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Thesis for the Degree of Master of Political Science

The Syria Crisis: From Civil War to the Terror Hub

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August 26, 2016

The Syria Crisis :
From Civil War to the Terror Hub
(시리아의 위기: 내전에서 테러의
중심지가 되기까지)

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by
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A Thesis

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The Syria Crisis: From Civil War to the Terror Hub

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Abstract

As Ba'ath Party was secular communist party and had brutal authoritarian dictatorship, it was challenged by religious Muslims of Syria. This was the beginning of the challenge to al-Assad dynasty. It rose to big problem today as we witness civil war in the country. The another problem was caused when al-Assad formed good relationship with Russia and Iran as it was thread to regional Sunni powers as al-Assad's family from Alawite sect, offshoot of Shia Islam which make minority in Syria. All Arab countries were on alert when theocratic Shiite Iran announced revolution against Sunni leaders and encouraged other Shiites to follow them. Bashar supported Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite armed political group fighting against Israeli aggression towards Lebanon. He is accused by Israel of delivering weapons from Iran to Hezbollah. He also supports Syrian Kurds' offence against Turkey. He made a lot of enemies during his presidency and now being strongly opposed by them.

This research paper talks about Syrian Civil War begun in 2011 and still continuing until today. We will discuss about history of the conflict going back to the independence of Syrian Republic from France until the beginning of uprisings in Syria following 'Arab Spring' in 2011. In this paper we will explain the Civil War using bargaining of Game theory by Samuel Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations'. In this research we will talk about

external roles and internal roles in Syria's Civil War, especially the United States' role in transformation of peaceful demonstration into violence and coming out of Islamic State (formerly ISIL, ISIS or IS) terror organization and controlling of considerably big territory of Syria and Iraq.



시리아의 위기: 내전에서 테러의 중심지가 되기까지

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요약

바트당은 세속적인 공산주의 정당이었고 잔혹하고 권위주의적인 독재를 실시했기 때문에 시리아의 종교적인 이슬람교도들로부터 반발을 받았다. 이것이 알아사드 시대에 대한 도전의 시작이었다. 이 문제는 오늘날 시리아의 내전에서 볼 수 있듯이 큰 문제로 발전했다. 시아파 이슬람의 분파로서 시리아의 소수집단인 알라위파 출신 알아사드 가족과 같은 지역 수니 세력에게 러시아 및 이란과의 친선관계는 생명 줄이었기 때문에, 알아사드가 러시아 및 이란과 친선관계를 맺었을 당시 또 다른 문제가 발생했다. 모든 아랍 국가들은 신정주의인 시아파 이란이 수니파 지도자들에 대한 혁명을 선언하고 다른 시아파들에게도 이란을 따르도록 요청했을 당시 경계 태세를 취했다. 바샤르 알 아사드는 레바논의 시아파 무장 정치 집단으로서 이스라엘의 레바논 공격에 대해 싸우는 헤즈볼라를 지원했다. 그는 이스라엘로부터 이란이 헤즈볼라에 무기를 전달하고 있다는 비난을 받았다. 또한 그는 시리아 쿠르드족의 터키에 대한 공격을 지원했다. 그는 집권기간 중 다수의 적을 만들어 현재 적들의 강력한 반대를 받고 있다.

본 연구는 2011년에 시작되어 현재까지 계속되고 있는 시리아 내전을 다룬다. 우리는 시리아 공화국이 프랑스로부터 독립했던 당시로부터 2011년 ‘아랍의 봄’ 이후 시리아 내 봉기의 시작에 이르기까지 분쟁의 역사에 대해 논할 것이다. 동 논문은 사무엘 헌팅턴(Samuel Huntington)의 ‘문명의 충돌(Clash of Civilizations)’ 게임 이론의 협상을 이용하여 내전을 설명할 것이다. 동 연구에서

우리는 시리아 내전의 외부 역할 및 내부 역할에 대해 다루고, 특히 평화 시위를 폭력으로 변화시키고, 이슬람 국가(IS) (공식적인 명칭: ISIL, ISIS 또는 IS) 테러 조직이 나타나 시리아 및 이라크의 영토 중 상당히 큰 부분을 통제하게 되기까지 미국의 역할이 무엇이었는지 살펴본다.



Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Motivation of Study

After revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, the wave of Arab Spring came to Syria. The anti government demonstrations in 2011 transformed into Civil War after Syrian Regime used force against peaceful demonstrators. World news about use of chemical weapons claiming government by rebels made this conflict harsher. The rise of terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL, later IS) especially United States and its regional powers' trained rebel groups joined these terrorist organizations made this conflict utmost challenge to the whole world today.

Even US led anti ISIL Coalition couldn't change the situation to the better side but instead it let ISIL grow fast. But Russian assault on ISIL and other anti Syrian regime rebels invited by Syrian president Bashar al-Assad since September 2015 have successful as the territory of ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra Front (al-Qaeda in Syria)'s territories reduced steadfastly just in months. However, the Russian airstrikes faced several criticism following death of civilian population and destruction of Schools and hospitals by airstrikes.

This conflict is not limited within Syria but it affects whole world as ISIL linked terrorist attacks became frequent in Europe mainly Paris attack, Brussels Airport and subway station attacks and recent Istanbul Ataturk airport suicide attacks. Also, refugee problem which European Union countries reconsider their policies such as recently BREXIT of

United Kingdom is also part of this refugee problem today.

In this research we study the reasons of Syrian conflict, its genesis in Chapter 3 and 4 talking about Syrian post World War II history and Muslim Brotherhood versus Ba'ath Party struggle. Then we will talk about current situation which is 2011 peaceful demonstrations and its reasons and its transmission into civil War in Chapter 5 respectively. We also learn about its internal and external actors and main players such as United States and Russia, the need of cooperation between the United States and Russian Federation against terrorism and making a peace deal between fighting forces.

1.2 Research Objectives and Questions

The main objective of this study is to understand the Syrian Civil War in terms of internal and external conflicts and battling powers.

The specific objectives are:

1. Understand the genesis of Syrian Crisis (history of Muslim Brotherhood and Ba'ath party relationships)
2. Other internal and external reasons of Syrian Crisis
3. The role of regional powers in Syrian Crisis
4. The impact of Syrian regime and Iran and its proxy army Hezbollah's relationships

5. American Syrian policy and onsite battling Islamist fighters
6. Russian role in Syrian War

Based on the above research objectives, we can deduct the following research questions:

1. What is the reason of Syrian Civil War and why it turned into terror hub?
2. Was the American plan to overthrow the Syrian regime the direct cause of formation of ISIL?
3. Is US–Russia cooperation possible in handling Syrian Civil War?

1.3 Research Methodology

In this section, we will discuss about a research technique used to able to answer to the research questions.

1.3.1 Game theory and bargaining major countries in Syria

Since delinquency Syrian Revolution towards militarization, it was clear more than ever, that the popular protests that came out to call for the demands of a decent life, justice and political pluralism, after months turned to the substance of the political bargaining table on the great powers in the world.

The international dimension of the conflict in Syria has moved from bluffing to the public, after the launch of the United States and the West, the international alliance against "ISIS", and then the Russian military intervention, in parallel with a regional dimension was its components from the first moment beyond the armed opposition and the army of Assad formations, but extends to the regional powers in neighbouring Syria, it contributed to fuelling the conflict through military and financial support and political cover for both parts.

Iran and its Hezbollah allies united fiercely along the Syrian regime with ideology, emerging from the womb of "political Shiism" while Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey took the opposite side through the clear support of the Syrian opposition of different civil and military forms.

The look of the banner, the vast gap between the scene of the outbreak of the revolution in Daraa with slogans of 'the people want', the scene of sectarian fever and murder to hit Syria now, which prompted Hezbollah, for example, to the rolling of the summit admiration and the impact on the Arab street, toward sectarian war drains his fighters and his image, and an end to Turkey because -also-

undermine a decade policy of "reset problems" with neighbouring countries and a long awaited rapprochement with Syria, a state full of hostility and bring problems on its southern border.

This line-up which carries the recipe pairing between interests and ideological, it is necessary to refer to the wars on the model of civilization to 'clash of civilizations' of American think tank Samuel Huntington to understand its origins and exploring the fate lines.

According to Huntington, who was convinced to the core that major wars since the breakup of the Soviet Union will carry the stamp of cultural confrontations, what is going on today in Syrian territory is not only the face of the three levels:

The first level of the local players. They are two or more parties, including actual military confrontation lies. It may be states, armed militias, a regular army or popular.

The second level of the regional players. It states directly linked to the local players, and share with them culturally or ideologically.

Third level of the central players. It is the great powers of the world (such as the US, Russia, Germany, France, and England) associated Interestsfor the purposes of influence one of the elements of the first level or the second, or both.

Perhaps now, we began to classify the poles of the war in Syria, according to the previous three levels.

What concerns us today, is the question that preoccupied political analysts worried about the future of Syria and the region, which is: What happens after the Western and Russian direct interventions in

Syria?

what is known as Game theory was developed half a century ago a stunning applications for the model in the science of politics, particularly in the decision of war and peace decisions, and painted an outline of the types of major conflicts, such as those spin today on three local levels, regional and international in Syria. As the theory studied the predicted behaviours of the parts that want to either conflict or cooperate to achieve their interests.

In one of theoretical models, international conflicts are classified into 3 sections:

Competitive or zero conflicts

It is conflicts that the interest of two parties are completely contradict each other, so that means the party which had victory over another means an absolute loss to the other party so that the result (+1) to the first part necessarily mean the loss of the second party (-1).

These type of battles, for example, apply to the conflict with the liberation movements against the colonising powers, the Palestinian factions which call for the liberation of Palestine from the sea to the river.

Cooperative conflicts

A conflict in which, the interests of both sides are not conflicting fully. The interest overlapping so allow more bargaining and make concessions to reach an agreement to distribute the gains among the conflicting parties.

This model applies to almost US - Russian conflict in Syria. The

larger the index, is a consensus that the green light has been granted from US to Moscow for direct military intervention, in a scene it seems like it was dealt between the two parties, while it still revolves the bargains between them to end the war scenario, or in other words: the distribution of the final gains.

Destructive conflicts

In this type of conflict one party works strongly to destroy the other party. And this kind of conflict is taking the extinction of today's political map. It was adopted by the old dictatorships, and almost exclusively contemporary show on the form of comprehensive nuclear wars.

The bargaining theory answers one branch of game theory, or what is known as bargaining theory of international cooperation on the question what next in Syria?

While international conflicts of three levels erupt with local motivations, they do not soon get out of local players' hands, so one can stop only the big players on the international level. It seems the fate of the entire region dependent on bargains that does not stop between the poles of the United States and the West and Russia over the fate of their interests in Syria. There are two elements seal the results of this bargain.

The ability of the parties to be patient. That means there is no urgent need to make a deal at the earliest, to prevent the depletion of resources and political resilience. The party most able to withstand can eventually impose conditions on depleted parties.

The abundance of information among parties to the conflict: not only the field of intelligence on the battlefield, but the abundance of information about preferences and manoeuvres of counter party, which makes it more bargaining power.

Cornerstone of basis for this theory; it is that the player(the state) its share of the gains is not determined by the basis of his behaviour skylights, but only subjected to the behaviour of all players competing.

And indicates a track history of similar conflicts, whether in the Balkans, Central Asia, and the recent war on Iraq, that more scenarios that led to the stop of the three levels of war was severe attrition on the third level (top players) led them to exert their influence on regional allies in order to quell the war . And it boils down to the role of regional players to stop financial and military supplies to local allies, with the pressure on them to accept temporary or sustainable settlement that ends the confrontation formula.

It doesn't seem to be that the Russian or the US sides of the need for rapid deal on Syria, both parties are still investigating a number of interests to prolong the conflict gathering jihadists and root them out, exhaustion regional adversaries, flourished of arms markets, with an eye on a greater share of the pie taken at the end of the war. The recipe of quelling these wars can be summarized that the regional countries stop providing direct support for local players, thus raising the cost of confrontation rests with the major powers, or that the local players be able to resolve the land battle, or delinquency towards a ceasefire and sit down at the negotiating table. But solutions remain theoretical not

occupying ample space in the world of extreme political and ideological polarization.



Chapter 2. Review of Literature

Many scholars have written on Syria's Civil War topic.

Muriel Asseburg and Heiko Wimmen¹ on their article, they speak about no fertile clash authorization will be feasible until the parties suspend pursuing out-right military conquest and the interest of crucial native and international players in this (proxy) battle has been jaded. Though, there is at the moment no realistic outlook of retrieving convention on actually just one of the larger tensions acting out in Syria: the fight over regional dominance and effect, the Iranian nuclear programme, hostility among the United States and Russia/China, the Kurdish perspective, etc. On the other hand, it must be apprehended that an exacerbation of the Iranian nuclear struggle to military contrast, for instance, would increase the civil war in Syria.

