and
- Votes against loans, grants, subsidies, and funding for technical or other assistance from international organizations.

#### **2.4.3 Asset Freezes (Economic Sanction)**

Asset freezes are also becoming more popular as a means of targeting the leaders of 'rogue' regimes, corrupt autocrats, and their associates. An unusual sanction is the freeze of assets the target country holds in the sender country. A broad freeze of assets not only stops financial flows but also impedes trade, freezes are often imposed in conjunction with

broad trade controls. Merchandise, accounts receivable, and bank accounts all qualify as assets, as does real property. So once a freeze is announced anything owned by the target country, its corporations, or residents is potentially vulnerable. In general, foreign government assets have been frozen only in times of war or exceptional hostility. In recent years, however, the seizure of assets linked to drug traffickers or to terrorists or their supporters has become a more common weapon in the US arsenal, while the United Nations has been studying the seizure of assets owned by individual regime leaders and their supporters as a means of putting pressure on 'bad guys' in target countries and avoiding civilian costs. In general the freezing of assets made a limited contribution to cases involving the pursuit of major objectives, and in these cases sanctions were usually a small supplement to the use of military force. Freezing of the target's financial assets by the sender includes one or more of the following elements:

- Freezing or confiscation of bank assets of the target government or target nationals;
  - Confiscation or expropriation of other target assets, including the target's investment in the sender;
  - Freezing interest or other transfer payments;
  - Refusal to refinance or reschedule debt repayments (interest and principal); and
- Suspension or cancellation of joint projects.

- Blacklisting of sender's or third parties' companies doing business with the target, including trade and investment; and/or blacklisting of the target's companies doing business with the sender, including trade and investment.

#### **2.4.4 Diplomatic Sanctions**

Diplomatic sanctions are political measures taken to express disapproval or displeasure at a certain action through diplomatic and political means (the reduction or removal of diplomatic ties, such as embassies), rather than affecting economic or military relations. Measures include limitations or cancellations of high-level government visits or expelling or withdrawing diplomatic missions or staff.

#### **2.4.5 Military Sanctions (Economic Sanction)**

Similarly, military sanctions can range from carefully targeted military strikes (Military intervention) to degrade a nation's conventional or non-conventional capabilities, to the less aggressive form of an arms embargo to cut off supplies of arms or dual-use items.

#### **2.4.6 Sport Sanctions**

Sport sanctions (preventing one country's people and teams from competing in international events) are used as a way of psychological warfare, intended to crush the morale of the general population of the target country. The only instance where sports sanctions were used was the international sanctions against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1992–1995, enacted by UN Security Council by resolution 757.



#### **2.4.7 Individual Sanctions**

The United Nations Security Council can implement sanctions on political leaders or economic individuals. These persons usually find ways of evading their sanction because of political connections within their nation.

#### **2.4.8 Cultural Sanctions**

Finally, cultural sanctions, while having less of a negative impact than other forms of sanctions, can still have undesired results. The athletes of the target nation may be banned from international sports competitions, Folk dancers, musicians and other artists may be banned and restrictions may be placed on educational and tourist travel.

### **2.5 The Goals of Sanctions**

Nearly all sanctions scholars recognize the difficulty in determining the sender's objectives. This is particularly true when the sender's goals are primarily demonstrative for domestic or international audiences. Also, the "sender" is usually a heterogeneous entity with different components intending to achieve different purposes. Therefore, there is a need to explore the hidden agendas embedded in sanctions as well as the stated goals. A review of economic sanctions cases and previous scholarly studies suggests that the goals of economic sanctions fall into five categories: punishment (deterrence), compliance (coercion), destabilization (subversion), signaling, and symbolism (demonstrative effect).

#### **2.5.1 Punishment (deterrence)**

Both historically and conceptually, economic sanctions have been used to punish a transgression. Like sending a criminal to prison, the goal is not necessarily to rehabilitate

the wrong-doer, but to punish him for his offense and to deter others from such wayward behavior. Economic sanctions invoked for punitive ends also serve to define unacceptable behavior, either unilaterally or multilaterally, and thus contributes to the establishment of internationally accepted standards of legitimate conduct.

More specifically, the sender may invoke sanctions to discourage future objectionable policies by demonstrating the sender's willingness and ability to retaliate. If the undesirable behavior is punished with sufficient severity, it may not be repeated by the target country. For example, in announcing a grain embargo against the Soviet Union issued in response to the invasion of Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter declared, we will deter aggression.

Similarly, the sender may employ sanctions in order to deter other countries from undertaking undesired behavior by demonstrating to third parties the likely cost of misbehavior. For example, one purpose of U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba (1960) was to discourage other Latin American nations from emulating Castro's policies. Similarly, Soviet economic sanctions against Yugoslavia (1948-1955) and Lithuania (1990) served to deter other countries from emulating the target's policy of non-cooperation with the Soviet Union.

### **2.5.2 Compliance (coercion)**

The sender may impose economic sanctions in order to force the target to alter its policy or behavior to conform to the sender's preference or specific political goals, such as compelling desired action, encouraging acceptance of international norms, or restoring the status quo. In deterrence, one seeks to prevent action. In compliance, the sender is seeking

to force the target to undo an action. The latter is far more difficult to achieve, as Alexander George and William Simons explained in their edited volume *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*.

For example, the United Kingdom and the League of Nations imposed sanctions on Italy (1935-1936) in an effort to compel Mussolini to withdraw troops from Abyssinia. The Soviet Union's economic sanctions against Yugoslavia (1948-1955), China (1960-1970), and Albania (1961-1965) were imposed to win acceptance of Soviet leadership in other socialist countries. The U.S. grain embargo against the Soviet Union (1980-1981) sought Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The United Nations economic sanctions against Rhodesia (1965-1979) were designed to force acceptance of international standards governing human rights. The United Nations economic sanctions against Iraq (1990-1991) were crafted to force Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait and subsequently to allow UN arms inspectors to complete their work. The United States economic sanctions against India (1998) were designed to force India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty immediately and without conditions.

### **2.5.3 Destabilization (subversion)**

The sender may impose economic sanctions to destabilize the target government or subvert the entire target political regime. For example, Stalin sought to replace Tito with a pro-Soviet leader by imposing economic sanctions against Yugoslavia (1948-1955). When the U.S. embargoed Cuba (1960), it hoped to replace Castro's regime with a non-communist one. The economic sanctions imposed by the Organization of American States and the United States against Haiti (1991-1996) demanded the restoration of the

democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who had been overthrown in a military coup led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras.

#### **2.5.4 Signaling**

The imposition of economic sanctions conveys a signal of the sender's resolve to both the target and the sender's allies. It says that the words of the sender will be supported with action. Sanctions by a great power or an international organization often imply a threat of more drastic action (for example, military) against the target country. HSE contend that sanctions frequently serve as a junior weapon in a battery of diplomatic artillery aimed at the antagonistic state. In the 115 cases, HSE counted 34 cases of economic sanctions with companion policies of quasi-military action or/and regular military action. Economic sanctions may precede or accompany actual armed hostility. This indicates that the sender may use economic sanctions as a signal to convince the target to accept the sender's preference before launching military action.

For example, the United States and the United Nations imposed comprehensive economic sanctions, combined with vigorous diplomacy and a gradual military buildup, against Iraq in 1990 before they decided to adopt military action in 1991. Eric Melby argues that economic sanctions against Iraq were the best tool available on August 2, 1990, to signal outrage and determination to resist Saddam's annexation of Kuwait. In addition, Lisa Martin argues that costly sanctions by a great power can signal its determination and thus convince other states to join in the sanctioning effort.

### **2.5.5 Symbolism (demonstrative effect)**

Oftentimes, the demonstrative element behind a sanctions policy is not explicitly stated as a goal. Nevertheless, the demonstrative element is on occasion the most important goal, or the only meaningful function of the sanctions policy. Sanctions are often intended to defuse pressures and demonstrate the outrage of the domestic and international audiences. For domestic audiences, economic sanctions will defuse pressures for more extreme action and satisfy others that the government is acting firmly. For example, former British Foreign Minister David Lloyd George remarked in 1935 on the League of Nations economic sanctions against Italy (1935-1936): “[Sanctions] came too late to save Abyssinia, but they are just in the nick of time to save the [British] Government.” Only two weeks before Election Day in November 1960, President Eisenhower announced the U.S. export embargo against Cuba (1960), probably in an effort to help the Republican presidential candidate, Richard Nixon. The other candidate, John Kennedy, also promised the electorate to “do something” about Cuban leader Fidel Castro. For example, the U.S. economic sanctions against the Soviet Union (1983) were aimed at galvanizing criticism of Moscow’s downing of a Korean airliner. The West’s economic sanctions against China (1989) in the wake of the Tiananmen Square incident were principally designed to assuage domestic constituencies and to make a moral statement. For example, President George Bush stated on June 6, 1989: “The United States cannot condone the violent attacks and cannot ignore the consequences for our relationship with China.” The principal emphasis was on condemning the violent repression of demonstrations, focusing the world’s gaze on the brutal, anti-democratic act of the Chinese government, and discrediting the Beijing regime.

## 2.6 Limitations on the Use of Economic Sanctions

Sanctions often do not succeed in changing the behavior of foreign countries. One reason for failure in plain, the sanctions imposed may simply be inadequate for the task. The goals may be too elusive, the means too gentle, or cooperation from other countries, when needed, too tepid. A second reason for failure is that sanctions may create their own antidotes. In particular, economic sanctions may unify the target country both in support of its government and in search of commercial alternatives. This outcome is evident in a blunted the League of Nations actions against Italy in 1935-36, Soviet sanctions against Yugoslavia in 1948-55, US measures against Indonesia in 1963-66, UN actions against Rhodesia in 1965-79, and US sanctions against Nicaragua in the 1980s. Benito Mussolini expressed Italy's nationalistic defiance of the League's sanctions in 1935 with these words: To sanctions of an economic character we will reply with our discipline, with our sobriety, and with our spirit of sacrifice, quoted in Renwick 1981, 18. Defiant leaders of target countries have often flung similar words in the face of sanctions. For example, Manuel Noriega used comparable rhetoric when the United States imposed sanctions on Panama in the late 1980s. A third reason why sanction pressure may fail is that sanctions may prompt powerful or wealthy allies of the target country to assume the role of BLACK KNIGHTS. Their support can largely offset whatever deprivation results from sanctions themselves. Examples include the US sanctions against Cuba and later Nicaragua and Soviet sanctions against Yugoslavia and Albania. A fourth possible reason for failure is that economic sanctions may alienate allies abroad and business interests at home. When a sender's allies do not share its goals, they may, in the first instance, ask exasperating questions about the probability of a successful outcome, in the second instance, they may refuse to take the



sender's own initiatives seem all the more futile, finally, they may revolt and enforce national anti-sanctions laws, such as the US anti-boycott provisions and the British Protection of Trading Interests Act, to counteract the impact of the other nation's sanctions on their own foreign policy and economic interest. The protective legal barrier is a relatively new development but has spread to a number of countries, France, Denmark, Australia, and others where the errant aim of a sender state has wounded domestic firms.

