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Thesis for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Causes and Consequences of Counter Terrorism Strategy of Pakistan

by

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Department of International and Area Studies

The Graduate School

Pukyong National University

February 2020

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Causes and Consequences of Counter Terrorism Strategy of Pakistan

파키스탄의 대테러 전략의 원인과 결과에 관한

연구

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by

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for the degree of

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February 2020

Causes and Consequences of Counter Terrorism Strategy of Pakistan

A Ph.D. Dissertation


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
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
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
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Dedication

Every challenging task requires self-motivation as well as support of loved ones. This thesis is dedicated to my parents and my beloved wife who always stood beside me to accomplish my dreams.

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They have been my motivation and an inspiration throughout my life, and always supported my dreams and made me ambitious to pursue my dreams for higher studies. I would like to pay my gratitude to them for all they have done for me. My thesis is dedicated to my dear family.



파키스탄의 대테러 전략의 원인과 결과에 관한 연구

요약

본 연구는 미국의 ‘테러와의 전쟁’과 함께 시작된 파키스탄의 대테러 군사전략을 경험주의 방법론과 구성주의적 접근을 통해 연구하였다. 좀 더 구체적으로 말하면, 본 연구는 파키스탄에 ‘부가적인 군사력 기여’를 촉구하는 미국의 대테러 전략이 파키스탄의 군사전략과 양국 간의 관계에 미치는 영향을 분석하고자 하였다. 궁극적으로 본 연구는 파키스탄이 더 나은 대테러 전략을 구축하고, 더 효과적으로 테러의 위협에 대응하기 위한 파키스탄-미국 관계의 방향을 제시하고자 하였다.

미국의 파키스탄에 대한 ‘부가적 군사력 기여’에 대한 연구는 이미 상당히 진행되어 왔지만 본 연구는 파키스탄에서 진행된 각종 설문 조사와 심층 인터뷰와 같은 경험적 연구방법을 통해 파키스탄의 독립적인 군사작전에 중점을 두고 연구를 진행하였다는 점에서 본 연구의 학문적인 기여를 찾을 수 있다. 구체적으로 본 연구는 1 차, 2 차 데이터의 종합적 분석을 통해 진행되었다. 데이터는 임의론 선택된 50 명의 군인, 50 명의 기자, 30 명의 정책 분석가로 구성된 130 명의 응답자의 의견을 바탕으로 하고 있다. 데이터 분석에 따르면, 파키스탄의 군사전략은 테러의 이데올로기화, 테러가 지역에 미치는 영향, 시민들의 정부에 대한 지지, 드론 공격과 같은 여러 가지 요소에

의해서 영향을 받는 것으로 나타났다. 특히, 드론 공격의 증가는 민간인 학살과 자살테러의 증가의 원인이 된 것으로 밝혀졌다. 그리고 파키스탄 정부의 대테러 전략은 낙후된 지역의 시민, 특히 파슈툰족에 의해서도 많은 영향을 받는 것으로 증명되었다. 본 연구는 또한 미국의 파키스탄에 대한 추가적인 군사력 투입 요구가 양국 간의 신뢰를 손상시켰고 파키스탄으로 하여금 중국과 러시아와 가깝게 만들었으며 결과적으로 미국은 파키스탄의 도움을 잃음으로써 아프가니스탄에서 군대를 완전히 철수시키는 것에 어려움을 겪을 것이라고 주장하였다.

본 연구는 대외정책 결정에 있어서의 지역연구의 중요성을 환기시키면서 동시에 다음과 같은 정책적 함의를 제시한다. 먼저, 전쟁으로 이미 황폐해진 아프가니스탄의 유일한 문제 해결책은 대화를 통한 정치적 유대감의 형성이라는 점이다. 또한, 파키스탄과 아프가니스탄의 국경선상의 군사분쟁을 억제하고 평화적 분위기 조성을 위해 철조망과 감시탑 등의 수단을 통해 국경선의 경계를 명확히 하는 것이 중요하다. 그리고 자살테러를 방지하기 위해 과격한 군사 이데올로기와 이슬람에 대한 잘못된 인식을 바로잡은 분위기 조성이 필요하다. 마지막으로, 파키스탄의 정치인들은 알카에다와 같은 테러조직에 대항하기 위해 대화와 협상과 같은 평화적 해결 방식에 대한 국민들의 지지를 이끌어내는 것이 중요하다.

Abstract

This study offers the empirical analysis of the United States counter terrorism strategy and Pakistan's military scheme in war on terror and put forth the argument that the non-conventional military strategy adopted by Pakistani government to vanquish militancy is explained by constructivist approach. Predominantly, the counter-terrorism strategy of the United States was based on military operations, regardless of the strategy of Pakistan which was inconsistent and swinging between peace process and military operations. The purpose of the study is to assess the 'do more' strategy applied by the United States on Pakistan and the response showed by the Islamic state. Moreover, the research not only explains the relations between the United States and Pakistan as a result of 'do more' policy but also analyses the fact as to what would be the effect of the policy on bilateral relations between both states. Here, the focus for research is how to achieve a better understanding of Pakistan's counter terrorism strategy and enhance effectiveness of Pak-U.S. alliance in the fight against terrorism. Several research works are available in literature that highlights the United States' counter terrorism strategy of 'do more' towards Pakistan. However, the novelty of this research work is to underline the factors that trigger Pakistan to follow self-reliant military plan against militants by using empirical tools including survey and in-depth interviews. This research analysis of Pakistani military plan reveals that counter terrorism strategy is caused by multiple factors with ideology of terrorist, regional discourse, local support and drone strikes. However, suspensions of foreign funding or bilateral relations appear as the least relevant factors that can affect counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan.

The findings of Pakistan's military operations are based on Alternate form method, incorporating primary and secondary data. The random sample collected from 130 respondents (50 military persons, 50 media respondents and 30 political analysts), dent the notion that local people of affected areas are, primarily, deprived and illiterate and bonding among the Pashtuns is strong and robust, hence, regional discourse play an instrumental role in formulating the counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan's army. Moreover, this research work also investigates the cross-border terrorism which can be checked by applying fencing and check and balance on Pak-Afghan border. Further, it also examined that militants who do not wish to challenge government's writ any longer, are negotiated peacefully. Further, as a result of unsuccessful peace process with militants and after 2014, Pakistan army decided to launch operation against all militant groups without any discrimination. The study also analyzed that the drone attacks created restlessness among the local masses and, resultantly, suicide bombing is increased.

In addition, the research also evaluates the pressure that comes from the United States which has widened the trust deficit between both Pakistan and the U.S. Resultantly, Islamabad will slowly shift to Beijing and Moscow camp and will become laborious for the United States to get successful exit from Afghanistan without Pakistani support. Conclusively, the novelty of my research carries out the above-mentioned unique characteristics of Pakistan military strategy which needs to be understood through a context-specific constructivist approach.

To combat terrorism, international policy makers need to realize the importance of regional discourse which plays an important role and helps local people to fight against invaders. Afghanistan is considered as a graveyard of empires; hence

dialogues are the only solution to build a political consensus. In case of the United States, porous border of Pakistan and Afghanistan helped the militants where they could easily cross the border. To curb militancy across Pak-Afghan border, border fencing and check posts along demarcating line play a vital role to bring back regional peace and tranquility. Further, to counter suicide terrorism in Pakistan and its expansion to other regions, there is a need to create an environment that counteracts militants' radical ideologies and misinterpretation of Islam. Soft approaches to the ideological battle against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan also demand an increased role of political actors to developing a national consensus on the issue of terrorism and explore alternative political solutions.



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
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Chapter#1: Introduction

Around two decades has proceeded since Pakistan and the United States commenced cooperation in war on terror. During whole period, the centre of attention of most media remained on Pakistan in the Pak-U.S. alliance and they keep on evaluating the role of Pakistan against militancy. Moreover, most of the available literature debates that Pakistan is vouchsafing sanctuary to insurgents, while some of the studies present their viewpoint that security liaison between Pakistan and the United States are vital to achieve objectives in the region. Furthermore, some of the researches also discuss the role by the Islamic country against war on terror after utilization of foreign funding and the amount that goes into defence expenditure. There has been very less literature available on the impact of the United States' counter terrorism strategy on military scheme of Pakistan. Furthermore, there has not been an analysis of the conflict of priorities between the United States and Pakistan.

Due to importance of geo-strategic location, Islamabad was considered as a critical vertex against terrorism in the region, supplying much needed diplomatic, military and logistic support to the U.S. and its allies for operations in Afghanistan. The decision to join hands with the United States generated a socio-political split within Pakistan 's population and state elements but has also cost Pakistan billions of dollars in economic activities besides weakening the socio-political infrastructure.

The government continues to support the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, gaining favourable public opinion, from the U.S. or the alliance, remains elusive, primarily due to the U.S. operations, specifically the drone strikes, inside Pakistan and the declining socio-economic situation. The Pak-U.S. relationship is at a sensitive

juncture today and the Islamic State suffers from its worst ever economic, security, and political situation. While, the U.S. faces considerable domestic pressure in maintaining its support for Pakistan without any apparent benefit to the U.S.

Now, it is pre-requisite for Islamabad to get Washington's help in order to deal with insurgents and to maintain law and order in the country. While, on other side, the United States also require Pakistan's support to retain its troops in Afghanistan and to fight against extremism. Moreover, it is mandatory for both the United States and Pakistan to re-evaluate their strategies and priorities. The United States need to invest in economic sector of Pakistan which not only lift their image within the country but also helpful in checking militancy bring peace and stability in the region.

1.1 Purpose of the Study

The impetus of entire research is to understand the causes and consequences of counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan in forecasting and achieving the desired short/long term goals. In other terms, the research would assist in finding ways and means to achieve a better return on the U.S. policy in Pakistan after evaluating Pakistan 's true current capacity and capability and understanding its geo-political, socio-cultural, and socio-economic limitations. Research would highlight the importance and impact of public opinion on the pattern of extremism and courses of action, specific to the Afghan-Pak region within the years mainly from 2008–2018. Understanding the other variables, like regional discourse, ideology of terrorists, universal aggressive military strategy from the United States, suicide bombing and

level of trust would help formulate a better strategy for the U.S. and Pakistan to deal with such challenges in the future.

Several questions, with respect to the U.S. and Pakistan's counter terrorism strategy in the war on terror, revolve around the pattern of U.S. involvement in Pakistan. However, the centre of convergence of the research is to explain the relations between the United States and Pakistan as a result of 'do more' policy and also analyses the fact as to what would be the effect of this policy on bilateral relations between both of the states. The United States wants Pakistan to 'do more' against terrorists while Pakistan thinks in entirely opposite direction. According to Pakistan, the Islamic state has already lost more than 70,000 lives of people, misplaced the economy, fall in FDI and decline in business confidence, etc, in war against terror. Then, why is the Trump administration asking for 'do more' even though Pakistan has already given so many sacrifices. Hence, the focus revolves around the question of the study as how to achieve a better understanding of Pakistan's counter terrorism strategy and enhance effectiveness of Pak-U.S. alliance in the fight against terrorism.

Following are a few key objectives of this research:

- Evaluate counter terrorism strategies of Pakistan.
- Assess the 'do more' strategy of the United States towards Pakistan.
- Understand the strategy of Pakistan to divide Taliban into 'good and bad'.
- Analyse the impact of the U.S. counter-terrorism strategy on Pakistan's counter-terrorism strategy in particular and foreign policy in general.
- Determine the response of Pakistani military as a result of the U.S. counter-terrorism strategy.

- Determine the consequences of U.S. counter terrorism strategy on regional stability.

In due course, this study explores the possibility that regional discourse, ideology of militant groups, norms and traditions of local people, availability of resources play a vital role in shaping the counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan army. Hence, understanding the local discourse and availability of funds, is likely to play a significant role in achieving desired objectives and pave the way for a long-term Pak-U.S. strategic relationship. Moreover, it will not only provide credibility to the global war on terror but may also have direct/indirect impact on the strategic implications toward the U.S. in Afghanistan, Iraq and other areas with similar conditions.

1.2 Background of Counter Terrorism Measures

According to Darcy, Arce and Sandler (2005), Terrorism is the deliberated use or threat of use of violence by individuals or sub-national groups to procure political, religious, or ideological objectives through terrifying large audience (Daniel, Arce & Sandler, 2005, p. 183). By simulating eccentricity, militants create an atmosphere of fear where everyone feels vulnerable, thereby extending their sphere of influence as far as possible (Daniel, Arce and Sandler, 2005, p. 183).

Rapoport further divides terrorist into four major categories; nationalist, anti-colonial, anti-communist and anarchist. He believes that nationalist and anti-colonial emerged after first and second world wars while anti-communist and anarchist were escalated during cold war. Today, it is believed that a fifth kind of terrorist have taken birth and poses a serious threat to globalization. This form of terrorism has transnational characters (Radil and Pinos, 2019, p.2). Peter Mandaville (2007)

believed that the fifth group of terrorists more or less like Al-Qaeda as they came into limelight because they followed the global technology. They carried out a successful terrorist activity in the form of 9/11 attacks and gathered the world's attention in no time (Brown, January 19, 2017). Keeping it in mind, terrorism has become an international problem engulfing the whole world into its cruel clutches. The approaching millennium is thought to be more destructive than ever because of annihilation of huge number of innocent lives. Pakistan have faced several episodes of upheavals in the later part of 20th century, however, the political paradigm has completely changed after 9/11 attacks.

Since 2001 attacks, the budget allocation for devising anti-terror policies has been increased remarkably (Lum, Kennedy and Sherley, 2006, p.489). These expenditures reflect both depth and scope in the funding of counterterrorism programs. Not only has more money been spent, but there has also been a proliferation in the range of counter-terrorism policies implemented (Lum, Kennedy and Sherley, 2006, p.490). Moreover, this proliferation has also been reflected in the shift in emphasis of government grant solicitations which have called for the development of new technologies, tools, and partnerships to facilitate these efforts (Lum, Kennedy and Sherley, 2006, p.490).

The terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 killed nearly 3000 people. Soon after the 9/11 attacks, the US administration set up the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, an independent, bipartisan commission, chartered to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding 9/11, including preparedness for and the immediate response to the terrorist attacks (Kaczmarek, Lazarou, Guevara and Fogel, 2018, p.2). In July 2004,

the 9/11 Commission put forward 14 recommendations in its report to safeguard the world from future attacks. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) provided an overview of the 9/11 Commission report, its recommendations and the associated US anti-terror strategy of the time (Kaczmarek, et al, 2018, p.2). Table 1.1 shows reforms which the United States have done since 9/11.

Table 1. 1 Reforms since 9/11

Sr.No	Year	Reforms	Description
1.	2001	The USA Patriot Act	Preservation of life and liberty and expansion2003 of investigation of US Law Enforcement Agencies
2.	2003	Homeland Security Act	Creation of Department of Homeland security, linking 22 federal departments and agencies into the third largest cabinet department.
3.	2004	Intelligence Reforms	Establishment of office of Director of National Intelligence to control the intelligence community
4.	2010	EU-US Terrorist Financing Tracking Programme (TFTP)	Purposefully created to monitor terrorist financing organizations

5.	2012	EU-US Passenger Name Record (PNR)	Transfer and use of PNR data
6.	2018	Trump's approach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening border security • Screening for immigrants • Strict immigration laws • Investment in technology and infrastructure to curb cyber security risks

Source: (Kaczmarek et al, 2018, p.8)

Furthermore, according to a Washington Post investigation, more than 260 government organisations were either created or reorganised following the attacks, to focus on terrorism-related issues and enhance information-sharing processes (Kaczmarek et al, 2018, p.3). In 2010, more than 1200 government organisations and 1900 private companies were involved in work related to counterterrorism, homeland security, and intelligence (Kaczmarek et al, 2018, p.3).

Since 9/11, the United States (U.S.) has applied lots of counter terrorism strategy to prevent terrorism including denying terrorist's sanctuaries, Check and balance on funding to militants and their access to weapons of mass destruction. Further, Upgrade the security network on ports and borders to abort the terrorist plan from militants (Adams, Nordhaus and Shallen, 2011). For that purpose, both the

countries work together for regional stability and to remove mistrust between them (Nadim, 2017).

To counter anti-terrorists' activities, since 9/11, Pakistan introduced various anti-terrorism legislations in the form of various presidential acts and parliamentary laws as well as banned militant groups in various phases (Ahmed, 2014). Pakistan launched several military operations in wake of anti-terrorism strategy like Operation Al-Mizan (2002 – 2006), Operation Rah-e-Haq (November 2007), Operation Sher-e-Dil (September 2008), Operation Zalzala (2008 – 2009), Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem (2008), Operation Rah-e-Raast (May 2009), Operation Rah-e-Nijaat (October 2009), Operation Koh-e-Sufaid (July 2011), Operation Zarb-e-Azb. (June 15, 2014) (Nabi, 2016).

1.2.1 Pakistan and War on Terror

Regarding plan and manoeuvre, terrorism has different meanings for different groups. Terrorists are happy to acquire the phrase "*one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter*" (Ganor, 2002). There are three broad aspects of terrorism: the terrorist's, the victim's, and the general public. Firstly, terrorists believe on their actions and they find it quite legitimate for fighting what they believe in, to attain their goals by hook or by crook. Secondly, a terrorist's victim sees him as a criminal who have no respect for human life and thirdly, the general public's view is the most unstable and unpredictable. The aim of terrorist group in transnational terrorism is to achieve worldwide recognition and to create a situation of anarchy. They want to discourage foreign investments, tourism and assistance programs that can affect the

economy of the government in power, to influence government decisions and legislation and to satisfy vengeance¹.

Before 9/11, life in Pakistan was a rather peaceful and normal one. Most of Pakistanis do not even know about terrorism. Then, suddenly, the incident of 9/11 happened and the world changes irrevocably. United States believes that the attacks were carried out by 19 extremist Muslims on the orders of Osama Bin Laden, the founder and leader of Al-Qaeda and who was given sanctuary by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. US invaded Afghanistan as they refused to hand him over to US authorities (Kelly, 2011). According to NACTA, Pakistani government banned almost 65 organizations which were spreading hate literature.²

The U.S. started its military campaign in October 2001 to dislodge terrorists in Afghanistan and the threats are well proliferated in Pakistan also. Many of Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders fled from their country and got sanctuary in Pakistan 's tribal areas, bordering Afghanistan (Ahmed, 2014). Initially, these terrorists gathered in South Waziristan, but they created their bases in FATA also. By 2003, they joined with tribal militant group and a loose alliance under the leadership of Nek Mohammad Wazir came into being in South Waziristan. The Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda started their terrorist's activity not only against the troops of Afghanistan but the security forces of Pakistan. Later on, they expanded their terrorist activities to settled areas and big cities to produce widespread fear (Ahmed, 2014).

¹ U.S. Marine Corps, Individual's Guide for understanding and surviving terrorism

² National counter terrorism authority Pakistan. Available at <http://www.nacta.gov.pk/>

After taking part in war on terror (WoT), Pakistan faced lots of terrorist attacks after 9/11. Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 shows some statistics of terrorist attacks, their types and its targets that Pakistan faced over the years.




Figure1. 1Types of attacks in Pakistan since 1986

Source: GTD,

<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=attack&search=Pakistan>




Figure1. 2 Types of targets in Pakistan since 1986

Source: GTD,

<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=target&search=Pakistan>

As a result of military operations, Pakistan, in response, faced lots of terrorist attacks not only in operation areas but in big cities as well and as a result, lost lives of around 80,000 people. Table 1.2 shows fatalities, the Islamic country faced as a result of terrorist violence.

During past 18 years, the U.S. kept asking Pakistan to accelerate the efforts against terrorists. In the recent tweets of Donald Trump, he said:

'The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fool'.³

The U.S. president claims that there are safe heavens of terrorists in Pakistan and the Islamic country should do more against the militants especially Haqqani network who are attacking North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops in Afghanistan, and if Pakistan fails to comply then the U.S. will block their aid. On the other hand, Pakistan's Inter-services Public Relations (ISPR) chief Gen. Asif Ghafoor declared that Pakistan has already taken sufficient actions against terrorist and it is the time for the United States and Afghanistan to "do more". The ISPR chief wants the U.S. to check the activities of India in Afghanistan and their violation of ceasefire along the Line of Control (LOC) and the Working Boundary. LOC is the line between Pakistan Azad Kashmir and Indian Jammu Kashmir, while Working Boundary is the line between Pakistan along Sialkot and Indian held Kashmir. In response to Coalition Support Fund (CSF) received from the U.S., Ghafoor said that the fund is spent on War on Terror against terrorists. He continued that Pakistan supported the U.S. to defeat Al-Qaeda.⁴

The United States wants Pakistan to "do more" against terrorists while Pakistan thinks in entirely opposite direction. According to Pakistan, the Islamic state has already lost more than 70,000 lives of people, misplaced the economy, fall in FDI

³ Aziz, S., (January 2, 2018), 'Pakistan-US War of Words over Donald Trump's Tweet,' Aljazeera, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/pakistan-war-words-donald-trump-tweet-180102055709366.html>.

⁴ Iqbal, A., (Jan 2, 2018), 'Trump's Tweet on Pakistan Sparks War of Words,' Dawn, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1380174>.

and decline in business confidence, etc., in war against terror. Then, why is the Trump administration asking for “do more” even though Pakistan has already given so many sacrifices. Furthermore, the United States wants India to do more in Afghanistan which is not in favour of Pakistan and is also a threat for regional peace and security.⁵Moreover, it is evident that the policies of Trump administration are stricter towards Pakistan than the previous ones.

1.3 Literature Review

Literature review of the study is divided into two parts. In the first part, research will review the counter-terrorism strategy of the United States and Pakistan and in second part; it discusses the impact of former's strategy on later.

1.3.1 Counter-terrorism strategies of the U.S. and Pakistan

Jackson (2005) asserts that the language of counter-terrorism incorporates a series of assumptions, beliefs and knowledge about nature of terrorism and terrorists and those beliefs determine what kind of counter-terrorism policy is reasonable. He also emphasized that CT responses are not possible without social and political consensus or a clear belief what caused terrorism and what are the best possible ways to fight against it. Similarly, Wilkinson (2006) also suggests that there is no hard and fast rule to deal with terrorism because it is attached with culture and every country has its own parameters to deal with terrorism. This section is segmented into two parts. First, it discusses counter-terrorism strategy of the United States and Pakistan

⁵Clary, C., (August 24, 2017), ‘Trump signalled out India to do more in Afghanistan. That could easily backfire,’ The Washington Post, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/29/trump-singled-out-india-to-do-more-in-afghanistan-that-could-easily-backfire/?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main-trump-india%3Ahomepage%2Ft&utm_term=.48047c74711a](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/29/trump-singled-out-india-to-do-more-in-afghanistan-that-could-easily-backfire/?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main-trump-india%3Ahomepage%2Ft&hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main-trump-india%3Ahomepage%2Ft&utm_term=.48047c74711a).

while in the second section; it reviews impact of the United States strategy on Pakistan.