They access on Syria's war with pessimism eliciting main tangles and strongly pressurizing all party cessation. In this paper, we will bring major conflicts which are domestic and external power tensions as the cause of the ongoing war.

Phillip Smith² noted, as the United States of America proceed its

1 Muriel Asseburg and Heiko Wimmen, Civil War in Syria External Actors and Interests as Drivers of Conflict, *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*, 2012

2 Phillip Smith, THE SHIITE JIHAD IN SYRIA AND ITS REGIONAL EFFECTS, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 2015

campaign against ISIL troops in Syria while at the same time resisting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his proponents, the existence of Iran-supported Shiite militias, together with the impact of their Iranian trainers, will keep expanding.

Following the crisis in Iraq and Syria has increased into a complete regional battle field; a lot of Shiite militias are rapidly accepting a position as the Iraqi backbone state's major confronting power against ISIL and other extremist elements. The growth to interior minister Mohammed al-Ghabban from Badr Organization displays just how stubbornly Iran is dealing with, via both militarised and democratic techniques, to oppose U.S. struggle within Iraq. Across the utilization of Islamic Republic of Iran's Iraqi Shiite produced fighters like the Badr Organization, U.S. struggle to pressure Baghdad to be more comprising to Sunni Muslims have been considerably mutilated. More concretely, appointing Mohammed Ghabban will probably facilitate damage struggle to grow a National Guard style of anti-ISIL combating faction between Iraqi Sunnis.

This research paper partly agrees with the author but the research paper talks more about US-Russia affords on easing Syrian domestic conflicts and preventing regional powers' intervention.

Brian Michael Jenkins³ notes Syria's internal war is martyring the country's public institutions where as building the situations for proceeding regional conflict. Ruthless regime counterinsurgent

3 Brian Michael Jenkins, The Dynamics of Syria's Civil War, RAND Corporation 2014

manoeuvres, the prevalent anarchy that comes with the disintegration of control and the enforcement of strict Islamic rule in some insurgent areas are ousting a big part of the population. However, it is not yet obvious which party in the confrontation will be able to propose security to those who dream to run away from Islamist cruelty but can no further outlast in zealot enclaves faithful to the regime.

This article is BS which is talking only one side perspective. To give Syrian regime more power to crash religious extremist powers but also he cannot distinguish between moderate rebels and extremists. He levels them with same category meanwhile; this research paper gives insight into rebel groups.

If we look at the Frederic C. Hof⁴'s insight, what we see in Syria these days is, substantially, the state's effort to settle the identity crisis devised to it through the post-World War I partition of the Ottoman Caliphate. After all coherent Syrian governments starting in 1946 looked for installing a Syrian national character exceeding the state's lingering sectarian rifts and did in reality came off in offering some similarity of nationhood these separations were never truly deleted. yet as President Hafiz al-Assad planned a stage of pan-Arabism (which he by degrees fixed to a policy of Syria first) and was heard by members of the Sunni and Christian communities, Hafiz was also strengthening his

4 Frederic C. Hof, *Sectarian Violence in Syria's Civil War: Causes, Consequences and Recommendations for Mitigation*, The Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 2013

power via storing his inner range and security system with people of his own denomination and family: members he viewed as he could truly believe. Thereby, while sermonising and offering secularism, Assad established an apparatus unreservedly presenting the denominational poison pill: any effort by non-Alawites to remove the regime would take the risk of bringing the state down with it through a rough denominational confrontation.

This research paper agrees with the author about secular government's sectarian conflict but will bring external conflicts to feature Syria's ongoing war.

According to David E. Cunningham⁵, for civil wars to cease in agreed settlement, one of two occasions has to happen all the players (both internal and external) such as have the capacity to proceed the confrontation from one side have to consent to a settlement and in fact cease combating, or international players have to be wishing to force a peace on disagreeing veto actors. While we have many veto implementers, for instance in Syria, it is particularly hard to seek a convention that all veto actors can consent to, and thereby confrontation extend. In Syria, the degree of international obligation needed to enforce a peace is absent, and, whereas there are positions that international players can utilize to help veto players in obtaining agreed settlements, they are not likely to be done there. The civil war in Syria, thus, is apparently to continue much longer and the outlooks for

⁵ David E. Cunningham, Veto Players and Civil War in Syria, The Political Science of Syria's War, Project on Middle East Political Science, December 18, 2013

any type of agreed settlements are highly low.

This research paper partly agrees with author on saying the level of international commitment required to impose a peace is lacking in Syria. But he supports American foreign policy and refuses Russian interest. The United States without Russian presence cannot solve Syrian conflict as US supported rebels turned to ISIS and al-Nusra Front. This paper states more importance of US-Russian affords on solving Syria crisis.



Chapter 3. The short history of modern Syria.

After obtaining independence from Ottoman Empire in 1916, Syria had several governments. In October 1918 Arab and British soldiers entered into Syria and captured Damascus and Aleppo. Within Sykes-Picot agreement, Syria became a League of Nations(today's United Nations) mandate under French control in 1920.

Emir Faisal of the Hashemite dynasty (lately became king of Iraq) established short lived dependent kingdom of Syria in 1919. In March 1920, the Syrian National Congress proclaimed Faisal as king of Syria "in it's natural boundaries" from the Taurus mountains in Turkey to the Sinai desert of in Egypt. After few months following a clash between his Syrian Arab forces and French forces at the battle of Maylasun, Faisal's reign in Syria ended. France sent its troops to Syria and forced king to flee. Faisal's kingdom was split up by San Remo conference after a year placing Syria-Lebanon under French mandate, and Palestine under British control. Syria was divided into three autonomous regions by the French, with separate areas for the Alawis on the coast and Druze in the south⁶.

Syrians stood up against French colonialism by Sultan al-Atrash led revolt in Druze Mountain in 1925 and spread across the whole country and parts of Lebanon. It was suppressed in 1926 in spite of the fierce

⁶ Peter N. Stearns, William Leonard Langer (2001). "The Middle East, p. 761". *The Encyclopedia of World History*. Houghton Mifflin Books. ISBN978-0-395-65237-4.

battles between rebel and French forces in Damascus, Homs and Hama. Sultan al-Atrash was sentenced to death by the French, but he had escaped with the rebels to Transjordan and was eventually pardoned. The public welcomed him after his return to Syria in 1937.

3.1 Ba'ath party

Since its independence from France in 1946, Syria has been rocked by periods of political instability.

As the colonial hold of the great powers began to fade and the region witnessed a wave of Arab nationalism, Syria shifted through a succession of military coups.

But in 1970, Hafez al-Assad, an ambitious minister of defence, seized control. Rising from a humble background in western Syria, he was to rule the country for 30 years.

His was an autocratic one-party state in which any dissent was ruthlessly suppressed. Following the death of Hafez in 2000, father was succeeded by son – Bashar al-Assad took the reign and a dynasty was born.

In 2011, with the region in revolt, the al-Assad regime was challenged. The result is an ongoing civil war that has claimed hundreds of thousands of casualties and has displaced millions⁷.

In February 1956, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the creation of the United Arab Republic, the political union between Egypt and Syria. Syria's president Shukri al-Quwatli stepped down.

7 Syria: The Reckoning, Al Jazeera America, March 15, 2016

The first Arab president who willingly hand overed power to another Arab ruler. Idolised by many throughout Arab world, Nasser was a popular hero. The union was seen as a move countering the increasing strength of the communist party in Syria. Many Syrians have pushed the for the merger.

At first, Nasser was skeptical, eventually agreed for the Union but he set tough conditions, the withdrawal of the army from politics and the dissolution of the all political parties. In stroke Nasser effectively ended political pluralism in the new country. The Syrians reluctantly agreed to the Nasser's conditions, even though they supported the Union with Egypt such as the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party had to disband. The Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party had grown from the Ba'ath Party founded in 1947 in Syria by Mishel Aflaq. Ba'athism. Meaning Renaissance within ideology mixing nationalism, socialism and pan-Arab aspirations. The ideology called for both the unification of the Arab world into a single state and freedom from colonialism. Supportive of this ideology known as Ba'athists, had been of the

Forefront pushing the unity with Egypt. But Nasser demand the political party be dissolved raised concerns. "It led to divisions in the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party. It was a party that called for unity, liberty and socialism. Without liberty there would be no unity and no social justice. The Ba'ath Party agreed to the annulment of freedom in Syria. It allowed the country to be ruled by a regime that didn't allow freedom and banned the formation of parties. This led to splits in the

Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party"⁸.

A referendum was held. Nasser was elected as a president of United Arab Republic, but in Syria, opposition to the union soon began to grow. Syrians began resentful at the single party system and what they regarded as Nasser's policy favouring Egypt.

Nasser established six hundred members of National Assembly which four hundred were Egyptians and only two hundred were Syrians. Members were personally appointed by Nasser.

"Unity was undoubtedly the aspiration of all Arab nations. An entire generation lived the ideology of Arab nationalism. All Arabs have the right to express their hope of a single, unified state. There was nothing wrong with the idea. But its implementation was wrong. Nasser's conditions reflected his authoritative mentality. He demanded the disbanding of all parties in Syria. The Syrians were keen for unity and loved Nasser particularly after his stand in the 1956 Suez crisis. This made them accept these sacrifices. The Ba'ath Party held some senior posts in the unity government. But it eventually realised Nasser was ruling Syria in the same authoritative manner he ruled Egypt"⁹.

Nasser asserted his commanding control over the political scene in Syria. Ba'ath Party Leaders who championed the unity with Egypt, began to feel sidelined. They started to realise that Nasser had no intention of sharing power and many Syrians began to resent what

8 Dafi al-Jamaani-former Ba'ath Party leader's interview to al Jazeera channel 2013

9 Najib al-Ghadban-Arkansas University, member of the National Transitional Council's interview to al Jazeera channel 2013

they thought overbearing attitude among their Egyptian compatriots.

"people in Damascus supported the unity and Nasser. But some Egyptians didn't think in this way. They made us feel they were our social and intellectual superiors, especially in the army. Egyptian army officers thought they were better. This attitude damaged relations between Syrian and Egyptian officers"¹⁰.

Nasser became more autocratic. Alerted the risk from Syrian Army officers meddling in politics, he imprisoned those who opposed him. Other prominent officers were sent to serve in Egypt, where they could be closely monitored. Among those stationed in Egypt with five Syrians officers who would in time come to have a profound influence on Syria's future. Major Mohammed Omran, who served 1948 Arab-Israeli War had become active in politics. Major Salah Jadeed, a member of the Ba'ath Party who supported the political union Egypt and Syria. Captain Abdal Kareem al-Jundi, depicted a hero and actor. Major Ahmed al-Meer, a loyal Ba'ath Party member. And finally, captain Hafez al-Assad, an army officer who joined Ba'ath Party while still a student activist in a mid 1940s. He had graduated from Homs Military Academy as an Air Force Pilot. By 1960, these five Syrian officers had formed the core secret organization within the army, later became known as the Military Committee.

The five officers were all members of the Ba'ath Party. As far as we

10 Walid al-Saqqa-former Syrian Army officer's interview to al Jazeera channel 2013

know, their initial meetings were not focused on to cease power. They were more concerned about the demise of the Ba'ath Party after its dissolution and compliance with Nasser's demands. As Ba'athists, they were loyal to Nasser's pan-Arab goals. But they were keen to revive the Ba'ath Party in Syria. Three of the officers were from Alawite sect. Two was from Ismaeli sect, both offshoots of Shia Islam. They all vowed an oath to their secrecy. (Dafi al-Jamaani-former Ba'ath Party leader's interview to al Jazeera channel)"The Military Committee was formed during the unity between Syria and Egypt. It was Major Muhammad Omran's idea. Forming a committee in a party or an army means you're not satisfied with the situation in the country".

Other Syrian Army officers took matters into their own hands. On 28 September 1961 Lieutenant colonel Abdel Kareem al-Mahalawi leading a group of officers staged a Coup d'état in Damascus. The coup spelled the end of the union between Syria and Egypt. (Najib al-Ghadban-Arkansas University, member of the National Transitional Council's interview to al Jazeera channel)"Syrian society has many sects. They couldn't all be in agreement on unity. So it was only a matter of time before a group of Syrians ended this union. Syrian society was divided. Some backed the union and wanted it to succeed. Others, like the military officers, saw no hope in unity and wanted separation".

Nasser conceded sending troops to overthrow the usurpers, but he lacked sufficient support within Syrian Military. He already arrested many Syrians soldiers and officers stationed in Egypt. Among those

arrested were some of the officers of the Secret Military Committee. They were lately deported to Syria.

The Syrian officers who carried out the coup were labelled as secessionists. They have broken up the union with Egypt. Nazim al-Qudsi was chosen as president of Syria, the country's first post union head of state. Al-Qudsi drafted the new constitution of Syria and restored the role of the political parties outlawed by Nasser. Despite this, the Ba'athist officers in the Secret Military Committee fared a little better under the new regime. It was wary of Ba'athists, seeing them as the supporters of the unity with Egypt. Suspected of harbouring loyalties to Nasser dozens of officers, including the members of the Military Committee were dismissed from the army.