## **2.7 Limitations to Sanctions in Humanitarian Law**

Any sanctions regime imposed during a war or as a consequence of a war is governed by humanitarian law. (19) Under humanitarian law the civilian population must be protected from war and its consequences as much as possible. This requires that the civilian population must always be provided with or allowed to secure the essentials for survival: food, potable water, shelter, medicines and medical care.

### **2.7.1 The Hague Convention and Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907**

The Hague Convention and Regulations of 1907 contain a number of provisions that could substantially limit sanctions regimes. For example, the Martens Clause (eighth preambular paragraph, re-stated in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I thereto (21)) mandates that all situations arising from war be governed by principles of law of civilized nations, principles of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience. Article 50 of the Regulations provides: "No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible."

### **2.7.2 Geneva Conventions of 1949**

The Geneva Conventions have many provisions relevant to the imposition of sanctions. For example, they mandate the free passage of medical provisions and objects necessary for religious worship (see, for example, Convention IV, art. 23). The Conventions also set out rules relating to medical convoys and evacuation (see, for example, Convention IV, arts. 21-22), which could be violated by a sanctions regime that limited land or air convoys of humanitarian goods. Because the fundamental purpose of the Geneva Conventions is to provide for the medical needs of military personnel wounded in battle as a result of armed conflict, any provision of a sanctions regime that limits the ability of a State to provide for its war wounded must be viewed as illegal. Geneva Convention rights may not be abrogated or waived in any circumstance. The two protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 reinforce some of the provisions. For example, Protocol I, article 54, requires the protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. A provision of a sanctions regime that authorizes military action against such objects or that denies the repair and recommissioning of those illegally damaged in the course of armed conflict must be viewed as illegal. Protocol I, article 70, provides for relief actions for the benefit of the civilian population and would be violated by any provision of a sanctions regime that limits or modifies relief action. Protocol II contains parallel provisions to many of the provisions set out in Protocol I. For example, Protocol Additional II, article 14, provides for the protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.



### **2.7.3 General Assembly resolutions pertaining to armed conflict**

The General Assembly has passed many resolutions relating to the protection of persons in times of armed conflict. For example, General Assembly Resolution, of 14 December 1974, on the Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict provides, in paragraph "Women and children belonging to the civilian population and finding themselves in circumstances of emergency and armed conflict" shall not be deprived of shelter, food, medical aid or other inalienable rights, in accordance with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Declaration on the Rights of the Child or other instruments of international law, Bossuyt Report, 2000 [35].

## **2.8 Prior Relations between Sender and Target**

Sanctions are imposed against friends and foes alike. Forceful sanctions may be needed against belligerent countries to coerce them into yielding, especially since the stakes often involve national security or other major issues for both sender and target and because the target may be concerned about the reputational costs of conceding to a rival's demands (Drezner 1999) On the other hand, a friendly country will often consider the importance of its overall relations with the sender country before responding to economic sanctions. In addition, a sender is likely to trade more with an ally, and therefore have more leverage, than with an adversary. Such considerations led South Korea and Taiwan to accede to mild US pressure and forgo construction of nuclear reprocessing plants in the mid-1970s (HSE, Cases 75-1 and 76-2). Likewise, the decertification process had a galvanizing effect in

turning the political tide against President Ernesto Samper in Colombia. With friends, subtle or symbolic sanctions may succeed. To reflect the role of prior relations in determining the outcome of a sanctions episode, we have constructed an index for classifying the cases according to the state of political relations between the sender and target countries before the imposition of sanctions:

### **2.8.1 Antagonistic**

The sender and target countries are in opposing camps; illustrated by most Cold War cases, US-Japan relations prior to World War I, Arab-Israeli relations, and US relations with Cuba, North Korea, Iran, and Libya for the past two decades or more.

### **2.8.2 Neutral**

The sender country does not have strong ties to the target, but there is a workable relationship without antagonism; illustrated by immediate post-World War II relations between Spain and the United Kingdom despite centuries of dispute over Gibraltar (HSE, Case 54-3), US relations with Haiti prior to the 1987 sanctions (HSE, Case 87-2), and US relations with Iraq in the late 1980s prior to the invasion of Kuwait.

### **2.8.3 Cordial**

The sender and target countries are close friends and allies; illustrated by ties between the Arab League and Egypt prior to the Camp David accords (Case 78-6), US relations with the United Kingdom before the Suez crisis of 1956, Indian relations with Nepal before the 1989 dispute, and UK relations with Malta prior to base negotiations (HSE, Case 71-2).

## **2.9 Why are sanctions frequently used?**

In the first place, as the results of this study show, sanctions have not been, on balance, nearly so unsuccessful as the episodes directed against the Soviet Union in the 1970 and 1980 would suggest. In the second place, world leaders often conclude that the most obvious alternatives to economic sanctions would be unsatisfactory: military action would be too massive and diplomatic protest too meager. Sanctions can provide a satisfying theatrical display yet avoid the high costs of war. The second Iran case, where sanctions did preclude the onset of a full scale war in 2015, but the third Iraq case, where sanctions did not preclude the onset of a full scale war in 2003, furnishes a harsh reminder of just how costly military intervention can be. This is not to say that sanctions are costless.

### **2.10 Sanctions as a Bargaining Game**

The interstate dynamics of a sanctions episode are similar to those in other international crisis bargaining situations and can best be conceptualized as a war of attrition. To examine these dynamics, a simple model of crisis bargaining should be considered. First, we must assume that the two states sender and target — have a dispute over some good. It may be a material good, such as a piece of territory or resource, or more likely, it will be a policy enacted by the targeted state that is viewed as harmful by the sender. Initially, the sender state must decide whether to challenge the target with sanctions or to accept the status quo, allowing the target to possess the disputed good. Under some circumstances, the mere threat of sanctions may be enough to convince the target to alter its actions (historically, this can be seen in the case of the League of Nations threats against Greece over their border skirmish with Bulgaria in 1925; theoretically, this is demonstrated by Morgan and

Miers, 1999). Bargaining between the sides begins with the imposition of sanctions and does not end until the sanctions are terminated. If both sides possessed perfect and complete information, neither side would have doubts about the outcome, nor would sanctions ever actually be implemented in order to modify behavior. Because information asymmetries do exist, sanctions are sometimes utilized, and these are the cases that are of interest here. If the challenge is made and sanctions are imposed, the target may either concede to this economic pressure or resist the sanctions. If the target concedes, the sanctions end, and the sender is given possession of the good. If the target does not concede, then the onus is back on the sender to decide to continue to sanctions or to back down and end the sanctions. If the sender backs down, then the sanctions end with the target in possession of the good. Sanctions episodes end, not because the sides are unable to continue under the economic pressure, but rather because one side agrees to stop. This aspect of sanctions bargaining differs from wars, where fighting ceases because both sides agree to quit (Kecskemeti, 1958). At some point, at least one party in the sanctions dispute will prefer settling the issue to the expected costs of continuing the sanctions. Initially, however, both states may hope for a better settlement by maintaining sanctions on the basis of their expectations about the other side's ability and willingness to bear the costs of sanctions. While information is transmitted through this strategic interaction, the decision-making processes within the two states are still separate. If the target state chooses to back down when faced with economic pressure, then sanctions succeed. On the other hand, if the sender decides to abandon the policy, sanctions fail. These are two distinct decisions made by different sets of decision-makers.

## 2.11 Are Sanctions Effective?


In evaluating the success of economic sanctions, HSE first classify cases according to the type of foreign policy objective. The success rate importantly depended on the type of policy or governmental change sought. Episodes involving modest and limited goals, such as the release of a political prisoner, succeeded half the time. Cases involving attempts to change regimes e.g., by destabilizing a particular leader or by encouraging an autocrat to democratize, to impair a foreign adversary's military potential, or to otherwise change its policies in a major way succeeded in about 30 percent of those cases. Efforts to disrupt relatively minor military adventures succeeded in only a fifth of cases where that was the goal. Table 2.1 summarizes the scorecard. HSE found sanctions to be at least partially successful in 34 percent of the cases that they documented Table 2.1. It is important to reiterate that HSE score sanctions episodes on a scale from 1 to 16 (see chapter 3, Table 3.1 Variable Definitions). By HSE standards, successful cases are those with an overall success score of higher than 12, the success score is derived by multiplying the assigned policy result score by the sanctions contribution score, where 4 is the maximum index for each. HSE emphasize that a score of 9 does not mean that economic sanctions achieved a foreign policy triumph. It means only that sanctions made a modest contribution to a goal that was partly realized, often at some political cost to the sender country. Nor does a score of 6 indicate dismal failure. In fact, in all of the cases assigned a score of 6 and about a third of those scored, the sender's objective was at least partially achieved, but sanctions played only a MINOR role in reaching the outcome. In other words, there are several reasons why sanctions often do not work. Do economic sanctions ever work? It's a tricky question. After all, the decades-long US trade embargo against Cuba has not brought down

that regime, while the US, European, and British Commonwealth sanctions against South Africa may have played a part in changing that country's leadership. I think a part of what made Iran come to the bargaining table has to do with sanctions, that economic sanctions were important in ending apartheid in South Africa, and are leading Iran to negotiate with the West. The significant uncertain contingent on the panel was largely concerned with knowing more specifics before they could take a stand. "Depends on the country, its trade and its politics. Also, sanctions that are initially apparently ineffective can gradually undermine a regime, we have evidence both ways—sanctions of Myanmar and North Korea have accomplished little, those who agreed that sanctions have largely proved futile expressed varying points of view. This is true for limited sanctions being imposed on Russia. Much more comprehensive sanctions as in South Africa or Iran would be effective. meanwhile, the type of economy under sanction. The effectiveness must depend on the openness of the target economy and the uniformity of the sanctions.

Table 2.1. Success by policy goal

<b>Policy goal</b>	<b>Success cases</b>	<b>Failure cases</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Success ratio</b>
Modest policy changes	22	21	43	51%
Regime change & democratization	25	55	80	31%
Disruption of military adventures	4	15	19	21%
Military impairment	9	20	29	31%
Other major policy changes	10	23	33	30%
All cases	70	134	204	34%

Sucree: Book of Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, Peterson Institute.



Sucre: Book of Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, Peterson Institute.

First, sanctions are of limited utility in achieving foreign policy goals that depend on compelling the target countries to take actions it stoutly resists. In some cases, the security, political, or other costs of complying with the sender's demands may simply be higher than any pain that can be imposed with sanctions. Sanctions may fail if the sender feels less intensely about the stakes involved than the target, since the sender may choose to impose sanctions that are too weak to achieve even relatively modest objective.

Second, HSE classify some sanctions as failing to produce a real change in the target's behavior when their primary if unstated purpose namely, demonstrating resolve at home, signaling disapproval abroad, or simple punishment may have been fully realized.

Third, sanctions sometimes fail because sender countries have crosscutting interests and conflicting goals in their overall relations with the target country. Tensions among economic interests in the sender country that could either benefit or lose from a disruption



in trade, finance, and investment often lead to tepid measures timidly imposed. Cross-cutting economic & security interest with the target regime complicate the construction of a sanctions package, leading to ambiguous signals of policy resolve and intent by the sender country. The nature of the objective is an important political variable: Sanctions cannot stop a military assault as easily as they can free a political prisoner. Based on HSE analysis is organized by the five types of objectives listed earlier, namely: 1. *to effect relatively modest changes in the target country's policy*, 2. *to change the target country's regime*, 3. *to disrupt a relatively minor military adventure*, 4. *to impair the military potential of an important adversary*, and 5. *to change the target country's policies or behavior in other major ways*.