1.3.1.1 Do More as U.S. Policy towards Pakistan

In the recent tweets of Donald Trump, he orders Pakistan to “do more” against the militants otherwise the U.S. will stop aid and Pakistan has to bear the consequences. This is not the first time that Washington is asking Islamabad to “do more” against terrorism. The U.S. demanded Pakistan over a period of time to expand their counter-terrorism efforts.

Akram (2002) claimed that Bush administration committed to support Pakistan and Washington considered President Musharraf as the great hope for peace and stability in the region. He mentioned 9/11 Commission Report which was released in 2004 and report recognized President Musharraf as a most suitable choice who can bring peace in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Report further elaborated that the United States will continue to support Pakistan as long as Pakistan is committed to extend their efforts against militants. (Akram, 2002. P.118). However, Young (2009) considered the policies of President Obama were more focused and target-oriented towards Pakistan than President Bush. The main slogan of Obama’s policy was to disrupt, dismantle and to defeat Al-Qaeda. The United States’ president said that success in Afghanistan depends on cooperation from Pakistan and announced the \$7.5 billion aid package for Pakistan but the U.S. president attached this aid with the efforts of Pakistan in eliminating the safe heavens in Pakistan. (Young, March 28, 2009),

‘After years of mixed results, we will not provide a blank check, ’he said. ‘Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al-Qaeda and the violent extremists

within its borders. And we will insist that action be taken -- one way or the other -- when we have intelligence about high-level terrorist targets.

According to Walsh (2011), there prevailed trust deficit between the United States' administration and Pakistani government and one important example was the incident of Osama Bin Laden's assassination when there was no intelligence sharing from Washington with Islamabad. He further stated when Obama administration launched a target operation in Abbottabad (a city of Pakistan in which Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden was killed), there was started a war of words between Pakistan foreign office and the Obama administration and CIA chief Leon Panetta also confirmed that there was no sharing of information with Pakistan on Osama's presence in Abbottabad as the operation might be halted or Al-Qaeda leader may have escaped (Walsh, May 4, 2011).

When Trump came into power, most of the people in Pakistan were expecting changes in the U.S. counter-terrorism policy. According to Janjua (2018), Trump came up with aggressive and threatening language after holding the office. Trump stated in his tweets that the U.S. stupidly gave Pakistan a huge sum of \$33 billion while Pakistan, in response, delivered nothing except lies and cheating (Janjua, January 1, 2018). The United States' president mentioned that Pakistan should stop providing sanctuaries to militants otherwise they will think to stop the aid of Pakistan. Malik (2018) claimed that there was a perception in the Islamic state that Trump deliberately using fearsome language to divert the attention of American people from Russian leaks and got a chance to violate the sovereignty of Pakistan by discrediting their efforts against terrorism (Malik, January 4, 2018).

1.3.2 Counter-Terrorism Policy of Pakistan

Pakistani government and army used different techniques to deal with the militancy. The counter terrorism policy of Pakistan experienced three different periods.

1.3.2.1 Counter-terrorism strategy during Musharraf regime 2001-2007

President Musharraf in his book, *In the line of fire* stated that there were three major factors which triggered him to support the United States in war on terror. First, Pakistan is a weak country militarily which could not bear the United States' hostility. Second, Pakistan is economically weak as well and it could not sustain economic sanctions from the United States. Third, Pakistan's society is divided on ethnic, linguistic and sectarian ground (Musharraf, 2008).

Jones (2002) pointed out two elements which motivated President Musharraf to support the United States against war on terror. First, it would bring foreign funding to his country and second, the decision could lift his political stature internationally (Jones, 2002). Moreover, Pakistan's intelligence agency was also fragmented on the decision to support the United States in war on terror. Woodward (2002) claimed that Musharraf took a pronounced decision and dismissed ISI's chief General Mahmood to win intelligence's support. (Woodward, 2002, p.174).

Talking about Musharraf's strategy, Khattaq and Mushtaq (2015) claimed that states either go for military operation or negotiation by carefully measuring the prevailing conditions in order to resolve the conflict. They asserted that the CT strategy of Musharraf was based on military operations as well as peace process

irrespective of the fact that the United States did not like the idea to commence dialogues with terrorists. However, they further claimed that Musharraf's policy came out as a failure who did not pay attention towards rehabilitation and rebuilding of institutions in war-affected FATA region which caused a sense of deprivation among the masses and became the cause of emergence of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in the region (Khattak and Mushtaq, 2015, p.33-34).

Musharraf's strategy was baffled as on one side, he commenced peace process, while on the other side, he supported drone strikes. According to Khattak and Mushtaq (2015), Pakistan became the frontline ally of the United States and sent troops to Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) after 9/11 incident. In 2003, Pakistan army started Operation without understanding the history of local discourse. Soon after, Pakistan realized that the results of military operations are not as per their expectations and they are facing losses. Hence, they decided to change their counter-terrorism strategy and went for negotiations. In 2004, Pakistan military ceased the operation and the agreement was signed between Pakistan army and Nek Muhammad Wazir, who was a prominent mujahedeen leader and was killed in a drone attack in South Waziristan (Khattak and Mushtaq, 2015, p.33-34). Washington was not happy on this agreement and they claimed that the militant group will strike against NATO forces in Afghanistan. U.S. Secretary of State, Rice also condemned Musharraf strategy against terrorism and warned to cut financial aid. Subsequently, the U.S. continued drone strikes on FATA and killed the tribal leader and, finally, the peace agreement was discarded by the militants and FATA was changed into battlefield. After the death of Nek Muhammad, Baitullah Mehsud got the leadership of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and there started an intense fighting between Pakistan army

and Mehsud group. The battle concluded on a peace deal in February 2005 but it did not remain so long and Mehsud group breached the agreement and started suicide bombing.

Khattaq and Mushtaq (2015) further claimed, Musharraf acknowledged the United States' policy and banned many militant organizations in Pakistan and Pakistani president also started a campaign to reform Madrasahs. However, he did not pay attention to prevent the expansion of militant organization (Khattak and Mushtaq, 2015, p.37). According to them, TTP spread around the whole country during peace process and recruited the extremists in their group. TTP got hold of Bajaur Agency of FATA and collected support from the militants of Afghanistan. There were six agencies of FATA where Pakistan's army launched military operation one by one (Khattak and Mushtaq, 2015, p.35).

Khattaq and Mushtaq (2015) also professed that Musharraf's strategy to support the United States in following drone strikes did not work as it killed many innocent people along with militants and secondly, the strikes developed a sense of agitation among the local masses (Khattak and Mushtaq, 2015, p.40). According to Musharraf, they said, drone strikes are the most economical means to deal with the terrorists as there would be no loss of soldiers. Finally, the drone strike strategy was evaluated as a failure because the lethality of terrorists' acts was increased (Khattak and Mushtaq, 2015, p.40).

1.3.2.2 Counter-terrorism strategy during Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP) Government 2008-2012

According to Khatataq and Mushtaq (2015), the CT strategy during PPP was based on 3D approach; deterrence, development and dialogue, nonetheless, government of PPP was pressurized again by Obama administration to start military operations against terrorists (Khattak and Mushtaq, 2015, p.40). Although operations were considered as a success of Pakistan's military, however, the main leadership of TTP fled to Afghanistan. Khattak and Mushtaq further pointed out that two major operations named Operation *Rah-i-Raast* in Swat Valley and Operation *Rah-i-Nijat* in South Waziristan Agency were launched in 2009. The PPP government wanted to settle the matter peacefully but the activities of militants as well as increasing pressure from the United States trigger Pakistan's military to start kinetic operations in affected areas (Khattak and Mushtaq, 2015, p.40).

Khattak and Mushtaq (2015) considered PPP's strategy as failed one as it was mostly relied on drone strikes and resulted in a loss of many innocent lives. The United Nations and Amnesty International considered drone strikes against international law and they violated the fundamental rights of people. In a nutshell, this strategy did not produce the desired results (Khattak and Mushtaq, 2015, p.42).

1.3.2.3 Counter-terrorism strategy during Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz [PML (N)] Government 2013-2018

According to Syed (2013), there was not much difference in the counter terrorism strategy of government of Nawaz Shareef. PML(N) disclosed that they have five components – dismantle, contain, prevent, educate and reintegrate rather 3Ds – a

policy adopted by PPP against militancy, however, the policy of Nawaz government produced some productive results and the graph of terrorists' activities came down (Syed, July 6, 2013). Khattak and Mushtaq (2015) also affirmed that government of Nawaz did not support drone strikes as it take the lives of innocent people and against international law as well. Hence there was less number of drone attacks during PML(N) government (Khattak and Mushtaq, 2015, p.44). They further declared that the government of PML(N) believed in negotiations in dealing with terrorism but soon Sharif's government realized that terrorists' activities are increasing despite their peaceful policy. Hence, there started a major military operation called Operation *Zarb-e-Azb* in June 2014. The operation lasted for almost one and half year but it destroyed the backbone of Al-Qaeda and TTP. After operation *Zarb-e-Azb*, Pakistan army launched operation *Radd-ul-Fasaad* to demolish the sleeping cells of the terrorists across the country (Khattak and Mushtaq, 2015, p.44)

The literature of first part highlights two points. First, the United States is pushing Pakistan to do more as they believe that Pakistan is giving sanctuaries to terrorist organizations like Haqqani network which is responsible for the terrorist attacks on the U.S. troops and other bomb blasts in Afghanistan. Second, terrorists can capture nuclear technology and pose a serious threat for global peace. However, the mainstream literature does not provide any study which highlights why there persists confusion between the United States counter terrorism strategies and Pakistan military scheme and why Washington keep on asking Pakistan to 'do more'. Further, it does not provide any study about the key indicators which are the causes behind counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan.

1.3.3 Impact of ‘Do more’ strategy on Pakistan

The U.S. counter terrorism was not in equilibrium towards Pakistan after 9/11. Both of the former presidents, Bush and Obama, wanted Pakistan to do more against terrorism. During their tenure, the United States was not happy at all by the performance of Pakistan against terrorist groups. According to Naqvi (2016), when Trump administration started its new term in 2016, many pundits claimed that he would have to resume a balance policy towards Pakistan. In a speech, Pakistan’s permanent ambassador to United Nations, Maleeha Lodhi said that we will devise our country’s future strategy after observing the foreign policy of the U.S. under new president (Naqvi, 2016). Lodhi further elaborated that in past few years, the U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan remains unbalanced and new president would have to start a stable policy. However, the policy of Trump did not show any conclusive difference from the previous government of the U.S (Naqvi, 2016). Shinkman (2016) affirmed that U.S. president Donald Trump admired Islamabad’s efforts against terrorism when he took charge of his office. The United States’ president also thanked Pakistan government for their cooperation. In October 2017, the U.S. president tweeted that the United States would start to develop much better relationship with Pakistan and its leaders (Shinkman, 2018). But right after few months, the U.S. president increased pressure on Pakistan to ‘do more’ against militants. Aziz (2018) considered Trump’s tweet as unrealistic which he stated in January 2018. In the tweets, the U.S. president said (Aziz, 2018) that:

‘The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies and deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools.’

However, many experts believe that the statement that came from the U.S. president is not rational. Aziz (2018) quoted that Michael Kugelman, a U.S.-based analyst and Asia Program Deputy Director at the Woodrow Wilson Centre in Washington, DC, considered Trump's statement as highly undiplomatic. Kugelman further elaborated that significant cut in military aid indicates a very strict policy adopted by the U.S. towards Pakistan. In an interview to Al Jazeera, the United States' analyst stated that there is a deadlock from both sides as the U.S. is insisting to do more against militants while Pakistan is asserting that it has already done a lot and won't do any more. "This is not a good sign to both of the countries in fighting against terrorism," Kugelman added (Aziz, 2018).

Iqbal and Khan (2018) also claimed that 'do more' strategy of the United States is not rational and may affect Pakistan to support the United States against terrorism. Furthermore, there came a very strong response from Pakistani side as a result of harsh statement from U.S. president. Former Defence Minister Khurram Dastagir Khan in a tweet said (Iqbal and Khan, 2018) that:

'Pakistan as anti-terror ally has given free to the U.S.: land and air communication, military bases and Intel cooperation that decimated Al-Qaeda over last 16 yrs, but they have given us nothing but invective & mistrust. They overlook cross-border safe havens of terrorists who murder Pakistanis.'

After Donald Trump's tweet, the U.S. again suspended \$255 million military aid to Pakistan which inflamed them. Aleem (2018) also quoted Pakistan foreign minister's statement in same context. In an interview to Wall Street Journal, Pakistani Foreign Minister Khwaja Asif affirmed (Aleem, 2018) that:

'The U.S. had turned Islamabad into a "whipping boy" to distract from its own failures in the war in Afghanistan.....US's move could end up torching cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan on issues like sharing intelligence. "We do not have any alliance" with the U.S. This is not how allies behave.'

According to Talukdar (2018), Trump administration attached the revival of funds with the behaviour of Pakistan. As, U.S. State Department spokesperson Heather Nauert said that we are suspending military assistance to Pakistan unless or until Pakistani government will take conclusive action against Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network (Talukdar, 2018).

Political experts claim that it is difficult to convince Pakistan to change the behaviour. Similarly, Masood (2018) also claimed that results of growing pressure on Pakistan may not be fruitful for the United States. He added that the U.S. increased the pressure on Pakistan and recommended them to be placed on Terrorism Financing list. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), based in Paris, runs most of its activities secretly.⁶ Although, Alexandra Wijmenga-Daniel, a Task force spokeswoman confirmed that the name of Pakistan was included in the past in FATF but cleared in 2015 (Masood, 2018). Masood (2016) also quoted the statement of an international relations' professor to prove his argument. An International Relation Professor, Ahsan Butt, shed light on South Asia at George Mason University, stated that the U.S. will lose more as a result of mounting pressure on Pakistan. Butt asserted that Washington is using Islamabad air bases and land routes for launching drone strikes and deploying warheads to Kabul. Masood (2018) also marked the statement of former advisor to Pakistan's foreign minister. "The alternate best route to deploy

⁶ FATF's official website, <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/>

ammunition is Iran which is seven to eight times expensive,” Musharraf Zaidi, a former adviser to Pakistan’s foreign minister from 2011 to 2013, confirmed (Masood, 2018).

Khan (2018) concluded that suspension of aid may pose negative effect on bilateral relation of both countries. He further added that Pakistan stopped cooperation with the United States on important issues after suspension of aid from them. Pakistani government clarified that they will not conduct any joint operation within its boundary with any country including the U.S. (Khan, 2018). According to Khan (2018), Islamabad asserted that the U.S. need to adopt a balanced policy towards the Islamic state, otherwise Pakistan may reconsider its diplomatic relations with them and may consider other options like to block the North Atlantic treaty organization (NATO) supply route (Khan, 2018).

According to Ballesteros (2018), Pakistan may move to other countries to get their support. He further added that Pakistan is cherishing the relations with China and Russia after the deadlock between Pak-U.S. relations (Ballesteros, 2018). He quoted Pakistan, s former defence minister statement in same context. In an interview, Pakistan Defence Minister Khurram Dastagir claimed that Pakistan is busy in reviewing the foreign and security policy to support the U.S. war in Afghanistan. He also stated that Pakistan would move to China and Russia for military ammunition (Ballesteros, 2018).

This literature of second part accentuates two viewpoints. First, United States President Donald Trump is mounting pressure on Pakistani government by using threatening language and by suspension of aid as well. Second, most of the political experts consider the tactics used by Washington as undiplomatic to convince

Islamabad. However, the conventional literature does not provide any study which foregrounds the consequences of the stratagem applied by the United States and moreover, it did not provide any indication which reveal independent strategy of the Islamic country.

1.4 Methodology and Scope

The research design is achieved by conducting an in-depth, single-case study of Pakistan's military operations which entails a detailed investigation of the given phenomena within a specific context using a variety of data collected from respondents of various fields.

Single case study is based on document analysis, surveys and in-depth interviews. The research incorporates various variables (ideology of terrorist, regional discourse, kinetic military operation) to formulate a research concept which leads towards measurement of data. In measuring research concept, the study formulates operational definition which is the empirical observation of hypothesis, to measure attributes and variables. Moreover, to check reliability, the study incorporates different questionnaire from same person and vice versa. Further, in order to examine validity, research conducts survey and collects relevant information from respondents of various fields including military persons, political analysts, media persons, students, local affectees. Further, the study performs simple technique of descriptive statistics to build causal relations between the variables.

The dataset is collected from 130 respondents (50 military persons, 50 media respondents and 30 political analysts) for interviews and 300 respondents (100 locals and 200 students of counter terrorism strategy) for survey. Military persons provided

valuable information as what kind of retaliation they were facing during operations and how the mindset of jihadi groups was working against writ of the state. Survey on locals was also helpful in understanding their problems and behavior of Pakistani military with them. They also provided information on the hurdles which army faced while doing military operation. The data collected from surveys and interviews provided important insights for statistical analysis. Moreover, secondary sources including research articles, newspapers and official web pages of international organizations provided supplementary discernment on our research question, but secondary data imparted incomplete information about the subject and relevant information were missing. This was inferred through interviews with the officers and local affectees who proved instrumental to achieve desired results.

Data collected through online and field research was examined and analysed for the presence or absence of the variables. The result is a comprehensive and based on qualitative analysis. Open-ended interviews conducted with security experts, academics, journalists and law enforcement officers were useful for the analytical process of counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan and locals' problems. In order to investigate the causal relation among variables, interviews with security personals and locals through field research and online sources provided useful insights. A review of readily available academic and journalistic publications, historical evidence, assessments of security services and a chronology of military operations with relevant details also complemented the understanding of the counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan.

Further, the scope of this research is three fold: critically analysing the impact of the U.S. counter terrorism strategy on Pakistan's military scheme against militants

in the last two decades (finances, number of casualties, destruction, infrastructure, and long-term effects), gauging the role of Pakistan military in response of U.S. counter terrorism strategy, and examining and proposing ways and means to achieve a long-term strategic partnership.

1.5 Organization of Study

The first chapter covers the basic concepts and purpose of the study. The purpose of whole research is to understand the impact of the U.S. counter terrorism strategy on Pakistan's military approach in forecasting and achieving the desired short/long term goals. Further it briefly explains the counter terrorism measures taken by the United States and the participation of Pakistan in war on terror. Afterwards, the chapter examines literature review which comprised on two parts. In the first part, study reviews the counter-terrorism strategy of the United States and Pakistan, while in the second part; it discusses the impact of former's strategy on later and the study also discusses key findings of literature review followed by methodology and scope of dissertation.

In the second chapter, the study traces the development of hypothesis after application of constructivism approach. The international relations theory is based on identities and interests. Hence this chapter highlights the formation of counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan military based on ideas and identities of local discourse. Further it all considers the term good and bad Taliban and, the U.S. counter terrorism strategy of 'do more'. Based on relevant information obtained from constructivist perspective, the chapter suggests few hypotheses in the end.

The third chapter of dissertation discusses the research design which is achieved by conducting an in-depth, single-case study of Pakistan's military operations. Single case study is based on document analysis, surveys and in-depth interviews. Furthermore, the chapter incorporates vivid explanation of variables (ideology of terrorist, regional discourse, behaviour of locals, kinetic military operation) to formulate a research concept which leads towards measurement strategy. To achieve results, the chapter discusses dataset for interviews and survey and how it has been achieved. Moreover, it also examines secondary data including research articles, newspapers and official web pages of international organizations for case study of military operation. In the end, chapter briefly present analysis of data.

The fourth chapter discusses the case study of Pakistan's military operations. By using secondary data, this chapter considers the strategy of Pakistan army against militants since 9/11. It also gives some historical perspective of current military strategy of Islamic country. Further, the chapter points out indicators that trigger Pakistani military to design its counter terrorism strategy. Moreover, besides explaining the variable, this chapter facilitates an understanding and selection of the criteria for judging the counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan army in achieving desired set of objectives. The chapter also suggests the realities and misconceptions associated with local discourse (operation areas) and touches upon Pakistan 's perspective and limitations. The study performs analysis of documented data in this chapter which supposed to be insufficient to get the desired results as the data do not provide complete information regarding first hypotheses. Further, data on the third hypotheses also look incomplete as there lays insufficient data regarding ideology of militant groups. To prove or disapprove hypotheses, the study feels it obligatory to

perform analysis after collecting primary data. Further, study performs comparison of findings from both primary and secondary data to get desired results.

Hence, the next chapter discusses data collected from respondents of various fields by using research techniques called survey and In-depth Interviews. Furthermore, it considers different hypothesis one by one and discusses the unit of analysis by using statistical analysis to get a clear picture of the result. Eventually, the study detects its findings after collection of desired results.

The last chapter of dissertation concludes the study. It explains that counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan depends upon regional discourse. There were many local problems which Pakistan army faced in operation areas. One and the foremost problem was lack of awareness. Locals were unable to differentiate between militants and innocent civilians. Moreover, people of tribal areas are very much attached with their roots, so it became difficult for Pakistan military to displace people while launching military operation. Further, there was no political writ and no elections to choose candidate in those areas. Further, religious misguidance is also one of them and so-called local religious persons who distorted the real shape of religion used it as a shield to exploit innocent civilians. The study further examined that militant's ideology proved vital while launching military operation. As the militants were termed as mujahedeen when they were fighting against Soviet Union and So, initially it was difficult for army to fight against them and made some peace agreement due to scarcity of resources and to restore harmony. This habit of peace process was continued before operation Zarb-e-Azb. These peace processes were not successful due to stubborn attitude of militants. Study further elaborated that border fencing would help a great deal in lowering down the graph of terrorism in the country.

People don't want fencing as relatives of locals are living across borders. Residents of those areas are scared because after fencing, they cannot activate their illegal activities as most of the people earn money through smuggling and other illegal means and it would be end of their employment. Suicide bombing is one of the tactics to distract military operation. However, there is no link between both military operation and suicide bombing. However, drone attacks from the United States proved to be poisonous in terms of suicide bombings from militants. To combat terrorism, international policy makers need to realize the importance of regional discourse which plays an important role and helps local people to fight against invaders. Afghanistan is considered as a graveyard of empires; hence dialogues are the only solution to build a political consensus. In case of the United States, porous border of Pakistan and Afghanistan helped the militants where they could easily cross the border. To curb militancy across Pak-Afghan border, border fencing and check posts along demarcating line play a vital role to bring back regional peace and tranquility. Further, to counter suicide terrorism in Pakistan and its expansion to other regions, there is a need to create an environment that counteracts militants' radical ideologies and misinterpretation of Islam. Soft approaches to the ideological battle against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan also demand an increased role of political actors to developing a national consensus on the issue of terrorism and explore alternative political solutions. The findings of study are, however, based largely on a limited number of interviews, surveys, newspaper archives, research articles and the result may vary a bit if researchers conduct survey of large number of people or if the government authorities in Pakistan decide to release relevant data. Moreover, among other respondents, there are interviewees from state institutions as well in surveys and interviews results which can be biased. The soldiers are working on the counter terrorism strategy devised by the

government. It feels like that the element of patriotism can be found in the answers given by the respondents. The Al-Qaeda-inspired global insurgency led by TTP continues to evolve beyond this study's conclusion. How Pakistan, the U.S. and the other key players including China, India, Iran and Saudi Arabia respond to this evolving threat will define the future of terrorism in the region and can be the great fruit for future research.