The five former officers continued to meet in secret. This time, their discussions turned to actually taking power in Syria. They planned to overthrow the government of Nazim al-Qudsi. Aware of a need for a wider support base, they made contact with officers in the army who they knew held loyalties to Nasser. The Nasserists in Syria wanted to re-establish unity with Egypt. They saw the Ba'athists overture as falling in line with their own goals. But the Ba'athists of the Military Committee had other plans. They enlisted the support of Ba'ath Party founder Michel Aflaq. He consented to their plot to cease power through forceful means. Each had a shared goal. For the Ba'ath Party to cease power in Syria and to prevent any reunification with Egypt. (Najib al-Ghadban-Arkansas University, member of the National Transitional Council's interview to al Jazeera channel)"We must

remember the significant role played by the Ba'ath Party's military personnel. It all goes back to the time of coups in Syria in the 1940s when so-called 'ideological parties' seized power through coup d'états. The Ba'ath Party was no exception. Key figures like Akram al-Hawrani led to this kind of thinking. The Communist Party and the Nasserists also thought in the same way".

Syria was not the only country to experience revolution and upheaval. In neighbouring Iraq on 8 February 1963 members of the Iraqi wing of the Ba'ath Party seized power. The country's Prime Minister Abdel Kareem Qasim was seized. He was given a mock trial over Baghdad radio and then executed.

The Ba'athist revolution in Iraq inspired the Syrian wing of the Ba'ath Party. The Iraqi prime minister had been known as a strong and ruthless leader. If he could be overthrown and Ba'athists of Syria felt confident they could topple their own president and his regime. The Zero Hour was set. On 8 March 1963, Damascus woke to the sounds of tanks and armed vehicles. The coup was planned and led by the Ba'athists of the Military Committee. President Nazim al-Qudsi and members of his government were all arrested. Syria's new rulers issued their first statement full of grandiose sayings: 'Oh citizens of ... Arabs everywhere. The voice of virtue announces the word of virtue. On this distinguished day, falsehood is defeated. The will of the army and the people prevails. The reactionaries and separatists have been defeated. Those who drove Syria away from the true path of unity. Those who carried out secession and tried to replace unity with democracy'.

(Burhan Ghalioun-Contemporary East Study Centre's interview to al Jazeera channel)"During unity with Egypt, the Ba'ath Party had sought to share power with Nasser. But they had been denied this. So they sought to seize back power. And they did. They used a Ba'ath Party motto as a pretext to justify their actions. The slogan was: 'to rebuild unity on the right foundation'".

The coup was generally bloodless and was met with indifference by most Syrians. The Ba'ath Party in Syria had now seized power as its counterparts in Iraq had done them earlier. The members of the Military Committee who masterminded the coup reinstated themselves as military officers. Hafez al-Assad still in his thirties became the de facto head of the Syrian Air Force.

Suspected enemies were purged from the Army and fellow Ba'athists appointed to senior positions. (From Gamal Abdel Nasser-Egyptian President(1956-1970) "What happened today was a result of the Ba'ath Party's actions in Syria. It sacked officers and soldiers from the army. These are the autocratic practices of the Ba'ath Party. It has given jobs only to Ba'athists, excluding Syrians. It has divided the country and practised discrimination and sectarianism. It has favoured the minorities. The Ba'ath Party has divided the country into Ba'athists and Syrians. Ba'athists have everything and Syrians have nothing".

Though Nasser himself criticized the coup, the Ba'athists had enlisted the Support of the Nasserists in Syria. The tensions and divisions were soon to be exposed. The Nasserists still hankered for unification with Egypt. They quickly realised that Ba'athists had no intention of

following through on this goal. In July 1963, four months after the coup the Nasserists attempted a revolution of their own. With help of Egyptian Intelligence the Nasserists led an attack on the Army headquarters and other key targets. The ensuing battles left hundreds dead. Their attempted coup had failed. (Burhan Ghalioun-Contemporary East Study Center's interview to al Jazeera channel) "The main challenge facing the Ba'athists was the lack of social support. They came to power through a coup d'état. They didn't have many supporters in the army itself. So when they seized control of the army, they needed to clean it up. They had to get rid of those opposing them. And they did. They recruited about 3,000 civilians and trained them to become army officers. They dismissed the others".

The first month of the Ba'athists' rule proved bloody. They conducted ruthless crackdown on suspected opponents.

There were also tensions among the Ba'athists themselves. A growing split emerged between civilian Ba'athists, such as Michel Aflaq and the Party's Military Committee led by young officers, such as al-Assad. The military officers had commandeered the Party. But they now began to abandon the regional populist ideology by establishing a military dictatorship. (Dafi al-Jamaani-former Ba'ath Party Leader's interview to al Jazeera) "The Military Committee ruled the country because there was no Ba'ath Party in Syria. It had been dissolved during the time of union with Egypt. After the March eighth coup they gathered former Ba'athists to re-establish the party. But it had no real capabilities. The Military Committee was the real ruler". (Radwan Ziadeh-Syrian Center

For Political Studies' interview to al Jazeera) "The Ba'ath Party was used as the cover to seize power in the country. It wasn't a real party. It had no public support and its leaders were not elected. They were all appointed by the president who was also the secretary-general of the Party".

The members of the Military Committee preferred to stay out of the limelight. They looked for someone they could trust and control as head of state. Ba'athist officer Lu'ay al-Attasi was chosen. His position was mostly ceremonial and he resigned four months later. The Military Committee then appointed the Minister of Interior Amin al-Hafez as president. Now, Syria was effectively ruled by Military Junta.

Syria in 1963, a country ruled by small cabal of military officers. They sought to restructure the state, economy and society. Martial law was imposed. Political parties and movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood were banned. Newspapers and magazines were shut down. Syria's new regime was turning increasingly towards authoritarianism with only one party ruling it, the Ba'ath Party. (Haitam al-Maleh-Human Rights Activist's interview to al Jazeera) "The state of emergency had negative repercussions on life in the country. The rule of law was suspended and the authorities ruled by a state of emergency. There were arrests and confiscation of property. The announcement of the state of emergency was unlawful. Its continuity was also illegal. So whatever happened under the state of emergency was null and void. The state must be prosecuted for it. The constitution was shelved. Meetings were cancelled. Political activity was terminated.

Everything was monitored by the authorities. There were indiscriminate arrests. People were referred to what was called 'a state security court'. This court only exists during a state of emergency. It does not apply the state's laws. The authorities could confiscate anything they wanted. Many houses were seized during the state of emergency which was illegal in the first place". (Walid al-Saqqa-Former Syrian Army Officer's interview to al Jazeera) "The oppression started immediately after the March 8th coup. They executed people in Mezzeh prison. They held five-minute trials and carried out summary executions. This was done so people knew whoever dared to speak or plan anything would be killed".

One after the coup, the Ba'athist authorities had to contend with a new rival, the rising religious political force of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood was to become to the most prominent and strongest opposition to the secular regime. In April 1964 in a city of Hama, Brotherhood supporters took to the streets to denounce the Ba'ath Party. They put up road blocks and attacked Ba'ath Party offices. The stage went on high alert. Tanks were brought in to crush the uprising. The protest came in a wake of rising tension between Ba'ath Party supporters and Muslim Brotherhood followers. Security forces had clashed with a group of men who taken refuge in al Sultan Mosque in central Hama. The authorities had bombed the Mosque with the protesters inside. Forty people had been killed, others were arrested, some was sentenced to death.

Protests and strikes took places in several Syrian cities. Demonstrators

demanding civil rights and release of those arrested and an end of state emergency. This was not to be the last time Hama would rise up in protest. (Najib al-Ghadban-Arkansas University's interview to al Jazeera) "There was discontent in the country over the lack of importance given to religion. And over how the minorities had assumed power. A group of young religious men staged a sit-in at al Sultan Mosque. Marwan Hadid was one of them. He would later play an influential role. The new rulers were surprised. They immediately resorted to force to deal with the situation. The message was clear: the new authorities would not tolerate any opposition peaceful or armed".

There were tensions not only in the streets but also within inner circle of power. Mohammed Omran, the Military Committee's eldest and the most senior ranking member was not pleased. He had opposed the appointment of Amin al-Hafez as president. It's believed that he himself wanted the top position and was angry that someone else was chosen. He is also believed who've opposed the Military Committee's recourse of violence against its opponents. In this he clashed with the committee's strongman Salah Jadeed who saw force as the only way to protect regime. Ever the pragmatist Hafez al-Assad watched the dispute between the two members of the Military Committee developed. In the end Omran was to seal his own fate. He revealed to politician Michel Aflaq how the Military Committee had all along planned to sideline the civilian leaders of the Ba'ath Party. When it seized power in 1963.

Al-Assad moved closer to Salah Jadeed. They punished Omran for his

indiscretion by stripping him of his role in the Military Committee. He was assigned the job of Syrian Ambassador to Spain, effectively casted out from central power and sent to exile. Al-Assad was officially promoted to commander of the Air Force. Although Omran was out of the picture, tension within a Ba'athist led cabal rule the country continued to mount. Amin al-Hafez ruled with an iron fist, but he was a more military opportunist when a true ideologue of the Ba'ath Party. As Sunni Muslim, he was viewed externally serious tough president. But the officers in the Military Committee saw him more as a military figurehead. Al-Hafez wanted to assert his position. He sought to exploit the tensions between the Ba'athists.

A contest of power had been developing between two camps. On the one side with Michel Aflaq, a principal founder of the Ba'ath Party and on other was the group of military officers now ruling the country. Suspecting an opportunity, al-Hafez defected with the Aflaq's camp. Michel Aflaq was now seen as an enemy to the Military Committee. Aflaq wanted to confront the men in his view had betrayed the true spirit of the Party. Together Aflaq and al-Hafez pushed to dissolve the Military Committee.

Amin al-Hafez summoned the exiled officer Mohammed Omran to return to Syria where he was appointed both Minister of Defence and Military Chief Staff.

Salah Jadeed was outraged. He viewed this move as nothing less than a coup. He demanded in his words, revolution reviolence. (Walid al-Saqqa-Former Syrian Army Officer's interview to al Jazeera) "The

paratrooper battalion and the 70th armoured brigade attacked the presidential residence in Rawda Street. Salim Hatum launched the attack on the palace and al-Hafez's residence opposite. A fierce battle erupted between Amin al-Hafez's guards and the paratroopers".

Salah Jadeed made his swift determined move on the 22 February, 1966. A full scale assault was launched on the al-Hafez's residence. Jadeed's men showed no mercy. Many officers and soldiers were killed in bloody battle. Amin himself was injured.

Al-Hafez, Muhammed Omran and dozens of veteran Ba'athists were arrested and held in al Masa prison. Michel Aflaq fled Syria never to return. Yet again the new regime ruthlessly crushed its enemies. Hafez al-Assad was outside of the country during the coups and now had returned to Syria. He sided with Salah Jadeed. Al-Assad chose well. As a game, he managed to get promoted. As just 35 years old, he was assigned Minister of Defence.

The coup firmly set Salah Jadeed as the most powerful man in Syria. He appointed doctor Noor al-Din al-Attasi as the country's new president. (Walid al-Saqqa-Former Syrian Army Officer's interview to al Jazeera) "After the 1966 coup against Amin al-Hafez, they sought to appoint another Sunni. They chose Noor al-Din al-Attasi. He was a doctor and truly believed in the Ba'ath Party. Salah Jadeed was seen as a very smart army officer. He was very committed. He was in charge of all things to do with the officer corps. He could have commanded a battalion. But instead he wanted to know every officer working in the Syrian army and how they could serve the regime. He

managed all appointments, dismissals and transfers of officers. After the 1966 coup, Salah Jadeed was the regime's number one man".

19 June 1967, the Third Arab-Israeli War erupted. Syria joined Egypt and Jordan in three prompted assaults on Israel. From the Military Committee Ahmed al-Meer was Commander of operations. Hafez al-Assad was Minister of Defence.

Syrian army was unorganized and ill prepared. The result was tragedy for the Syrians who could not withstand the Israeli attacks. Shortly after a cease fire was agreed, Israelis captured the strategically vital Golan Heights. The defeat was a crushing embarrassment to the Syrians. After a round of accusations Ahmed al-Meer was held responsible. As punishment, he was thrown out of the Military Council. Al-Assad did not escape a criticism for his role either. This defeat marked definite turning point in his relationship with the committee.