#### **2.11.1 Modest Changes in Policy**

Sender countries have frequently threatened or deployed sanctions to pursue relatively modest changes in the policies of target countries. Modest changes are not trivial changes. Changes that we have labeled modest may have loomed large in the political life of the sender or target during the time of confrontation. However, we apply the label "modest change" to policy goals that do not threaten the government in power or its military capabilities. For example, the settlement of an expropriation dispute or releasing a few political prisoners does not compare with stopping a military adventure or destabilizing a government. Illustrative of these cases is Case 94-2 (HSE), in which Greece blocked EU aid destined for Albania in a successful effort to shorten the jail time of ethnic Greek leaders imprisoned in Albania following their conviction as Greek spies. The objective was quite specific, and Greece had considerable leverage owing to Albania's troubled economy. Another representative case was Case 92-11 (HSE), in which the United States



imposed mild sanctions on Nicaragua for three years (1992-95), both to encourage the government to establish better control of the military and to settle a number of expropriation cases. Because of its dominance in the Western Hemisphere, the United States achieved a measure of success in both objectives. In fact, the United States has actively pursued modest policy goals, accounting for 22 of the 43 modest policy change observations listed in table 2.1.

### **2.11.2 Destabilizing a Government**

By far, regime change is the most frequent foreign policy objective of economic sanctions, accounting for 80 out of the 204 observations Table 1. Including in both counts cross-listed cases and cases with multiple phases). Just under a third of the regime change episodes a success from in the second edition of *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, we libeled "regime change" episodes as "destabilization" cases. Here we adopt the broader term "regime change" to encompass not only the explicit targeting of a particular foreign leader but also structural changes that imply new leadership, most notably the embrace of democracy. The standpoint of the country imposing sanctions a success ratio well below the rate for modest policy change cases but much the same as other major foreign policy objectives. In our view, success in a third of the cases contrasts favorably with the skepticism often expressed in the literature. International institutions (such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States) played a role in 31 percent of the successful episodes and 69 percent of the failures. For example, the Korean War (HSE, Case 50-1). As well, regime change was a corollary objective in two other military impairment cases, two military adventure cases, and one case classed under other major goals—and again all these cases are cross-listed. In cases initiated after the Cold War.

Regime change (generally led by the United States and the European Union) emerges as a common strategy for restoring or promoting democratic forms of government.

### **2.11.3 Disrupting Military Adventure**

At the close of World War I, the classic rationale offered for economic sanctions was to preserve peace, usually by coercing an aggressive country to abandon its military adventure. Lord Curzon, a member of the war cabinet of British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, suggested in 1915 that the sure application of sanctions might have averted the outbreak of a lesser conflict than World War I: Sanctions did not, it is true, succeed in preventing the war; they have not, at any rate at present curtailed its duration, but I should like to put it this way. I doubt very much whether, if Germany had anticipated when she plunged into war the consequences, commercial, financial, and otherwise, which would be entailed upon her by two, three, or four years of war, she would not have been eager to plunge in as she was. Remember this. Though possibly we have not done all we desired, we have done a great deal, and we could have done a great deal more if our hands had not been tied by certain difficulties. It is naturally a delicate matter for me to allude to this. A good many of them have been removed by the entry of the United States of America into the war, but we have always the task of handling with great and necessary delicacy the neutral states, and this difficulty still remains with us. (Quoted in Mittrany 1925, 36)

Influenced by Lord Curzon and President Woodrow Wilson, after World War I, British and American policy officials came to view sanctions as an explicit substitute for military action. This doctrine dominated official thinking until the dismal failure of the League of Nations to restrain Benito Mussolini in his conquest of Abyssinia (HSE, Case 35-1). Thereafter, advocates viewed sanctions as a key component of an overall effort to disrupt

unwelcome military adventures. In recent years, the doctrine has taken a further twist: To reverse military adventures, sanctions are sometimes utilized as a prelude to force rather than a substitute for force. HSE define disrupting a military adventure as an action on a scale less grand than the two World Wars, the Korean War, or the Cold War, and an action where the sender is not itself involved as a military participant. As mentioned, the classic (and failed) instance of the use of sanctions to thwart a military adventure was (HSE, Case 35-1) League of Nations and UK v. Italy. Other instances include Case 40-1: US v. Japan; (HSE, Case 60-3) US v. Cuba; and (HSE, Case 95-1) US v. Peru and Ecuador (border conflict). Success was achieved in just 4 of these episodes, with scores of 16. Sanctions failed to deter the target country's martial ambitions in 15 cases. It is worth noting that, since the 1960s, not even one success has been attributable to sanctions. This category by far accounts for our lowest success ratio, under 1 in 5. Because successes are so few and because the cases are so different from one another, it is difficult to ferret out potential sources of success and failure in these cases. Indeed, unlike the other major goal categories, companion measures appear only in failed episodes, compliant targets were relatively more stable, and the costs imposed on the target in successes were just a third of those in failures.

#### **2.11.4 Impairing Military Potential**


The immediate purpose of practically every economic sanctions episode is to diminish the potential power of the target country. Nevertheless, we can distinguish between the imposition of economic measures to achieve defined political goals and the conduct of a major war or economic campaign to weaken an adversary. The targets were major powers not only Germany in the two World Wars but also the Soviet Union, China, and India. It

is unreasonable to expect that sanctions that disrupt a modest amount of trade or finance can significantly detract from the economic strength or military ambitions of a major power. Efforts by the United States and other powers to limit the acquisition of nuclear weapons by secondary powers. In neither of the two World Wars, the Cold War, nor the Korean and Vietnam wars did the Allies believe that sanctions would decisively contribute to the outcome. Instead, they expected that economic denial would marginally erode the adversary's military capabilities, thereby constraining its actions. Sanctions became a minor adjunct to major war efforts, and "trading with the enemy" was labeled an offense in its own right, quite apart from calculations of cost and benefit. Thus for nearly four decades (until 1990), the United States sought to constrain the Soviet military machine by denying it technological sustenance, initially through the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) (HSE, Case 48-5) and later, in the 1980s, through additional measures associated with the Afghanistan invasion (Case 80-1) and the Polish crisis (HSE, Case 81-3). Comparable broad sanctions were imposed on China (HSE, Case 49-1).<sup>6</sup> the nuclear weapons cases echo the same refrain but at a lower decibel level.

#### **2.11.5 Other Major Policy Changes**

Under this heading we put a variety of cases that are not comfortably classified exclusively or at all under other categories, while three cases are cross-listed. HSE include in the major policy change category those cases where country A sanctioned country B because of country B's relations with country C. Examples include (HSE, Case 73-1) Arab League v. US, over US support for Israel in the October war; (HSE, Case 89-1) India v. Nepal, over Nepal's relations with China; and (HSE, Case 92-10) China v. France, over French sales of arms to Taiwan. As with regime change and military impairment cases,

success was achieved in just under a third of these cases. A recent success was (HSE, Case 91-4) in which the United States and the Netherlands persuaded Indonesia to abandon its occupation of East Timor.<sup>9</sup> Mentioning just two failures, there is little evidence that the Arab League boycott has moved Israel on the question of establishing a Palestinian homeland (HSE, Case 46-1) and sanctions did not help Indonesia prevent the consolidation of neighboring territory into Malaysia (HSE, Case 63-2). Companion policies were frequently used but not particularly helpful in this category. As in the military impairment cases, however, international cooperation with the sender was significantly higher in success cases than in failures, and international assistance to the target was significantly lower in success cases. The warmth of relations prior to sanctions appears to have been more important in this category than most others, and sanctions were also more likely to succeed against democratic regimes.



### 3. Literature Review & Related Works

Previous studies presume that sanctions increase the likelihood of political repression in targeted states. Political scientists have failed to investigate the extent to which economic sanctions impact political repression in purely autocratic regimes. Sanctions imposed on purely autocratic regimes significantly decrease levels of political repression when measured in terms of extra judicial killings, political imprisonment, disappearances, and torture, Emmitt and Travis, 2011 [13].

Sanctions were typically imposed after human rights respect decreased in the target country. Respect for human rights typically increases shortly after the imposition of sanctions. Multilateral and targeted economic sanctions have a stronger negative impact on respect for human rights, compared to unilateral and comprehensive sanctions. Additionally, whereas respect for human rights in target countries typically decreases after sanctions have been imposed, the level of democracy increases over the whole range of sanction episodes, which allows to refute regime type of target countries as alternative explanation for diminishing respect for human rights, Emanuel Ingold, 2013 [14].

Sanctions can conflict with the WTO's first agenda: free trade. Even worse, economic sanctions are criticized because these sanctions are, arguably, targeted at the people at large, not to the regime, a violator of international norms. Sanctions can contribute to a decrease in individual states human rights violations and can be an effective enforcement tool for international law Buhm-Suk Baek, 2008 [5].


Does economic coercion increase or decrease government respect for human rights in countries targeted with economic sanctions? If economic sanctions weaken the target regime's coercive capacity, human rights violations by the government should be less likely. If, on the contrary, sanctions fail to attenuate the coercive capacity of the target elites and create more economic difficulties and political violence among ordinary citizens, the government will likely commit more human rights violations.

Focusing on competing views of why sanctions might improve or deteriorate human rights conditions. Extensive sanctions are more detrimental to human rights than partial/selective sanctions. Economic coercion remains a counterproductive policy tool, even when sanctions are specifically imposed with the goal of improving human rights. Finally, multilateral sanctions have a greater overall negative impact on human rights than unilateral sanctions, Riley and Travis [13].

Instigating democratization has been by far the most common goal of sanctions initiated by the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations against authoritarian regimes in the post-Cold War period. Given previous research on the democratic effects of sanctions, the frequent use of sanctions as a tool for democratization is rather surprising Von Soest & Wahman, 2014 [10].



Table 3.1 Number of international sanctions according to sanction goals.



Source: Von Soest & Wahman

In a seminal and widely cited study, argued that sanctions have an adverse effect on the level of democracy in targeted countries. According to the logic presented by Peksen and Drury, 2010 [31]. The negative democratic effect of sanctions is a consequence of increased levels of repression used by political elites in targeted countries as they attempt to cope with increased domestic pressure (Table 3.1). Indeed, severe and widespread repression has often followed international sanction as a means to fight off increased opposition. However, previous research in the comparative democratization literature have shown that economic stress is one of the most robust determinants of democratization and/or regime change in authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes tend to survive with



a mixed strategy of repression and co-optation. Without the financial ability to co-opt counter elites, authoritarian regimes often resort to a strategy of increased repression, Von Soest & Wahman, 2014 [10].

Although the current literature on comparative democratization makes it plausible that sanctions could have a positive effect on the level of democracy in the targeted country, this is not to say that all sanctions necessarily have the same effect. As several authors have acknowledged, Kirshner 1997 [19], Allen 2005; Hufbauer et al. 2007 [15], senders have used a multitude of sanction designs to achieve their desired goals. Since the end of the Cold War, democratization has motivated an overwhelming majority of sanctions directed towards authoritarian regimes. Previous literature gives little support for continuing the practice of sanctioning authoritarian regimes, especially if the aim is to induce democratization. It is suggested that sanctions are not only generally ineffective, but also counterproductive in increasing the level of democracy in the targeted countries, Von Soest & Wahman, 2014 [10].