Chapter#2: Theoretical Framework

2.1 Introduction

In the 2nd Chapter, the research put forward introduction of theory of constructivism and figure it out that identities and interests play a key role in formulating the counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan. It also discusses the gap between both the United States and Pakistan in the course of action towards militants. On the basis of constructivism, study proposes different hypotheses at the end.

The counter-terrorism strategy of the United States and Pakistan can well be explained through one of the well-renowned theory, constructivism. It is relatively a new approach in the field of international relations and came into being as liberalism and realism failed to forecast the collapse of the Soviet Union. At that time, there was a need of a new track to explain this concept in international politics after the end of the Cold War. It quickly got popularity and become one of the leading schools in international relations.

During 1980s, international relations theory was influenced by neorealist and neoliberal institutionalism; both theories attributed to materialism and individualism. Constructivists demonstrated how attention to norms and states identities could help uncover important issues neglected by neorealist and neoliberals. Term Constructivism was coined by Nicholas Onuf in his important book, *The World of Our Making* (1989). Alexander Wendt contests the neorealist description of the contemporary state system as a competitive, self-help world (Wendt 1992, pp. 391-425). He classifies his concept into three different steps. First, he unknots the idea of self-help from anarchy and reveals that self-interests and security are not related to

anarchy rather both belongs to different school of thoughts. Second, he gives the idea that self-interested concepts of security and power politics always play crucial role when states come closer to in international environment where there occurs least possibility of role of anarchy. Third, he reintroduces first and second image determinants to assess their effects on identity – formation in different kinds of anarchies. Classical realists such as Thomas Hobbes, Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau attributed egoism and power politics primarily to human nature, whereas structural realists or neorealist emphasize anarchy. Difference stems from different interpretation of anarchy. Neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz attributed power politics primarily to anarchy. Waltz argues that wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them. Waltz defines political structure on three dimensions: ordering principles, principles of differentiation and the distribution of capabilities. By itself, this definition predicts little about state behaviour. It does not predict whether two states will be friends or foes, will recognize each other's sovereignty, will have dynastic ties, and will be revisionist or status quo powers, and so on.

A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward objects, including other factors, based on the meanings that the objects have for them. States act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening, and friends are not. The distribution of Power may always affect states' calculation, but how it does so depend on the intersubjective understandings and expectations, on the distribution of knowledge, that constitute their conceptions of self and other. If society forgets what a university is, the powers and practices of professor and student cease to exist; if the United States and Soviet Union decide that they are no longer enemies, the cold war is over. It is collective

meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions. Each person has many identities such as brother, son, teacher, and citizen. Similarly a state may have multiple identities as sovereign, leader of the world, etc. Identities are the basis of interests. Actors' interests cannot be determined independent of the social context. Institutions are not real or objective, but they are 'beliefs'. They represent what actors collectively know. Processes of identity formation under anarchy: If states identify the structure negatively, then they will think that one's gain is the other's loss. Negative identification of the structure, namely anarchy lead to realist power politics. Actors are concerned with the preservation security, worry about relative gains. It is shown in the Figure 2.1.

Constructivism believes in the power of norms, traditions, culture, identity and social interactions in explaining international relations. Constructivists, as mentioned above, consider that material world shapes and is shaped by social world. State's military power and the distribution of military power among states do not automatically constitute a certain international social structure. Even without any central governance that has authority over all states in the world, the international system does necessarily become a 'competitive security system', as neorealist regard. It can also be an 'individualistic security system', as neoliberals think, or a 'cooperative security system' (Wendt 1992, 397-399). Anarchy and distribution of military power do not predetermine states' identities and relations among them. Strong military power that a state has can mean threatening power or protecting power for other states. Nuclear weapon in the hand of United States has different meaning for Taiwan from nuclear weapon in the hand of China. Treating states 'like billiard balls of varying size' (Mearsheimer 1994/1995, p.48) is not adequate to




Figure 2. 1The codetermination of institutions and process

explain this reality. Although military capabilities and distribution of power always become intervening factors, they cannot adequately understand relations among states. Whether two states become ally or enemy can be predicted by only understanding the material military structure. States' identities and social structure are also significant factors that determine relations among states. Similar identities and long-history of alliance between two states, for example, can be a basis of cooperative security system; but distinct identities and long-history of conflict can construct competitive security system.

Unlike Neorealism, which believes only in the predominance of material power (military and economic power), and Neoliberal Institutionalism, which recognizes only a relatively weak impact of non-material forces, constructivism recognizes the importance of discursive force (knowledge, thoughts, culture, language, and ideology) as well as material power. All forces work together to build the world order. Discursive power works by creating intersubjective meaning and reproducing it. It enforces how to define and understand the material structure, phenomena, identity of states, relationships between states, and any other social facts. The same material expression can be exploited with discursive power to produce any desired interpretations by mitigating the possible meanings. The United States will offer various interpretations for Pakistan and North Korea's nuclear weapons through its discursive force. The former is unthreatening and the latter menacing; Pakistan is a friend while North Korea is an enemy. Such social identifications are not indicated by material power or material power distribution. It is constructed by discursive force. The international anarchic system, therefore, does not necessarily constitute a state's self-help system. One state's massive military practice can be interpreted as a military

threat to another state. Each threatened state might upgrade its military armament, but they might also construct a concert of security or collective security to balance the threat. As Wendt repeatedly said, 'Self-help is an institution'. It also depends on intersubjective understanding and expectations and on 'distribution of knowledge,' that constitute states' conception of self and other. It is not 'a constitutive feature of anarchy (Wendt 1992, 396-403). The possibility of individualistic and cooperative security system erodes the significance of balance of power concept in world politics. Because material power of other states does not automatically mean military threats, there is also no need to assume that every increase of material power of other states should be balanced by a state. The concept of balance of power, instead, as indicated by Stephen Walt, a realist, before the end of the Cold War, should be replaced with that of balance of threat (Walt 1985, pp.8-9). It means, what a state should balance is a threatening military power and not unthreatening military power. Whether a state becomes a threat or not depends on the type and role identities that it has and international norms and institutions, which are also constructed through social interaction, supply the meanings that a state can refer to.

It consequently degrades the importance of relative gain that offensive neorealists emphasize and makes cooperation among states be more likely. By identifying the role identity of other states, a state will know with which states it should cooperate and impose assertiveness (Grieco, 1988; Mearsheimer, 1995). Although relative gain still becomes states' consideration, it is not the only factor that determines the character of relations among states. As neoliberal institutionalists indicate, concern about relative gain can be a second consideration after consideration over absolute gain. State has material substrate of agency, including its intrinsic

capabilities. It also has desire to survive and preserve this material substrate (Wendt 1992, p.402; Mearsheimer 2001, pp.30-31). However, because competitive security system is not the only possible international system, maximizing material power and accumulating relative gains as much as possible are not also the only possible way to meet such desire. States' identity then will reduce uncertainty in international system. Its relatively stability can be a basis for a state to predict each other behaviour. Through this, states could relatively overcome the prisoner's dilemma. It is correct, as often argued by neorealist, that cheating can be obstacle in building and maintaining cooperation (Grieco, 1988). But, by identifying other states' identities first, a state can predict whether its partners will cheat it and decide whether or not it will cooperate with other states. States' interest to gain long term benefits then encourages them to develop and preserve their 'good' reputations and identities. Once the issue of relative gains is overcome and states realizes about the importance to preserve identities, cooperation among states is more likely and can be built on a stronger basis.

This point makes constructivism to encompass neoliberal Institutionalism in understanding the reality of international institutions. Although neoliberal institutionalists underscore institutions' capability to reduce certain norms of uncertainty and alter transaction costs, they cannot give strong guarantee that prevents states to commit in cheating. Neoliberal institutionalists are not consistent on the questions of what institution can do over the predetermined self - interest states. Joseph Nye acknowledgements of 'complex learning' process, Robert Jervis notes on the 'changing conceptions of self and interest' and Robert Keohane calls on the 'sociological conceptions of interests' assert the possibility of transformations of identity and interests (Wendt 1992, p.399). Yet, if self-interest identity is a

constitutive feature and the nature of state, it will be impossible for international institution to change such identity. What international institution can do is only constraining such interest so that it does not break out the institutional cooperation. Institution can build reward -punishment mechanism to prevent the act of cheating and provide long -term rewards. However, that mechanism only reorientates states from short-term gain to long-term gains, but it does not change the inherent character of self-interest states. Cheating, thus, is more likely to happen in Neoliberal Institutionalism than in Constructivism.

2.2 Identities and Interests

As a relatively stable set or structure of identities and interests that are often codified in formal rules and norms, international institution has enough discursive power to internalize identity and consequently to change identity into states. International institution is not only able to constrain state's self-interest, but also internalize new or other interests into the state. International institution has certain set of rules and parameters that are termed as international norms from which states can derive their self-interests. In international environment, states always analyse certain situation and devise the strategy based on international norms. Similarly, Martha Finnemore explains that international institutions and norms of humanity transforms states interests and its behaviour over humanity issue. 'Multilateral norms', Finnemore writes, "create political benefits for conformance and costs for nonconforming action" (Katzenstein. 1996, 153-185). And Thomas Risse-Kappen tells that democracies teaches the states to live peacefully. Moreover, it also educates that states should develop a collective security system by developing a collective

identity for specific purposes (Katzenstein 1996, 357-399). It is also important that international norms is not the single factor that affect state's strategy but one cannot ignore the role of domestic politics which proves to be vital in modifying state's behaviour. Statesmen are not like white paper, which can be easily coloured with international norms. Localization process bridges discursive interaction between domestic politics and international institutions. It can manifest in the form of prelocalization (resistance and contestation), local initiative (entrepreneurship and framing), adaptation (grafting and pruning), or amplification and 'universalization'. This process explains why some transnational ideas and norms find greater acceptance in some states than in others (Acharya 2004, pp.240-254).

According to constructivism, there exists a relationship between international social structure, material structure and domestic politics which generate multiple identities exhibited by a state in world politics. The constructivist approach is different from neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists, both assume a single and relatively static self - interest identity. Constructivist believe that a state can have multiple identities; it can be a capitalist state, a socialist state or a democratic or autocratic. Similarly, a state can be an ally for one state and an enemy for another.

According to constructivism, states define their interests differently in different situation and identities are never permanent in international relations. In the triangle of the United States, Pakistan and Afghanistan, there occurs change of identity as well before and after 9/11. This is important in elaborating the concept how counter terrorism strategy of the United States is affecting the military scheme of Pakistan and how war on terrorism turns to war of survival for them. After 9/11 attacks, Pakistan moved to the U.S. camp and supported the U.S. with air base, land

routes and military personals. In return, Pakistan got financial aids from the United States. But, as a result of military operations against terrorists, Pakistan faced heavy retaliation in the shape of bomb blasts all across the country. Whenever, Pakistan military started military operation, suicide bombing got increased not only in hard areas but also in metropolitan cities to frighten people and destabilize the government. Initially, the interests were shifted for the country as they were facing the disruption of peace and security. Islamabad still believed that it is essential to deal the militants with iron hands in order to restore the peace of country. Constructivists predicted that identities are never permanent in international relations. It is a continuous process of change. Similarly, identities of the United States, Pakistan and Afghanistan changed drastically. There was strain relationship between Washington and Islamabad. Pakistan became nuclear power before 9/11 and successfully launched nuclear tests on 28th May 1998. The United States imposed sanctions on the Islamic country as testing nuclear technology is a step towards destabilization of world peace. Then, one unfortunate day, 9/11 incident happened and international relations between the United States and Pakistan changed suddenly. The United States President, George. W. Bush at that time asked Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf for cooperation in fighting war against terror. Time had been changed. The United States, who was imposing sanctions few years back on Pakistan, is giving aid to the Islamic country to help them in war on terror. There was also change in the identity of Pakistan as well. The country which was enemy just few years ago, is a dearest friend now. Pakistan rendered full support to the United States as they need their help to eliminate militancy from their region. There was change of identity happened with Taliban also. Taliban were freedom fighters for both the United States and Pakistan as

well. Both the countries provided full support to them in terms of latest arms and ammunitions to fight against Soviet Union.

According to constructivism, states define their interest in a situation. After 9/11, interests of the United States were changed, and freedom fighters of 80s became terrorists now. The U.S. started its military campaign in October 2001 to dislodge terrorists in Afghanistan and the threats are well proliferated in Pakistan also as many of Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders fled from their country and got sanctuaries in federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region of Pakistan and they needed full support from Pakistan (Ahmed 2014). Islamabad knew its geo-strategic importance for Washington against Al-Qaeda. To deal with the terrorists, the U.S. entered Afghanistan, and Pakistan provided support in shape of logistics assistance, sharing intelligence information, capturing and giving back to the United States. The interests of the United States moved like a pendulum from one side to the other.

From analytical point of view, it emphasizes how state defines interests, fear and relations with other states. According to this theory, neither interests nor fears are permanent. He claims that international relations are not given but constructed. Further, Wendt also believes that states define their interests through the process of defining or evaluating a situation. Similarly, the relationship between the United States and Pakistan has been topsy-turvy especially during past 40 years. The United States was very much concerned for the territorial expansion of Soviet Union. In 1979, Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and the United States needed support from Pakistan to curtail communist Soviet Union. Islamabad provided sanctuaries to Taliban commanders and raised a movement of jihad against Soviet Union. It was impossible for the United States to win the war against the Soviet Union without local

support. At that time, the strength of mujahedeen was almost double than the U.S. army. Initially, mujahedeen were not organized and well-trained to fight against the Soviet Union but after the U.S. involvement, mujahidin got more sophisticated weapons to fight against Soviet army. War continued for almost 10 years and the U.S. funded with the net worth of \$2.1 billion during this period. Osama Bin Laden was also a part of mujahidin (Reidel, 2010). The assistance of CIA included latest anti-aircraft missiles and stinger missiles which have the capacity to bring down the Soviet Union aircraft and helicopters and it proved to be a blessing in disguise for Afghans. But the most devastating effect of the war on neighbouring countries were the migration of Afghan refugees. This was the second largest refugee migration after Syrian refugees. As constructivism tells that relationships between states depends upon their vested interests. Similarly, after Afghan war, Washington levied Pressler amendment on issue of nuclear technology on Pakistan. Again, after 9/11, they started War on Terror and required Pakistani support to fight against terrorism. Here, constructivism has been greatly utilized to explain international relations among states because of its identity and social interaction-based approach.

Constructivism suggests that every state devise their counter terrorism strategy according to regional discourse. Initially, Pakistan army started military operations against terrorists in FATA when Pakistan Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf sent huge army to the affected region. Pakistan military bore a heavy loss in this operation due to the novelty of this kind of operation, lack of knowledge about terrorists and lack of support from the local public. Many of the soldiers lost their lives during the operation. Soon, Pakistan government realized that they need to change their strategy

and then, Pakistan military decided to go for negotiations with Taliban and Al-Qaeda members who promised to go for ceasefire both in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Moreover, constructivists claim that every state creates its own definition to deal with the terrorists and no other state can dictate the policy. In similar context, cultural discourse always shapes counter-terrorism strategies and states act accordingly. This approach of constructivism clarifies the scenario of turning out of WoT to war of survival. CT agencies in Pakistan devised their policy according to militants and terrorists they are dealing, and they purposefully devised a term named good and bad Taliban. The CT approach of Pakistan is stricter towards the militants who are destabilizing the peace of the country especially Al-Qaeda.

Constructivism is also helpful in addressing the question, why does the United States ask Pakistan to do more against terrorism. According to the theory, as identities and interests of states are continually being constructed and reconstructed. In the case of Pakistan, the United States is putting pressure on Pakistan to do more against terrorists because Washington claims that Islamabad is giving sanctuaries to terrorist organizations like Haqqani network which is responsible for the terrorist attacks on the U.S. troops and other bomb blasts in Afghanistan. Constructivism suggests that states react intrinsically to the threats of their interests. The United States claims that terrorist group in Pakistan may get on hold of nuclear technology which is a real threat for world peace, so they want Pakistan to take serious actions against militants.

In sum, the United States is pushing Pakistan to do more as they believe that Pakistan is giving sanctuaries to terrorist organizations like Haqqani network which is responsible for the terrorist attacks on the U.S. troops and other bomb blasts in

Afghanistan. Secondly, terrorists can capture nuclear technology and pose a serious threat for global peace.

2.3 Hypothesis

Based on constructivism, research produces four hypotheses featured below:

H1: Success or failure of military operation depends upon regional discourse.

H2: The resistance showed by local people of affected areas against Pakistan military depends upon the U.S. military activity against the militants in Pakistan.

H3: Success or failure of military depends upon terrorist political orientation by militants towards Pakistani government.

Above mentioned hypotheses are drawn from the idea of identities and interests as given by constructivist approach.

The first hypothesis is based upon the fundamental principle of constructivist approach which shows that people act toward objects, including other factors, based on the meanings that the objects have for them. Similarly, counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan military depends on the object which is regional discourse. Pakistani military devise their counter terrorism strategy by keeping the territory in mind where Pakistan launched operation to tackle militants. The second hypothesis is based on the concept of discursive power. According to constructivism, both discursive power which includes norms, traditions, ideas, ideology, language, etc, and material power which can be military or economic, constitute the world disposition. Discursive power works by manipulating the certain meanings and produce the desired expression. It explains how the material objects, ideas and identities of states and relationship among the states are defined. Furthermore, a state can develop two different

expressions for two states having same technology. Like the United States who produce different interpretations for Pakistan and North Korea. The former is considered as friend while later as enemy. Similarly, the nuclear weapons of Pakistan are not as threatening as that of North Korea. Similarly, success or failure of military operation depends upon terrorist political orientation of militant group and that Ideology can be manipulated as good or bad. The third hypothesis is drawn from the idea of interests. International institution is not only able to constrain state's self-interest, but also internalize new or other interests into the state. International institution has certain set of rules and parameters that are termed as international norms from which states can derive their self-interests. In international environment, states always analyse certain situation and devise the strategy based on international norms. By keeping their interest safe, Pakistani military adopt counter terrorism measures in order to prevent regional terrorism. Similarly, Pakistani military was facing suicide bombing as a result of drone strikes from the United States, not only on military troops but innocent people also, from terrorists that also pumped up Pakistani military to launch peace process.

This chapter has isolated three major causal and contributing factors behind counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan, namely, regional discourse, terrorist political orientation by militants, the U.S. military activity against the militants in Pakistan. Next chapter will place the primary research question of this study in an international context and lays the methodological foundation for testing the validity of the aforementioned factors. Moreover, next chapter also aims to discuss research design in details to collect answers of the primary and secondary research questions,

delineate the hypothesis, focus on the working definitions, discuss research methodology and conduct data analyses.



Chapter#3: Research Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This dissertation is characterized as an explorative research, given the fact that the main aim is to understand why a phenomenon occurs. In other words, when conducting an explorative research, we will generate causal variables. Moreover, the approach followed in this research is a theory testing approach which means that the study develops a theory which further leads to analysis. In other words, the approach is deductive. According to Waltz, a theory cannot be tested directly rather hypotheses which are assumed to test the validity of theory. Waltz further asserted that it is not a academic approach to accept or reject a theory quickly unless or until the required results are found. He stresses that even if a hypothesis passes all tests, no theories can be proven true (Waltz, 2010. p.14). The way forward when attempting to test a theory is to link theoretical concepts with a few variables, making it possible to deduce hypotheses and test them (Waltz, 2010, p.17). Moreover, this research is classified as case study. John Gerring defines a case study the following way (Gerring, 2004, p.341):

“For methodological purposes a case study is best defined as an in-depth study of a single unit (a relatively bounded phenomenon) where the scholar’s aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena”.

After an exhaustive review of related literature, the previous chapter has isolated four major causal and/or contributing factors behind counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan, namely, ideology of militants, regional discourse, border fencing,

and kinship. This chapter places the primary research question of this study in an international context and lays the methodological foundation for testing the validity of the aforementioned factors in the case of Pakistan. Therefore, this chapter aims to discuss research design in details to collect answers of the primary and secondary research questions, delineate the hypothesis, focus on the working definitions, discuss research methodology and conduct data analyses. The study focuses on the main research question as why the United States is asking Pakistan to ‘do more’ against terrorism despite loss of billions of dollars and weakening of socio-economic infrastructure. Further, why Pakistan is not following the United States counter terrorism strategy. Since a total of four hypotheses are derived from constructivism, which seek to either confirm or disconfirm the validity of the theory.

The methodology of given research problem is based on document analysis, surveys and in-depth interviews. Before moving forward, let us describe briefly;

- Document analysis: In document analysis, study uses secondary data including journals, newspapers and published dissertation work to support hypothesis.
- Survey: Survey research occupies central importance in applied social research. The measurement procedures that involve asking questions from respondents comes under the umbrella of survey research.
- In-depth Interviews: In-depth interview is a qualitative research technique which is used to conduct intensive individual interviews where numbers of respondents are less, and research is focused on a specific product, technique, situation or objective.

3.2 Variables

In scientific research, scientists, technicians and researchers incorporate variety of methods and variables when conducting their experiments. In simple terms, a variable represents a measureable attribute that changes across the experiment whether comparing results between multiple groups, multiple people or even when using a single person in an experiment conducted over time.

There are two types of variables which we will discuss here;

- a) Independent Variables
- b) Dependent Variables

Table 3. 1List of variables

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables
Regional Discourse	Military Operation
The U.S. military activity against the militants	The resistance showed by local people of affected areas
Terrorist political orientation by militants	Military Operation

3.2.1 Independent Variables

Independent Variables are defined as a characteristic that we (ones who are conducting the experiment) manipulate to identify a factor. Independent variables are also known as factor or prediction variable. It is noteworthy that participants are

unable to change independent variables in an experiment. Only the researchers who are conducting the experiment can control and change it.