From then on, he began to act more autonomously. A rift began to appear between al-Assad and his committee comrades. (Walid al-Saqqa-Former Syrian Army Officer's interview to al Jazeera) "Ahmed al-Meer was not a key political player. He was not one of the prominent officers. He was commander of operations during the 1967 war. They managed to sideline him by blaming him for that defeat. (Najib al-Ghadban-Arkansas University's interview to al Jazeera) "The 1967 defeat was disastrous for the Syrian and Egyptian regimes. They said it wasn't a complete defeat because the goal of the war had been to topple the regimes. But they didn't fall. It caused a deep rift. 37-year old Hafez al-Assad was Minister of Defence at the time. The

defeat shocked him. He tried to blame the civilian leaders for intervening in the defence ministry affairs. Others blamed him. Some claimed he had ordered his forces to withdraw. I don't believe in the conspiracy theory that al-Assad sacrificed the Golan Heights considering the experience of the Syrian army at that time. There was no way this army could have won such war. Internal struggles had led to the dismissal of experienced officers".

Defeat in 1967 led to another conflict. This time, between Salah Jadeed and Hafez al-Assad. The conflict escalated day by day as al-Assad's ambition grew. Still in line for criticism for his performances in 1967, Defence Minister al-Assad tried to pend the popularity among the armed forces by offering scholarships and free services. To those he favoured he lavished promotions in afford to buy loyalty. His strategy was to create a trusted following that would become his weapon against all opponents. (Najib al-Ghadban-Arkansas University's interview to al Jazeera) "There were two reasons behind the dispute between Salah Jadeed and Hafez al-Assad. The first was internal politics. Jadeed belonged to the leftist ideological trend. He had radical ideas. He believed in change and reform. His Marxist ideas led to the division of Syrian society into the bourgeoisie class, the working class and the proletariat. His colleagues were amateurish leftists who were experimenting of their ideas on the society. Hafez al-Assad didn't think like this. He was more pragmatic than ideological".

Abdel Kareem al-Jundi was security and intelligence chief. His security apparatus was used to terrify and control the Syrian people.

But in the battle between Jadeed and al-Assad, he too was faced with terror. His loyalties laid firmly with Jadeed. And seeing al-Assad steadily gain upper hand gave al-Jubdi serious cause for concern. He became paranoid. Believing that he would face the same fate of Mohammed Omran and Ahmed al-Meer, on 2 March 1969, Abdel Kareem al-Jundi was found dead in his office. He left a chilling letter foretelling the dark consequences of Hafez al-Assad. (Dafi al-Jamaani-Former Ba'ath Party Leader's interview to al Jazeera)

"During the rift between Jadeed and al-Assad, Abdel Kareem al-Jundi committed suicide. He was the most honest man amongst them. He had played a major role in supporting their rule. He committed suicide because he knew Hafez al-Assad would carry out a coup. He knew what the results would be. He committed suicide because he felt he had wronged himself and the people".

Simmering tensions across Syria's border were bound to add al-Assad's own problems. In neighbouring Jordan, a power struggle erupted between a ruling Hashemite kingdom and Palestinian guerrilla organizations based in Jordan at that time. On 15 September 1970, they clashed in a vital conflict known as Black September. Leftist Salah Jadeed decided to intervene in support of the Palestinian fighters. He ordered Syrian armed vehicles to cross the border and engage Jordanian forces. Yet crucially, Syrian army forces were not accompanied by any air support. Four days in the hostilities and royal Jordanian Air Force made Syrian armoury to retreat. Hafez al-Assad had personally overseen the military operation.

Failure in Jordan finally gave Salah Jadeed a chance to strike. On 30

October 1970, he called for an urgent meeting of the Ba'ath Party regional command. Confident he was backed out by majority of the party leadership, Jadeed openly attacked al-Assad. The meeting spooled in a heating debate of twelve grueling days. The resulting decision was to strip al-Assad of his position and expel him from the party. Jadeed had made his move.

Al-Assad now showed his teeth. Before any of Jadeed's orders were followed through, forces loyal to al-Assad sprang to action. Tanks and troops surrounded the committee headquarters. Al-Assad had played his hand leading to yet another coup. He settled his scores in one swift blow ordering an arrest of all his opponents. Salah Jadeed and president Noor al-Din al-Attasi were thrown behind bars. (Walid al-Saqqa-Former Syrian army officer's interview to al Jazeera) "Any of al-Assad's opponents not in prison were a potential threat. So, none of them were to be left in peace. Either they were killed or imprisoned".

Salah Jadeed and Noor al-Din al-Attasi languished in prison over two decades. In 1992, al-Attasi was released to receive a medical treatment in France. He died a month after arrival. Salah Jadeed passed the following year still behind bars. (Walid al-Saqqa-Former Syrian army officer's interview to al Jazeera) "Hafez al-Assad was determined to keep Salah Jadeed in jail as long as he ruled. And that's what happened. Several Arab leaders, including King Hussein of Jordan tried to intervene and convince al-Assad to release Jadeed or at least place under house arrest. But all attempts were in vain. Al-Assad feared Jadeed because he had many supporters".

Chapter 4. Syrian Internal issue. The Early Clash Between Al-Assad's Regime And Muslim Brotherhood

Hafez al-Assad called the coup the corrective movement. He sought a cleansing purge to rid himself of all opposition, yet one dangerous man was still at large. Mohammed Omran, one of the five founding officers of the 1960 Military Committee. Omran now had ambitions to challenge al-Assad. From a supposedly safe base in Lebanon, he began to rally a support from his former colleagues in the army. But before picking up any momentum, Omran was assassinated in his Tripoli home on 4 March 1972. The finger was pointed to al-Assad though he never admitted an involvement. (Dafi al-Jamaani-Former Ba'ath Party Leader's interview to al Jazeera) "Hafez al-Assad assassinated him. He was in Lebanon. Omran thought Salah Jadeed was the strong man of Syria. When Jadeed was imprisoned, Omran saw his chance to seize power. He had supporters in the army. Al-Assad killed him. Hafez al-Assad doesn't accept any Alawite to oppose him. That would be dangerous".

Hafez al-Assad called his coup 'the corrective movement'. By series of brutal actions, he had eliminated all his opponents. Yet his ployful power was well planned. He didn't immediately seek the presidency. He casted a Sunni character for the role. Ahmed Hasan al-Hatib became

president, while al-Assad from the Alawite sect of Shia Islam, assigned himself the lower position, as Prime Minister. Six month later, on 12 March 1971, al-Assad's plan played out. He was declared the president of the state, legally elected through public referendum. Yet no rivals stood against him. His first move was to change an image of Ba'athist precedence, previously seen as distinct from pious population. Visiting almost every Syrian city, he met all sects and classes, championing the slogan 'national reconciliation'.

Al-Assad appointed 173 Syrians to form the People's Assembly. They were sent a task to draft the new constitution. On 13 March 1973, al-Assad called a National Referendum to vote on the new constitution. It gave al-Assad supreme authority over all aspects of life and the possibility to retain this powers over indefinite numbers of turns. The new constitution was a blueprint for dictatorship. (Burhan Ghalioun-Syrian National Council Leader (2011-2012)'s interview to al Jazeera) "The president gave himself the power to overrule the parliament. He was the absolute ruler. The parliament was turned into a tool in his hands. He brought executive, legislative and judicial authority under one umbrella. He was the Chief Judge. He had the right to dissolve the parliament and set new legislation without parliamentary referral. He was the ultimate authority and military ruler. No one could do anything without his approval".

Controversy focused on the articles of the constitution that related to the president's religion. Hafez al-Assad had scrapped an item stating the president should be a Muslim. This led to a huge protest

particularly, in a city of Hama. Sensing the need to avoid a confrontation, al-Assad quietly retracted the amendment.

By religion, al-Assad was an Alawite. A small sect viewed by some Sunni Muslims as heretics. Al-Assad looked to legitimize his position. He asked Lebanese Shia leader imam Moasser al-Sader to issue a fatwa, claiming the Alawites as part of the larger, more accepted Shia Muslim sect.

The new constitution drastically limited public freedoms. It upheld the state of emergency posed since 1963. The 1965 law for protecting the revolution and law 109, which enable civilians to be tried in a military courts. Article 8 entrenched the power of the Ba'ath Party. It proclaimed members as leaders in society and state, meaning only Ba'athists could reach top positions.

Thousands rushed to join the party. (Burhan Ghalioun-Syrian National Council Leader(2011-2012)'s interview to al Jazeera) "We've been living a real political catastrophe since that time. There were no political activities and no recognised parties. All people must worship that character. No more parties, no syndicates. Nothing but President Hafez al-Assad. He was the worshipped and the inspirer".

Al-Assad was a pragmatist. He was not for one ideological policies, though he pushed the idea of worshipping of great leader. Throughout the country, streets and town squares were filled with his portraits and statues. Syria was subjugated under one motto 'Hafez al-Assad, our leader, forever!'. But in popular culture there was at this time a room for satire. Mild satire was condoned by the regime. In a hope that it

would implicate the scent into any voices from the street. Although behind the scenes, the regime was pulling the strings. Such performances represented as freedom of expression. Some Syrian viewers perceived this as a reflection of an open democracy. In reality, it was all fixed. The regime only accepted sanctioned criticism on its own terms away from streets and mosques. (Haitam al-Maleh-Syrian National Coalition's interview to al Jazeera) "Al-Assad wanted people's love and loyalty. So he allowed such acts during the early years of his rule. But in the late 1970s or 1980s, he urged people to speak out and criticise aspects of government. When we did so, we were arrested. It was a trap. When a ruler encourages the people to criticise the regime and then arrest them when they do... I call that a trap. There were no freedoms. People who criticised the 1973 constitution were arrested. Criticism was not allowed. It was a military, oppressive, unjust regime. You either support it or you get arrested".

The Syrian army was al-Assad's greatest asset. He lavished special attention only armed forces. A career soldier, his links to the army were strong. And it was through the military that he raised to power. Al-Assad knew that commanding their loyalty was a key to initiating or repelling any coup. He worked hard to strengthen his grip in the army, building what he described as an ideological, politically educated army, completely loyal to its leadership. He needed an army for protection his regime at all cost.

An intricate network of internal security kept tabs on the people. A shadowy system ran secret prisons, an interrogation system hidden from

the eyes of any judiciary. Taking pride of place in the sinister web was the military intelligence.

In 1973, the Fourth Arab-Israeli war erupted. Al-Assad was keen for a fight. Syria's Golan Heights still were under Israeli occupation. On 8 October same year, Egyptian and Syrian forces confronted the Israelis on two fronts. Sinai from the south and Golan in the north. Hostilities raged for nearly three weeks. As the dust settled on the battlefield, all combatants claimed a victory. Al-Assad didn't win back the Golan Heights. His claimed to success was in briefly recapturing of the small border town of al Qunaitra. (From Hafez al-Assad's television address to the Syrians on 19 October 1973) "The enemy has been preparing its troops for over a week. They thought they could deceitfully defeat us. But we were alert".

The 1973 war cost Syrian lives but gave al-Assad strength. He assumed an image of great leader making a stand against Israelis. With Egypt entering into peace talks, Syria now stood alone as Israel's only significant front line Arab foe. Al-Assad exploited the status, championing the Palestinian cause in his speeches. Syria appeared as subjugated society, yet under the surface, tensions sterner.

Al-Assad's biggest thread in Syria came from the Muslim Brotherhood, the group as established in Syria in 1945 by doctor Mustafa al-Sabawi. In its early years, it formed apart of Syria's recognized opposition. But by 1963, the ruling Ba'athists had outlawed the Brotherhood. Now driven underground, a wide network of members conspired against the Ba'ath Party. Facing increasing pressure from the regime, some

members of the Brotherhood developed a more militant view. They sought retaliation from regime's actions. One of the leading figures of this militant tendency was sheikh Marwan Hadid. (Ali al-Bayanouni-Muslim Brotherhood official's interview to al Jazeera channel) "Some members of the Muslim Brotherhood believed the only way to confront the regime was with arms. They began believing in the use of force. If the regime came to power through arms, then it can only be defeated with arms. This notion was championed by Sheikh Marwan Hadid. He had many followers in Hama, Aleppo and other areas".

Sheikh Marwan Hadid had become a household name back in 1964 in Hama seven years before al-Assad had assumed power. Following clashes with Ba'athist security forces, a number of protestors had taken refuge in al Sultan Mosque. Regime forces stormed the building. Over forty protesters were killed. Marwan Hadid, who was inside the mosque was arrested and later sentenced to death. To quell the flames of an outraged country, the court had acquitted Hadid.

For Hadid, the incident in Hama marked the point of no return. He declared an only way to confront the Ba'athist regime was with arms and an eye for an eye.

Al-Assad ascended the power seven years later and as increasingly oppressive regime heightened the stakes for Hadid. Most of the Muslim Brotherhood at that time did not support armed insurrection. Many of its members rejected Hadid's militancy. Yet some agreed with him and formed an armed group. Members of this group were closely monitored

by the authorities. On 30 June 1975, following a clash with security forces, Hadid was apprehended and jailed in a notorious al Mazzah prison. He died in prison a year later, after being subjected to continuous torture. (Ali al-Bayanouni-Muslim Brotherhood official's interview to al Jazeera channel) "Following Hadid's death, his followers decided to take revenge. Acting alone, they launched attacks on security figures. Neither the Muslim Brotherhood nor the regime knew who was behind these acts".