Sanctions worsen the level of democracy because the economic hardship caused by sanctions can be used as a strategic tool by the targeted regime to consolidate authoritarian rule and weaken the opposition. Furthermore, sanctions create new incentives for the political leadership to restrict political liberties to undermine the challenge of sanctions as an external threat to their authority. Both the immediate and longer term effects of economic sanctions significantly reduce the level of democratic freedoms in the target. Also comprehensive economic sanctions have greater negative impact than limited

sanctions. Sanctions can create negative externalities by reducing the political rights and civil liberties in the targeted state, Dursun Peksen, 2010 [31].

A large part of the early work on sanctions has focused on their effectiveness as a coercive policy tool, and the conditions under which sanctions can achieve successfully their intended policy objectives. Evaluation of the consequences of sanctions results on human rights, democracy and life expectancy is a new approach, but the phenomenon of international negative sanctions is generally studied in relation to its effectiveness. Since its publication, Hufbauer et al.'s *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* (1985) became the central point of reference for the empirical study of economic sanctions. Many scholars have devoted their efforts to distinguishing characteristics of degrees of success and failure of the economic punishment [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29].

San Ling LAM (1990) examined economic sanctions and the success of foreign policy goals. He found that, conclusions of Hufbauer and Schott (1985) that economic sanctions do not contribute very much to the achievement of foreign policy goals, except in several situations involving small target countries and modest policy goals, are sensitive to and unduly biased by the methodology adopted. He argues that, evidence that import controls have some leverage.

And reject the hypothesis that the sanctions and their consequences jointly have no impact on foreign policy goals. He concluded that further empirical work is required before pronouncements on the effectiveness of economic sanctions can be made [30].

Kimberly Ann Elliott and Peter P. Uimonen (1993) re-examined to use a probit estimation technique to examine some of the variables that may determine success or failure in the use of economic sanctions as an alternative to military action [31].

HSE found that, the conclusions of Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1985) regarding the effectiveness of economic sanctions in achieving foreign policy goals. While Lam's criticisms of the HSE methodology are valid, the results of the model developed here differ in lending support to the HSE conclusions. In addition, the model can be used to predict the probability of sanctions contributing to a peaceful resolution of the recent Middle East crisis. The predicted probabilities of success in the Iraq case were above average and well above 50 percent. Susan Hannah Allen (2006) examined the determinants of economic sanctions success and failure, with strong results suggesting that political structures do affect the way states respond to economic coercion. She argues that the presence of a democratic target shortens the duration of sanctions, regardless of which side concedes and the factors that do not cause sanctions success do not necessarily cause sanctions to fail and the regime type of the target state is an important factor on both sides of the sanctions equation [6].

Susan Hannah Allen and David J Lektzian (2012) in economic sanctions, have referred it as a blunt instrument that the international community has often wielded without full consideration of the impact that these measures will have on the population of the targeted countries, particularly the weakest elements of society. They studied Case studies of sanctions against Cuba, Iraq, and Yugoslavia which have demonstrated the impact that sanctions can have on the availability of food, clean water, and medicine, causing many to

conclude that all sanctions have extensive public health consequences. They examined the generalizability of these conclusions in a quantitative cross-national study of sanctions and their public health effects. They compared these effects to those associated with both civil and interstate conflicts as critics have recently suggested that sanctions are not a humane alternative to armed warfare. They find that when sanctions have a large economic effect on the target they can have severe public health consequences. These consequences are substantively similar to those associated with major military conflicts. However, when sanctions have little or no economic effect on the target, they also have no substantive effect on public health. Building on recent work to explore the human consequences of war, this work also helps to demonstrate the importance of smart sanctions and humanitarian exemptions in sanctions policy [32].

Matthias Neuenkircha and Florian Neumeierb (2015) analyze the effect of US economic sanctions on the target countries' poverty. Their results indicate that US sanctions are indeed affecting the wrong people as we observe a 2.3–5.1 percentage points (pp) larger poverty gap in sanctioned countries compared to their nearest neighbors. Severe sanctions, such as fuel embargoes, trade restrictions, the freezing of assets, or embargoes on most or all economic activity are particularly detrimental and lead to an increase in the poverty gap by 6.1–7.4 pp [33].

## 4. Data & Methodology

### 4.1 Dataset & the Proposed Method

The main independent variables data for this paper were gathered using the new version of Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg dataset (HSE, 2008) for the main independent variables. The Imposition of Economic Sanctions (IES) dataset includes 2675 cases in 71 countries and during 35 years, since 1978 - 2012. Economic sanctions are defined as actions that one or more countries take to limit or end their economic relations with a target country in an effort to persuade that country to change its policies. All sanction variables are binary and takes the value of 1 if the sanction type was implemented for a duration of more than two months that year, and 0 if the sanction or sanction type wasn't in place. The dependent variables data for the *Physical Integrity Rights Index* is taken from Cingranelli and Richards's (CIRI) (2004) human rights dataset [17]. The data for *the state department political terror scale* and the *amnesty international political terror scale* impact of sanctions on *human rights* is also tested on two different versions of Gibney and Wood's political terror scale from the polity IV dataset, the level of government respect for a variety of internationally recognized human rights. The two index variables are based on data from the United States State Department and Amnesty International. The data for the *policy variables* of democracy is taken from online dataset of systemic peace. The data for *the empowerment rights index* is taken from Cingranelli and Richards's human rights dataset. The data for *GDP per capita* (log) is taken from the World Bank. The data for *Civil war* variables is taken from the polity IV dataset [15]. Because all the dependent variables utilized in the analysis are ordinal variables with scales of at least five points, all

the regression models are reported using ordinary time-series cross sectional regressions with fixed effects. We used Probit-Statistical Method, Stata version 14.0 to analyses impact of predictor on dependent variable with panel data.

## **4.2 Research Questions**

The main question is, based on the Policy Result index and the Sanctions Contribution index qualitative analysis in Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott, (2008) We are trying to find out whether any of the sanctions results (successful outcome, positive outcome, minor outcome & failed outcome) caused improving the variables of human rights, democracy in the target countries or has harmful consequences.

In fact, we want to answer that, in the target countries when sanctions are applied, the amount of autocracy, disappearances, torture, political imprisonment and executions, extrajudicial killings, will increase and worker's rights, political participation, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of movement will decrease in the target countries if probability of sanctions successfully will increase [34].

## **4.3 Why I chose The Successful Score as an Independent variable**

When sanctions are imposed to target countries, based on HSE sanctions score, regardless of success and failure, we have a plan to measure if sanctions results have harmful and damaging effects on human rights as well as the democratic process.

As a matter of fact measuring the success and failure of sanctions is not our interest and research subject.

#### **4.4 Dependent Variables**

The impact of sanctions on human rights is tested on three different indexes. The first is the Physical Integrity Rights Index (PHYSINT) from Cingranelli and Richards's (CIRI) (2004) human rights dataset. It is a nine-point scale composed from four variables 1.Extrajudicial killings, 2.Disappearances, 3.Political imprisonment and 4. Torture are covering different aspects of human rights abuses, the index ranges from 0 (most violations of physical integrity rights) to 8 (no violations of physical integrity rights). The second is the Political Terror Scale the State Department (PTSS) from the Polity IV dataset and four variables 1.Disappearances, 2.Torture, 3.Political imprisonment and 4. Executions (they both range from 1 (no violations) to 5 (most violations), however for an easier comparative interpretation of the regression tables they have been recoded so 1 denotes most violations and 5 denotes no violations). The third one is the Political Terror Scale the Amnesty International (PTSA) from the United States State Department and Amnesty International in the Polity IV dataset are four variables 1.Disappearances, 2.Torture, 3.Political imprisonment and 4. Executions (they both range from 1 (no violations) to 5 (most violations), however for an easier comparative interpretation of the regression tables they have been recoded so 1 denotes most violations and 5 denotes no violations). To test the effect targeted sanctions have on democratization rights, this study refers to a Polity variable from two variables based on the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2011) and New Empowerment Right Index from five variables based on the Cingranelli and Richards's human rights dataset. The Polity variable from two variables, 1. Autocracy, 2. Democracy, (autocracy score from the democracy score, and ranges from -10 (lowest



levels of democracy and highest level of autocracy) to 10 (highest levels of democracy and lowest level of autocracy). The New Empowerment Rights Index from five variables, 1. Worker's rights, 2. Political participation, 3. Freedom of religion, 4. Freedom of speech and 5. Freedom of movement, (ranges from 0 (most violations of democratic rights and civil liberties) to 15 (no violations of democratic rights and civil liberties)).

## **4.5 Independent Variables**

**Sanction All** The main independent variables of the study are coded based on the Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg dataset (2008) [2]. All sanction variables are binary and takes the value of 1 if the sanction type was implemented for a duration of more than two months that year, and 0 otherwise, including restrictions on trade in several goods (export & import), finance (financial transaction, exchange an asset for payment, investment), transport sector, travel restrictions, asset freeze, fuel embargoes and arm embargo. Export: Sender country imposes export controls. Import: Sender country imposes import controls. Finance: Sender country imposes capital controls. Results Score: 16-point scale that is the product of a four point policy success score and a four-point score of sanctions contribution.

We characterize a score of 8 or higher as a “successful” outcome. The Policy Result index (on an index scale of 1 to 4), (1: failed outcome, 2: minor outcome, 3: positive outcome and 4: successful outcome) and the Sanctions Contribution index (on an index scale of 1 to 4, (1: negative contribution, 2: minor contribution, 3: substantial contribution and 4: decisive contribution) to achieve goals e.g. regime change & democratization, modest policy changes, disruption of military adventures, military impairment and other major policy changes.




Successful outcome Independent variable taking the value of 16 if the sanction was successful. Found by multiplying by the policy result index (4: successful outcome) which the outcome sought by the sender country was achieved, and which the sanctions contributed (4: decisive contribution) successful outcome.

Positive outcome Independent variable taking the value of 8 to 12 if the sanction was positive outcome. Found by multiplying by the policy result index (2: minor outcome or 3: positive outcome) which the outcome sought by the sender country was achieved, and which the sanctions contributed (3: substantial contribution or 4: decisive contribution) outcome result. Meaning the sender's goals were partly realized.

Minor outcome Independent variable taking the value of 2 to 6 if the sanction was minor outcome. Found by multiplying by the policy result index (2: minor outcome) which the outcome sought by the sender country was achieved, and which the sanctions contributed (2: minor contribution or 3: substantial contribution) outcome result.

Failed outcome Independent variable taking the value of 1 if the sanction was failed. Found by multiplying by the Policy Result index (1: failed outcome,) which the outcome sought by the sender country wasn't achieved, and which the Sanctions Contributed (1: negative contribution) outcome result. In the sense that the sender's goals were largely or entirely realized.