Here, we will discuss independent variables of our research one by one;

3.2.1.1 Regional discourse

Regional discourse is the territory where Pakistan launched operation against terrorists. It can easily be understood if we look back on Soviet-Afghan War when Pakistan military supported the United States against the Soviet Union. At that time, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) became the breeding place for mujahedeen. The United States defeated the Soviet Union with the help of Pakistan. While, after 9/11, The US-led military campaign in Afghanistan dislodged the Taliban regime that they supported previously. It expanded the threat well into Pakistan. Most of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban leaders and cadre slipped into Pakistan's tribal areas, bordering Afghanistan. Initially, they had concentrated in South Waziristan and then expanded their support base in the other areas of the FATA. At the time it became difficult for Pakistani forces to launch operation against same mujahedeen whom they supported previously during Soviet-Afghan War.

3.2.1.2 The U.S. military activity against the militants

Since 9/11, the United States wanted Pakistan to accelerate the efforts against Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Initially, Pakistan started military operation against the militants but soon they realized that the capacity which they have is not sufficient to deal with terrorists. Hence, Islamabad government decided to commence peace process with Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The United States was not happy with this

strategy by Pakistan and in 2005, Washington launched drone strikes to destroy militants in the areas where they believed that terrorists got sanctuaries.

3.2.1.3 Terrorist political orientation by militants

As Pakistan supported Taliban during Soviet-Afghan War, some of them still don't want to challenge the writ of the government. Hence, Pakistan military differentiated Taliban on the basis of their ideology. Those who do not destabilize the government and want to remain peaceful are given safe exit. Some of these groups targeted with military operations and offered no peace deals like Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Al-Qaeda. While some groups offered both military operations and peace deals.

3.2.2 Dependent Variables

Dependent Variables are those values that depend on others. Dependent variables answer the question: 'What is it that we are testing?' and 'What is the measured response to various levels of the independent variable?' they are actually the outcome of the participants' actions and can be changed accordingly. The more would be the number of dependent variables, the stronger would be the results of an experiment. Further, the quantity of dependent variables in an experiment should be greater than one.

Here, we will discuss our dependent variables one by one;

3.2.2.1 Military Operation

Pakistan army started operations against terrorists in 2003 in FATA. Due to unfamiliarity of this kind of military operations, the counter terrorism strategy looks

confused and Pakistani military bore a heavy loss initially. There were many reasons i.e. novelty of this kind of operation, lack of knowledge about terrorists and unavailability of support from the local public. Around 1200 to 1500 soldiers lost their lives during the operation. Soon, Pakistan government realized that they need to change their strategy and they decided to go for negotiations with Taliban and Al-Qaeda members. Later on, peace process military operation goes side by side.

3.2.2.2 The resistance showed by local people

After 9/11, when Pakistan became the United States ally and started military operation against Taliban, there established trust deficit between army and local people as they were thinking that the United States is giving aid to the Islamic state and Pakistani military providing their services in return. The terrorism and military operations both have disturbed the lives of the residents of FATA and destroyed the internal peace of the country. Terrorists commenced suicide attacks to intimidate peace of the country. Whenever, the United States launched drone strikes in hard area, terrorists started suicide bombing to frighten army and gave a message to revise the counter terrorism strategy. The drone strikes from the U.S. are going side by side along with military operations by Pakistan. It happens in 2007, when military started operation on Red Mosque (Laal Mosque). Similarly, in 2008 and 2009, when army launched Operation Rah-e-Haq and Operation Sher Dil, there started a series of suicide attacks across the whole country. Same happens when army started Operation Zarb-e-Azb. The sole intention of suicide bombing is to disengage the military.

These variables prove instrumental in developing research concept of study upon which a measurement strategy is developed. Research concept should be precise, concise and abstract as it has a direct impact on the quality of knowledge produced by

research studies. It also contributes to the identification and delineation of scientific disciplines within which research is conducted. The counter terrorism strategy of the United States and Pakistan is divided. It seems that both of the countries plan strategies for their vested interest.

To put reasoning behind the United States' 'do more' strategy, it is mandatory to explore the counter terrorism strategy of the Islamic State. In previous chapter, the study created few hypotheses by using variables. The variables of the study will play an important role in guiding research to discover the answer of puzzling question.

The study hypothesizes that 'success or failure of Pakistani military depends upon regional discourse. Here, counter terrorism of Pakistani military is actually 'the strategy to reduce the risk of terrorism for Pakistan and its citizens, so that people can live freely with confidence' and regional discourse can be defined as 'the territory where Pakistan launched operation against terrorists'. While studying counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan, regional discourse plays an important part in devising the strategy of Pakistan military forces. In devising the strategy, Pakistan army is aware of regional situation as before 9/11 when they supported mujahedeen, the United States defeated the Soviet Union with the help of Pakistan but after 9/11 same mujahedeen became terrorists. Similarly, there came a difference in strategy of the United States after 9/11 when their campaign in Afghanistan dislodged the Taliban regime that they supported previously. History tells that tribal people have their own culture. They settle their disputes through *Jirgas* and bear no interference from outside. This part of the world remains backward for many centuries and there are prospects of lack of awareness as well. There was a possibility also that their relatives and loved ones also member of those terrorist organizations. Moreover, there is a

chance as well that local may not want Pakistani army to launch operation as they have their relatives living across border. In past, there was no hurdle in crossing border and meet with their loved ones as Pashtuns living on the Pakistani side have kinship and economic ties with people living across the border. Furthermore, higher rates of kinetic military operation make trust deficit more likely between army and local people. A democratic government always launches military operation to protect the people. In a situation when there are the prospects of trust deficit between state's army and local masses, it means people may not like military operations. There can be many factors of trust deficit. Pakistan was taking financial aid from the United States. Further, local people have their relatives in the banned terrorist organizations which were spoiling regional peace. The terrorism as well as military operations both may have disturbed the lives of the residents of FATA and destroyed the internal peace of the country. Further, cross border movement on both sides increased terrorist activities. Terrorists can easily melt in local condition and it may be difficult to recognize them as local culture suits them. There is a possibility that locals don't want fencing as they are doing cross border movement for centuries as the relatives of tribal areas live on both sides of the border. Moreover, terrorists can also disturb border fencing through terrorist activities to prevent government by doing the job.

This study further hypothesizes that 'the resistance showed by local people of affected areas against Pakistan military depends upon the U.S. military activity against the militants in Pakistan'. Suicide bombing is actually a terrorist act that comes from militant side. It can be occurring as a retaliation against government and law enforcement agencies. Terrorists want to intimidate government and try to attack arm forces and local people. The graph of suicide bombing went up when the U.S.

launched drone strikes against the militants in Pakistan. Further, suicide bombing can also be increased during military operations as terrorists want the government to change its counter terrorism policy. As suicide bombing proves not only human loss but financial loss as well in terms of loss of economy. There are prospects that trust deficit between state's army and local people can be created when innocent civilian's loss their loved ones during suicide bombings and they may build rebellious attitude to take revenge. It may also create a sense of deprivation among masses.

The dissertation hypothesizes that 'Success or failure of military depends upon terrorist political orientation by militants towards Pakistani government'. Now it is important to understand ideology of militant group here. It is the mindset of militant group working against the writ of government or not following to achieve their goals. The strategy of Pakistan military was wage as they were confused whether to launch operation against terrorists or handle the matter with negotiation and this confusion even turned the situation even worse. On one side, Pakistan started peace process with terrorists while on the other side, they were launching operation. As Pakistan did not stick to one counter terrorism strategy and it floated between military operations and peace process, it seems like they were not sure which strategy would be more fruitful and bring positive outcome. Islamabad was getting Washington's aid while their policy was ambiguous as well. For the purpose, it is important to study here whether Pakistani military made two strategies – one for good Taliban and the other one for the bad Taliban and is it possible to negotiate with the terrorists?

These concepts prove to be vital in the development of measurement strategy and achievement of results.

3.3 Devising measurement strategies

The process of measurement is important as it enables direction to research towards achieving conclusive results. The measurement of political phenomenon must be precise and accurate. Moreover, measuring research concept can have a significant impact on the findings and even leading to desired results. Further, in measuring research concept, operational definition of the concept plays a vital role in achieving the desired results. Operational definition is the empirical observation which should be developed to measure attributes and variables. The important thing is to think carefully while choosing operational definition that the definition relates closely with the meaning of original concept.

The first hypothesis is “success or failure of Pakistani military depends upon regional discourse”. Here, counter terrorism of Pakistani military is actually ‘the strategy to reduce the risk of terrorism to Pakistan and its citizens, so that people can live freely with confidence’ and regional discourse can be defined as ‘the territory where Pakistan launched operation against terrorists’. Based on these two concepts, the operational definition of counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan is the strategy which is made to keep the vested interest of the country safe by achieving maximum benefit. The operational definition of regional discourse is the number of local people who are affected as the relatives of tribal people are living on both sides of the border, in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan.

The second hypothesis is “The resistance showed by local people of affected areas against Pakistan military depends upon the U.S. military activity against the militants in Pakistan”. Here, the resistance showed by local people of affected is actually ‘a bomb attacks or other means carried out by local people, especially

terrorists, who intends or expects to kill themselves as well as other people' and the U.S. military activity is actually drone strikes which Washington launched to destroy militants who got sanctuaries in affected areas. On the Basis of these two concepts, the operational definition of the resistance showed by local people of affected areas in Pakistan is suicide bombing to persuade Pakistani as well as the U.S. military to change their counter terrorism strategy. The operational definition of the U.S. military activity is the number of drone strikes launched by the U.S. army in hard areas.

The third hypothesis of the study is that success or failure of military depends upon terrorist political orientation by militants towards Pakistani government. Here, the study sets the definition of two concepts - military operation and ideology of militant group. Military operation can be defined as "the coordinated military action against militants" while ideology of militant group is "mindset of militant group working against the writ of government or not". These definitions would be used to develop operational definition of the two concepts and this operational definition would indicate what should be observed empirically to measure both military operation and ideology of militant group. This method provides us direction what data should be collected. Here, operational definition of military operation is "the number of military operations launched by Pakistani army against the militants" and operational definition of ideology of militant groups is "number of peace process between Pakistani military and the militant groups.

The observations described above are generally be used as the basis for an empirical test of the hypothesis. The measurement strategies here could detect and measure the presence and amount of the concept in question.

3.3.1 Alternative-form method

It is a form of method to measure reliability by calculating the same attribute more than once. This form of method uses two different measurement techniques rather than one. Here, to assess counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan, the dissertation uses both primary and secondary data and makes comparison between them after collection of findings. Further, different questionnaire from same person also play important role in checking the reliability of the measurement technique.

Further, validity refers to the degree of correspondence between the measure and the concept it is thought to measure. In order to check the validity, the study conducts survey and collect relevant information closely related to research concept by asking questions from respondents of various field. In this research simple technique of descriptive statistics will be used to build causal relations between the variables.

3.4 Data Collection

The research goals are achieved by conducting an in-depth, single-case study on the counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan. This entails a detailed investigation of the given phenomena within a specific context using a variety of data collected from respondents of various fields, i.e. military persons, political analysts, media persons, students, local affectees. The aim is to provide an analysis of the context and processes that illuminate the theoretical issues being studied in last chapter. Critics of the case study method point out that the study of a small number of cases can offer no grounds for establishing reliability or generality of findings. Others feel that the sole focus on the study of one case biases the findings. Some analysts also criticise this

approach as merely an ‘exploratory tool’⁷. However, the case study has its own strength in exploring a case and hypothesis in its entirety⁸. Since the proposed research is not planned to generalise to other contexts, the in-depth single-case study approach is the most appropriate way to gain a comprehensive understanding of counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan. Instead of presenting anecdotal evidence to support the research claims, the systematic research design is based on qualitative methods. Data is analysed using descriptive statistics in order to understand socio-economic background of counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan. Qualitative methods, intended to add value to study, include comprehensive descriptions of an opportunity sub-sample of local respondents, students, media and army personals (based on surveys and in-depth interviews). To ensure a representative sample, it was crucial to conduct interviews with respondents belonging to diverse socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds. However, the study was given access to interview military persons but serving military respondents can be biased as the answer may affect their careers. Individual biasness and limitations of self-reporting also came across as another hurdle to gathering accurate information from respondents as some of the interviews were conducted on telephone. Therefore, the study tried to conduct as many interviews as he can in order to draw the authenticity of the research. Interview from the locals were conducted in Sawat, Bonair, Malakand, and from seven agencies of FATA. These were the parts which were severely afflicted from militancy.

Moreover, all the interviews from the locals of affected areas were conducted in Urdu, the national language of Pakistan. As a Pakistani citizen, I speak fluent Urdu

⁷ School of Information, University of Texas. *The Case Study as a Research Method*, University of Texas <<http://www.ischool.utexas.edu/~ssoy/usesusers/l391d1b.htm>>.

⁸ Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Cornell University Press, 1997) 53.

and am also adequately aware of Punjabi and Seraiki, two widely spoken local languages of Pakistan. Knowledge of local languages enabled the researcher to conduct interviews without engaging an interpreter. I asked both implicit and explicit question to get the clear opinion from the respondents. Similarly, interviews with the military persons were also limited to seeking relevant information, which could be made public without compromising their professional code of conduct. Prior to conducting interviews, the respondents from all categories were asked whether they had any objections in revealing their identities for the purpose of the thesis. For those who preferred their identities to be concealed, I respected this request and concealed the identity of the interviewee within the thesis. The interviewee had the full right to request the interviewer to terminate it at any time during the interview. Any accounts that have not been cited or recorded during the interviews have not been referenced in the thesis.

To get a clear picture of the counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan, the study tried to collect data from secondary sources as well as local respondents can be biased towards military as Pakistan army is working in the affected areas of NWFP and Baluchistan Province. Second, respondents from military can also be biased due to their professional career. Moreover, this study feels it necessary to compare the results from both the segments of case study (Document analysis and In-depth interviews) and a better analysis can be put forward. These and some other reasons motivated me to collect data from both primary and secondary sources.

The analysis of counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan draws on a dataset derived from a convenience sample of 130 respondents (50 military persons, 50 media respondents and 30 political analysts) for interviews and 300 respondents (100

locals and 200 students of counter terrorism strategy) for survey. Military persons provided valuable information as what kind of retaliation they were facing during operations and how the mindset of jihadi groups was working against writ of the state. Survey on locals was also helpful in understanding their problems and behavior of Pakistani military with them. They also provided information on the hurdles which army faced while doing military operation. The data collected from surveys and interviews provided important insights for statistical analysis.

Secondary sources including research articles, newspapers and official web pages of international organizations provided supplementary discernment on research question, but secondary data imparted incomplete information about the subject and relevant information were missing. This was inferred through interviews with the officers and locals involved in investigating individuals and proved instrumental in accomplishing the study.

3.5 Data Analysis

Data collected through online and field research was examined and analysed for the presence or absence of the variables identified in the literature review. The result is a comprehensive, in-depth account of counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan, based on qualitative analysis. In accordance with the analysis, the phenomenon of counter terrorism is analysed at domestic and national level. Organising data according to different levels of analysis provided important insights into the relative impact of the different variables (ideology of terrorist, regional discourse and the effect of drone strikes from the U.S.) at different levels. Open-ended interviews conducted with security experts, academics and journalists were useful for the

analytical process of counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan and locals' problems. In order to investigate the causal factors among variables, interviews with security personals and locals through field research and online sources provided useful insights. A review of readily available academic and journalistic publications, historical evidence, assessments of security services and a chronology of military operations with relevant details also complemented the understanding of the counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan.

Data analysis helped to answer many important questions regarding counter terrorism in Pakistan. The analysis of secondary data and interviews of Pakistani military officials and local affectees were utilised to develop an understanding of the motivations and factors running behind counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan.

This chapter gives an account of empirical tools used in this study and how research design will be performed. In next chapter, the study presents descriptive analysis of case study of Pakistan's military operations after 9/11. It will help the study to develop understandings of variables triggering the counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan. Moreover, next chapter also examines the counter terrorism measures taken by Pakistani military to subjugate militancy.

Chapter#4: Case Study of Military Operations

4.1 Introduction

The case study is performed by two kinds of research methodologies i.e. Document analysis which is conducted via secondary data and Surveys and In-depth Interviews via primary data.

4.2 A case study of military operations

Geo-strategic US-Pak relationships are not innovative, but it has a long history of past six decades. Most of the United States involvement in Pakistan is to reinstall the democratization process. After 9/11, both the United States and Pakistan come into close context and work together against terrorism and extremism. This study will analyse the relationships during Afghan War and then after 9/11 attacks.

4.2.1 Pakistan – A breeding place for mujahidin during Soviet-Afghan War

In order to analyse, how War on Terror turned to war of survival, it is essential to take a look on historical event briefly. During Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989), Geo-strategic location of Pakistan helps the United States to curtail the expansion of communist Soviet Union. Constructivism suggests that states define their interests through the process of defining or evaluating a particular situation and the United States was very much concerned for the territorial expansion of Soviet Union. For this purpose, Washington required supports from Pakistan. The Islamic state provided sanctuaries to Taliban commanders and raised a movement of jihad against Soviet

Union. Initially, the strength of invading army was 30,000 but it increased later on to 100,000. While, in contrast, the quantity of mujahidin was 200,000. In the start, there were guerrilla wars between mujahidin and Soviet Union troops but later on, with the involvement of the U.S., mujahidin got more sophisticated weapons to fight against Soviet Union's army. War continued for almost 10 years and the U.S. funded with the net worth of \$2.1 billion during this period. Osama Bin Laden was also a part of mujahidin (Reidel, 2010). The assistance of CIA included latest anti-aircraft missiles and stinger missiles which have the capacity to bring down the Soviet Union aircraft and helicopters. Mujahidin were succeeded to push back army with the help of CIA, but war posed catastrophic effect on Afghanistan and they paid a heavy price in shape of the death of more than 90,000 of Afghan people including mujahidin, local people and government officials. Around 1.5% populations of Afghan people killed overall. They most devastating effect of the war on neighbouring countries was the migration of Afghan refugees. Around six million people were migrated to nearby countries and almost 95% of them moved to Pakistan and Iran. This was the second largest refugee migration after Syrian refugees. It was a difficult task for Pakistan to deal with such a large number of refugees (Reidel, 2010).

4.2.2 Pakistan and the war on terrorism

According to constructivism, states define their interest in a particular situation. After 9/11, interests of the United States were changed, and freedom fighters of 80s became terrorists now. The U.S. started its military campaign in October 2001 to dislodge terrorists in Afghanistan and the threats are well proliferated in Pakistan also. Many of Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders fled from their country and got sanctuaries in federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region of Pakistan

(Ahmed 2014). By 2003, they joined with tribal militant group and a loose alliance under the leadership of Nek Mohammad Wazir came into being in South Waziristan. They started terrorist activities in that region and, with the passage of time, got expanded into settled areas and big cities to produce widespread fear (Ahmed, 2014).

The United States declared War on Terror in Afghanistan and they needed full support from Pakistan. Islamabad knew its geo-strategic importance for Washington against Al-Qaeda. To deal with the terrorists, the U.S. entered into Afghanistan, and Pakistan provided support in shape of logistics assistance, sharing intelligence information, capturing and giving back to the United States. Christian Fair wrote in her book that American officials acknowledges the services of Pakistan against global terrorism and said that Pakistani support against global terrorism in terms of catching terrorists and providing troops is matchless. Above all, Pakistan provided their two naval air bases to the United States to deal with the militants (Fair, 2004, p. 27).

4.2.3 Taliban found safe heavens in Pakistan

Both the countries, i.e. Pakistan and Afghanistan are demarcated by 2640km long Durand Line. The important thing is that anybody can cross the border without getting visa as the border line is not fenced. After 9/11, when the United States attacked Afghanistan, most of the Pashtuns crossed the border line and hide themselves in FATA of Pakistan and Osama Bin Laden was also among them. It is to be noted that majority of the Pashtuns were already living there and it was not difficult for immigrants to melt themselves among the people who already lived there. It is also important to mention here that FATA was the most disowned region of Pakistan before 2001 attacks and there was already an atmosphere discontentment among the local masses. So, after moving here, immigrants took the region as a

breeding place to unite their movement and provoked the locals to start 'Jihad' against the U.S. Soon after, the region became the recruitment centre of terrorists who trained the youth and injected Talibanization into them. Soon, the trained youth spread into different districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and started terrorist activities. The sole purpose of the movement is to support Afghan Taliban against the U.S. forces. It took almost five years for Taliban to unite the radical-minded people in Afghanistan and Pakistan and started insurgencies, but Islamabad officials take this case in a different way (Ashraf, 2011).

It was the Pashtuns belt which affected most. During Russia-Afghan war, the place was used to train mujahedeen. Pashtuns knew that mujahedeen believe on hardcore religious ideology which was contrary to their culture. So, there is a group of progressive Pashtuns who thought after entering the Taliban again after 9/11 attacks that another war might hit their grounds. As a result, Pashtun nationalists and their elders stood up against Taliban, but before the victory of military operation in Swat Valley in 2009, they paid a heavy price.

4.2.4 Military operations in Pakistan after 9/11

Constructivism suggests that every state devise their counter terrorism strategy according to regional discourse. Initially, Pakistan army started operations against terrorists in 2003 in FATA and the first operation was Operation *Al-Mizan*. The operation continues until 2006 when Pakistan Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf sent around 70,000 to 80,000 army personnel to FATA. Pakistan military bore a heavy loss in this operation due to the novelty of this kind of operation, lack of knowledge about terrorists and lack of support from the local public. Around 1200 to 1500 soldiers lost their lives during the operation. Soon, Pakistan government realized

that they need to change their strategy. In 2006, Pakistan military decided to go for negotiations with Taliban and Al-Qaeda members who promised to go for ceasefire both in Pakistan and Afghanistan but as a result of the U.S. drone attacks, Taliban did not keep their words and started building their rebellious agenda. The terrorists developed their base in Swat Valley also. In November 2007, army started operation *Rah-e-Haq* against terrorists called Tahrik-e-nafaz-e-sharat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM). The operation ended after peace accord named Malakand Accord between the government and TNSM (Nabi, 2016).

It is to be noted that FATA have seven agencies named Khyber Agency, Kurram Agency, Bajaur Agency, Mohmand Agency, Orakzai Agency, North Waziristan and South Waziristan. These were the places where militants were hiding. In January 2008, Pakistani forces started operation in South Waziristan Agency against TTP Commander Baitullah Mehsud and his followers. For this, around 200,000 people were displaced, and military demolished almost 40,000 houses. Pakistan military also started Operation *Sher-e-Dil* side by side in Sep 2008, in Bajaur Agency to kill terrorists. 1000 militants were killed, and 63 security persons lost their lives during this operation. Army also launched Operation *Sirat-e-Mustaqeem* in Bara Tehsil of Khyber Agency in July 2008 against Lashkar-e-Islam. Soon, military took over the control of these agencies (Nabi, 2016).