The regime's oppression and a death of Hadid had a knock on effect. Followers of Hadid intensified their anti-regime operations. They carried out series of assassinations. Most of the key targets were individuals belonging to Alawite sect. But on 16 June 1979, anti-government rebels raised their resistance to a whole new level. That day armed men attacked the Aleppo Artillery Academy killing 30 Syrian soldiers. It was an inside job aided by Ba'athist officer Ibrahim al-Yousef. A group calling itself the combatant vanguard of the Muslim Brotherhood claimed responsibility. The armed group had asserted their direct affiliation to the Brotherhood. Members of the combatant vanguard were followers of Marwan Hadid. Al-Assad responded in typical fashion. (Ali al-Bayanouni-Muslim Brotherhood official's interview to al Jazeera channel) "The authorities planned to crack down on the Muslim Brotherhood. In al-Assad's words they were his most serious threat. The regime claimed the Muslim Brotherhood was behind the attacks. To them, this justified arresting and killing its members. The Interior Minister publically denounced the group. He pledged to hunt and

destroy them. It was open war against the Muslim Brotherhood. Thousands were arrested, including those who were not involved in operations”.

The combatant vanguard operated in the shadows. Their most prominent member was a man called Adnan Uqla. His views led to his expulsion from the Muslim Brotherhood. Uqla affirmed the responsibility for the attack on the Aleppo Artillery Academy. He boasted the recruiting the Syrian officer Ibrahim al-Yousef as the operation’s insider. (Adnan Uqla’s audio record—from al Jazeera’s ‘Syria: the reckoning’) “It’s clear that the blessed jihadi movement in Greater Syria has taken its decision...After the death of our leader, Sheikh Marwan Hadid situation in Syria exploded. The Muslim Brotherhood released statements denying its responsibility for any violent acts. It called for a non-biased international committee to probe all that’s happened and clear its name. It also issued a statement denying responsibility for the military school incident and denouncing such ways to resolve political conflicts. It said Islam rejected such operations. That was their official statement announced in the Brotherhood’s al-Dawa magazine”. This is a rare audio recording from Adnan Uqla. In it he appears to be criticising the Muslim Brotherhood for being too passive in a face of the regime. (Najib al-Ghadban-Syrian National Coalition member’s interview to al Jazeera channel) “The Muslim Brotherhood was targeted in Syria. They were much larger than the Combatant Vanguard. Brotherhood members thought they had the right to self-defence. Differences amongst members helped the regime to

oppress the group”.

The Combatant Vanguard’s ambition was nothing less than an armed uprising. Through mobilising the public, vowed to destroy the regime. Key to their plan was personnel of the regime itself. Slipping under all security measures, the Vanguard recruited a number of insiders from all walks of the armed forces.

In 1980, Mamoun al-Naqqar was the first Syrian Air Force pilot to defect from the military. He sought political asylum in Jordan. (Mamoun al-Naqqar-Former Syrian Air Force Pilot’s interview to al Jazeera channel) “We wanted to continue the momentum and overthrow the regime. Then any Syrian citizen run for office. On 15 September 1980, we were based in Khelekhleh airport in al-Suwayda city. I was a fighter pilot. I had coordinated with the Combatant Vanguard. After taking off from al-Suwayda, I broke radio communication with base and flew straight to Amman airport. The Jordanians were surprised, but they welcomed me”.

Such high profile active defection shook the regime to its core. It brought severe reaction from the hard liners such as Refat al-Assad, the brother of Hafez. He was known as his brother’s shield, commanding a brigade of elite troops.

Chapter 5. Paradoxes of the Arab Spring

5.1 Syrian trap

After the fall of the regime of Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt at the beginning of 2011, and already begun the elimination of the Libyan Jamahiriya with its leader Muammar Gaddafi, Arab Spring continued its march across the Arab world. But its results in other countries were different. Thus, social and political upheaval in Iraq, Jordan, and Bahrain couldn't lead to the collapse of their regimes. However, in these three states anti-government demonstrations in general were extinguished gradually (in Bahrain, however, it has been provided by armoured vehicles of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)). But in Syria and Yemen, the conflict took a protracted nature, and the regime still survived in Syria and Yemen in the end.

5.2 The reasons for the Syrian crisis and its specifics

There were some reasons for the crisis in Syrian society in the past of which we mentioned in Chapter 4: too long being in power Bashar al-Assad (taking into account actual transmission of this power to him from his father), corruption, injustice, the increase in the jobless educated youth, the deterioration of socio-economic status, and more. But a number of important causes lay already in the demographic structure of the population of Syria, and the current system of resource allocation and benefits. The total population of Syria in 2011 amounted to

approximately 22 million people [World Bank 2014; 2015]. Among ethnic groups Arabs make up more than 90%, the Kurds – about 10% the rest falls on the Turkmens, Armenians, people from the North Caucasus ("Circassians"), Assyrians, etc .; among religious groups of Muslims constitute 87%¹¹, of which the vast number – the Sunnis (70%), and other Muslim and semi-Muslim denominations – about 14–15%, including Alawites which possess a very small fraction of present day Syria and close to them in terms of modern Syrian Twelver Shiites and Ismailis; Christian denominations, among which are dominated by Orthodox and Jacobites, in the order of 10%, there are also Druze – about 3% [World Bank 2014;2015].

With linear look at these statistics it is no doubt that the Sunni Arabs have dominant position in ethno-confessional picture of the country, but a dominant position of political, economic and military structure taken by Minority group of Arab Alawites. This suggests it is the logical conclusion that the protest movement must be inevitably led by the Sunni Arabs as representatives of ethno-confessional majority that, in fact, was already on the first stages of the political process in 2011. But then situation influenced by other factors, including Kurdish.

The difficult situation in Syria was not in the least due to the powerful information campaign against the Regime of this country launched by the West and the six Arab countries on a scale that does not yield to

¹¹ If, of course, be regarded as a trend alavizm Shiism rather than as an independent religion, stand out from Islam [see, for example: Friedman 2010].

previous information pressure on Libya. In the course there were disinformation and the direct manipulation of the facts on a large scale, Intimidation, hysteria, etc. [see .: Al Qallab 2014; Jego 2013; Dede 2012]. Bashar al-Assad's regime, already unpopular by monarchs of Gulf (confirmation of this was the League of Arab States Summit, held in March 2008 in Damascus and boycotted almost half of the Member States), following widely covered events in 2011 has become even more enemies. To their ranks joined the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated forces, won the first after Arab Spring parliamentary elections in Tunisia and Egypt¹², as well the Libyan National Transitional Council, which received pressure from local Islamists opposing Syrian Regime and Western sponsors of the Libyan revolutionaries.

The opponents of President al-Assad focused on Syrian traditional problems seriously aggravated in the last few years. This is an increase of (by some estimates up to 15%)Kurdish minority due to the influx of refugees from Turkey and Iraq, the political "awakening" of the Druze sect in the south and increasingly hostile Turkey, trying to replace the Iranian influence in Damascus. Furthermore, in the beginning of twenty first century new deep factors in this the country declared themselves pulling Syrian society for radical changes.

Being for decades an ally of the Soviet Union, Syria was a socially

12 Position of the official Cairo has changed remarkably after the "anti-Muslim Brotherhood" coup²⁰¹³ and the coming to power of the military, led by Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi.

oriented state, adopted the Soviet model of economic planning. The accumulation of financial resources went mainly due to external factors: the economic and military support from the USSR side and the Arab oil to support the so-called "Arab solidarity", only from 1975 to 1980 ensured country inflow of \$ 4 billion, stimulated normal economic growth. However, the level of domestic savings then it constituted only 12% at a rate of 25% [World Bank 2012], and endemic corruption did not allow most of the "external money "work for the Syrian economy [Transparency International 2013].

It formed a strong dependence from foreign capital in those years of the Syrians, due to which, after the fall in oil prices, resulted in a reduction in financial aid under "Arab solidarity" and the collapse of the USSR the country was not prepared for independent economic model. Former Syrian President Hafez al-Assad was constantly looking for new external resources that can provide economic growth, but his efforts did not bring tangible results. With coming of young president Bashar al-Assad to power in 2000, looking for new strategy became more intense. New economic policy provided, sought to particularly reduction of governmental role in regulating the economy, introduction of market base economics, the rejection of many of the social obligations of the state. As part of this policy state subsidies for bread, rice, corn and other food products were phased out. Social situation deteriorated particularly sharply after the abolition in early 2000s subsidies for fuel oil: it led to a sharp rise in price and 4% drop in industrial production and a tangible decline in living standards of the

majority of Syrians.

The fact that, unlike other countries of the Arab Spring in Syria the actual decline could be observed before the start of unrest the standard of living of large segments of the population, testifies It should be following fact: despite rapid GDP growth, observed in the country (as, indeed, in all the other Arab African States) in the 2000s. Syria was the only country of Arab Spring, where on the eve of its start there was a decrease of the average life expectancy of the population (in all the rest of these countries, it was recorded in the same period steady growth).

Lack of conformity of the old political system to new economic realities became more obvious.

5.3 The ruling Syrian regime and its support

First of all, it was the al-Assad family and the ruling party "Ba'ath" interested in conservation of the status quo and prevent foreign intervention. As It was already noted above, a significant portion of the country's leadership at the outbreak of social and political tension were Alawites, their influence largely contributed to that the whole Syrian armed forces remained loyal to the regime. Despite the fact that information about the ethno-confessional composition of regular Syrian army today is not so much. Second, the Alawites have historically occupied a fairly high position in the Armed Forces – in any case, from

the time of acquisition of the country's Independence. By 1955, more than half recruited serjeants were Alawites. In contrast, the more affluent Sunnis were less prone to military Service and Politics of Ba'athists' corporatism [Batatu 1999]. By the end of twentieth century Alawites accounted for over 60% of the officer corps of Syrian-regular army. At present the bulk of recruiting force is formed from Sunni, but the Alawites as already mentioned, continue to dominate the composition of officers and occupy key positions [Syria ... 2012].

It should be borne in mind that, despite the many problems in a country's management system, Bashar al-Assad has succeeded to establish a certain balance between the various groups of population, especially ethnic and religious; this is in a multi-religious and multi-ethnic country, as well as the difficult migration situation, it is considered to be one of the important domestic achievements.

However, as we have seen above, the problems accumulated enough so the opposition took advantage of a good opportunity.

Regime of Bashar al-Assad as the regime of his father, has historically relied on power structures. This dependence is the most crucial moment did not allow the Syrian elite to understand that in periods of phase of social and political tension controlling society from a position of strength can become ineffective. There was needed to prepare for bad, especially since a few years before the current crisis, the harbingers of serious challenges for Syrian regime has become a failed state coup, which in 2005 was headed by Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam,

and unfolded in August 2006 confrontation between Israel and the Syrian-backed Lebanese organizations "Hezbollah". The deterioration of the socio-economic position, compounded by total corruption, constantly preheated tension in the society, which by early 2011 had reached apogee. For a social explosion was enough one spark, and it became the news of the events in Egypt.

Anti-government demonstrations and unrest in Syria began on January 26, 2011, i.e. the day after the first scale of protests on the square Al-Tahrir in Egypt like they started in the same way as in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen with an act of self-immolation (with respect to Syria we are talking about the self burning of a resident of the provincial city of Al-Hasaka [Shishkin 2012]). However, anti-government demonstrations up to the mid of March sparked, although it took place in a number of cities, including capital, not widespread. In mid-March, they also have already turned such.

Al-Assad's regime made a serious mistake, too much resolution on enforcement by resorting to forceful suppression of the rebellion. From anti-governmental performances in the Arab world in 2011, and especially from the experience of Tunisia and Egypt, the Syrian government should have taken an important lesson: the use of force not in time is just capable of harassing counterproductive effect. By limiting the power action only three months after the start of demonstrations, regime therefore lost a lot of time and committed themselves to a protracted exit from the crisis. At this point the Syrian Special Forces

have already perceived in people's mind as the worst enemy of the civilian population. Discredited itself, Syrian special services were in a vulnerable position, which oppositionists did not fail take advantage of them with a very cynical act, using the old method – a provocative murder of their own sides¹³. Thus, according to the Secretary of National Committee Association of Syrian Communists Kadri Jamil, which is one of the representatives determined inside opposition on the side of the opponents of the regime worked special sniper team, firing on their own participants of anti-governmental demonstrations. The operation of such an arrow was always captured by his partner-operator, and the video of the murder immediately spread in the Internet with the comment claiming of it's been done by security forces. By the way, not only foreign media paid attention to this fact, but some Syrian opposition too [see Borovikova .: 2012].