## 4.6 Control Variables

To control for the effect of developmental differences between the countries, GDP per capita (log) denotes the natural log of Gross Domestic Product per capita (in 2012 constant US dollars), Civil war denotes the Magnitude score of episode(s) of civil warfare involving that state in that year Scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) for each MEPV (Major Episodes of Political Violence); Magnitude scores for multiple MEPV are summed; 0 denotes no episodes. The standard layout for Probit Model is the following:

## 4.7 Probit Model

Table 4.1: Standard layout for Probit Model

Variables	Points	Probit Model
PHYSINT		
	0	0
	1, 2, 3,	1
	4, 5, 6, 7,	2
	8,	3
PTSS & PTSA		
	1,	0
	2,	1
	3,4,	2
	5,	3
Polity		
	-10	0
	-9,-8,-7,-6,-5,-4,-3,-2,-1,	1
	0	2
	9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1,	3
	10	4
New EMPINX		
	0	0
	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,	1
	10,11,12,13,14,	2
	15	3

PHYSINT 0, 1, 2, 3,

PHYSINT = 0 : this is Model 1

If PHYSINT value is 0, it is recorded 1, and else is 0  
and run Probit regression with this dummy dependent variable.

PHYSINT = 1 : this is Model 2

If PHYSINT value is 1, it is recorded 1, and else is 0  
and run Probit regression with this dummy dependent variable.

PHYSINT = 2 : this is Model 3

If PHYSINT value is 2, it is recorded 1, and else is 0  
and run Probit regression with this dummy dependent variable.

PHYSINT = 3 : this is Model 4  
If PHYSINT value is 3, it is recorded 1, and else is 0  
and run Probit regression with this dummy dependent variable.

PTSS 0, 1, 2, 3,

PTSS = 0 : this is Model 1  
If PTSS value is 0, it is recorded 1, and else is 0  
and run Probit regression with this dummy dependent variable.

PTSS = 1 : this is Model 2  
If PTSS value is 1, it is recorded 1, and else is 0  
and run Probit regression with this dummy dependent variable.

PTSS = 2 : this is Model 3  
If PTSS value is 2, it is recorded 1, and else is 0  
and run Probit regression with this dummy dependent variable.

PTSS = 3 : this is Model 4  
If PTSS value is 3, it is recorded 1, and else is 0  
and run Probit regression with this dummy dependent variable.

PTSA 0, 1, 2, 3,

PTSA = 0 : this is Model 1  
If PTSA value is 0, it is recorded 1, and else is 0  
and run Probit regression with this dummy dependent variable.

PTSA = 1 : this is Model 2  
If PTSA value is 1, it is recorded 1, and else is 0  
and run Probit regression with this dummy dependent variable.

PTSA = 2 : this is Model 3  
If PTSA value is 2, it is recorded 1, and else is 0  
and run Probit regression with this dummy dependent variable.

PTSA = 3 : this is Model 4  
If PTSA value is 3, it is recorded 1, and else is 0  
and run Probit regression with this dummy dependent variable.

Polity 0, 1, 2, 3, 4

Polity = 0 : this is Model 1

If Polity value is 0, it is recorded 1, and else is 0  
and run Probit regression with this dummy dependent variable.

Polity = 1 : this is Model 2

If Polity value is 1, it is recorded 1, and else is 0  
and run Probit regression with this dummy dependent variable.

Polity = 2 : this is Model 3

If Polity value is 2, it is recorded 1, and else is 0  
and run Probit regression with this dummy dependent variable.

Polity = 3 : this is Model 4

If Polity value is 3, it is recorded 1, and else is 0  
and run Probit regression with this dummy dependent variable.

Polity = 4 : this is Model 5

If Polity value is 4, it is recorded 1, and else is 0  
and run Probit regression with this dummy dependent variable.

New EMPINX 0, 1, 2, 3,

New EMPINX = 0 : this is Model 1

If New EMPINX value is 0, it is recorded 1, and else is 0  
and run Probit regression with this dummy dependent variable.

New EMPINX = 1 : this is Model 2

If New EMPINX value is 1, it is recorded 1, and else is 0  
and run Probit regression with this dummy dependent variable.

New EMPINX = 2 : this is Model 3

If New EMPINX value is 2, it is recorded 1, and else is 0  
and run Probit regression with this dummy dependent variable.

New EMPINX = 3 : this is Model 4

If New EMPINX value is 3, it is recorded 1, and else is 0  
and run Probit regression with this dummy dependent variable.

Table 4.2: Variable Definitions

<u>Dependent Variables</u>	
Human Right	
PHYSINT	Physical Integrity Rights Index from Cingranelli and Richards's (CIRI) (2004) human rights dataset. It is a nine-point scale composed from four variables 1.Extrajudicial killings, 2.Disappearances, 3.Political imprisonment and 4. Torture are covering different aspects of human rights abuses, The index ranges from 0 (most violations of physical integrity rights) to 8 (no violations of physical integrity rights).
PTSS	Political Terror Scale the State Department from four variables 1.Disappearances, 2.Torture, 3.Political imprisonment and 4. Executions (they both range from 1 (no violations) to 5 (most violations), however for an easier comparative interpretation of the regression tables they have been recoded so 1 denotes most violations and 5 denotes no violations).
PTSA	Political Terror Scale the Amnesty International from four variables 1.Disappearances, 2.Torture, 3.Political imprisonment and 4. Executions (they both range from 1 (no violations) to 5 (most violations), however for an easier comparative interpretation of the regression tables they have been recoded so 1 denotes most violations and 5 denotes no violations).
Democracy	
Polity	Polity variable from two variables, 1. Autocracy, 2. Democracy, (autocracy score from the democracy score, and ranges from -10 (lowest levels of democracy and highest level of autocracy) to 10 (highest levels of democracy and lowest level of autocracy).
New EMPINX	New Empowerment Rights Index from five variables, 1.worker's rights, 2.political participation, 3.freedom of religion, 4.freedom of speech and 5.freedom of movement, (ranges from 0 (most violations of democratic rights and civil liberties) to 15 (no violations of democratic rights and civil liberties).
<u>Independent Variables</u>	
Sanction All	Dummy variables taking the value one if:  The main independent variables of the study are coded based on the Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg dataset (2008). All sanction variables are binary and takes the value of 1 if the sanction type was implemented for a duration of more than

	two months that year, and 0 otherwise, including restrictions on trade in several goods (export & import), finance (financial transaction, exchange an asset for payment, investment), transport sector, travel restrictions, asset freeze, fuel embargoes, arm embargo.
Export	Sender country imposes export controls.
Import	Sender country imposes import controls.
Finance	Sender country imposes capital controls.
Results Score	16-point scale that is the product of a four point policy success score and a four-point score of sanctions contribution. We characterize a score of 8 or higher as a “successful” outcome. The Policy Result index (on an index scale of 1 to 4), (1.failed outcome, 2.minor outcome, 3.positive outcome and 4.sucessful outcome) and the Sanctions Contribution index (on an index scale of 1 to 4, (1.negative contribution, 2.minor contribution, 3.substantial contribution and 4.decisive contribution) to achieve goals e.g. regime change & democratization, modest policy changes, disruption of military adventures, military impairment and other major policy changes.
Successful outcome	Independent variable taking the value of 16 if the sanction was successful. Found by multiplying by the policy result index (4.sucessful outcome) which the outcome sought by the sender country was achieved, and which the sanctions contributed (4. decisive contribution) successful outcome.
Positive outcome	Independent variable taking the value of 8 to 12 is the sanction was positive outcome. Found by multiplying by the policy result index (2.minor outcome & 3.positive outcome) which the outcome sought by the sender country was achieved, and which the sanctions contributed (3. substantial contribution & 4. decisive contribution) outcome result. Meaning the sender’s goals were partly realized.
Minor outcome	Independent variable taking the value of 2 to 6 if the sanction was minor outcome. Found by multiplying by the policy result index (2.minor outcome) which the outcome sought by the sender country was achieved, and which the sanctions contributed (2. minor contribution & 3. substantial contribution) outcome result.
Failed outcome	Independent variable taking the value of 1 if the sanction was failed. Found by multiplying by the Policy Result index (1.failed outcome,) which the outcome sought by the sender country wasn't achieved, and which the Sanctions Contributed (1.negative contribution) outcome result. In the sense that the sender’s goals were largely or entirely realized.



### Control Variables

GDP per capita	denotes the natural log of Gross Domestic Product per capita
Civil war	denotes the Magnitude score of episode(s) of civil warfare involving that state in that year Scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) for each MEPV (Major Episodes of Political Violence); Magnitude scores for multiple MEPV are summed; 0 denotes no episodes

## 4.8 Summary

Table 4.3: Summary Statistics

Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Dependent Variables</i>					
PHYSINT	1818	3.83	2.28	0	8
PTSS	2202	2.95	1.11	1	5
PTSA	2022	3.10	1.09	1	5
Polity	2117	0.57	6.71	-10	+10
New EMPINX	1822	6.78	4.08	0	14
<i>Independent Variables</i>					
Export	2425	0.19	0.39	0	1
Import	2425	0.16	0.37	0	1
Financial	2425	0.28	0.45	0	1
Results Score	769	6.03	3.24	1	16
Failed outcome	2425	0.02	0.13	0	1
Minor outcome	2425	0.20	0.40	0	1
Positive outcome	2425	0.09	0.29	0	1
Successful outcome	2425	0.00	0.05	0	1
<i>Control Variables</i>					
GDP per capita(ln)	2122	7.03	1.26	4.17	10.72
Civil War	22030	0.39	1.34	0	7



## 5. Research Results & Analysis

In fact, the real question was, based on the Policy Result index and the Sanctions Contribution index qualitative analysis in Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, does any of the sanctions results, caused improving the variables of human rights, democracy and life expectancy at birth in the target countries or has harmful consequences?

Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 reports the effects sanctions in general have on three proxies of human rights and tables 5.4 and 5.5 reports the effects sanctions in general have on two proxies of democracy. All the dependent variable is a binary dummy variables. GDP per capita variables are log transformed. In the all tables Successful Outcome Variable are omitted for no case. R-squared as a statistical measure of how close the data are to the fitted regression line and which also known as the coefficient of determination, or the coefficient of multiple determination for multiple regression are 26.1 average, between min (.17) max (.56) to in the all of below tables. The Chi-Squared as a test is used to determine whether there is a significant difference between the expected frequencies and the observed frequencies in one or more categories are 62.4 average, between min (17) max (198) to in the all of below tables.

Table 5.1 reports the effect sanctions in general have on human rights conditions. The Export, Financial and the Minor outcome has a significant negative impact on the Model 1. Only the Financial has a significant negative impact on the Model 2. The Export, Import, Financial and failed outcome has a significant negative impact on the Model 3 and The


Model 4. Reports the results indicate for four models specifications of sanctions results on Physical Integrity Rights Index which is a proxy of human rights. We can say that the main independents variables, Export, Import, Financial and Minor, Failed and Positive outcome has a significant negative impact on Physical Integrity Rights Index as a one of proxy of human rights. However, simply indicates that in this model there is much evidence to suggest that any of these particular results of sanctions have undue effect on the human rights variable case. That means, this suggests that economic sanctions in general lead to higher levels of human rights abuses in the target country, if everything else is equal.