Furthermore, after the failure of Malakand Accord in Swat Valley, Pakistan army launched Operation *Rah-e-Rast* in May 2009 and soon got the control. In Oct 2009, operation *Rah-e-Nijaat* was started in South Waziristan to destruct terrorist base. In order to destroy militants in Kurram Agency, military started Operation *Koh-e-Sufaid* in July 2011 against Sunni extremists. Till 2012, Pakistan military controlled

most of the Malakand Division and agencies of FATA. The only remaining part of FATA where terrorists were present was North Waziristan. Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani did not give green signal to start operation in that area because of opposition of local inhabitants and lack of army proficiency to handle such a large operation. But when Raheel Shareef succeeded Kiyani, he gave command to start operation and finally, Operation *Zarb-e-Azb* was started in June 2014. It was one of the largest operations in the history of Pakistan and continued for almost two years. The operation started against all the major terrorists' group, including TTP, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, East Turkestan Islamic Movement, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Al-Qaeda, Jundallah and the Haqqani Network. Pakistan military used the slogan "Seek, Destroy, Clear, Hold". Pakistan military got visible success in operation *Zarb-e-Azb*. Around 3400 terrorists were killed 837 of their houses were demolished and almost 21193 terrorists were arrested. Fig. 3 shows the declining of terrorist incidents after operation *Zarb-e-Azb*.

Pakistan military paid a heavy price for this. 488 officers lost their lives and almost 1914 got injured. There was a vivid increase in security situation after this operation (Nabi, 2016). Although, Pakistan military got success in military operations, but their officials claimed that some of the terrorists have been run to Afghanistan and hide them there. Terrorists also attacked Army Public School on Dec 16, 2014 and later on, Pakistan army claimed that terrorists came from Afghanistan. After operation, Pakistan army got visible clues of cross border infiltration (Nabi, 2016). On May 12, 2017, there was a firing from the Khost province of Afghanistan and two Frontier Constabulary (FCB) soldiers were injured. After Lal Shahbaz Qalander⁹ attacks and

⁹ The shrine of famous religious personality named Lal Shahbaz Qalander.

following attacks across country, Pakistan military blaming Afghan-based Pakistani terrorists doing these infiltrations. On May 18, 2017, Pakistan military claimed that they have satellite images and ground evidences that show terrorists' involvement from Afghanistan (Mohanty 2017). Lieutenant Colonel Haroon of the Pakistan Army claimed that according to evidences, Parchow in Nangarhar Province of Afghanistan was used for terrorist activities by TTP, Khalid Sajna and Deaesh groups (Mohanty, 2017).

Here, research also evaluates the counter terrorism strategy of the United States based on financial aid provided by Washington to Islamabad, in order to counter the militant activities. Table 4.1 shows the financial assistance provided by the United States to Pakistan from 2001 to 2019.

Table 4. 1Financial assistance from the United States

Sr. No.	Year	Financial aid (\$)
1	2001	\$177m
2	2002	\$831m
3	2003	\$563m
4	2004	\$401m
5	2005	\$712m
6	2006	\$888m
7	2007	\$824m
8	2008	\$873m
9	2009	\$1.2b

10	2010	\$2.7b
11	2011	\$1.9b
12	2012	\$1.2b
13	2013	\$812m
14	2014	\$1.0b
15	2015	\$1.1b
16	2016	\$780m
17	2017	\$837m
18	2018	\$367m
19	2019	\$129m

Source: USAID, <https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/PAK>

Table 4.1 shows that after 2010, the U.S. gradually cut down the financial aid. It was the time when President Obama clearly said that financial aid should be attached with the performance of Pakistan and he wanted the Islamic State to ‘do more’ against terrorist groups. Moreover, Figure 4.1 shows the number of incidents over a period.




Figure 4. 1 Attacks from 1986 to 2017

Source: Global Terrorism Database (GTD),

<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=overtime&search=Pakistan>




Figure 4. 2 Financial Aid vs. Terrorist Incidents Source: USAID, GTD

Figure 4.2 shows that relationship between the financial aid and the number of incidents is directly proportional. The United States increases the financial aid from 2005 to 2013 which give a boost to terrorist incidents. As soon as, the financial aid decreases, the number of terrorist attacks also decreases.

4.2.5 Good Taliban vs. Bad Taliban

The United States want Pakistan to “do more” against the terrorists. Apart from Afghan conflict, they want to ensure safe control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, averting the major Pak-India conflict, check on Pakistan not to proliferate nuclear technology. Hence, they want Pakistan to do more against militants.

As mentioned above, ideas shape identities according to constructivism. Pakistan differentiated Taliban on the basis of their ideology. Those who carried similar thoughts were given safe exit. In order to analyse, we try to see the strategy of Pakistan army towards the militants. From 2002-2013, Pakistan army conducted almost 57 large-scale operations against nine militants’ groups (Staniland, Mir and Lalwani, 2015, p.6). Some of these groups targeted with military operations and offered no peace deals like Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Al-Qaeda. While some groups offered both military operations and peace deals. By contrast, Haqqani network was the only terrorist organization which received no military operation but one peace deal. Figure 4.3 and 4.4 show the violence, number of military operations and peace deals in FATA (Staniland, Mir and Lalwani, 2015, p.7)

Furthermore, Pakistan army distinguishes the militants group on their ideological basis and their role which should be helpful for them in Afghanistan, India and in their country also.

From the Figure 4.5, it is clearly evident that Pakistan military did not take any action against Haqqani networks and Gul bahadur group is on second number and this situation is hurting the United States in Afghanistan.




Figure 4. 3Violence in FATA

Source: Staniland, Mir and Lalwani 2015, p.8




Figure 4. 4 Military Operations and peace deals in FATA

Source: Staniland, Mir and Lalwani, 2015, p.7




Figure 4. 5 Military operations and peace deals from 2007 to 2013

Source: Staniland, Mir and Lalwani, 2015, p.8

4.2.6 Border fencing and cross border terrorist activities

The length of Pak-Afghan border line is measured approximately 2640 kilometres. The line is not clear-cut and well-defined and local population on both sides of border considered it as hypothetical. They cross the border without paying attention to government rules (Shah, 2013, p.86).

Moreover, there is no formal jurisdiction from both of the government who control the movements across border. Another reason, that local people do not take border line seriously, is that line runs through local towns and villages of Pashtuns community who have common culture, norms, traditions, language, etc. They live on one side of the border and their agriculture lands are present on the other side of the border (Shah, 2013, p.87). Similarly, the relatives of Pashtuns community live on

both sides of the border. These people cross border on daily basis and do not indulge in any formalities (Shah, 2013).

Some important tribes living along the Durand Line are the Afridis, who live mainly in Khyber, Tirah, Chorah Bazar, Kohat Pass and some areas of Ningrahar; the Shinwaris in the Khyber Pass and near the banks of the Kunarh river and Sirobi; the Mohmands in Peshawar and at Lalpura, Asmar (Kunarh) and Dhakka in the Ningrahar; Mangals in Kurram Agency and in Paktika; Wazirs, who are further divided in Ahmadzai Wazirs in South Waziristan and the Utmanzai Wazirs in North Waziristan, live in Birmal, Shawal, Shakai, Razmak, Khaisora Valley, Shaktu, Wana and Badar; the Mahsuds live in Kaniguram and Makin; the Daurs are concentrated mostly in the Miranshah, Mirali and Datta Khel areas; Achakzais are in Gulistan and Kandahar; and the Barech in Nushki and in Afghanistan. The major non-Pashtun ethnic groups living adjacent to the Durand Line include the Wakhi, Khow, Kirgihiz, Tajik, Kalash, Sarikuli, Yedgha and Bash-gali, who live mainly in Chitral, Wakhan, Kunarh, Nuristan, Kamdesh, Bamburet and the Barir Valley (Shah, 2013, p.88).

After the United States invasion in Afghanistan, Taliban leadership crossed the border line and regroup them in tribal areas of Pakistan for launching cross border incursion against NATO forces (Shah, 2013, p.98). The succeeding development damaged tribal structure badly and led to the elimination of the tribal social elite, a weakening of political authority, destruction of the educational system, undermining of the cultural institutions, including the *Jirga* and *hujra* and mosques, and the displacement of thousands of families; together the developments have spread havoc across the region. This once isolated, but otherwise peaceful area has become the most dangerous area in the world. The hijacking of the tribal system by foreign

militants, who are better trained and well-financed, and the destruction of the tribal social fabric continues to badly affect the region as a whole (Shah, 2013).

Pakistani President, General Pervez Musharraf suggested fencing on Pak-Afghan border to keep check on unauthorized movement of people. He thought that fencing would enable Pakistan to restrict illegal activities happening across Pak-Afghan border (Shah, 2013). Moreover, Durand Line is very long, and it is not possible to fence the whole area. At the same time, there are certain parts of the line which does not require any barrier as those areas are hard to cross. So, it was decided that fencing would only be built only on those areas which can be utilized for movement. In addition to blocking the entry of unauthorized people into Pakistan, the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan has also enabled illegal traders to smuggle all sorts of goods into Pakistan, including electronics. A considerable part of the goods imported by Afghanistan under the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement between the two countries has been smuggled back into Pakistan. While the Pakistani authorities demanded the fencing of the border, because they were convinced that it would stop illegal entry into Pakistan, fencing has serious implications for Afghanistan (Shah, 2013, p.99). The Afghan authorities see this as a clever Pakistani move to convert a “controversial” line into a permanent international border under the pretext of stopping cross-border terrorism by enlisting the support of the US. Afghanistan has never, according to the Afghan sources, accepted this as a settled border. They always considered it as “imposed” upon them by the imperialists and were never reconciled to the division of the Pashtuns into three parts (Shah, 2013).

There also came strong opposition from Afghan side and President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai considered this move as impracticable and unserviceable.

He further said that Pashtuns and other families live on both sides of the border and any kind of barrier on Pak-Afghan border may divide them which are unjustifiable. He further claimed that fencing would not prevent terrorists rather it may divide different tribes and families living across border area (Shah, 2013, p.100). Further, there came a strong reaction from Pakistani side and nationalists from Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan province opposed this move and termed it unacceptable as fencing the border is not social and economic interests of the ethnic Pashtun tribes. Further, Muttahida Majlis Amal, a group of religious parties who were in then in government both in Pashtunkhwa and Balochistan, also disapproves it.

People of the tribal areas met on Afghan side and demanded that the government stop doing fencing. On 8 January about 8,000 people protested in Paktika and about 500 protested in Kunarh. On 15 January the local branch of Awami National Party organized about 2,000 tribesmen in Chaman. A conference of Baloch political parties held in Quetta also opposed the fencing of the border and termed it as “a conspiracy against the tribesmen straddling the border” and showed their solidarity with the Pashtun political parties who opposed the fencing of the Durand Line (Shah, 2013). Not content with this, on 10 January 2007, the Afghan government wrote a formal letter to the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and expressed deep concerns over the fencing of the border (Shah, 2013).

In April and May 2007, clashes erupted between the troops of the two countries over the fencing of the border. The Afghans accused Pakistan of legalizing the Durand Line by implementing its fencing project. The Afghan Defense Ministry spokesmen confirmed that the Afghan troops were tearing down the fences near the Durand Line that separates the two countries when they were fired on by the Pakistani

troops, the Afghans only retaliated with small arms in self-defense (Shah, 2013). The exact number of deaths is not known, but a careful estimate put it at about 20, the majority on the Afghan side (Shah, 2013). The Afghans regarded it as a seizure of their territory by Pakistan. However, the Pakistan government denied these allegations, and made it clear that they had no intention of occupying Afghan territory. They also reiterated that they were determined to stop the cross-border infiltration and would utilize all resources under their control and within their reach and go ahead with the fencing of the border at an appropriate time.

Many other countries including the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, Sweden, etc., interceded and convinced Pakistan that fencing may further deteriorate the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Rather than fencing, Pakistan should develop effective border control mechanisms and the countries will provide incentives for it (Shah, 2013). They promised to provide Pakistan with a mini mobile radar system, which Pakistan called “the most suitable technology because of its state-of-the-art capability to check such movements within the radius of five kilometers area” (Shah, 2013). But there was not seen any development in the plan and the project was relinquished. The authorities of Pakistan again decided to construct fencing instead to rely on mini Radar system.

Due to heavy operations in FATA, Pakistani army deployed more than 100,000 troops there and claimed to have around 240 security check posts, while Afghans, on the other side, only have 100 check posts. Interestingly, three major towns, including Chaman and Ghaznali, are located half in Pakistani and half in Afghanistan. In addition to the famous Khyber Pass route leading via Torkham into Afghanistan, there are about 128 frequently and infrequently used routes between

Pakistan and Afghanistan, which need to be checked properly to control the cross-border movement of unwanted people (Shah, 2013, p.101). However, due to the strict vigilance on the Pakistani side, cross-border activity has been substantially reduced. Fewer border security arrangements on the Afghan side have not been enough to restrict the movement from the other side. It has been labelled a very difficult task which would “take an inordinate amount of resources” (Shah, 2013). Commenting on the issue of the fencing of the Durand Line, a top Pentagon official, Colonel Viet Luong, Commander Task Force Rakkasan and 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, said that (Shah, 2013)

“It’s naive to say that we can stop, you know, forces coming through the border”. “In order to secure the border, as well – as you know, it takes a lot. It takes efforts on the other side, by the Pakistanis.” He was aware of the peculiar situation. “To secure the border in the traditional sense, if you’re talking about, you know, like what we would do along our own border with Mexico down in the south western United States, that’s not what we’re doing. It takes an inordinate amount of resources and force to be able to do that”, he said. “You can look at this as a defense in depth, whereby you have your frontline defenders, which are – which really starts on the Pakistani side of the house, by the way. They have hundreds of border checkpoints across backed up by dozens of checkpoints on our side that’s manned by Afghan border police, and then we back those guys up with the US and ANA forces, really to hand over the border piece to the Afghan border police”.

4.3 Consequences of ‘do more’ strategy

Both, the U.S. and Pakistan are facing deadlock as the former, insisting to do more against Taliban and Haqqanis while later, asserting that it had already done a lot. This is not a good sign for both countries. The policy may result in some significant consequences in relationship between them.

4.3.1 Impasse relation between the United States and Pakistan

History claims that this is not the first time that the U.S. is building pressure on Pakistan. In 2011, the cooperation between Obama administration and Pakistani government was at the lowest level as the U.S. got conclusive evidences of presence of Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad and killed him in a secret operation. After that, Washington suspended the major portion of Pakistani aid, but the strategy did not turn out to bring a major shift in counter-terrorism strategy of Pakistan. In this regard, former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Bill Milam, said (Seftel, 2018):

The U.S. started withholding our goodies from Pakistan in 1965, when President Lyndon Johnson cut off most of our military assistance to Pakistan when it attacked India. We cut off most assistance, both military and aid, when President George H.W. Bush could no longer certify, as required by the 1985 Pressler Amendment that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device, and when those sticks didn't work. We tried to use a huge assistance package as an irresistible carrot to get Pakistan to confirm completely to our way of thinking in the fight against terrorism, including in Afghanistan. The results are clear – none of it worked. Pakistan marches to its own beat.

Following the Trump tweets on do more, when Washington abruptly cut down the military aid to Pakistan, there came a strong reaction on social media saying that the U.S. allegations are unjust (Khan, A 2018). In response, Pakistani government also claimed that Trump administration's criticisms are baseless. They continued that the Islamic state sacrificed a lot in war against terrorism and gave full support to the U.S. and international community against Islamist group in Afghanistan. However, many experts and political thinkers claim that Pakistani military is using some of the militants as strategic assets against India and Afghan government, but Pakistani army do not comply with these allegations (Shams, 2018). The U.S. knows that the role of Pakistan is vital in war against terrorism in Afghanistan and any instability in either country will not be in favour of both Islamabad and Kabul.¹⁰

Furthermore, on the future prospects of Pak-U.S. relations, Anthony H. Cordesman is the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) said (Seftel, 2018):

The practical issues affecting any hardline approach towards Pakistan are (a) what can the U.S. actually do that will matter enough to really change Pakistani behaviour, and (b) what will happen if the Pakistanis respond by limiting U.S. access to Pakistan's airspace. Ports and land routes; giving more freedom of action and support to the Taliban and other threats to Afghanistan; and/or tilting even more towards China.

Moreover, Pakistan military spokesman Maj. Gen. Asif Ghafoor said to Voice of America that suspension of aid from the U.S. will not affect Pakistan in fighting

¹⁰ Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, taken from Wikipedia, viewed on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghanistan%E2%80%93Pakistan_relations

against terrorism, but it will, surely affect the security cooperation between both the countries (Bengali, Wilkinson and Sahi, 2018).

4.3.2 Effect on the U.S.-China relations

China has made billions of investments in Pakistan in the form of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and it would be wrong to assume that China will be happy to see the deteriorating relations between Washington and Islamabad (Panda 2018). There are multiple reasons as why China won't be glad on declining relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan. Firstly, CPEC carries substantial importance for China as well as Pakistan.

China is one of the biggest economies of the world while Pakistan is struggling to eradicate terrorism and bring the economy on the right track. One of the biggest reasons behind huge investment is that China wants peace in Pakistan and Afghanistan as Chinese province may also hit by the rampant terrorism prevailed in his neighbouring countries. Along with, China will also get huge profits as the power project would be run by the Chinese companies. These projects provide a route to China to Middle East through Arabian Sea and the shipment which took 45 days previously will take 10 days now and they can save time and cost by this investment (Mustafa and Zafar, 2017).

Moreover, increasing U.S.-India relations may raise China's concerns of security in the region.¹¹ A Swedish-based think-tank, Stockholm International peace Research Institute, released a report on Indian concerns over CPEC. They asserted that Indian

¹¹ The United States and India: forging an indispensable democratic partnership, viewed at <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2018/01/14/444786/united-states-india-forging-indispensable-democratic-partnership/>

opposition of CPEC is because of internationalization of Kashmir dispute and Chinese involvement in Indian Ocean. India believed that China was neutral since 2013 and no longer be neutral now due to its economic interests in region (Shah, 2017).

4.3.3 Hurting both the U.S. and Pakistan in Afghanistan

Experts believe that Washington can't gain the ultimate goals by putting pressure on Islamabad to do more against terrorists. A senior expert on Pakistan at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Moeed Yusuf, claimed that the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan are in serious trouble and the situation may harm them in Afghanistan. He asserted that

"The mistrust is so deep and that is going to be very difficult for both sides to work a way out in which they would essentially rely on each other, trusting that they would be sincere to whatever is being done. On both sides the default position is one that is very sceptical of the intentions on the other side,"¹²

Like the U.S., Pakistan also needs stability in Afghanistan due to many reasons. Firstly, Islamabad already has hostile relation with New Delhi and can't afford to open another avenue of hostility on its western border. Secondly, Pakistan maintains that Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Indian intelligence agency (RAW) are using Afghan land to carry out terrorist activities in Baluchistan.¹³ Thirdly, Pakistan wants to reach central Asian Republics (CARs) for trade but the borders are separated by Afghanistan. Fourthly, a large number of Afghan refugees are resided in Pakistan. In

¹² The Economic Times, 12 July, 2018

¹³ The Express Tribune, 23 November, 2017 viewed at <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1566348/1-ttp-daish-jamatul-ahrar-using-afghan-soil-terror-activities-pakistan-fo/>

order to send them back to their country, stable Afghanistan is very important. Although, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration Situation, Nancy Izzo Jackson said that current situation in Afghanistan is not suitable for Afghan refugees to return to their home. But toxic relations between the U.S. and Pakistan would hurt both the countries in Afghanistan (Ali, 2018).

4.3.4 Following regional-based counter-terrorism policy

The counter-terrorism strategy of Pakistan is based on good and bad Taliban. The government continues to celebrate peace accord with militant group carrying identical ideology.¹⁴ In due course, Washington administration already threatened Islamabad to put sanctions. On recent situation, Daniel S. Markey, who is a senior research professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and the academic director of the Global Policy program, argued that (Seftel, 2018):

There are a couple of things that are missing from the Trump administration's approach right now. One is evidence of a commitment by the administration to just how far it is willing to push. The Pakistanis are pretty skilled at girding themselves for irritations from the U.S. and the aid cut-offs or slowdowns. They can weather all of that. The question is, do we have other pressure tactics that we're actually willing to use – things like denying them to international financial institutions and resources that go well beyond U.S. assistance. Just how mean are we willing to get? On the other side, just how

¹⁴ Government will celebrate peace accord with those militant group who act upon its' manifesto

committed are we to the fight in Afghanistan in ways that would get Pakistan, over time, to see that its interest is in aligning itself with what our strategy is? That is, if they began to believe that the most likely solution in Afghanistan was one in which the Afghan Taliban were either brought to the table or brought into a political processor ultimately defeated, then they would probably be more inclined to get behind that effort themselves and support it. But for the time being and for as long as I can remember, I think they've suspected that the U.S. would with a job half-finished and would leave the problem in their lap. Given those assumptions, the idea that they would turn against some of their militant allies like the Afghan Taliban and that Haqqani network, seems less compelling. So that's where we're stuck.

4.3.5 Alliance with China and Russia

After amid allegations from Washington, Pakistan may turn towards new alliances. It is a matter of fact that over two decades, both Pakistan and Russia were against each other due to conflict of interests. But it is back story now. In addition, China is doing billions of investments in CPEC project. Moreover, China, Russia and Pakistan have their own strategic interest in Afghanistan and all of them want stability in the region which may persuade them to make an alliance.

In 2017, Russia hosted some meeting in which Pakistani and Chinese officials participated to discuss the Afghan War to find out the solution. Right now, the biggest threat to Russia and China is the emergence of Islamic State (IS) in Afghanistan and terrorism can easily move to Russia. Furthermore, unstable Afghanistan is also not in favour of Pakistan and China. On the other side, the U.S. and India signed an agreement called Logistic Exchange Memorandum of

agreement (LEMOA), which allow Indian market to access to the U.S. weapon (Maqsood, 2017). In order to counter the threat, Pakistan may go for alliance with Russia and China.

CPEC is not only a trade route but the development of many projects. Both China and Pakistan are already cooperating in many fields like infrastructure, energy, agriculture and communication. Experts claim that CPEC triangle of China, Russia and Pakistan can be the game changer in Southeast Asian politics (Ablaza, 2017). But the question is whether Russia will join the project as Moscow have very close relationship with New Delhi and Russia remain the key weapon supplier in past. Political pundits assert that Russia may leave India behind. In this context, Russian Intelligence Chief Alexander Bogdanov already visited Gwader and showed interest to be the part of this project (Maqsood, 2017). Moreover, both Pakistan and Russia want to strength their defence and military relationship.