However, the Syrian regime was strong enough, despite the pressure inside and outside.

For a while, one of the factors of its relative strength served no presence in the country of any pronounced opposition area. Benghazi and Ajdabiya were port cities, where ships of Transitional national allies Council (NTC) of Libya could enter directly, besides from

13 This method of excitation of hatred to the government with an amazing similarity even in the tackle used in a variety of countries, regions and periods: from Lithuania in 1991 to Kiev in 2014 [see .: Isayev, Shishkin 2014b]. And this cannot but suggest that revolutionary performances these directors attended the same school.

neighbouring Egypt, in a state of post-revolutionary turmoil, showed full support to the rebels of Cyrenaica. In the case of a Syria, its neighbours Lebanon and Iraq, which borders the province of Homs, to date, supports al-Assad's regime that makes it difficult to open the supply of weapons. Daraa, being non large provincial town with a population of 60 thousand simply unable to become a centre of resistance like Benghazi, the second capital of Libya. Radically-minded opposition, located outside Syria, mainly in Istanbul, tried to influence the situation from the outside, sending its militants. However a chance to shake as a monolithic regime as Syrian, it was not too high, especially if we take into attention the power of the Syrian army, considered to be one of the the strongest in the Arab world.

Also note that since the beginning of anti-government demonstrations in March 2011 Syrian elite maintained monoliths and integrity. There was not a single Syrian diplomat, which would betray the country's leadership. In the ranks of the Syrian army no observed cases of mass desertion. Even inside Syrian opposition continues to insist on the resolution of socially-political conflicts exclusively through negotiations and reforms.

It should also be borne in mind that the majority of the population of Syria for a long period continued to support President and his party, especially after the lifting of a state of emergency and the abolition of press censorship, and promises to give up the leading role of the Ba'ath Party and hold free elections.

It is noteworthy that the Syrian youth as a whole, especially in the university environment had pro-government sentiments and took active participation in demonstrations in support of the regime of Bashar al-Assad. It is likely that an important role against opposition sentiments in this case played National Union of Syrian Students (al-Ittihad al-watani li-t-Talabasuriyyin) – a very large-scale organization, possessing significant resources and enjoying authority among students. In addition, the statements of the leaders of the most major universities – Damascus, Aleppo, Tishreen and others about 95% of the teaching staff they were somehow related to the Ba'ath Party in power.

5.4 The main forces of the Syrian conflict

The ruling regime as an actor in Syrian conflict has already been discussed above. The study of other major actors in the Syrian opposition to start from the position of the Kurdish population, which explains a lot in the situation in Syria and policies of neighbours, especially Turkey, and then we will look the so-called determined opposition, external enemies and external allies.

5.4.1 Kurds

The situation of the Kurdish minority is ambiguous. Its population in Syria, as noted above, strongly grew in recent years. By compared with other ethnic and religious groups Kurds did not actively participate in

national demonstrations. This is explained by the fact that the Syrian opposition is maintained by Turkey. Fearing a drastic change of the country's leadership and the establishment of the dictatorship to patronize the Turks, the Kurds of Syria they prefer to put up with the current state of affairs, staying away from large-scale manifestations of discontent. In addition, they almost are not represented in the National Assembly of Syria. According to the leader of the Syrian-Kurdish party "Yekiti" (Democratic Union) Hassan Saleh, in areas densely populated by Kurds are subjected to less harassment than in Arab areas, but from time to time activists get arrested [Erlich 2011]. One of the explanation of this fact can serve as a fact that Kurds, before the arrival of waves of refugees in the region constituted 10.8% from nearly 23 million population of Syria, settled mainly in the north-eastern part of the country, which is strategically important for Syrian government: location of limited oil reserves.

National Movement Syrian Kurdish parties, consisting of Twelve parties ignored the summit of the Syrian opposition, held in Antalya, Turkey at the end of May 2011. It argued with a fact that any such meeting only hurt Syria's Kurdish population, since Turkey harshly and systematically suppress any political and social aspirations of the Kurds. The representative of the Kurdish Left Party Saleh Kado approved that the Kurds living in Syria, strongly do not trust Turkey and its policies, that was the reason to boycott the summit [Shikhani 2011].

In addition, since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Bashar al-Assad

took a course of rapprochement with the Kurds. In particular, in April 2011 presidential decree granting issued Syrian citizenship to the Kurds living in the north-eastern provinces of Al-Hasaka. Thus the Kurds has been given an important signal about the readiness of the regime to follow the path of further expansion of their rights towards autonomy. After that, the balance in the Kurdish public opinion, swaying between the regime and the opposition, swung toward cooperation with the regime. Proof of this was the August 2011 meeting of the opposition in Istanbul (which ended in the establishment of the Syrian National Council), which only two Kurdish parties took part.

5.4.2 Domestic opponents of the Assad regime

This is internal opposition¹⁴, requiring social and politicalre form, amending the constitution, the release of political prisoners, and others. Conditional core of the Syrian internal opposition is the Coordination Council for democratical changes (Hay'attansik al-al-uataniyya Do-t-tagyir ad-dimukratiyy), promotes peaceful protests like the only possible tool to overthrow the current regime and denies any possibility

¹⁴ It's needed to divide the opposition in Syria to systemic and non-systemic, or patriotic and unpatriotic. The first group should be classified as Syrian internal organizations acting for the resolution of the situation in the country through negotiation, without intervention from the outside (for example, the Communist Party of Syria), while the second owned structures, insisting on the support of external forces, among which include the Free Syrian Army and the Council of National Salvation.

of foreign intervention in Syria's affairs [Foreign Policy 2011]. Integrity of Coordination Council in these matters did not allow it to establish a dialogue with the so-called non-systemic opposition in the face of Syrian National Council (Majlis al-al-al-uataniyy Suriy) and the free Syrian army, which positively evaluated prospective introduction of no-fly zone over Syria, and so on

A characteristic feature of the internal opposition in Syria is its extreme heterogeneity and lack of indisputable leaders able to clearly articulate the requirements regime's opponents, defend its interests and thus to engage in productive dialogue with representatives of the regime. By the way, at the beginning of May 2011 the authorities of the country decided to start talks with the opposition, finding negotiators among demonstrators was engaged presidential adviser of Bashar al-Assad Buseyna Shaaban, but these attempts were not successful. However, the fragmentation and the lack of a single centre gave them sometimes success of the opposition forces, allowing them to stay mobile and practically invulnerable movement.

5.4.3 International opposition

International opposition stood firm to the president's resignation, the descent of the cabinet, accepting a new constitution, creating a National Transitional Government. The most noticeable component of the external opposition in Syria has become the so-called Free Syrian Army - organization headquartered in Turkey, which takes in the numbers of military deserters [White 2011] and is supported by the

"Muslim Brotherhood". Free Syrian Army attacked on the army units, police stations and so on. , giving considerations to characterize it as a network of armed groups with terrorist leaning.

On July 17, 2011 in Turkey was formed opposition of Syrian National Council, which held its first meeting in Istanbul. The Council includes representatives of Islamic and liberal movements, as well as independent candidates – a total of 25 people. Syrian National Council got acknowledgement by France, Spain and Libya: in November 2011 Alain Jupp, the French foreign minister said, that the organization is a legitimate partner in transition dialogues [Rettman 2011] and members of the Transitional Council of Libya acknowledged them as the sole legitimate government Syria [New Libyan ... 2011].

5.4.4 The Islamists

One of the most influential components of the Syrian opposition from the very beginning of the crisis were the Islamists. In mid-2012 there was the first surprise factor in the character of Syrian conflict, which soon put the question all the strategic line of action external to the its forces. Already in the course of the battle for Aleppo revealed that the leading force in the clashes was not Free Syrian Army (FSA), but unknown organization "Jabhat al-Nusra." Its forces began to grow rapidly, and about a dozen other Islamist oriented organizations joined it which has operated earlier under the auspices of the FSA. Therefore, by the end of 2012, at which the creation of unified political forces of

the Syrian opposition was scheduled, supported by Arab and Western countries with military support in the FSA in Syria, the latter has lost its role of leading powers, and in its place popped "Jabhat al-Nusra."

5.4.5 External opponents of the regime of al-Assad

Those are The United States and the country's of "Arabian Six" (as well as Turkey and Israel), insisting the President's resignation, the dissolution of Cabinet of Ministers of and focused on the extrusion of Russian influence from the region, an opportunity to influence on Iran, to drop Alawite regime of al-Assad, and so on.

One of the important events of the midsummer 2011, the United States' clearly demonstrating position regarding Syria was attacked by demonstrators supporting Bashar al-Assad on the US and French embassies in Damascus. The conflict has led to the fact that the US Embassy in Syria has been closed, and Ambassador Robert Ford left the country [Sharp 2012]. Dissatisfaction of pro-government demonstrators was caused by the fact that France and the United States officially supported Syrian opposition, repeatedly visited the troubled cities, conducted a meeting with the opposition and, according to some witnesses, supplied them with arms and means of satellite communication [Protesters ... 2011]. Leaders of those countries called for the most severe measures against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, and President Barack Obama expressed his admiration for the courage of oppositional demonstrators [Expert Online 2011].

Very revealing is the behaviour of the representatives of The United States during the discussion of the UN resolutions on Syria, October 5, 2011 and February 4, 2012, after the imposition of veto by Russia and China. So, the official response of the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton of the United States on the final decision of the UN Security Council was following: "Countries that continue to supply the regime of Bashar al-Assad with gun that fired on innocent men, women and children, should think hard about what they are doing. These countries took the wrong side in terms of history. In that dispute they protect not those who should be protected "[Clinton: Russia... 2011].

The situation is further complicated when, on 21 August 2013 in a number of Western and Arab media reported on use of chemical weapons in the suburbs of Damascus [Benkorich 2013; Shachtman in 2013; Nuriyeva 2013]. Western countries put full responsibility for what happened on the Syrian regime. The President Barack Obama on August 30 declared the possibility of a military strike against Syria after September 9. It should be mentioned that that time's Turkish Prime Minister RejebTayyib Erdogan called on US not to limit air strikes and organize military offensive. The concentration of American military-naval forces in the Mediterranean had begun. Willingness to support the US military operation was expressed by France (albeit, Germany and the United Kingdom abstained from such support).

Thus, there was a real danger of internationalization of the conflict by scenario, close to the Libyan, or even with the threat of a more direct

and intense participation in it The US and some of its allies.

However, the escalation of the conflict has been avoided in the first of place, thanks to the positions of Russia and the personal negotiations between Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama during the G-20 summit in St. Petersburg in September 2013, with the result that it became possible to unblock the situation by agreeing to Syrian government on the elimination of chemical weapons.

Despite the fact that in most Arab countries initially anti Assad mood prevailed, yet the position of the League of Arab States was far from consensus. One side, the Economic and Social Affairs of the Arab League Council States in November 2011 developed a package of sanctions, in accordance with which the freezing of financial operations with the Central Bank of Syria and introduced some restrictions on the entry of high-ranking Syrian bureaucrats in other Arab countries. The Foreign Ministers of the Arab League also took the decision to suspend Syria's membership in League Council [Syria forms ... 2012]. However, by the end of 2011 came the first disagreements among the members of the League. Thus, two weeks after the start of work on the Arab League observers in Syria December 2011 Arab diplomats have started to report arguable details of the situation in the country. Moreover, among observers, in fact, there was a split. While some characterised local situation as a full-fledged civil war that requires urgent intervention of the international community, others stopped demonizing the Syrian regime, declaring the need for talks with the Syrian

president and the laying responsibility for civilian casualties and the governmental troops and the soldiers of the Free Syrian Army.

5.4.6 Allies of the regime among the Arab states

In general, it is worth noting that since the beginning of the Arab Spring, al-Assad's regime enjoyed the support of four Arab countries: Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine and Algeria, and the position of each of them had a good reason. Iraq and Lebanon, for example, wanted to prevent the outbreak of Civil War at their own borders. This is especially significant for Lebanon, which traditionally experiences a high degree of dependence on Syria. Meanwhile, a further expansion of the Civil War due to the fall of the Syrian regime it seems likely, since Syrian society is very diverse and disunited.

If the regime falls, some religious and ethnic groups will strive for independence (as the Kurds), or usurpation of power in the country, and in this case necessarily conflict spreads to Lebanon, where the supporting al-Assad Shiite Hezbollah remains under attack from all directions: Israel, the Christian Maronites and Sunni Muslims.

Palestine also sees al-Assad as enemy of Israel and fighter for the independence of the Palestinian territories. In fact, the struggle for the proclamation of independence of the Palestinian state always remained one of the key points of foreign policy of Syria. For its part, Algeria supports the first all Syria first because its leader Abdel Aziz

Bouteflika initially took very conservative position in relation to the events of the Arab Spring, criticizing its destructive potential. However, pressure from the Persian Gulf monarchies had influence on its position: several times Algeria abstained in the vote on Syria framework of the Arab League Council.