Table 5.1 the Effect of Economic Sanctions on the PHYSINT (1978-2012)

Variables	Model 1 Most Violations	Model 2 Moderate Violations	Model 3 Violations	Model 4 No-Violations
Export	-0.487** (0.16)	0.218 (0.12)	-0.239* (0.12)	-0.928*** (0.23)
Import	-0.290 (0.16)	-0.207 (0.13)	-0.261* (0.13)	-5.358*** (0.28)
Financial	-1.290** (0.40)	-0.685** (0.21)	-0.557** (0.21)	-0.811* (0.35)
Failed		-0.411 (0.58)	-0.064* (0.43)	-5.852*** (0.91)
Minor Out	-0.569** (0.18)	-0.073 (0.55)	-0.726 (0.61)	0.565 (0.45)
Positive Out		0.013 (0.55)	-0.317 (0.61)	
GDP per capita	-0.123 (0.07)	-0.007 (0.05)	-0.047 (0.05)	0.555** (0.21)
Civil War	0.047 (0.05)	0.110** (0.04)	-0.219*** (0.06)	
Constant	-2.295** (0.72)	-0.625 (0.71)	1.247 (0.77)	-10.227*** (2.31)
Chi2 (p)	41.817 (.000)	31.948 (.000)	49.862 (.000)	95.203 (.000)
R-squared	.197	.241	.179	.559
Observation	527	571	571	502

P. Value in Parentheses beneath the coefficients, Probit regression model results.

\*Sig at p<%10; \*\*Sig at p<%5; \*\*\*Sig at p<%1 [two-tailed].



When Physical Integrity Rights Index is the significant dependent variables, disrespect for human rights actually will increase, that means, the amount of extrajudicial killings, disappearances, political imprisonment and torture are covering different aspects of human rights abuses will increase when probability of sanctions successfully will increase.

Table 5.2. The Effect of Economic Sanctions on the PTSS (1978-2012)


Variables	Model 1 Most Violations	Model 2 Moderate Violations	Model 3 Violations	Model 4 No-Violations
Export	-0.454* (0.23)	-0.327* (0.16)	-0.437*** (0.12)	-0.073 (0.13)
Import	-0.986*** (0.26)	-0.372* (0.17)	-0.891*** (0.13)	-0.643*** (0.14)
Financial	-0.748** (0.24)	-0.779*** (0.22)	-0.852*** (0.18)	-0.574* (0.25)
Failed		0.126 (0.70)	-0.921 (0.66)	-0.149 (0.38)
Minor Out	0.316 (0.28)	-0.536 (0.67)	-0.668 (0.62)	-0.349* (0.15)
Positive Out		-0.109 (0.67)	-0.509 (0.63)	
GDP per capita	0.717*** (0.12)	-0.226*** (0.06)	0.041 (0.05)	-0.160** (0.06)
Civil War			-0.105** (0.03)	0.211*** (0.04)
Constant	-6.969*** (1.13)	1.390 (0.84)	0.265 (0.76)	-1.072* (0.54)
Chi2 (p)	198.718 (.000)	34.665 (.000)	84.985 (.000)	74.067 (.000)
R-squared	.458	.276	.179	.241
Observation	512	557	640	634

P. Value in Parentheses beneath the coefficients, Probit regression model results.

\*Sig at  $p < 10\%$ ; \*\*Sig at  $p < 5\%$ ; \*\*\*Sig at  $p < 1\%$  [two-tailed].

Table 5.2 reports the effect sanctions in general have on human rights conditions. The Export, Import and Financial has a significant negative impact on the Model 1 and model 2, Model 3 and Model 4. But the Minor outcome has a significant negative impact on the Model 4. Reports the results indicate for four models specifications of sanctions results on the Political Terror Scale of State Department Index which is a proxy of human rights. We can say that this main independents variables, Export, Import, Financial and Minor

outcome has a significant negative impact on Political Terror Scale of State Department Index as a one of proxy of human rights. However, simply indicates that in this model there is much evidence to suggest that any of these particular results of sanctions have undue effect on the human rights variable case. That means, this suggests that economic sanctions in general lead to higher levels of human rights abuses in the target country, if everything else is equal.



This, however, simply indicates that we cannot say, in this model there is no evidence to suggest that any of these particular results of sanctions have undue effect on the human rights variable case. When some models of Political Terror Scale of State Department Index is the significant dependent variables, such as Export, Import, Financial and Minor outcome variables, disrespect for human rights actually will increase, that means, the amount of Executions, disappearances, political imprisonment and torture are covering

different aspects of human rights abuses will increase when probability of sanctions successfully will increase.

Table 5.3. The Effect of Economic Sanctions on the PTSA (1978-2012)

Variables	Model 1 Most Violations	Model 2 Moderate Violations	Model 3 Violations	Model 4 No-Violations
Export	-0.268 (0.22)	-0.520*** (0.15)	-0.311* (0.12)	0.160 (0.13)
Import	-4.700*** (0.26)	0.187 (0.16)	-0.521*** (0.13)	-0.287* (0.14)
Financial	-0.921*** (0.25)	-0.548* (0.23)	0.318 (0.19)	-0.833** (0.28)
Failed	-4.526*** (0.54)	0.635 (0.67)	-0.332 (0.52)	-0.806 (0.59)
Minor Out	-0.233 (0.26)	-0.354 (0.64)	0.249 (0.49)	-0.091 (0.50)
Positive Out		-0.312 (0.65)	0.314 (0.49)	-0.176 (0.51)
GDP per capita	0.273*** (0.08)	-0.057 (0.07)	0.106* (0.05)	-0.198** (0.06)
Civil War		-0.111* (0.05)	-0.091** (0.03)	0.155*** (0.04)
Constant	-7.140*** (0.72)	0.230 (0.82)	-0.717 (0.64)	-0.565 (0.70)
Chi2 (p)	35.337 (.000)	41.433 (.000)	33.693 (.000)	17.574 (.000)
R-squared	.294	.182	.241	.196
Observation	532	621	621	621

P. Value in Parentheses beneath the coefficients, Probit regression model results.

\*Sig at p<%10; \*\*Sig at p<%5; \*\*\*Sig at p<%1 [two-tailed].




Table 5.3 reports the effect sanctions in general have on human rights conditions. The Import, Financial and failed has a significant negative impact on the Model 1. The Export and Financial has a significant negative impact on the Model 2. The Export and Import has a significant negative impact on the Model 3. The Import and Financial has a significant negative impact on the Model 4. Reports the results indicate for four models specifications of sanctions results on the Political Terror Scale the Amnesty International Index which is a proxy of human rights. We can say that this main independent variables, Export, Import, Financial and Failed outcome has a significant negative impact on the Political Terror Scale the Amnesty International Index as a one of proxy of human rights. However, simply indicates that in this model there is much evidence to suggest that any of these particular results of sanctions have undue effect on the human rights variable case. That means, this suggests that economic sanctions in general lead to higher levels of human rights abuses in the target country, if everything else is equal. When some models of Political Terror




Scale the Amnesty International Index is the significant dependent variables, such as Export, Import, Financial and Failed outcome variables, disrespect for human rights actually will increase, that means, the amount of Executions, disappearances, political imprisonment and torture are covering different aspects of human rights abuses will increase when probability of sanctions successfully will increase.

Table 5.4. The Effect of Economic Sanctions on the Polity (1978-2012)

Variables	Model 1 Full autocracy	Model 2 Moderate autocracy	Model 3 Hybrid regimes	Model 4 Moderate democracies	Model 5 Full democracies
Export	-0.771* (0.30)	-0.114 (0.11)	0.369 (0.30)	0.156 (0.11)	-0.716*** (0.19)
Import	-0.323 (0.26)	-0.287* (0.12)	0.474 (0.26)	-0.365** (0.12)	-0.289 (0.18)
Financial		-1.554*** (0.25)	-0.730 (0.40)	-0.875*** (0.18)	-0.793*** (0.19)
Failed		0.649 (0.60)		-0.569 (0.63)	1.639*** (0.34)
Minor Out	-1.721** (0.54)	0.823 (0.57)	-0.583* (0.24)	-0.443 (0.59)	0.659** (0.23)
Positive Out	-1.635** (0.55)	0.545 (0.57)		-0.181 (0.59)	
GDP per capita	0.063 (0.06)	-0.059 (0.06)	-0.505*** (0.11)	0.049 (0.05)	0.315** (0.11)
Civil War	-0.234* (0.11)	0.049 (0.04)	0.213*** (0.06)	-0.108* (0.04)	
Constant	-0.684 (0.63)	-1.757* (0.77)	1.531* (0.76)	0.463 (0.71)	-3.183*** (0.90)
Chi2 (p)	38.793 (.000)	69.372 (.000)	102.316 (.000)	48.030 (.000)	71.281 (.000)
R-squared	.208	.187	.368	.258	.232
Observation	521	626	579	626	546

P. Value in Parentheses beneath the coefficients, Probit regression model results.

\*Sig at p<%.10; \*\*Sig at p<%.5; \*\*\*Sig at p<%.1 [two-tailed].



Tables 5.4 and 5.5 reports the effects sanctions in general have on two proxies of democracy. Table 5.4 reports the effect sanctions in general have on democracy conditions. The Export, Minor and Positive outcome has a significant negative impact on the Model 1. The Import and Financial has a significant negative impact on the Model 2 and Model 4. Only the minor outcome has a significant negative impact on the Model 3. The Export, Financial, Failed and minor outcome has a significant negative impact on the Model 5. Reports the results indicate for five models specifications of sanctions results on the Political Terror Scale the Amnesty International Index which is a proxy of human rights. We can say that this main independents variables, Export, Import, Financial, Failed, Minor and positive outcome has a significant negative impact on the Polity Index as a one of proxy of democracy. However, simply indicates that in this model there is much evidence to suggest that any of these particular results of sanctions have undue effect on the

democracy variable case. That means, this suggests that economic sanctions in general lead to higher levels of democracy abuses in the target country, if everything else is equal. When some models of Polity Index is the significant dependent variables, such as Export, Import, Financial and Failed, Minor and Positive outcome variables, disrespect for democracy actually will increase, that means, the amount of autocracy will increase when probability of sanctions successfully will increase.

Table 5.5. The Effect of Economic Sanctions on the New EMPINX (1978-2012)

Variables	Model 1 Most Violations	Model 2 Moderate Violations	Model 3 Violations	Model 4 No-Violations
Export	-0.287 (0.20)	-0.446*** (0.13)	-0.125 (0.13)	-0.411* (0.23)
Import	-0.662** (0.21)	-0.150 (0.13)	-0.244 (0.14)	-0.147 (0.13)
Financial		-0.771*** (0.20)	0.360 (0.28)	-1.422*** (0.25)
Minor Out	-0.209 (0.68)	0.635 (0.54)	-0.691 (0.56)	-0.209 (0.20)
Positive Out	-1.140 (0.72)	0.602 (0.55)	-0.264 (0.57)	
GDP per capita	-0.209* (0.10)	-0.118* (0.06)	-0.073* (0.06)	0.721*** (0.09)
Civil War	-0.039* (0.07)	0.089* (0.05)	-0.065 (0.04)	
Constant	0.243 (0.91)	-0.323 (0.70)	-0.074 (0.80)	-4.913*** (0.81)
Chi2 (p)	26.286 (.000)	52.570 (.000)	25.550 (.000)	157.267 (.000)
R-squared	.219	.169	.245	.404
Observation	480	535	535	466

P. Value in Parentheses beneath the coefficients, Probit regression model results.

\*Sig at p<%10; \*\*Sig at p<%5; \*\*\*Sig at p<%1 [two-tailed].