Furthermore, U.S.-India-Afghanistan nexus convince Pakistan to shift towards China and to some extent on Russia for fulfilment of its defence needs. On October 9th, 2017, former Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi at that time clearly said that the country will find new sources for the completion of its defence needs rather than depend on the U.S. (Ahmar, 2017).

4.4 Analysis of case study of military operations

Study revealed that Pakistan paid the price in war on terror after 9/11 as the Islamic country was not ready to fight against the people whom they gave training during Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989). Moreover, the interests of the United States were not the same towards Pakistan after 9/11 as it was before. During Soviet-Afghan

war, Geo-strategic location of Pakistan helps the United States to curtail the expansion of communist Soviet Union. Pakistan became breeding place for mujahedeen and trained and equipped them with latest weapons to fight against the Soviet Union. While, after 9/11, interests of the United States were changed, and freedom fighters of 80s became terrorists. The U.S. started its military campaign in October 2001 to dislodge terrorists in Afghanistan and the threats are well proliferated in Pakistan. Many of Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders fled from their country and got sanctuaries in federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region of Pakistan. The strategy applied by Islamabad against militants was not fruitful and bore heavy loss by the Islamic state. Tab 4.1 and Fig, 4.2 shows that foreign funding posed negative effect of the counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan. During first decade, the graph of the United States' funding is moving upward and so on the graph of terror incidents. Similarly, due to unfamiliarity of the war, Pakistan also launched peace process with the militants along with military operations, but peace processes were not successful due to various reasons including drone strikes from the United States, military operations from Pakistan army, etc. Furthermore, study explored that ideology matters a lot while pursuing counter terrorism strategy against militants. Fig, 4.4 and 4.5 shows that most number of operations were started against TTP who are destabilizing the writ of government but none of the operation was launched against Haqqani network. The United States keep on asking Pakistani government to launch operations against Haqqani Group and Pakistani government denied their availability in their country. There is no formal jurisdiction from both of the government who control the movements across border. Another reason is that line runs through local towns and villages of Pashtuns community who have common culture, norms,

traditions, language, etc. They live on one side of the border and their agriculture lands are present on the other side of the border. Similarly, the relatives of Pashtuns community live on both sides of the border.

After the United States invasion in Afghanistan, Taliban leadership crossed the border line and regroup them in tribal areas of Pakistan for launching cross border incursion against NATO forces. The succeeding development damaged tribal structure badly and led to the elimination of the tribal social elite, a weakening of political authority, destruction of the educational system, undermining of the cultural institutions, including the *Jirga* and *hujra* and mosques, and the displacement of thousands of families; together the developments have spread havoc across the region. This once isolated, but otherwise peaceful area has become the most dangerous area in the world. In addition to blocking the entry of unauthorized people into Pakistan, the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan has also enabled illegal traders to smuggle all sorts of goods into Pakistan, including electronics. A considerable part of the goods imported by Afghanistan under the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement between the two countries has been smuggled back into Pakistan. While the Pakistani authorities demanded the fencing of the border, because they were convinced that it would stop illegal entry into Pakistan, fencing has serious implications for Afghanistan. The Afghan authorities see this as a clever Pakistani move to convert a controversial line into a permanent international border under the pretext of stopping cross-border terrorism by enlisting the support of the U.S. Moreover, international community convinced Pakistan that fencing may spoil the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The case study of Pakistan's military operation evaluates that identity of militants was manipulated after 9/11 as suggested by constructivist approach through idea of discursive power. Militants were supposed to be freedom fighters during Soviet Afghan War and Pakistan military found difficulty to fight against militants with different identity. Second, data shows that military operations and peace process go side by side until 2013. In 2014, Pakistani government realized that strategy of peace process does not work and launched operation *Zarb-e-Azb* to vanquish terrorists. Third, data also highlights that financial assistance and drone strikes from the United States poses negative impact on terrorism. The graph of terrorism comes down after 2013, the same time when the U.S. put conditions on foreign funding. Fourth, it also examines that human bomb also on rise during the period of drone strikes from the United States. The chapter analyses too that Pakistan's military found difficulty in launching operations against militants as Pakhtoons are very much gelled and live on both sides of Pak-Afghan border. Pakistan military gathered local support to counter militants. Although, secondary data imparted useful but incomplete information about the subject, hence, study finds it indispensable to assemble primary data from survey and interviews.

In this chapter, the study performs analysis of documented data which supposed to be insufficient to get the desired results as the data do not provide complete information regarding first hypotheses as there lies confusion between counter terrorism strategy of the United States and Pakistan and study is unable to find any connection between regional discourse and military operation. Further, data on the third hypotheses also look incomplete as there lays insufficient data regarding ideology of militant groups. To prove or disapprove hypotheses, the study feels it

necessary to perform analysis after collecting primary data. Further, study performs comparison of findings from both primary and secondary data to get desired results.

In survey, research collects data through questionnaire using dependent and independent variables from respondents including students of different universities who are studying strategic studies and foreign policy and local people who are the main affectees. Similarly, in In-depth interviews, the units of analysis are army officials, media respondents and political analysts.



Chapter#5: Analyses of Survey and In-depth Interviews

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the study performs analysis after collecting primary data through surveys and In-depth interviews. In survey, research collects data through questionnaire using dependent and independent variables from respondents including students of different universities who are studying strategic studies and foreign policy and local people who are the main affectees. Similarly, in In-depth interviews, the units of analysis are army officials, media respondents and political analysts.

Survey research is one of the most important areas of measurement in applied social research. It encompasses the measurement procedures that involve asking questions from respondents. While In-depth interview is a qualitative research technique which is used to conduct intensive individual interviews where numbers of respondents are less, and research is focused on a specific product, technique, situation or objective.

In order to test hypothesis, the study organized surveys and interviews. For survey, the units of analysis were university students who were studying strategic studies and foreign policy and local people who were the main affecters. There were 200 locals and 300 students from different universities who managed to register their viewpoint. I asked several questions (using variables) from respondents to test hypothesis. Here, the research discusses data for hypothesis one by one.

5.2 Surveys

5.2.1 H1: Success or failure of military operation depends upon regional discourse

In response to a question, whether local culture creates any hurdle in launching operation, respondents responded as shown in Figure 5.1 as;




Figure 5. 1 Local culture is hurdle in launching military operations

Above graph shows that 67% of the locals are strongly agreed with the statement that local culture creates hurdle in launching operation while 22% of the

locals are moderately agreed with the statement. 7% are slightly agreed and only 4% are disagreed that it does not create much difference. Similarly, when we ask the similar question from students, we see that 60% of the students are strongly agreed. 20% are slightly agreed, 10% are moderately agreed while only 10% are disagreed what we asked.

Further, in response to a question, is there local families having members in banned organizations, respondents answers are shown in Figure 5.2 as follows;




Figure 5. 2 There are local families having one or two members in banned Organization

Above graph shows that 51% of the locals are strongly agreed with the statement that there are families having one or two members in banned organization

while 20% of the locals are moderately agreed with the statement. 10% are slightly agreed and 19 % are not agreed with the statement. Similarly, when we ask the similar question from students, we see that 49% of the students are strongly agreed. 20% are slightly agreed, 11% are moderately agreed while 20% are disagreed what we asked.

While getting the answer of another question, if family member dies in drone attacks, they turned against states, respondents view are as follows in Figure 5.3;




Figure 5. 3 If a family member dies in drone attacks, they turned against states

Above graph shows that 45% of the locals are strongly agreed with the statement that it happens that people turned against states if family member dies in drone attacks while 35% of the locals are moderately agreed with the statement. 10%

are slightly agreed and only 10% are not agreed with the statement. Similarly, when we ask the similar question from students, we see that 50% of the students are strongly agreed. 20% are slightly agreed, 12% are moderately agreed while 18% are disagreed what we asked.

In response to a question, whether Pakistan requires help of local people while launching operation, respondents responded as shown in Figure 5.4;




Figure 5. 4 Pakistan army requires help of local people for operation

Above graph shows that 45% of the locals are strongly agreed with the statement that Pakistan army requires help of local people while launching operation while 15% of the locals are moderately agreed with the statement. 20% are slightly agreed and 20% are not agreed with the statement. Similarly, when we ask the similar

question from students, we see that 40% of the students are strongly agreed. 20% are slightly agreed, 25% are moderately agreed while 15% are disagreed what we asked.

Similarly, when asked from the respondents, by following the U.S. strategy, the trust deficit between the states and local increase, as shown in Figure 5.5 as;




Figure 5. 5 Fencing on border can stop cross border terrorist activities

Above graph shows that 75% of the locals are strongly agreed with the statement that Fencing on border can stop cross border terrorist activities while 15% of the locals are moderately agreed with the statement. 10% are slightly agreed and none are disagreed with the statement. Similarly, when we ask the similar question from students, we see that 70% of the students are strongly agreed. 19% are slightly agreed, 4% are moderately agreed while 7% are disagreed what we asked.

Similarly, when asked, whether the military check posts on border play vital role to restrict terrorist movement or not, they responded as shown in Figure 5.6 as;




Figure 5. 6 Military check posts on border play vital role to restrict terrorist movement

Above graph shows that 70% of the locals are strongly agreed with the statement that military check posts on border play vital role to restrict terrorist movement while 10% of the locals are moderately agreed with the statement. 15% are slightly agreed and only 5% are not agreed with the statement. Similarly, when we ask the similar question from students, we see that 75% of the students are strongly agreed. 15% are slightly agreed, 10% are moderately agreed while none are disagreed what we asked.

5.2.2 H2: The resistance showed by people against Pakistan military depends upon the U.S. military activity against the militants in Pakistan

In response to a question, when drone strikes from the U.S. government starts, there come a strong reaction from militant in shape of suicide bombing, responded replied as shown in Figure 5.7;




Figure 5. 7When military operation starts, there came a strong reaction from militant in shape of suicide bombing

Above graph shows that 80% of the locals are strongly agreed with the statement that when drone strikes from the U.S. government starts, there come a strong reaction from militant in shape of suicide bombing while 10% of the locals are moderately agreed with the statement. 10% are slightly agreed and only 10% are not

agreed with the statement. Similarly, when we ask the similar question from students, we see that 75% of the students are strongly agreed. 15% are slightly agreed, 10% are moderately agreed while none are disagreed what we asked.

5.2.3 H3: Success or Failure of military operation depends on terrorist political orientation of militant groups towards Pakistani government

In response to a question, whether peace process should be the part of military strategy, the locals and students responded as shown in Figure 5.8.

The graph shows that 70% of the locals are strongly agreed with the statement that peace process should be the part of military strategy while 10% of the locals are moderately agreed with the statement. 13% are slightly agreed and 7% are disagreed that peace process and military operation cannot go side by side. Similarly, when we talk about students, we see that 65% of the students are strongly agreed. 21% are slightly agreed, 10% are moderately agreed while only 4% are disagreed what we asked.

However, Figure 5.8 also shows that 70% of the locals are strongly agreed with the statement that peace process should be the part of military strategy while 10% of the locals are moderately agreed with the statement. 13% are slightly agreed and 7% are disagreed that peace process and military operation cannot go side by side. Similarly, when we talk about students, we see that 65% of the students are strongly agreed. 21% are slightly agreed, 10% are moderately agreed while only 4% are disagreed what we asked.




Figure 5. 8 Peace process should be part of military strategy

In response to a question, people who dropped weapons can be termed as good Taliban, respondents reply is shown in Figure 5.9.




Figure 5. 9 People who dropped weapons are termed as good Taliban

Above graph shows that 62% of the locals are strongly agreed with the statement that people who dropped weapons can be termed as good Taliban while 28% of the locals are moderately agreed with the statement. 10% are slightly agreed and no one is disagreed that those who dropped weapons can be termed as good Taliban. Similarly, when we talk about students, we see that 60% of the students are strongly agreed. 29% are slightly agreed, 7% are moderately agreed while only 4% are disagreed what we asked.

In response to a question, whether Taliban can be termed as good or bad, respondents registered their views in Figure 5.10 as follows;




Figure 5. 10 Are there any good or bad Taliban

Above graph shows that 49% of the locals are strongly agreed with the statement that Taliban can be termed as good or bad while 35% of the locals are moderately agreed with the statement. 9% are slightly agreed and only 5% are disagreed that Taliban cannot be termed as good or bad. Similarly, when we ask the similar question from students, we see that 50% of the students are strongly agreed. 30% are slightly agreed, 10% are moderately agreed while only 10% are disagreed what we asked.

5.3 Survey Analysis

The survey analysis confirms that success or failure of military operation depends upon regional discourse as described by constructivist approach. Study already elaborated that constructivism concedes the value of discursive as well as material power. Both discursive power which includes norms, traditions, ideas, ideology, language, etc, and material power which can be military or economic, constitute the world disposition. Discursive power works by manipulating the certain meanings and produce the desired expression. It explains how the material objects, ideas and identities of states and relationship among the states are defined. Furthermore, a state can develop two different expressions for two states having same technology. Taliban who were mujahedeen before 9/11 became terrorists later on and Pakistani military was not fully prepared to fight against the people whom they were supporting few years back. Moreover, data here revealed that Pakistani military were facing many problems in afflicted areas. One and the foremost problem was lack of awareness. Taliban were also from Pashtun community and local people felt that they are their well-wisher. Local people were unable to differentiate between good and bad. Initially, when Taliban fight against Pakistan army, they convinced local community to fight with them and most of the people blindly support them. Some of the locals think that these Taliban are the custodian of their lives, so they can easily convince locals to take one or two young ones of the families along with them. Those Taliban used to train them, and locals found no problem by doing this. The study also disclosed that people of tribal areas are very much attached with their roots, so it became difficult for Pakistan military to displace people while launching military operation. They were scared that military operation might affect their culture and

traditions and things might change forever. Moreover, local people did not want to leave their precious belongings behind. But at the same time, they want to get rid of militants at any cost as terrorist attacks were already affecting their norms and traditions. One important political problem in those areas was lack of government writ. Those who have power can do anything and nobody can stop him. There were no elections to choose candidate in those areas. Influential people can manipulate the matters for their vested interests. A tribal council, which has a legislative function called *Jirga*, usually resolve the matters but the council was biased as well. Study further confirmed that local culture of tribal areas is also one of the reasons behind terrorism and insurgency. As relatives of people of tribal areas and Afghanistan were living on both sides of the border, hence, they move freely on both sides through porous border. Furthermore, it was difficult for Pakistan military as well to distinguish between common man and militant. Data also revealed that role of *Mullah* (religious person) is also controversial in affected areas, who misguide people after manipulating the real shape of Islam used it as a shield to exploit innocent civilians. *Mullah* was very strong in those areas and people used to believe whatever he said irrespective of the fact whether it is right or wrong. This research also confirmed that there was no writ of the government and influential people can exploit people for their vested interest. As there were no elections in tribal areas, so those people don't want Pakistan military to come and establish government writ over there. Study revealed that fencing on border is not an easy task. Initially, when Pakistan army started fencing, there came retaliation because there were no check and balance and people moved freely across borders. It was difficult to distinguish who is right and who is wrong. Moreover, people don't want fencing as relatives of locals are living across

borders and people of those areas are scared because after fencing, they cannot activate their illegal activities as most of the people earn money through smuggling and other illegal means and it would be end of their employment. There was no writ government in those areas, so challenge to border fencing can be described as; on one side it will affect their culture and their daily routine as they can't move freely across border and on other side they are scared that their employment would be finished by doing this as they don't know other skills to earn their livelihood. In addition, local people lost their employment as a result of terrorism. Army is providing skills to them to earn livelihood. They are building their homes and providing security that has life threat from militants. Terrorism affected locals in many ways; it engulfed whole families. People lost their loved ones in suicide bombing, girls could not go to school and local business was destroyed. There are many ways to restrict cross border terrorism i.e. border fencing, local awareness, military check post, understanding to local problems, etc. Pakistan army brought awareness among the masses. They had lost their employment, army provided skills to them and provided incentives to them to start businesses. There are many changes as a result of Pakistan army presence, i.e., eradication of terrorism, revival of sports, revival of life, elimination of Kalashnikov culture, creation of infrastructure, provision of basic facilities to locals, etc. Pakistan army brought revolution in their lives and created awareness. Military created the writ of the government over there which was previously unseen in that region. People were double-minded. They were unable to decide whether to go to army camp or militants' camp. One of the main reasons was that the area was underprivileged since the establishment of Pakistan and government never paid attention towards it. So, they were unable to believe army. Most of them were facing pressure from militants

also and got life threats if they share any information with army. Few people among locals also believe as well that Pakistan army may destroy their values. This is because of religious misguidance. Before military operation, locals had to leave their homes and their belongings. It was obvious reaction from them to resist. They were scared that their belongings might be stolen, or their houses might be destroyed, etc. They thought that check posts in their areas are not meant to protect them but disrespect their values. Those people feared change. They thought their norms, traditions and values might be destroyed through revolution by Pakistan army. People were misguided. When one person of a family was killed in bomb blast or drone attacks, other members became rebels and got involved in illegal activities. Militants got benefit by brainwashing their minds. In return, few of them turned out to be militants. Study also confirmed that before 9/11, there was not much difference between Afghan and Pakistan Taliban. They must work for their vested interests to destabilize the region. Furthermore, Pakistan army was careful while launching operation. They tried to engage people through dialogues in order to avoid trust deficit and those who joined hands with Pakistan army, they were provided security and army gave training to them to live a better normal life.

Study confirmed that locals showed resistance against Pakistan military as a result of the U.S. military activity like drone strikes against militants in Pakistan. Resultantly, militants used different tactics to resist and tried to sabotage peace like suicide bombing, land mining, etc., to divert army's attention. Suicide bombing is one of the tactics to distract military operation. These kinds of coward attacks are tried to demoralize military. Further, there is no link between both military operation and suicide bombing. Instead, suicide bombing starts whenever army launch

operation but graph of bombing coming down as operation proceeds further. However, drone attacks from the U.S. military also posed negative impact on the counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan. The Islamic country saw more deterioration and destabilization as a result of foreign involvement whether it be drone attacks or foreign funding.

Further, the survey analysis examined that military operation depends upon terrorist political orientation of militant group towards Pakistani government which also is in line with constructivist approach. As, it was examined that the militants were termed as mujahedeen when they were fighting against the Soviet Union and the United States funded and equipped them with modern weapon and Pakistan provided safe heavens and trained them to fight against Soviet Union. But after 9/11, those mujahedeen turned to terrorists. Hence, initially it became difficult for army to fight against them. Furthermore, there were many problems facing by Pakistani army during Musharraf period and unfamiliarity of local routes was one of them. It was difficult for army personals to recognize courses. Further, some so-called religious people were not favouring Pakistani military to fight against Taliban and they exploited people by using religious card. Due to the hurdles facing by Pakistani forces in operation areas, they decided to evoke some peace agreement to bring the situation under control. The study further elaborates that scarcity of resources is also one of the key elements which Pakistani army was facing. Collectively, there are seven tribal agencies in FATA region, but the army was facing scarcity of resources to face the challenges. Therefore, government try to engage militants by using different tactics whether it is peace process, involving locals or through other means. The study explored that there are certain peace committees as well working in the area where

Pakistan army launched operation. Due to unfamiliarity of local routes and culture, Pakistan army took the help of those committees to negotiate with them. Study reveals that this habit of peace process was continued before operation *Zarb-e-Azb* as Pakistan army was trying to bring militants on negotiation table but these peace processes were not successful due to stubborn attitude of militants. They usually backed out from their promises to stay peaceful and attacked on soldiers and military check posts. Study further analyses that there are not such things like good Taliban and bad Taliban. Before 9/11, these Taliban were funded by the United States and got sanctuary in Pakistan to fight against the Soviet Union. After 9/11, when United States operation in Afghanistan they turned around and became militants. Hence, the difference between good and bad is just the matter of time. Before 9/11, they were termed as good while after, they were reported as bad. Further, Pakistan army do not differentiate among militants while going through operation. There are some local people who are known to be the companions of terrorists. Those people sometimes come forward to help military about militant hideouts. In return, army provides security to them. To avoid maximum loss, Pakistan army was following 3Ds policy; Dialogue, Destroy, Development. First engage people through dialogue, this can be the best policy to negotiate and come with a solution to avoid losses. If it will not work, then come with aggressive strategy and fight against terrorists. Further, the third stage is development. It means to rebuild the affected area as a result of military operations.

5.4 In-depth Interviews

My units of analysis for in-depth interviews were Army officials, media persons, political analysts and local people. I asked several questions (using variables) from respondents to test my hypothesis. Here, I will discuss data for my hypothesis one by one.

5.4.1 H1: Success or failure of military operation depends upon regional discourse

5.4.1.1 Army respondents

There were almost 50 military persons who managed to register their viewpoint. Most of them believed that it was difficult for Pakistan military to launch operation as there were many problems i.e., displacement of local people, attachment of people with their culture and roots, lack of awareness, lack of government writ, etc. Fig 5.11 shows that 70% of the people believe that there was lack of awareness by Pakistani military and they were not prepared for this war, while 30% of the army persons responded that Pakistani military faced difficulty in those areas because local people are attached and closely bonded with their roots and they were not ready to leave their houses behind when Pakistani army asked them to shift to other place as they have to launch military operation. In similar context, one of the respondents remarked that,

‘There were many difficulties in those areas. One and the foremost problem was lack of awareness. Locals were unable to differentiate between good and bad. Most of the people blindly support Taliban. One of the reasons, you can say, is fear of militants’.

Similarly, another army person responded,

'People of tribal areas are very much attached with their roots, so, obviously it became difficult for Pakistan military to displace people while launching military operation. They don't want to leave their belongings behind'.

The graphical depiction is shown here in Figure 5.11 as;




Figure 5. 11 Difficulty faced by military

In order to combat cross border terrorism, Pakistan military feels it mandatory to install border fencing.

Fig 5.12 shows that 70% of the people believe that there is no check and balance on border and locals can move freely without showcasing their identity and this activity raises the chances of terrorism, while 30% of the army persons responded that border fencing is mandatory as most of the locals are involved in illegal activities and smuggling and it is their bread and butter. They know that after fencing the border, it would be difficult for them to earn their livelihood. In similar context, one of the army men remarked that,

'Fencing is really challenging on border but it is mandatory to stop terrorism. Initially, yes, there came retaliation because there was no check and balance and people moved freely across borders. It was difficult to distinguish who is right and who is wrong'.

Similarly, another person replied,

'People don't want fencing as relatives of locals are living across borders. But it is important to fence border in order to stop illegal activities across border like smuggling, drug trafficking, etc'.

Here is the graphical depiction of respondents shown in Figure 5.12 as;




Figure 5. 12 Why don't want Boarder Fencing?