In addition, Egypt and Yemen's position on the Syrian conflict changed after the revolutions of June 30, 2013 and September 21, 2014, respectively. In the land of the pyramids the power regained by the military, led by Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, is interested in the settlement of the Syrian conflict and turned to building friendly relations with Russia. In South Arabia for the first roles began to emerge Houthis, oriented primarily at Iran and the Russian Federation that identified their position which is fundamental to Moscow and Tehran on Middle East question. But due to the long-range escalation of the conflict in Yemen, today's support for Assad can only be spoken in relation to the authorities in Sana'a.

5.4.7 Other allies.

It is above all Russia, seeking to secure the post of president defending Bashar al-Assad, preventing foreign invasion, strengthening its position in the region, and so on. The key point in the Syrian developments of 2011-2012, the veto of the Russian Federation on the resolution at the UN Security Council on Syria in order to eliminate the likelihood of military intervention in this country and repetition of Libyan scenario.

On February 7, 2012 the meeting of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, during which the latter promised a complex reforms in the country (about the position of Russia at the time and in 2013, see, ex, the Russian Foreign Ministry in 2013 ...). Behind Russia's Syria in 2013; Zhukov 2013). During the same meeting, an agreement concluded to place on the territory of Syria Russian radar detectors, set against the American anti missile system equipment [Isaev 2012b]. Russia's strategic interests in the stabilization of the Syrian crisis due to the fact that Syria is one of the few Russian allies in the Middle East. In addition, support for Syrian nation with whom Russia has developed long-standing and close ties, looked very smart step ahead of the presidential elections in Russia, so the strengthening of the political image of Vladimir Putin as the leader of the country, which "we do not abandon our allies" increased the chances of success in the campaign. Such a step could prevent a split of the elite, especially in the light of the preceding decisions of the Libyan issue. In addition, active support of the countries of the West to Syrian opposition provokes Russian reciprocal support for the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

Russia has repeatedly made it clear that the Syrian issue is fundamental for her. First, the failure in resolution of the Libyan conflict, which led to a complete de stabilization of the country showed the leadership of Russia, which entails consequences irresponsible intervention in conflicts. Even many analogous of policy in Europe have now become aware of this, and the fact that the authoritarian regimes

preserve the stability in the region. "First of all we need to strengthen the existing security measures and refuse any indulgence of radical Islamism, even if our friends and allies in the Persian Gulf funding them. In the long term perspective it is necessary to refrain from new military adventures against such authoritarian regimes, because overthrowing them will only generate chaos "- writes, for example, F. Balanchy [Balanche 2012].. Second, Western wide support for Russian non-systemic opposition pushes Putin's response to the principled in external issues, one of which was a Syrian. It is obvious that the Russian leadership will continue to hinder any external intervention in what it considers Syria's internal affairs. Finally, thirdly, the Russian Federation has other strategic interests in Syria. In particular, marine port Tartous is the only one left in the Mediterranean, where the no barrier entrance allowed to Russian warships; besides, on the territory of Syria is the location of only military base in the Middle East. In September 2015 Russian support of the regime of al-Assad has moved to a new level. In this regard, it should be mentioned that President Vladimir Putin's speech at UN on September 28, 2015, in which he confirmed that Russia still considers President Bashar al-Assad the only legitimate president of Syria, and said that Russia is ready to provide his regime with military-technical assistance in the fight against 'Islamic state'(IS) terrorist group. Finally, at the request of Syrian government, Russian Federation began air strikes on the positions of the IS at end of September 2015. However, there is a risk that for various reasons, missile and bomb strikes well and also may

affect the position of the Syrian non-Islamist oppositions.

5.5 Development of the Syrian internal conflict and its transformation to a trap

As we have said, the growth of tension in Syria and escalating protests in conflict with internal violence began on March 15, 2011 can be mentioned events in the town of Daraa bordering with Jordan, where the rebels almost captured the city and held it for two months. These events stirred up the whole country. Almost immediately after the beginning of the uprising erupted in mass disturbances in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and a number of other cities and districts of the country. The sharp reaction of the governmental forces to the demonstration, including executions of the demonstrators, only exacerbated the confrontation between the opposition and the government, which is amplified, then it subsided within a few months. Thus, in early June, about 3 million people attended the protests across the country [Korotaev, Isaev, Shishkin 2013]. They began to sound increasingly for a change of political regime. At the same time supporters of President al-Assad intensified. Beginning in April–May in Damascus, Tartous and other cities they held demonstrations in support of Bashar al-Assad and they had too massive character [Isaev, Shishkin 2012b], which indicated the presence in country's major base of support for regime. There started manoeuvres to mitigate the conflict by the government. Already at the end of March was dismissed the cabinet, who had practically ruled the country since 2003, and in its

new composition entered including representatives of the moderate opposition and the left liberal. Following this the emergency mode was cancelled, a number of political prisoners were released from prison, and many provincial governors were displaced. The president even considered to recognize the truth of the Protesters' demands to apologize to the families of the victims that was almost unprecedented in practice of authoritarian rulers in the Middle East. These measures were aimed at enhancing the socio-political base of the regime and at the same time to promote the disengagement determined in the ranks position to at least neutralize its moderate part, and in the best case – to incline them to the side of the regime. Not immediately, but gradually these measures began to bear fruit (but, as it became clear later, this too turned out to be completely insufficient to denote the exit from the trap).

Especially it became obvious in 2012, when in fact, began a new phase of the conflict, giving it a number of fundamentally other features and other exiting (although this period is still very relatively) of the Syrian national framework character. During the truce, which began on April 12, 2012, the Syrian government managed to make an important step towards the internal consolidation. On May 8, parliament elections were held for the first time after Ba'athists came to power in 1963 which were carried out on alternative of multi-party basis. Despite the magnitude of the internal conflict, more than 50% of voters took part in them. Victory of the National Unity Party bloc in election, headed by the "Ba'ath ", as well as the conduct of the election itself and the

percentage of participation in them voters have strengthened the legitimacy of the regime on inside politic field, which, however, has not meant a change in the course of the Civil War, however, strengthened the faith of the regime and its supporters in such a possibility.

On the other hand, in 2012, due to military assistance to Syrian opposition, as well as a number of mistakes of al-Assad oppositions managed to achieve significant military successes. Not surprisingly, in the mid-2012 was considered by armed opposition forces and their Arab and Western supporters as a resolutely turning point in their favour, heralding the imminent collapse of the existing regime. Indeed, in July fights went on the streets of Damascus, and in the beginning of August, the rebels managed to occupy a significant part of the north of the capital Aleppo [seemore info: Siruk 2012; Nasr 2012b; Secker, Russell 2012].

However, in the first half of 2013, Bashar al-Assad still managed to break the opposition in Syria, in its favour, in result not only domestic but also the international situation began to take shape in favour of the current government. At first, internally on a number of fronts, the regime managed to press opposition forces, and the victory in her most notorious radical Islamist-local forces associated with 'Al-Qaeda', put under question further opportunity to support these opposition forces on the part of not only the West, but also the Arab regimes.

Secondly, at regional level started practical forming of Shiite axis, not only in the form of direct entering of Hezbollah on the side of the

Syrian regime, but also by means began military-political support for it from Tehran that would hardly be possible without the tacit participation of the Iraqi regime led by Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. In addition, it became quite obvious and common Kurdish consensus in the form of a formal positive neutrality in relation with Syrian regime, including military political support provided by the Iraqi and Turkish Kurds to their Syrian brethren, which also benefited the Syrian regime, and not any of the armed opposition fractions.

But in the second half of 2013, in the foreground, in addition to purely Syrian in origin Jabhatal-Nusra there appeared militants prior to this generally in the Iraqi province of Al Anbar and to carry out acts of terrorism practically throughout Iraq. The organization is called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This organization was created in April 2013 on the basis of the Iraqi branch of Al-Qaeda, active in the country for over a decade now declared itself like structure, carrying direct threat to the existence of two national states.

At the turn of 2013-2014 folding environment in the region, seemed to portend a general development of further developments in a gain of opposition through Sunni-Shiite confrontation, with a margin in favour of the Shiites.

In favour of this it seemed to indicate and events developing in the first months of 2014 clashes between Jabhatal-Nusra and ISIL weakening the overall capacity of Sunni radicals who fought in Syria, and allowed armed forces of the Syrian regime to develop a successful

offensive on their positions. The relative success of ISIL in the confrontation with their radical rivals was also on hand of Syria and the Iraqi regime, the more that the leadership of Al-Qaeda are presented by Ayman al-Zawahiri expressed in this confrontation supported Jabhatal-Nusra, recognizing it as its only legitimate branch in Syria, at the same time declined in a similar status of ISIL.

With sufficient coordination between the leadership of Syria and Iraq, created the conditions for the application of their joint first decisive strike primarily on ISIL, which could contribute to achieve strategic advantage in operation with radical Islamists in both countries. However, this did not happen, and ISIL's victory over Jabhatal-Nusra and following the establishment of a caliphate on the territory seized by the Islamists in Syria and Iraq has created a fundamentally new situation in region.

After creation of the 'Islamic state' final conflict enforcement stepped in unclearness. Thus, the regional conflict has truly become multi-dimensional nature of that significantly increases the risks of further proliferation in the direction to any of the countries located here. At the same time increase escalating risks of any serious internal conflicts to a new region-wide component.

The Syrian conflict has turned into a political dead end, to be clear, not just a regional but a global scale. First, opposing forces inside Syria they themselves have no clear advantage, the war goes to attrition. But this exhaustion does not affect the belligerents, but the state in general.

Secondly, in the conflict directly intervened several neighbouring countries, they represent with no obvious purpose. Third, as a result of weakening of the regime of al-Assad new players have come out. This is Kurds, Turkey is very concerned of their gain of their own state which can further blow Greater Middle East. Fourth, with the emergence and intensification of the Islamic state actually formed the Iraqi-Syrian impasse with Kurdish 'surprise'. And this node includes Turkey, Lebanon(And in particular the Shia "Hezbollah"), Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, in one way or another Gulf States, even partially Israel, now also Russia and a number of other players. Fifth, despite the ever-increasing danger of Islamic State, policy towards this monster from the US, Europe, Saudi Arabia and other major forces have no difference in sequence. It seems that to some extent IS is being secretly patronized. At the same time it is obvious that it is unlikely to winit without an alliance with the regime of al-Assad. However, the United States, the Gulf States and Israel still see al-Assad a sworn enemy for them. Perhaps they hope that they will be able to first overthrow al-Assad, and then neutralize the terrorists of Islamic State. This is a dangerous illusion. But before the election for President of the United States in 2016 it is unlikely to venture to declare any recognition of al-Assad, the more so because it requires additional agreement with Russia. However, the activation of Russia's politics in Syria still made John. Kerry, the head of state of US claim that the United States did not insist on the immediate overthrow of al-Assad (though they cannot overthrow him).

There are a number of contradictions in the Syrian-Iraqi complex. The way out of it would only be fair and constructive attempt to find the world's largest players' consensus, the objectives of which would be to stabilize the situation of the Civil War and the establishment of a powerful comprehensive coalition that includes not only the United States and their allies, but also countries such as Russia and Iran (in building such a coalition there are proposals of Vladimir Putin). Even in this case, reconcile warring parties and different countries in the region would be extremely difficult. But given the reluctance of the United States and the West to abandon the manic idea of "toppling al-Assad (And thus create more chaos and conflict in the region) progress of this stalemate is not visible yet.

* * *

Syrian trap today - it's not just an insoluble knot of contradictions within the same country or even the region. It is, in fact, the World's trap, which demonstrates the futility of the course of The United States and the West to strengthen the confrontation with Russia and regional governmental powers to undermine the stability for the sake of illusory benefit, a policy which ignores the interests of many countries and their legitimate desire to live differently than anything the West. This is a dead end, which demonstrates that any flirtation with radical Islamists or attempts coercive pressure on them is not productive. In contrast, all provides additional strength to radicals. A short, but colourful history of the Arab spring, reborn in Autumn (as well as the Iraqi tragedy, which

lasts for more than ten years), shows that the most effective deterrent force and a barrier against the spread of radical Islamism was just authoritarian secular regimes, against whom wave of radical revolution was directed. In this way, out of the Syrian impasse, as well as from the Middle East deadlock to find a compromise of interests, establishing the most stable regimes in all the countries where they therefore staggered, as well as support for those regimes that succeeded themselves to establish order in their countries.



Chapter 6. Conclusion

6.1 The surprises and contradictions of Middle Eastern Crisis

The Middle East, as we have said – it is a region that is for decades is the focus of the entire international society and not just because it is restless and conflict. It always presents such 'surprises' and turning points which, significantly affect the world. It is not surprising, for here are closely intertwined global geopolitical interests and regional powers, the largest energy reserves allow to influence the level of prices on them, and acute manifestations religious bigotry creates a breeding ground for terrorists. If we add to this the creation of outstanding issues of national states (Kurds, Palestinians), unformed nation, diversity of ethnic and confessional composition of the population in many countries, enormous wealth concentrated in certain centres, huge weapons purchases and much more, then the picture appears more vivid and disturbing.