Table 5.5 results show the models testing the effect of the four economic sanctions results on New Empowerment rights Index, proxy of democracy. Reports the effect sanctions in general have on democracy conditions. The Export and Financial has a significant negative impact on the Model 2 and Model 4. But only The Import has a significant negative impact on the Model 1. Reports the results indicate for four models specifications of sanctions results on the New Empowerment Right Index which is a proxy of democracy. We can say that this main independent variables, Export, Import and Financial has a significant negative impact on the New Empowerment Right Index as a one of proxy of democracy. However, indicates that in this model there is some evidence to suggest that any of these particular results of sanctions have undue effect on the democracy variable case. That means, this suggests that economic sanctions in general lead to higher levels of democracy abuses in the target country, if everything else is equal. When some models of New

Empowerment Rights Index is the significant dependent variables, such as Export, Import and Financial variables, This means, disrespect for democracy actually will increase the amount of worker's rights, Political participation, freedom of religion, freedom of speech and freedom of movement will decrease when probability of successful sanctions will increase.



## 6. Conclusion & Future Work

### 6.1 Overall Conclusion

While incorporating several changes to the original model by Hufbauer and Schott (1985), this paper is an attempt to test whether any of the sanctions results (successful outcome, positive outcome, minor outcome & failed outcome), Causes improving to the variables of human rights and democracy in the target countries or has harmful consequences? We are able to deduce from the coefficients of the sanctions on the right-hand side based on the Policy Result index and the Sanctions Contribution index which is in the qualitative analysis of the Probit-Statistical Method by Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1985). We for the first time, show that the conclusions achieved using Hufbauer and Schott are sensitive to the methodology adopted. Generally it's difficult to conclude that sanctions cause improvement or more violation of human rights and democracy, although it can be said that sanction on its own is a violation of human rights. Violations of human rights and democracy depend on which stage of democracy and human rights the targeted countries are at. When the government does not absolutely respect democracy, if sanctions are imposed, that country will be drawn more towards violation of human rights and democracy. Therefore we cannot easily reject the sanctions and their consequences jointly have no impact on Human Rights, Democracy. This is solely dependent on the outcome results and polity of target countries. In addition we show that based on the conclusions it is too hasty to disregard the consequences of sanctions results.

## 6.2 Future Direction

A direction for future research would be to create a clearer picture of consequences of sanctions results and to study each target country case by case.

In addition, Sanction cases which cause human rights violations, naming military sanctions, diplomatic sanctions, sport and individual sanctions replace economic sanctions and trade sanctions.





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# APPENDIX

Sanctions coded:

## **1- Afghanistan**

Sanction: 1980-2002.  
Targeted asset freeze: 1998-2001.  
Targeted travel sanctions: 1980-2002.  
General travel sanction: 1999-2002  
General asset freeze: 1999-2002.  
Arms embargo: 2000-2002.  
Ban of Military Corporation and training: 2000-2002.

## **2- Albania**

Sanction: 1978-1994.  
Aid: Aid delayed: 1994.  
Financial sanctions: Expulsion of illegal immigrant workers: 1994-1995.

## **3- Algeria**

Sanction: 1992-1994.  
Loan freeze: 1992-1994.

## **4- Angola (UNITA)**

Sanction: 1985-2003.  
Freeze of Exim Bank financing: 1985-1991.  
Reduction of aid: 1989-1991, 1993-2003.  
Representatives in international institutions voting against loans to Angola: 1989-1991, 1997-2003.  
Ban on export of military equipment: 1991-1993.  
Targeted travel sanctions: 1997-2002.  
Ban on diamond imports: 1998-2002.  
Asset freeze: 1998-2002.  
Export ban on mining services: 1998-2003.

## **5- Argentina**

Sanction: 1978-1985.  
General import ban (not main trading partner): 1978-1985.  
No new export credits extended (not main trading partner). 1982-1985.  
General freezing of assets (not main trading partner): 1982.  
No new loans extended (not main trading partner): 1978-1982.

#### **6- Armenia**

Sanction: 1989-2002.  
Block of gas exports: 1991-1995.  
Arms embargo: 1992-2002.  
Block on export of electricity: 1992-1995.

#### **7- Azerbaijan**

Sanction: 1992-2002.  
Reduction of aid: 1992-2002.  
Export ban of military equipment: 1992-2002.

#### **8- Bolivia**

Sanction: 1979-1982.  
Reduction in economic aid: 1980-1982.  
Suspension of military aid: 1979-1982.  
Reduction in World Bank Loans: 1980-1982.

#### **9- Bosnia-Herzegovina**

Sanction: 1991-2001.  
Reduction of aid: 1991.  
Arms embargo: 1991-2001.

#### **10- Burma (Myanmar)**

Sanction: 1988-2007.  
Reduction of aid: 1988-2007.  
Ban of export of military equipment: 1988-2007.  
Denial of Exim Bank loans: 1989-2007.  
Representatives in international institutions voting against loans to Burma (Myanmar): 1989-2007.  
Not renewing bilateral textile agreement: 1991-2007.  
Targeted travel sanctions: 1996-2007.  
Targeted visa bans: 1996-2007.  
Ban on trade imports: 2003-2007.  
Targeted asset freeze: 2003-2007.  
Arms embargo: 2003-2007.

#### **11- Burundi**

Sanction: 1978-1999.  
General trade embargo 1996.  
General trade embargo with exceptions for vital items 1997-1998.  
General travel sanctions 1996-1999.

#### **12- Cambodia**

Sanction: 1992-2007.  
Arms embargo: 1991-1992.  
Reduction of aid: 1997-2007.



Ban on petroleum export: 1992-1997.  
Ban on log import: 1992-1997.

### **13- Cameroon**

Sanction: 1992-1998.  
Reduction of aid: 1992-1998.  
Export ban of military equipment: 1992-1998.

### **14- China**

Sanction: 1978-2007.  
Ban on export of military equipment: 1990-1996.  
Ban on nuclear corporation: 1990-1997.  
Ban on nuclear technology: 1997-2007.  
Ban on export of high technology equipment: 1991-1996.  
Suspension of US Exim Bank loans: 1996.

### **15- Colombia**

Sanction: 1996-2007.  
Reduction of aid: 1996-1998.  
Ban on EX-IM Bank loans: 1996-1998.  
US representatives instructed to vote against loans to Colombia from multilateral development banks: 1996.  
Targeted travel sanctions: 1996-1998.  
Discontinuation of OPIC programs: 1998.  
Targeted asset freeze: 1998-2007.

### **16- Congo (Democratic Republic of)**

Sanction: 2003-2007.  
Arms embargo 2003-2007.  
Reduction of aid: 2003-2007.  
Reduction of military aid: 2003-2007.  
Targeted asset freeze: 2003-2007.  
Targeted travel sanctions: 2003-2007.

### **17- Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)**

Sanction: 1999-2007.  
Reduction of aid: 1999-2007.  
Stop of IMF assistance: 1999-2001.  
Arms embargo: 1999-2007.  
Ban on diamond imports: 2005-2007.  
Targeted asset freeze: 2006-2007.  
Targeted travel ban: 2006-2007.

### **18- Cuba**

Sanction: 2003-1992.  
Arms embargo 2003-1992.  
Ban on export of military equipment: 2003-1992.

### **19- Ecuador**

Sanction: 1994-2000.  
Ban on export of military equipment: 1994.  
Stop of military corporation/training: 1994-2000.

### **20- El Salvador**

Reduction of aid: 1990-1992.  
Reduction of military aid: 1990-1993.

### **21- Equatorial Guinea**

Reduction of aid: 1992-2000.  
Ban on all forms of financial corporation: 1992-1999.  
Asset freeze: 1993-2000.

### **22- Estonia**

Sanction: 1992-1999.  
General asset freeze: 1992-1999.  
Ban of oil export: 1993-1999.

### **23- Fiji**

Sanction: 1987-2007.  
Aid reduction: 1987-1988, 2000-2001, 2006-2007.  
Military aid reduction: 1987-1988, 2006-2007.  
Stop of Defense Corporation: 1987-1992, 2000-2001, and 2006-2007.  
General travel sanctions (main traveling partners): 1987, 2006-2007.  
General export ban (main trading partners): 1987.  
General embargo (not main trading partners) 1987-1997.  
Export ban on arms 2000-2003.

### **24- France**

Sanction: 1983-1996.  
Export ban on uranium: 1983-1986, 1988-1996.  
Import ban on military projects: 1995-1996.  
Stop of Defense Corporation: 1995-1996.  
Consumer boycotts: 1995-1996.  
Ban of access to projects in Australia: 1992-1993.

### **25- Gambia The**

Sanction: 1994-2002.

Reduction of aid: 1994-1997.  
Reduction of military aid: 1994-2002.  
Stop of Military Corporation: 1994-2002.  
General travel sanctions: 1994-1995.

## **26- Grenada**

Sanction: 1983.  
General travel sanctions: 1983.  
General trade embargo: 1983.

## **27- Guatemala**

Sanction: 1978-2005.  
Reduction of aid: 1993.  
Revokes preferential trade status: 1993.  
Veto against future loans in World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Inter-American Bank: 1993.

## **28- Haiti**

Sanction: 1987-2005.  
Reduction of aid: 1987-1990, 1993-1994, 2001-2005  
General trade embargo (main trading partner): 1991-2005.  
Targeted asset freezing: 1993-2001.  
UN Targeted asset freezing: 1993-1994.  
UN Oil embargo: 1993-1994.  
UN Arms embargo: 1993-1994.  
UN Targeted travel sanctions: 1993-2001.  
General travel sanctions: 1994.

## **29- India**

Sanction: 1978-2001.  
Ban on financial assistance: 1998.  
Ban on Trade and Development Agency (TDA), Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and Exim Bank financing: 1998-1999.  
Export ban of high technology products: 1998.  
Opposition to loans from international financial institutions: 1998.  
Ban on US bank loans to the government of India: 1998.  
Reduction of aid: 1998.  
The World Bank postpones consideration of almost \$1 billion in loans to India: 2001.

## **30- Indonesia**

Sanction: 1991-2005.  
Reduction of aid: 1991-1998, 1999-2002.  
Ban of Military Corporation: 1992-1996, 1999-2005.

Veto of trade and economic corporation pact between Association of Southeast Asian Nations and EC: 1992.

Ban on export of military equipment: 1993-1996, 1999-2005.

Arms embargo: 1994-1996, 1999-2005.

### **31- Iran**

Sanction: 1979-2012.

Oil import ban: 1979-1981, 1987-1990, 2000-2012.

Reduction of aid: 1979-1981, 1987-2012.

Reduction of military aid: 1979-1981.

General freeze of assets: 1979-1981-1984-2012.

General export embargo (excluding food and medicine): 1980-1981.

Export embargo of military equipment: 1984-2012.

General travel sanctions: 1980-1981

General import ban: 1987-1990.

Denial of Export-Import Bank Credits 1990-2012.

Denial of World Bank Loans: 1993-1999.

General trade embargo: 1995-1998.

General trade embargo with exemptions for food and medicine: 1999-2000.