Taking about the local problems, most of the army men believe that there is no political writ in this area since partition of sub-continent. Fig 5.13 shows that 70% of the people believe that there were no election in this area and the strongest one can do anything while 30% of the army persons responded that lack of political writ is one of the primary problems. Since partition, government did not pay attention towards this part and it lagged behind than other parts of the country. It raised a sense of dissatisfaction among the local masses. In similar context, one of the respondents remarked that

‘Locals were getting fed up with those militants, there was no political writ, ‘Might is Right’, those who have power can do anything and nobody can stop him’.

Similarly, another person replied,

‘There were no elections to choose candidate in those areas and no concept to choose candidate. Powerful man can do anything. There were no institutions. They resolve their matters in Jirgas (A tribal council which has a legislative function) which are also biased’.




Figure 5. 13 Main Problem of locals

Fig 5.14 shows that 85% of the army persons believe that people trust Pakistan army. According to them, this is a misconception that there is any kind of rift between locals and Pakistan army, rather Pakistan army played a major role in creating awareness among the local masses. While, on the other side, 15% of the army persons responded that Taliban and the people, who don't like peace are against Pakistan military. They don't want army presence in affected areas. In similar context, one of the respondents remarked that,

'No, this perception is not right that locals are against Pakistan army, only Taliban and other militants are against army. Local people trust army and realize that only Pakistan army can eradicate terrorism from their land'.

Another respondent replied,

'Locals trust on Pakistan army. They have lost their employment as a result of terrorism. Army is providing skills to them to earn livelihood. They are building their homes and providing security that has life threat from militants'.

Here is the graphical representation of respondents shown in Figure 5.14 as;




Figure 5. 14 Why locals against army?

Similarly, fig 5.15 shows that 80% of the people believe that border fencing should be done on primary basis in order to curtail terrorism, while 20% of the army persons responded that check and balance on border through check posts is necessary to stop people who used to involve in spoiling the order of the region. In similar context, one of the respondents said that,

'Terrorism affected locals in many ways; it engulfed whole families. People lost their loved ones in suicide bombing, girls could not go to school and local business was

destroyed’. There are many ways to restrict cross border terrorism i.e. border fencing, local awareness, military check post, understanding to local problems, etc.

Graphical representation is as follows shown in Figure 5.15 as;




Figure 5. 15 How government can control cross border terrorism?

Further, fig 5.16 shows that 65% of the people believe that it is difficult to say whether there exist any link between Pakistani Taliban and Afghani Taliban, while 35% of the army persons responded that there may be a possibility and they can work for common interest. In similar context, one of the army men remarked that,

‘Militants were existed on both sides and they worked for their vested interests, so, it is impossible to say that there would be no contact. When they could move freely across border then they would definitely have links but Pakistan military got lots of success in destroying their network’.

Graphical depiction of respondents is shown here in Figure 5.16 as,




Figure 5. 16 Link between Afghan & Pakistan Taliban

5.4.1.2 Media respondents

There were almost 40 media persons who managed to respond. Most of them claimed that Pakistan military face many difficulties while launching operation in hard areas.

Fig 5.11 shows that 60% of the people believe that Pakistan military faced many hurdles in terms of distinguishing locals from militants. According to them, it became sometimes very difficult as militants are living among locals as well. While 30% of the media persons responded that locals think that Taliban are the custodians and whatever, they are doing is in the best interest of them. In similar context, one of the army men remarked that,

'Local culture was one of the main problems. As relatives of people of tribal areas and Afghanistan were living across border, hence, they move freely on both sides of border without any hurdle. It was for Pakistan military to distinguish between common man and militant'.

Another person remarked,

'Some of the locals think that these Taliban are the custodian of their lives, so they can easily convinced locals to take one or two young ones of the families along with them. Those Taliban used to train them and locals found no problem by doing this'.

Fig 5.12 shows that 70% of the people believe that there is no check and balance on border and relatives of locals live on both sides of the border. Crossing border freely without registering the identity raises the chances of terrorism. While 30% of the media persons responded that border fencing is mandatory as most of the locals are involved in illegal activities and smuggling and it is their bread and butter. They know that after fencing the border, it would be difficult for them to earn their livelihood. In similar context, one of the army men remarked that,

'Residents of those areas are scared because after fencing, they cannot activate their illegal activities as most of the people earn money through smuggling and other illegal means and it would be end of their employment'.

Fig 5.13 shows that 60% of the people believe that religious misguidance is one of the main problems among locals. They are not well-educated and religious manipulation from the so-called local religious scholars deteriorates the situation. While 40% of the media persons responded that there is no polling right to locals. In similar context, one of the army men remarked that,

'Among many problems, religious misguidance is one of them. Little knowledge is dangerous and some local religious persons distorted the real shape of religion and secondly the exploitation of haves to haves not'.

Fig 5.14 shows that 65% of the army persons believe that people don't want to change and their behaviour is ethnocentric. They resist change whether it is applied from any medium. While, on the other side, 35% of the army persons responded that most of the locals are unable to differentiate between friend and foe and this is because of lack of knowledge and prevalence of wide spread ignorance. In similar context, one of the media people remarked that,

'Not all, but few believes that Pakistan army may destroy their values. This is because of religious misguidance. They thought that check posts in their areas are not meant to protect them but disrespect their values'.

Another media person believed,

'People were scared of change. They thought their norms, traditions and values might be destroyed through revolution by Pakistan army'.

Further, terrorism affected a great deal to local people and inculcate rebellious attitude among masses. One of the media persons remarked that,

'People were misguided. When one person of a family was killed in bomb blast or drone attacks, other members became rebels and got involved in illegal activities. Militants got benefit by brainwashing their minds. In return, few of them turned out to be militants'.

Taking about link between Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban, fig 5.16 shows the results. It depicts that 60% of the people believe that yes, there exist link between both the Taliban and they work together at times to dislodge and revert opposite forces, while 40% of the army persons responded that there is a least possibility that both the Taliban work together. In similar context, one of the respondents remarked that,

'Before 9/11, there was not much difference between Afghan and Pakistan Taliban. There is least possibility that these people do not exchange dialogues. They must work for their vested interests to destabilize the region'.

5.4.1.3 Political respondent

There were almost 20 political analysts who managed to respond. Mostly people responded in a similar fashion what army believes that people over there were intensely attached with their roots and it was difficult to convince them that they have to leave the area to eradicate militancy.

Fig 5.11 shows that 60% of the people believe that common man don't want to evacuate from operation areas as they have valuable belongings in their homes and secondly military operation might affect their house's construction. While 40% of the political persons responded that there is strong mullah in those areas. Locals think that these religious scholars are their custodians and whatever, they are saying is in the best interest of them. In similar context, one of the political analysts remarked that,

'The problems were two fold; before military operation and after military operation. Before military operation, locals don't want to leave their belongings behind. When Pakistan army launched military operation, militants used to hide themselves in those vacant houses, so in due course of operation, these houses were bombarded. After operation when those locals came back, they were unable to accept that their houses had been destroyed which were constructed by their forefathers'.

Another analyst responded,

'Mullah (religious person) was very strong in those areas and people used to believe whatever he said irrespective of the fact whether it is right or wrong. Those mullahs used to exploit religion to misguide people'.

Fig 5.12 shows that 60% of the people believe that border fencing may affect culture of local people as they have a long tradition to stay connected and can move freely across Pak-Afghan border. There is no check and balance on border and they are used to it. While 40% of the political persons responded that illegal activities border fencing can stop illegal activities as most of the locals are involved in illegal activities and smuggling and it is their bread and butter. They know that after fencing the border, it would be difficult for them to earn their livelihood. In similar context, one of the army men remarked that,

'There was no writ government in those areas, so challenge to border fencing can be described as; on one side it will affect their culture and their daily routine as they can't move freely across border and on other side they are scared that their employment would be finished by doing this as they don't know other skills to earn their livelihood'.

Further, fig 5.13 shows that 65% of the people believe that there were no election in this area and the strongest one can do whatever happens to be in his best interest. There are no laws or legalities. He can achieve anything by hook or by crook. While 35% of the political persons responded that lack of polling right is one of the primary problems. Since partition, government did not pay attention towards this part and it lagged behind than other parts of the country. It raised a sense of dissatisfaction among the local masses. In similar context, one of the analysts remarked that *'Major resistance to Pakistan military came from top level hierarchy. Those people have their vested interest. They used to exploit the people under them and no one to stop them. As there were no elections, those people don't want Pakistan military to come and establish government writ over there'*.

Fig 5.14 shows that 80% of the political respondents believe that one of the main reason of rift between Pakistan military and locals is the scared of belongings which they left behind when army launched operation. While 20% of the persons said that family reactions of the culprit is one of the main reason of clash between army and locals. In similar context, one of the political analysts remarked that, *'Before military operation, locals had to leave their homes and their belongings. It was obvious reaction from them to resist. They were scared that their belongings might be stolen or their houses might be destroyed, etc'*.

Another person replied,

'When one member of a local family joined militant group and Pakistan army arrested or killed that person in military operation that person then there came a strong reaction from that family'.

In response to a question, how terrorism affected local people, a political analyst said,

'People were double-minded. They were unable to decide whether to go to army camp or militants' camp. One of the main reasons was that the area was underprivileged since the establishment of Pakistan and government never paid attention towards it. So, they were unable to believe army. Most of them were facing pressure from militants also and got life threats if they share any information with army'.

When I asked whether there is any trust deficit between army and locals, one of the political analysts responded,

'Pakistan army was careful while launching operation. They tried to engage people through dialogues in order to avoid trust deficit and those who joined hands with Pakistan army, they were provided security and army gave training to them to live a better normal life.'

5.4.2 H2: The resistance showed by people against Pakistan military depends upon the U.S. military activity against militants in Pakistan

5.4.2.1 Army respondents

There were almost 50 military respondents who managed to register their viewpoint. Most of them believed that Pakistan military had lots of challenges. Local people are very much intact with local culture, norms and traditions. They didn't ready to accept change. First and foremost important thing what army realized is to create awareness among the masses. In response to a question, what kind of

retaliation Pakistan army faced as a result of drone strikes from the U.S., one of the respondents remarked,

‘Militants used different tactics to resist and tried to sabotage peace. Initially, when Pakistan army started operation, those militants used different tactics like suicide bombing, land mining, etc, to divert army’s attention’.

Here is the graphical representation of respondents shown in Figure 5.17 as;




Figure 5. 17 What kind of retaliation as a result of operation?

In response to a question, how presence of Pakistan army affects locals, one of the respondents responded,

'We believed that we brought awareness among the masses. They had lost their employment, we provided skills to them. We provided incentives to them to start businesses'.

Here is the graphical representation of all the respondents shown in Figure 5.18 as;




Figure 5. 18 How army presences affect locals?

5.4.2.2 Media respondents

There were almost 40 media persons who managed to respond. Most of them responded that there were huge challenges to Pakistan army while launching operation and they tried their best to create awareness among locals. When, I asked what kind of retaliation Pakistan army faced as a result of drone strikes from the U.S., one of the media people remarked,

‘Locals try to create every resistance which is going towards change. They resist border fencing as well. This may stop the illegal activities across the border’.

In response to a question, how presence of Pakistan army affects locals, one of the media persons responded,

‘There are many changes as a result of Pakistan army presence, i.e., eradication of terrorism, revival of sports, revival of life, elimination of Kalashnikov culture, creation of infrastructure, provision of basic facilities to locals, etc’.

5.4.2.3 Political respondents

There were almost 20 political analysts who managed to respond. Mostly people responded in a similar style what army believes that that local people are very much close with local culture, norms and traditions. They resist change. When I asked what kind of retaliation Pakistan army faced in hard areas as a result of drone strikes from the U.S., one of the political analysts remarked,

‘Before operation Zarb-e-Azb, smuggling was common in FATA region. People were involved in illegal activities. Pakistan army couldn’t engage them at every front due to scarcity of strength. Initially, after Zarb-e-Azb, there came retaliation from militants like Army Public School, Peshawar attack’.

In response to a question, how Pakistan army affects common man, one of the political analysts remarked,

'Pakistan army brought revolution in their lives and created awareness. Military created the writ of the government over there which was previously unseen in that region'.

When I asked what kind of link you see between military operation and suicide bombings, one of the persons replied.

'Suicide bombing is one of the tactics to distract military operation. These kinds of coward attacks are tried to demoralize military. There is no link between both military operation and suicide bombing. Yes, you can say that suicide bombing starts initially when army launched operation but graph of bombing coming down as operation proceeds further'.

5.4.3 H3: Success or failure of military operation depends on terrorist political orientation of militant groups towards Pakistani government

5.4.3.1 Army respondents

There were almost 50 military respondents who managed to register their viewpoint. Most of them claimed that army launched operation against all militants without any differentiation but army gives a chance to local militants to surrender and drop their weapon and those who obey military's order are given a chance to rehabilitate their lives. In response to a question, whether or not army differentiates militants while launching operation, one of military respondents claimed that:

'There is no doubt that army launched operation against all militants. One must understand when a person is challenging the writ of government then he must be penalized'.

Another military respondent remarked that

'This was a unique kind of war. If we look at the history, we will understand the problem. Basically, these militant were termed as mujahedeen when they were fighting against Soviet Union and the United States funded and equipped them with modern weapon and Pakistan provided safe heavens and trained them to fight against Soviet Union. But after 9/11, those mujahedeen had become terrorists. So, initially it was difficult for army to fight against them'.

Here is the graphical depiction of the respondents shown in Figure 5.19 as,




Figure 5. 19 Does army launch operation against all militant groups?

Fig 5.19 shows that 80% of the army respondents believed that Pakistan military launch operation against all militant groups without any differentiation, while 20% respondents carries point of view that military operation is always the secondary option by Pakistan army, while their primary concern is to negotiate with militants. It shows that majority of army personals believe that Pakistan military do not differentiate among militants. They have only one agenda to crush militants and reinstall peace and harmony in the country. One of the reasons for peace process was lack of resources which Pakistan military carried at that moment. As, initially, military was not well-trained when they launched war against terrorists and bore huge loss. In a similar fashion when asked about question, how army decides to go for peace process, one of the army person replied,

'Initially during Musharraf era, army was not well trained for this kind of unique war and there were many hurdles to deal with militants like unfamiliarity with local routes, mujahedeen turning to militants, religious exploitation, etc. So, army made some peace agreement in order to restore harmony.'

Another respondent responded in same context and said that

'There is no Peace process now. There was a time when army was not getting its targets and faced massive resistance from the militants then they went for option of peace process, but one should realize that no peace process was successful. One day, militants promised to stay calm and the next day they attacked on Army checkpost. They worked for their vested interest.'

This statement shows that none of the peace deal was successful. Militants usually do not abide by their promises. They claimed that they will not launch any terrorist activity but they did and this habit from militants made situation even worse.

Their sole interest was to challenge the writ of government and work for it. Moreover, fig 5.12 shows that 70% of the military respondents claimed that Pakistan military launched peace process due to scarcity of resources while 30% claimed that lack of proper training for war against Taliban is the main reason to pursue peace process from Pakistan military. Pakistan army is confronted with enemies on both eastern and western border and it gets difficult for them to get in hands when they have limited quantity of personals. Further, the restless domestic conditions force Pakistani military to perform multitasks apart from carrying out their duties on borders.

The graphical depiction of respondents in Figure 5.20 as;




Figure 5. 20 Why army launched peace process?

Additionally, the difference between good and bad Taliban is based on identity before and after 9/11. Before 9/11, these Taliban were considered as mujahedeen while their identity converted into terrorist after 9/11 attack. As, in response to question, how can you differentiate good and bad Taliban, one of the army respondent remarked as,

'Before 9/11, when these Taliban were funded by the United States and Pakistani government, they were in favour of Pakistan. After 9/11, they turned around and became militants after the United States operation in Afghanistan. So, the difference between good and bad is just the matter of time'.

This statement shows that change of identity works as stated by constructivism. Identities are not permanent in international relations. As for one men's terrorist are for another men's freedom fighters. It confirms that identity plays a vital role in launching military operations.

5.4.3.2 Media respondents

There were almost 40 media persons who managed to respond. Most of them claimed that army managed to differentiate them on the basis of their thinking and ideology. Those who obey military's order are given a chance to rehabilitate their lives.

Fig 5.19 shows that 65% of the army respondents believed that Pakistan military launch operation against all militant groups without any differentiation, while 35% of respondents carries point of view that Pakistan military take in hand both military operation and peace process. It depends on the identity of terrorists it shows that majority of media personals believe that Pakistan military do not differentiate

among militants. They go only one mindset to defeat terrorism and reinstall peace and harmony in the country.

Further, in response to a question whether or not army differentiates militants while launching operation. One of the media analysts claimed

'The story is completely different now. Initially, they were carrying a legacy of Soviet-Afghan War, so it was difficult for army to launch aggressive counter terrorism strategy against all militants. Peace processes were also part of their strategy but most of the peace processes were unsuccessful due to stubborn attitude of militants'.

This statement shows that none of the peace deal was successful. Militants usually do not abide by their promises. They claimed that they will not launch any terrorist activity but they did and this habit from militants made situation even worse. Their sole interest was to challenge the writ of government and work for it. Moreover, fig 5.20 shows that 65% of the military respondents claimed that Pakistan military launched peace process due to scarcity of resources while 30% claimed that mujahedeen are turning to terrorists and change of identity prompt Pakistani military to check militants while launching aggressive counter terrorism strategy. One of the media respondents said that

'Army decides to go for peace process due to scarcity of resources. There are seven agencies in FATA and the strength and resources of Pakistan army are not enough to meet the requirement. Hence, in one part where army is doing operation, then they try to engage militants in other part through different means whether it be peace process, involving locals or through other means'.

Another media person responded in same context and said that

'Peace process should always be the part of military strategy to avoid inevitable loss. Pakistan military tried to follow the strategy but was not getting fruitful results.'

Some of the media persons claimed that military can differentiate among militants. They believed there are different types of terrorists. Some of them are active while some are passive. But some of them are facilitator of terrorists who provide help like in finding out the location to launch terrorist activity. Media person viewed that those facilitators sometimes don't want to facilitate anymore to militants and drop their weapons in front of army. One of the media analyst remarked in a similar fashion that

'You cannot say that army differentiates militants while going through operation but yes, there is a possibility that people who are actually not spreading militancy but they are the companion of militants. Those locals can drop their weapons and help military to find out militants. In return, army provides security to them'.

Further according to media respondents, there is no such thing as good or bad Taliban. It is just a matter of fact that militants who are challenging government writ are termed as bad Taliban while others are considered as good one. Similarly, one of the respondents remarked that,

'There was a perception that Taliban who are in Pakistan, they are good and those who are in Afghanistan are bad but according to my opinion, there is no such thing good or bad, only the militants who drop their weapon and endorse military ideology to rebuild peace and harmony are termed as good and those challenge writ of state can be termed as bad'.

This statement shows that change of identity of Taliban belongs to Pakistan is different from Afghan Taliban. This idea supports constructivist approach where

Identities are not permanent in international relations. It confirms that identity plays an important role in launching military operations.

5.4.3.3 Political analysts

There were almost 20 political analysts who managed to respond. Mostly claimed that army managed to differentiate them and launching operation with limited resources across all areas is not a child's play. Fig 5.19 shows that 65% of the army respondents believed that Pakistan military launch operation against all militant groups without any differentiation, while 35% of respondents said that Pakistan military carried both military operation as well as peace process. It depends on the identity of terrorists. It shows that majority of political analysts believe that Pakistan military do not differentiate among militants. Their sole aim is to defeat militants and revive peace and harmony on the beloved land. Along with military operation, it was also a job of army to reconstruct and develop those areas which had been destroyed as a result of operation or bomb blasts. In a similar fashion, one of the analysts said that, *'To avoid maximum loss, Pakistan army follows 3Ds policy; Dialogue, Destroy, Development. First engage people through dialogue, they may follow and understand what you are saying. If it is no happening then adopt aggressive strategy against militants. After that, rebuild the destructed area'*.

Moreover, political analysts claimed that army was also dealing with crisis of identity – the crisis of identity before and after 9/11. As one of political remarked that, *'It was really a tough war for Pakistan army. If I can say that putting one hand on your right eye and see the militants as mujahedeen from your left eye then putting one hand on your left eye and look at the militants as terrorists from your right eye. This happened with Pakistan army. Before 9/11, these people were fighting in Afghanistan*

and the United States and Pakistan supported them but story changed after 9/11. Now they had become terrorists. So, peace process was one of army's strategies to engage them'.

Most of the analysts believe that there is no such thing as good and bad Taliban. All these are media-designed terms. They further said that at that time, different types of peace building committees and different characters, who participated in crushing agony, were working and most of people believed that they are good Taliban. As one of the analysts remarked that,

'After 9/11, when Pakistan army launched operation against militants, they faced difficulty to tackle infiltration due to scarcity of resources. They divided their targets into categories. Against certain militant groups, they opted only strategy to launch military operation, but they opted peace process as well as military operation strategy against certain group. Taliban who took part with Pakistan army in building peace can be termed as good Taliban.'

Another analyst replied in a similar context that

'There are certain peace committees who are already working in the area where Pakistan army launched operation. Due to unfamiliarity of local routes and culture, Pakistan army took the help of those committees to launch operations. Some people termed those peace committees as good Taliban but actually it is not'.

Hence, military operation depends upon ideology of militant group. The study examined that there are seven agencies in FATA and the strength and resources of Pakistan army are not enough to meet the requirement. Hence, in one part where army is doing operation and then they try to engage militants in other part through different means whether it be peace process, involving locals or through other means. There

are certain peace committees as well who are already working in the area where Pakistan army launched operation. Due to unfamiliarity of local routes and culture, Pakistan army took the help of those committees to launch operations and the activity of peace process was continued before operation *Zarb-e-Azb*. There was a time before 2014 when army was not getting its targets and faced massive resistance from the militants then they went for option of peace process, but these peace processes were not successful due to stubborn attitude of militants. One day, militants promised to stay calm and the next day they attacked on Army check post. They worked for their vested interest. Moreover, there are not such things like good Taliban and bad Taliban. Before 9/11, when these Taliban were funded by the United States and Pakistani government, they were in favour of Pakistan. After 9/11, they turned around and became militants after the United States operation in Afghanistan. So, the difference between good and bad is just the matter of time. Further, Pakistan army do not differentiates militants while going through operation but there are some companions of militants. Those locals can drop their weapons and help military to find out militants. In return, army provides security to them. To avoid maximum loss, Pakistan army was following 3Ds policy; Dialogue, Destroy, Development. First engage people through dialogue, they may follow and understand what you are saying. If it is no happening then adopt aggressive strategy against militants. After that, rebuild the destructed area.