Although much has been said in this paper about the many sharp changes, turns and 'surprises' that occurred in Syria in recent years, however still worth to stay on some issues, especially since many of them confirmed putting forward the concept that the events of the Arab Spring (As well as the events that followed it) is the start of reconfiguration of the World System.

First of all, it must be pointed out that all these years the US policy constantly varied in various aspects, so detection of a clear logic in it

is difficult, however we try to formulate possible conclusions (analysis of US policy in the modern period, See: Grinin 2015b). First, in general we can say that the United States took course to reduce its direct involvement in the conflict in the result of which they withdrew their main forces from Afghanistan and Iraq. This suggests the possibility that the United States' waging war is reducing¹⁵. But attempts to build the charter on their regimes in these countries have not given the desired results. Military capabilities and the success of these regimes are clearly not justified given expectations. As a result, "America was forced deeper immerse herself in the Middle East "[TolGonyul 2015].

Second, the withdrawal does not mean that the US wants to shorten the extent of their influence in the region. It seems on the contrary, they try to use the methods of internal anti-inflation controversies, inspiring conflict, aid to opposition groups to overthrow stable regimes. Apparently, some members of the American political elite suggest that in the chaos as a result of the overthrow of the legitimate rulers (as in Libya or Syria) and the balkanizing the countries, they will implement its global policy easier.

Third, the United States began to actively use various forces to weaken the regimes that they are not pleased with, or for their own purposes.

Fourth, they probably believe that a policy of 'Divide and control', when trying to counter some other countries to each other (notably Iran

15 United States "instead of" trying to expand the number and geography of local operations with the help of drone bombing targets, and groups for special purposes, which in flagrant violation of the sovereignty of the majority of countries in the world. According to the latest activities of such groups in 2014 affected some 150 countries [Turse 2015].

- Israel and Saudi Arabia). However, to understand the meaning and purpose of this policy is quite difficult but one thing is clear - the US is trying to weaken the most regimes that are not controlled by them fully and then, they often seek to achieve their goals at any cost, even possible deterioration of relations with allies.

As a result, US policy seems sufficiently contradictory, even their interaction with allies is very selfish. They try not to take any constant obligations and act on momentary at the same time believing that all countries will be happy to cooperate with them in any area and at any time when the US wishes to. All this looks very arrogant and not far-sighted, and shows, on the one hand, the fall of the professionalism in foreign policy [Freeman, 2015], and on the other hand - that the US elite falls into the illusion of its super powerfulness¹⁶. In general, this leads only to increased chaos and emergence forces that no one is able to control. As a result, the United States may squander their power more quickly, than in the case of a balanced and realistic approach (see. About it from the opinion of the Ukrainian crisis of Cohen [Smith 2015]). In addition, ill-conceived attempts to use the most developed forces liberate the political ambitions of regional governmental leaders, such as Saudi Arabia, that they start their own aggressive game (as in the case of Saudi intervention in Yemen) [see, ex., TolGonyul 2015].

16 Nehru [1977 m 1: 82]. Recalling another Herodotus, on a similar occasion, wrote "In the history of nations there are three stages: the success, the consequences of success - arrogance and unfairness, and then, as their consequence - the fall."

In the papers repeatedly voiced in the history of journalism that in the second half of the 1980s American President and the King of Saudi Arabia agreed to increase oil production by Saudis, which ultimately led to a sharp drop in oil prices in 1986 and aggravation of economic problems in the Soviet Union (which contributed to its collapse). This can be little doubting, in any event not just set the true proportion between objective and subjective factors of falling oil prices. Similarly, we can talk about possible agreements in the second half of 2014 between Barack Obama and King Abdullah on the violations in oil prices, to create economic chaos in the unruly Russia (and also in Venezuela, which failed to make 'Colour revolution', and some other oil producing countries). If so, then it seems that the US policy, figuratively speaking, is that, in order to release the genie out of the bottle by directly governmental specific task, is not infinite resting on the fact that as a result of this "genie" will become uncontrolled and can do a lot of ills. Anyway, once there was a sharp turnaround in the oil story, and falling prices of oil has affected the whole world. The consequences of this are not yet clear. The probability of this turn means down of OPEC, the most powerful cartel of developing countries. The drop in oil prices caused a strong change, associated with the situation in many countries, including also US oil industry. Playing with the oil prices, which will lead The United States, along with the Saudis and the Persian Gulf countries (but at the same time against each other), and continues threaten with major changes. It suddenly made Iran centre of attention. At the same time it is possible that the Arab

countries of Gulf outsmarted the US, weakening the prospects of shale oil production [see, for example: Doan 2015].

Another turn is not so dramatic, but it is also very important– Israel's transformation into a provincial point of the Greater Middle East. The events in this area pales in comparison with others. Of course, Israel does not like it very much, as it does not like, that the United States began to be more interested in Iran than Israel either.

In Israel, Obama's rating is falling. Charges figurative one another flash in the local press: "Obama against Israel" [Nepomnyashchii 2015]; "Obama throws Israel under the wheels of the Middle East bus" [Kahan 2015]; Obama "allow Iran to gain strength, moves the "Muslim Brotherhood" forward, adheres to the anti-Semitic views and adopt radical Islam "[Glick 2015].

Another metamorphosis that occurred as a result of unthoughtful American policy, linked to Iran. Despite all sanctions and pressure on the country, the desperate desire of Saudis to weaken Iran, it seems that the position of the latter was strengthened. Iran was unexpectedly needed for the United States and Europe. Iran is needed so much that the United States is ready to spoil relationships with reliable allies [see, ex., TolGonyul 2015]. Perhaps the analysts were right who believe that Iran is needed for The United States as an instrument of weakening energy power of Russia [Whitney 2015a; 2015b]. Obviously, as the US and European sanctions against Iran, as well as close to the approval of agreement between Iran and the United States with respect to their allies related to Iran's nuclear program is not based on a true threat,

and the United States agreed non-stop desire to disarm those whom they perceive as enemies of the West; enemies who determined by single lines, – those who reject hegemony of US, rightly believes George. Hertler [2015]¹⁷. But the problem is that America is constantly changing her enemies and betrayed (Or makes suicidal steps to do) those whom she considered allies (like Mubarak). Hence, the chaos grew from here.

Endless change of US foreign policy dramatically exacerbate instability in the Middle East, trying to extinguish a fire with kerosene (such as an attempt to put pressure on Russia by lifting the sanctions on Iran, and Iraq's problem addressed by attempts to overthrow the Turkish leader Erdogan and so on...) such examples lead to a randomization of an even greater extent.

In any case, the US policy does not look any forward-looking or prudent. Undoubtedly, Washington made a big mistake, excessively and even dramatically expand the horizons of their external interest, whereby it turned United States at the centre of irrational wars and crises [The Nation ... 2015].

But, it's probably one of the manifestations of change, 'the era of new coalitions', the first phase of which is associated with randomization, attempts to change conflicted situation [see. more info: Grinin 2009a; 2012v; 2013a; Grinin, Korotaev 2009a; 2012b; Grinin, Korotayev 2010b; 2015].

¹⁷ He also adds that if the country disarm remain little factors constraining the West from indulging his predatory instincts, no matter where he saw to the impact opportunities. In fact, it is never discussed [Hertler 2015].

Within the framework of these features of US foreign policy also, worth noting the change of attitude towards the Kurdish problem. Again, the United States is trying to act against her allies, particularly Turkey, to which she often become treating it not like an allied state.

'Islamic state' (IS, ISIL) – one of the most unpleasant surprises of Greater Middle East. Speaking of Berdyaev's law: "All revolutions end with reactions." However, extending this law, we can say that any intervention also often ends with reactions. That is why we can assume that ISIL – a reaction to the intervention of the West and the United States.

Around the 'Islamic state' there are a lot of hype and conspiracy theories. But the assertion that it is the active US aid to Syrian opposition (along with other factors such as abandoned officers of Saddam's army) significantly helped the formation of this organization, also, seems very similar to the truth [see.: Cronin 2015]. Anyways, the Islamic State with its monstrous radicalism attracts a huge number of volunteers from different countries, while in the western countries forming a fifth column of radicalized Muslims. According to US intelligence estimates, about 15 thousand foreigners from 80 countries have arrived in the region to join the ranks of ISIL with an average up to a thousand men a month [see.: Cronin 2015].

The experts from various countries have warned that the impact of IS can and most likely will continue to grow, as the strength of the movement is 'attractive for calling for many accompanied resistivity against world of oppression and injustice' in Middle Eastern countries

itself, and western. So there is a chance for ISIL to become a global movement [Strokan 2015]. On the other hand, this danger brings former enemies together. For example, in Syria thousands of Iranian and Iraqi troops coming aimed to support the armed forces in the fight against the Islamic state to protect Damascus. In addition, ISIL could radicalise Islamic slogans and practices, so there is a possibility of many dissociating from them. The absence of any security guarantees for all countries in the Greater Middle East further strengthens tension, as a result of all feverishly arm and threaten each other.

This region has always (but now can perhaps even to a greater extent) violated international standards that have become habitual acts of revenge and terrorism complemented by displays of aggression, becoming ordinary job (like an unexpected bombing of Yemen), quickly form military coalition, which announces the war against legitimate leaders and at the same time is easy to recognize the overthrow of the legitimate elected president. Here comes – the constant threat of instability. It can be assumed that the change in the international order can start right here in this region with the highest degree of pressure, where the war has become a permanent and terror – the norm.

At the time, we pointed out that the international community's fight alongside with growing US self-interest, not wishing to recognize common interests will be the main intrigue of the global contradictions [Grinin 2005; 2008a; 2009a]. In recent years, especially in connection with Arab Spring (and then to the Ukrainian events), more noticeably confirm this. It is clear that the real purpose of the 'masters of the

universe'– to cope with the decline of the empire. This implies revival strategy of 'divide and control' in Western Asia with the participation of Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel [Escobar, 2015].

All of this is leading to increased US opposition, split of the peace and the creation of new coalitions. According to J. Thomas, 'China, Russia and the rest of the world in the face US threats and boasting, not just fold their banners and agree that it is necessary to listen to the United States. Instead, they will provide an alternative. And they are doing it very well and quickly. Currently US' overrating of its forces not only gives the opportunity to the other powers, it forces them to create a fully an empire' [Thomas 2015].

Thus, to form a new, more adequate global initiative must come primarily by USA. 'Washington needs to rethink its approach. Terminate intervention and antagonism to rebuild relations with the help of trade and mutual trust and accept the inevitability of decline of the empire'– rightly observes M. Whitney [2015a].

The US and Europe are often hard and act aggressively against developing countries, because they feel that it does not apply to them and will not be affected. However, globalization has such nature that events on one side of the world are beginning to rapidly influence the situation in other places. Thus, Libya and ISIL began to influence the situation in Europe and the US. Refugees, hostage-taking, executions, the fight against terrorism made it necessary to involve countries that are in opposition to the West.

Thus, there is a situation that objectively makes a more responsible

attitude to the results of foreign policy and geopolitical stake, but so far that Western countries act as if we live in the nineteenth century, and not in the twenty first century. But in the era of globalization, response to such actions will be fast enough and it may be unexpected.

Distribution of risk of Islamist-terrorist ideology as a result of the collapse of previously stable countries in the region, are most prone to this due to their ethnic and religious characteristics. The terrorist attacks in Tunisia and attacks on checkpoints in the Sinai – that's not a joke...


Most dangerous is the situation in Libya, which becomes the third, after Iraq and Syria, a hotbed of militant Islamism in the Middle East. Here flock Islamist radicals of all countries. More and more is growing danger that the Islamist-radical sphere of influence spread to the regions of Sub-Saharan Africa, up to Mali, Chad, Nigeria, where the radicals 'Boko Haram' and others are already operating there. The West risks of creating a permanent source of terrorism and radicalism in Africa, which will poison lives for decades. And they (the West) will not succeed to sit in their well-being. Measures to control immigration cannot help, but, in fact, do not help if it is seriously discussed of the need to bomb miserable float of illegal immigrants.

If we use the terminology of A. Toynbee [1991], the external proletariat in Asia and Africa, seeping in Europe and America, and become their internal proletariat, which could undermine the stability [see also: Emre 2015]. The United States and the West need to refuse the destruction policy of the states in Greater Middle East and Africa, including the so

called revolutions, and start thinking about how to help strengthen their statehood. After all, the processes of globalization more visibly unite the fate of nations.

* * *

Greater Middle East, of course, is again and again surprising the world. At the same time, in the societies of the region there have been radical changes that will occur sooner or later, though, unfortunately because of the large US geopolitics and radical Islamist organizations, the cost of these changes may be high.



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