The oil boycott by large US companies with US government support beginning in 1979 has been coded as a de facto oil embargo. At the end of 1979 President Carter imposed a “real” ban on oil imports from Iran.

Export embargo of military equipment does not only cover a broad general ban on the export of all military equipment, but also more specific bans of certain weapons, machines or chemicals.

### **32- Iraq**

Sanction: 1979-2003.

Export embargo of some military equipment: 1979-1982, 1984-2003.

Export embargo of all arms supplies: 1990-2003.

General trade embargo with exemptions for donations of food and medicine: 1990-2003

Arms embargo: 1990-2003.

General financial sanctions: 1990-2003.

General asset freeze: 1990-2003.

General travel sanction: 1990-2003.

### **33- Jordan**

Sanction: 1990-1997.

Oil export ban: 1990-1992.

Reduction of aid: 1991, 1993-1997.

### **34- Kazakhstan**

Sanction: 1993-1996.

Reduction of fuel export: 1994-1996.

Stop of payments for coal imports: 1993.

### **35- Kenya**

Sanction: 1990-1993.

Reduction of military aid: 1990-1993.

Reduction of aid: 1991-1993.

### **36- Latvia**

Sanction: 1992-1998.

Increased prices of oil exports: 1992-1998.

Denial of MFN status: 1993-1994.

Increased tariffs for agricultural products: 1994-1998.

Reduction of amount of oil exported: 1998.

### **37- Lebanon**

Sanction: 1984-1997.

Ban on export of military equipment: 1984-1995.

Suspension of military aid: 1984-1992.

General travel sanctions: 1985-1997.

General trade embargo: 1985-1992.

### **38- Lesotho**

Sanction: 1982-1986.

General trade embargo (with exemptions for vital goods): 1982-1986.

Arms embargo: 1983.

General travel sanctions: 1986.

In May 1983 and January 1986 South Africa slows traffic into and out of Lesotho for “security checks.” “The resulting long lines caused shortages of essential supplies in Lesotho....” (Washington Post, 12 August 1983, A1). Since this caused an effect similar to that of a trade embargo I have coded it as a General trade embargo.

### **39- Liberia**

Sanction: 1992-2006.

Arms embargo: 1992-2006.

Ban on imports of Liberian sources: 1992-1997.

Ban on financial transactions: 1992-1997.

Targeted travel sanctions: 1996-1997, 2001-2006.

Targeted asset freeze: 1996-1997, 2004-2006.

Reduction of aid: 2000-2006.

Diamond embargo: 2001-2006.

#### **40- Libya**

Sanction: 1978-2004.  
Ban of export of military equipment: 1979-2004.  
Ban on import of crude oil: 1982-2004.  
Ban on export of oil, gas equipment, technology: 1982-2004.  
Ban on import of refined petroleum products: 1985-2004.  
General trade embargo (not main trading partner): 1985-2004.  
General travel sanctions: 1985-2004.  
General asset freeze: 1986-2004.  
Ban on investments in Libya: 1996-2004.

#### **41- Lithuania**

Sanction: 1990.  
Oil embargo: 1990.  
Gas embargo: 1990.  
Food, metal, tire and cable export ban: 1990.  
Coal export ban: 1990.

#### **42- Macedonia**

Sanction: 1991-1995.  
Reduction of aid: 1994.  
Arms embargo: 1991-1995.

#### **43- Malawi**

Sanction: 1992-1993.  
Reduction of aid: 1992-1993.

#### **44- Nepal**

Sanction: 1989-1990.  
General trade sanctions: 1989-1990.  
General travel sanctions: 1989-1990.

#### **45- New Zealand**

Sanction: 1986-2001.  
General import ban (not main trading partner): 1986-2001.

#### **46- Nicaragua**

Sanction: 1978-1995.  
Reduction of aid: 1981-1984, 1992.  
Ban on export of military equipment: 1982-1995.  
Ban on import of sugar: 1983-1990.  
Veto of World Bank loans: 1983.  
General trade embargo: 1985-1990.  
General travel restrictions: 1985-1995.



In 1983 the Reagan administration redistributes most of Nicaragua's sugar export quota among "Central American nations friendly to US. This is coded as ban on import of sugar.

#### **47- Niger**

Sanction: 1993-2000.

Reduction of aid: 1993-1997, 1999-2000.

Opposing loans from international financial institutions: 1996.

#### **48- Nigeria**

Sanction: 1993-1998.

Reduction of aid: 1993-1998.

Reduction of military aid: 1993-2007.

Suspension of Military Corporation: 1993-2007.

Ban on export of military equipment: 1993- 1999.

Targeted travel sanctions: 1993-1998

General travel sanctions (between Nigeria and US): 1993-1999.

Termination of OPIC and Exim Bank programs: 1994-1998.

Arms embargo: 1995-2007.

Denial of export licenses: 1995-1998.

#### **49- Pakistan**

Sanction: 1979-2001.

Reduction of aid: 1979-, 1999-2001.

Ban on export of military equipment: 1990-1995.

Stop of OPIC, TDA assistance: 1979.

Ban on Trade and Development Agency, OPIC and Export-Import financing: 1998-1999.

Restrictions on US exports of high-technology products: 1998.

Opposition to loans from international financial institutions: 1998.

Ban on US bank loans to the government of Pakistan: 1998.

#### **50- Panama**

Sanction: 1987-1990.

Reduction of aid: 1987-189.

Reduction of military aid: 1987-1989.

Representatives in international institutions voting against loans to Panama: 1987-1989.

Suspension of sugar quota import: 1987-1989.

Asset freeze: 1988-1989.

General trade embargo: 1989.

General travel sanctions: 1989.

Prohibits Exim Bank loans: 1987-1989.

#### **51- Peru**

Sanction: 1979-2003.

Reduction in aid: 1992-1994.



Reduction in military aid: 1992-1994, 1995.  
Ban on export of military equipment: 1995.  
Stop of military corporation/training: 1995.

#### **52- Poland**

Sanction: 1981-1987.  
Cancellation of US Export-Import Bank credit insurances: 1981-1986.  
General travel restrictions: 1981-1984.  
Ban on export of high technology goods: 1981-1986.  
Suspension of fishing rights: 1981-1983.  
Block of application to IMF: 1982-1984.  
Denial of Most Favored Nation status: 1983-1986.

#### **53- Romania**

Sanction: 1983-1993.  
Suspension of MFN status: 1988-1993.  
Decline of export credits: 1988-1992.  
Decline of Exim Bank loans: 1988-1992.  
Reduction of aid: 1990.  
Block of trade and corporation deal: 1990.

#### **54- Russia**

Sanction: 1991-1999.  
Ban on financial sanctions: 1991-1999.  
Trade embargo: 1992-1999.  
Reduction of aid: 1991-1999.  
Arms embargo: 1991-1999.  
General asset freeze: 1992-1999.  
General travel ban: 1992-1993.  
Oil embargo: 1992-1999.

#### **55- Rwanda**

Sanction: 1994-1997.  
Arms embargo: 1994-1995, 1996-1997.  
Reduction of aid: 1995-1995.

#### **56- Serbia**

Sanction: 1991-2001.  
Reduction of aid: 1991-1995.  
Arms embargo: 1991-1995.  
Ban on financial sanctions: 1992-1995.  
Trade embargo: 1992-1995.  
General asset freeze: 1992-1999.  
General travel ban: 1992-1993.  
Oil embargo: 1992-1995.

#### **57- Sierra Leone**

Sanction: 1997-2003.  
Reduction of aid: 1997-1999.  
General trade embargo: 1997-1999.  
Targeted travel sanction: 1997-2003.  
Targeted asset freeze: 1997-2003.  
Arms embargo: 1997-1998.  
Ban on export of oil: 1997-1998.  
Ban on diamond import: 2000-2003.

#### **58- Somalia**

Sanction: 1988-1997.  
Arms embargo: 1992-2012.  
Reduction of aid: 1988-2012.  
Targeted asset freeze: 2001-2012.

#### **59- South Africa**

Sanction: 1978-1991.  
US arms embargo: 1963-1998.  
Reduction of aid: 1977-1993.  
UN arms embargo: 1977-1994.  
Prohibits Exim Bank loans: 1964-1991.  
Oil export embargo: 1973-1992 Ban of new investments: 1984-1990, Ban of new bank loans: 1985-1991.  
Export ban of high tech: 1985-1991.  
General ban on imports: 1986-1991.

#### **60- Sudan**

Sanction: 1989-2012.  
See also Case 89-3: US v. Sudan (1989: Human rights; civil war)  
Reduction of aid: 1988-2012.  
Stop of Military Corporation/ training: 1990-2012.  
US general asset freeze: 1997-2012.  
UN general asset freeze: 2005-2012.  
UN targeted asset freeze: 2006-2012.  
UN targeted travel ban: 2006-2012.  
UN general travel ban: 1996-2001.  
Block on financial transactions: 1996-2012.  
General trade embargo (with exceptions for areas considered key for US national interest; the president mentions the import of gum Arabic: 1997-1999.  
General trade embargo with exceptions for agricultural goods, medicine and medical equipment: 1999-2012.

#### **61- Suriname**

Sanction: 1982-1991.

Reduction of aid: 1982-1988, 1990-1991.

#### **62- Syria**

Sanction: 1986-2012.

Ban on military equipment: 1986-1994, 2004-2012.

Arms embargo: 1986-1994.

Targeted visa bans: 1986-1987.

Denial of Exim bank loans: 1986-1990, 2004-2012.

General travel sanctions: 1987-1994, 2004-2012.

Suspension of aid: 1986-1990, 2004-2012.

Prohibits financial transactions: 1996, 2006-2012.

Oil embargo: 2003-2012.

Export ban with exemptions for food and medicine: 2004-2012.

#### **63- Thailand**

Sanction: 1991-1992.

Reduction of aid: 1991.

Reduction of military aid: 1991.

#### **64- Togo**

Sanction: 1992-2012.

Suspension of Military Corporation: 1990-2012.

Reduction of aid: 1992-2012.

Targeted travel sanctions: 1992-2012.

#### **65- Turkey**

Sanction: 1978-1999.

Reduction of aid: 1978-1981-1986, 1986-1999.

Veto of EU custom union (financial sanction): 1990-1999.

#### **66- Turkmenistan**

Sanction: 1991-1995.

Import ban of gas deliveries: 1991-1995.

Asset freeze: 1991-1995.

#### **67- Ukraine**

Sanction: 1993-1997.

Reduction of oil export: 1993-1997.

Increased tariffs: 1995-1997.

#### **68- Vietnam**

Sanction: 1978-1988.

Ban on financial sanctions: 1978-1988.

Trade embargo: 1978-1988.

Reduction of aid: 1978-1988.  
Arms embargo: 1978-1988.  
General asset freeze: 1978-1988.  
General travel ban: 1978-1988.

#### **69- Yemen**

Sanction: 1990-1997.  
Reduction of aid: 1990-1997.  
Expelling immigrant workers and sending them back to Yemen (coded as financial sanction):1997.

#### **70- Zambia**

Sanction: 1996-1998.  
Reduction of aid: 1996-1998.

#### **71- Zimbabwe**

Sanction: 1983-1988.  
Reduction of aid: 1983-1988.  
Targeted travel ban: 1983-1988.  
Targeted asset freeze: 1983-1988.