5.5 Finding and analysis

The study confirms that success or failure of military operation by Pakistan depends upon regional discourse. In previous literature, it was mentioned that

Pakistani military was not prepared to fight against Taliban as the ground situation does not look like what it exactly seems to be. Furthermore, it was revealed that Pakistan army faced huge loss when they started participating in war on terror but literature was unable to examine the variables why Pakistan military was reluctant to fight against Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Data here revealed that Pakistani military were facing many problems in afflicted areas. One and the foremost problem was lack of awareness. Taliban were also from Pashtun community and local people felt that they are their well-wisher.

Locals were unable to differentiate between good and bad. Initially, when Taliban fight against Pakistan army, they convinced local community to fight with them and most of the people blindly support them. Some of the locals think that these Taliban are the custodian of their lives, so they can easily convince locals to take one or two young ones of the families along with them. Those Taliban used to train them and locals found no problem by doing this. The study also disclosed that people of tribal areas are very much attached with their roots, so it became difficult for Pakistan military to displace people while launching military operation. They were scared that military operation might affect their culture and traditions and things might change forever. Moreover, local people did not want to leave their precious belongings behind. But at the same time, they want to get rid of militants at any cost as terrorist attacks were already affecting their norms and traditions. One important political problem in those areas was lack of government writ. Those who have power can do anything and nobody can stop him. There were no elections to choose candidate in those areas. Influential people can manipulate the matters for their vested interests. A tribal council, which has a legislative function called *Jirgas*, usually resolve the

matters but the council was biased as well. Study further confirmed that local culture of tribal areas is also one of the reasons behind terrorism and insurgency. As relatives of people of tribal areas and Afghanistan were living on both sides of the border, hence, they move freely on both sides through porous border. Furthermore, it was difficult for Pakistan military as well to distinguish between common man and militant. Data also revealed that role of *Mullah* (religious person) is also controversial in affected areas, which misguide people after manipulating the real shape of Islam used it as a shield to exploit innocent civilians. *Mullah* was very strong in those areas and people used to believe whatever he said irrespective of the fact whether it is right or wrong. This research also confirmed that there was no writ of the government and influential people can exploit people for their vested interest. As there were no elections in tribal areas, so those people don't want Pakistan military to come and establish government writ over there. Study further confirmed that border fencing would help a great deal in lowering down the graph of terrorism in the country. Study revealed that fencing on border is not an easy task. Initially, when Pakistan army started fencing, there came retaliation because there was no check and balance and people moved freely across borders. It was difficult to distinguish who is right and who is wrong. Moreover, people don't want fencing as relatives of locals are living across borders and people of those areas are scared because after fencing, they cannot activate their illegal activities as most of the people earn money through smuggling and other illegal means and it would be end of their employment. There was no writ government in those areas, so challenge to border fencing can be described as; on one side it will affect their culture and their daily routine as they can't move freely across border and on other side they are scared that their employment would be finished by

doing this as they don't know other skills to earn their livelihood. In addition, local people lost their employment as a result of terrorism. Army is providing skills to them to earn livelihood. They are building their homes and providing security that has life threat from militants. Terrorism affected locals in many ways; it engulfed whole families. People lost their loved ones in suicide bombing, girls could not go to school and local business was destroyed. There are many ways to restrict cross border terrorism i.e. border fencing, local awareness, military check post, understanding to local problems, etc. Pakistan army brought awareness among the masses. They had lost their employment, army provided skills to them and provided incentives to them to start businesses. There are many changes as a result of Pakistan army presence, i.e., eradication of terrorism, revival of sports, revival of life, elimination of Kalashnikov culture, creation of infrastructure, provision of basic facilities to locals, etc. Pakistan army brought revolution in their lives and created awareness. Military created the writ of the government over there which was previously unseen in that region. People were double-minded. They were unable to decide whether to go to army camp or militants' camp. One of the main reasons was that the area was underprivileged since the establishment of Pakistan and government never paid attention towards it. So, they were unable to believe army. Most of them were facing pressure from militants also and got life threats if they share any information with army. Few people among locals also believe as well that Pakistan army may destroy their values. This is because of religious misguidance. Before military operation, locals had to leave their homes and their belongings. It was obvious reaction from them to resist. They were scared that their belongings might be stolen or their houses might be destroyed, etc. They thought that check posts in their areas are not meant to protect them but

disrespect their values. Those people were scared of change. They thought their norms, traditions and values might be destroyed through revolution by Pakistan army. People were misguided. When one person of a family was killed in bomb blast or drone attacks, other members became rebels and got involved in illegal activities. Militants got benefit by brainwashing their minds. In return, few of them turned out to be militants. Study also confirmed that before 9/11, there was not much difference between Afghan and Pakistan Taliban. They must work for their vested interests to destabilize the region. Furthermore, Pakistan army was careful while launching operation. They tried to engage people through dialogues in order to avoid trust deficit and those who joined hands with Pakistan army, they were provided security and army gave training to them to live a better normal life.

Study confirmed that locals showed resistance against Pakistan military as a result of the U.S. military activity like drone strikes against militants in Pakistan. Resultantly, militants used different tactics to resist and tried to sabotage peace like suicide bombing, land mining, etc., to divert army's attention. Suicide bombing is one of the tactics to distract military operation. These kinds of coward attacks are tried to demoralize military. Further, there is no link between both military operation and suicide bombing. Instead, suicide bombing starts whenever army launch operation but graph of bombing coming down as operation proceeds further. However, drone attacks from the U.S. military also posed negative impact on the counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan. The Islamic country saw more deterioration and destabilization as a result of foreign involvement whether it be drone attacks or foreign funding.

The study further confirms that military operation depends upon terrorist political orientation of militant group towards Pakistani government which also is in line with constructivist approach. It was examined that the militants were termed as mujahedeen when they were fighting against the Soviet Union and the United States funded and equipped them with modern weapon and Pakistan provided safe heavens and trained them to fight against Soviet Union. But after 9/11, those mujahedeen turned to terrorists. Hence, initially it became difficult for army to fight against them. Furthermore, there were many problems facing by Pakistani army during Musharraf period and unfamiliarity of local routes was one of them. It was difficult for army personals to recognize courses. Further, some so-called religious people were not favouring Pakistani military to fight against Taliban and they exploited people by using religious card. Due to the hurdles facing by Pakistani forces in operation areas, they decided to evoke some peace agreement to bring the situation under control. The study further elaborates that scarcity of resources is also one of the key element which Pakistani army was facing. Collectively, there are seven tribal agencies in FATA region but the army was facing scarcity of resources to face the challenges. Therefore, government try to engage militants by using different tactics whether it is peace process, involving locals or through other means. The study explored that there are certain peace committees as well working in the area where Pakistan army launched operation. Due to unfamiliarity of local routes and culture, Pakistan army took the help of those committees to negotiate with them. Study reveals that this habit of peace process was continued before operation *Zarb-e-Azb* as Pakistan army was trying to bring militants on negotiation table but these peace processes were not successful due to stubborn attitude of militants. They usually backed out from their promises to stay

peaceful and attacked on soldiers and military check posts. Study further analyses that there are not such things like good Taliban and bad Taliban. Before 9/11, these Taliban were funded by the United States and got sanctuary in Pakistan to fight against the Soviet Union. After 9/11, when United States operation in Afghanistan they turned around and became militants. Hence, the difference between good and bad is just the matter of time. Before 9/11, they were termed as good while after, they were reported as bad. Further, Pakistan army do not differentiates among militants while going through operation. There are some local people who are known to be the companions of terrorists. Those people sometimes come forward to help military about militant hideouts. In return, army provides security to them. To avoid maximum loss, Pakistan army was following 3Ds policy; Dialogue, Destroy, Development. First engage people through dialogue, this can be the best policy to negotiate and come with a solution to avoid losses. If it will not work then come with aggressive strategy and fight against terrorists. Further, the third stage is development. It means to rebuild the affected area as a result of military operations.

On the basis of analysis, two out of three hypotheses has been proven. The first hypothesis is proven as the success or failure of military operation depends on regional discourse. Data here revealed that Pakistani military were facing many problems in afflicted areas. One and the foremost problem was lack of awareness. Taliban were also from Pashtun community and local people felt that they are their well-wisher. Locals were unable to differentiate between good and bad. The study also disclosed that people of tribal areas are very much attached with their roots, so it became difficult for Pakistan military to displace people while launching military operation. They were scared that military operation might affect their culture and

traditions and things might change forever. Moreover, local people did not want to leave their precious belongings behind. Data also revealed that role of *Mullah* is also controversial in affected areas that misguide people after manipulating the real shape of Islam used it as a shield to exploit innocent civilians. Further, fencing would play a decisive role in combating cross border terrorism. It will prevent smuggling of illegal products like heroine and other goods. Moreover, check and balance on border can be helpful to distinguish locals from militants. Further, second hypothesis is proved correctly as suicide bombing not increases due to kinetic military operation. Suicide bombing is one of the tactics to distract military operation. Further, drone strikes from the U.S. poses negative impact and the graph of suicide bombing goes in upward direction during drone strikes. However, there is no link between both military operation and suicide bombing. Suicide bombing starts initially when army launched operation but graph of bombing coming down as operation proceeds further. Verily, the third hypothesis is partially proven. As in previous studies, it was claimed that Pakistan army did not launch military operation against certain groups and went for peace accord. But on the basis of recent data collected from respondents of various fields, it is proven that Pakistan military launched peace process with Taliban and other groups due to scarcity of resources but none of the peace process was successful. Hence, after the incident of Army Public School where around 150 children were killed, military decided to launch operation without any discrimination. The operation is still going on in the form of Operation *Radd-ul-Fassad* against militants.

Chapter#6: Conclusion

The discussion presented in this thesis leads to the conclusion that existing literature on ‘do more’ strategy of the United States towards Pakistan have limited utility in explaining the counter terrorisms strategy of Pakistan. Predominantly, the counter-terrorism strategy of the United States was based on military operations, regardless with the strategy of Pakistan which was inconsistent and swinging between peace process and military operations. This research work underlined the factors that trigger Pakistan to follow self-reliant military plan against militants. This research analysis of Pakistani military plan reveal that counter terrorism strategy is caused by multiple factors with military operation, ideology of terrorist, regional discourse, resistance showed by locals against Pakistan government and the U.S. military activity. However, suspensions of foreign funding or bilateral relations appear as the least relevant factors that can affect counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan.

6.1 Summary of key findings

This study offers an empirical analysis of the United States counter terrorism strategy and Pakistan’s military scheme in war on terror and put forth the argument that constructivist approach is explain the non-conventional military strategy adopted by Pakistani government to vanquish militancy. According to constructivism, states define their interests differently in different situation and identities are never permanent in international relations. During Soviet-Afghan War, Pakistan military supported the United States against the Soviet Union. At that time, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) became the breeding place for mujahedeen. The United States defeated the Soviet Union with the help of Pakistan. While, after 9/11, The US-led military

campaign in Afghanistan dislodged the Taliban regime that they supported previously. It expanded the threat well into Pakistan. Most of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban leaders and cadre slipped into Pakistan's tribal areas, bordering Afghanistan. Initially, they had concentrated in South Waziristan and then expanded their support base in the other areas of the FATA. At the time it became difficult for Pakistani forces to launch operation against same mujahedeen whom they supported previously during Soviet-Afghan War. After 9/11 attacks, Pakistan moved to the U.S. camp and supported the U.S. with air base, land routes and military personals. In return, Pakistan got financial aids from the United States. However, as a result of military operations against terrorists, Pakistan faced heavy retaliation in terms of bomb blasts all across the country. Whenever, Pakistan military started military operation, suicide bombing got increased not only in hard areas but also in metropolitan cities to frighten people and to destabilize the government. By following constructivist approach, interests of the United States were changed after 9/11 and freedom fighters of 80s became terrorists now. The U.S. started its military campaign in October 2001 to dislodge terrorists in Afghanistan and the threats are well-proliferated in Pakistan as well as many of Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders fled from their country and got sanctuaries in federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region of Pakistan and they needed full support from Pakistan. Islamabad knew its geo-strategic importance for Washington against Al-Qaeda. To deal with the terrorists, the U.S. entered into Afghanistan, and Pakistan provided support in shape of logistics assistance, sharing intelligence information, capturing and giving back to the United States.

From the given theory of international relations (constructivist approach), the study drew four testable hypotheses based on counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan

which (ideology of militants, regional discourse, resistance showed by locals against Pakistan government and the U.S. military activity) have been confirmed.

The study confirms that success or failure of military operation depends upon regional discourse. There were many local problems which Pakistan army faced in operation areas. One and the foremost problem was lack of awareness. Locals were unable to differentiate between good and bad. Most of the people blindly support Taliban. Some of the locals think that these Taliban are the custodian of their lives, so they can easily convince locals to take one or two young ones of the families along with them. Those Taliban used to train them and locals found no problem by doing this. Moreover, people of tribal areas are very much attached with their roots, so it became difficult for Pakistan military to displace people while launching military operation. They don't want to leave their belongings behind. Locals were getting fed up with the militants. Further, there was no political writ. Those who have power can do anything and nobody can stop him. There were no elections to choose candidate in those areas. Powerful man can do anything. There were no institutions. They resolve their matters in Jirgas (A tribal council which has a legislative function) which are also biased. Local culture was one of the main problems. As relatives of people of tribal areas and Afghanistan were living across border, hence, they move freely on both sides of border without any hurdle. It was difficult for Pakistan military to distinguish between common man and militant. Further, religious misguidance is also one of them. Little knowledge is dangerous and some local religious persons distorted the real shape of religion and used it as a shield to exploit innocent civilians. Mullah (religious person) was very strong in those areas and people used to believe whatever he said irrespective of the fact whether it is right or wrong. Study also reveals that

major resistance to Pakistan military in terrorism-affected areas came from top level hierarchy among locals. Those people have their vested interest. They used to exploit the people under them and no one to stop them. As there were no elections, those people don't want Pakistan military to come and establish government writ over there. Study further confirmed that border fencing would help a great deal in lowering down the graph of terrorism in the country. Study revealed that fencing is really challenging on border. Initially, there came retaliation because there was no check and balance and people moved freely across borders. It was difficult to distinguish who is right and who is wrong. People don't want fencing as relatives of locals are living across borders. Residents of those areas are scared because after fencing, they cannot activate their illegal activities as most of the people earn money through smuggling and other illegal means and it would be end of their employment. There was no writ government in those areas, so challenge to border fencing can be described as; on one side it will affect their culture and their daily routine as they can't move freely across border and on other side they are scared that their employment would be finished by doing this as they don't know other skills to earn their livelihood. In addition, local people lost their employment as a result of terrorism. Army is providing skills to them to earn livelihood. They are building their homes and providing security that has life threat from militants. Terrorism affected locals in many ways; it engulfed whole families. People lost their loved ones in suicide bombing, girls could not go to school and local business was destroyed. There are many ways to restrict cross border terrorism i.e. border fencing, local awareness, military check post, understanding to local problems, etc. Pakistan army brought awareness among the masses. They had lost their employment, army provided skills to them and provided incentives to them

to start businesses. There are many changes as a result of Pakistan army presence, i.e., eradication of terrorism, revival of sports, revival of life, elimination of Kalashnikov culture, creation of infrastructure, provision of basic facilities to locals, etc. Pakistan army brought revolution in their lives and created awareness. Military created the writ of the government over there which was previously unseen in that region. People were double-minded. They were unable to decide whether to go to army camp or militants' camp. One of the main reasons was that the area was underprivileged since the establishment of Pakistan and government never paid attention towards it. So, they were unable to believe army. Most of them were facing pressure from militants also and got life threats if they share any information with army. Few people among locals also believe as well that Pakistan army may destroy their values. This is because of religious misguidance. Before military operation, locals had to leave their homes and their belongings. It was obvious reaction from them to resist. They were scared that their belongings might be stolen or their houses might be destroyed, etc. They thought that check posts in their areas are not meant to protect them but disrespect their values. Those people were scared of change. They thought their norms, traditions and values might be destroyed through revolution by Pakistan army. People were misguided. When one person of a family was killed in bomb blast or drone attacks, other members became rebels and got involved in illegal activities. Militants got benefit by brainwashing their minds. In return, few of them turned out to be militants. Study also confirmed that before 9/11, there was not much difference between Afghan and Pakistan Taliban. They must work for their vested interests to destabilize the region. Furthermore, Pakistan army was careful while launching operation. They tried to engage people through dialogues in order to avoid trust

deficit and those who joined hands with Pakistan army, they were provided security and army gave training to them to live a better normal life.

Study confirmed that locals showed resistance against Pakistan military as a result of the U.S. military activity like drone strikes against militants in Pakistan. Resultantly, militants used different tactics to resist and tried to sabotage peace like suicide bombing, land mining, etc. to divert army's attention. Suicide bombing is one of the tactics to distract military operation. These kinds of coward attacks are tried to demoralize military. Further, there is no link between both military operation and suicide bombing. Instead, suicide bombing starts whenever army launch operation but graph of bombing coming down as operation proceeds further. However, drone attacks from the U.S. military also posed negative impact on the counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan. The Islamic country saw more deterioration and destabilization as a result of foreign involvement whether it be drone attacks or foreign funding.

The study further confirms that success or failure of military operation depends upon terrorist political orientation of militant group towards Pakistani government. The militant were termed as mujahedeen when they were fighting against Soviet Union and the United States funded and equipped them with modern weapon and Pakistan provided safe heavens and trained them to fight against Soviet Union. But after 9/11, those mujahedeen had become terrorists. So, initially it was difficult for army to fight against them. Initially during Musharraf era, army was not well-trained for this kind of war and there were many hurdles to deal with militants like unfamiliarity with local routes, mujahedeen turning to militants, religious exploitation, etc. So, army made some peace agreement in order to restore harmony. Moreover, this all is due to scarcity of resources. There are seven agencies in FATA

and the strength and resources of Pakistan army are not enough to meet the requirement. Hence, in one part where army is doing operation and then they try to engage militants in other part through different means whether it be peace process, involving locals or through other means. There are certain peace committees as well who are already working in the area where Pakistan army launched operation. Due to unfamiliarity of local routes and culture, Pakistan army took the help of those committees to launch operations. This habit of peace process was continued before operation *Zarb-e-Azb*. There was a time before 2014 when army was not getting its targets and faced massive resistance from the militants then they went for option of peace process, but these peace processes were not successful due to stubborn attitude of militants. One day, militants promised to stay calm and the next day they attacked on Army check post. They worked for their vested interest. Moreover, there are not such things like good Taliban and bad Taliban. Before 9/11, when these Taliban were funded by the United States and Pakistani government, they were in favour of Pakistan. After 9/11, they turned around and became militants after the United States operation in Afghanistan. So, the difference between good and bad is just the matter of time. Further, Pakistan army do not differentiates militants while going through operation but there are some companions of militants. Those locals can drop their weapons and help military to find out militants. In return, army provides security to them. To avoid maximum loss, Pakistan army was following 3Ds policy; Dialogue, Destroy, Development. First engage people through dialogue, they may follow and understand what you are saying. If it is no happening then adopt aggressive strategy against militants. After that, rebuild the destructed area.

As a result of allegations from the U.S., Pakistan may search for new alliances. It is a matter of fact that over two decades, both Pakistan and Russia were against each other due to conflict of interests. But it is back story now. In addition, China is doing billions of investment in CPEC project. Moreover, China, Russia and Pakistan have their own strategic interest in Afghanistan and all of them want stability in the region which may persuade them to make an alliance. Furthermore, unstable Afghanistan is also not in favour of Pakistan and China. On the other side, the U.S. and India signed an agreement called Logistic Exchange Memorandum of agreement (LEMOA), which allow Indian market to access to the U.S. weapon. In order to counter the threat, Pakistan may go for alliance with Russia and China. Moreover, CPEC is not only a trade route but the development of many projects. Both China and Pakistan are already cooperating in many fields like infrastructure, energy, agriculture and communication. Experts claim that CPEC triangle of China, Russia and Pakistan can be the game changer in Southeast Asian politics. But the question is whether Russia will join the project as Moscow have very close relationship with New Delhi and Russia remain the key weapon supplier in past. Political pundits assert that Russia may leave India behind. In this context, Russian Intelligence Chief Alexander Bogdanov already visited Gwader and showed interest to be the part of this project. Moreover, both Pakistan and Russia wants to strength their defence and military relationship.

Study showed that Pakistan also needs stability in Afghanistan due to many reasons. Firstly, Islamabad already has hostile relation with New Delhi and can't afford to open another avenue of hostility on its western border. Secondly, Pakistan maintains that Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Indian intelligence agency (RAW)

are using Afghan land to carry out terrorist activities in Baluchistan. Thirdly, Pakistan wants to reach central Asian Republics (CARs) for trade but the borders are separated by Afghanistan. Fourthly, a large number of Afghan refugees are resided in Pakistan. In order to send them back to their country, stable Afghanistan is very important. Although, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration Situation, Nancy Izzo Jackson said that current situation in Afghanistan is not suitable for Afghan refugees to return to their home. But toxic relations between the U.S. and Pakistan would hurt both the countries in Afghanistan.

On the basis of analysis, two out of three hypotheses have been proven. The first hypothesis is proven as the success or failure of Pakistani military operations depends on regional discourse. Data here revealed that Pakistani military were facing many problems in afflicted areas. One and the foremost problem was lack of awareness. Taliban were also from Pashtun community and local people felt that they are their well-wisher. Locals were unable to differentiate between good and bad. Further, people of tribal areas are very much attached with their roots, so it became difficult for Pakistan military to displace people while launching military operation. Moreover, the role of *Mullah* is also controversial in affected areas, who misguide people after manipulating the real shape of Islam, used it as a shield to exploit innocent civilians. Moreover, fencing would play a decisive role in combating cross border terrorism. It will prevent smuggling of illegal products like heroine and other goods. Further check and balance on border can be helpful to distinguish locals from militants. The second hypothesis has been confirmed as suicide bombing not increases due to the U.S. drone strikes. Suicide bombing is one of the tactics to distract military operation. These kinds of coward attacks are tried to demoralize

military. However, there is no link between both military operation and suicide bombing. Suicide bombing starts initially when army launched operation but graph of bombing coming down as operation proceeds further. The third hypothesis claimed that Pakistan army did not launch military operation against certain groups and went for peace accord. But on the basis of recent data collected from respondents of various fields, it is proven that Pakistan military launched peace process with Taliban and other groups due to scarcity of resources but none of the peace process was successful.

6.2 Implications of findings

The history of Afghanistan tells us vivid results where no foreign state wins the war when they entered with an inclination to capture the Islamic country. One and foremost important reason is regional discourse which plays an important role and helps local people to fight against invaders. In case of the United States, porous border of Pakistan and Afghanistan helped the militants where they could easily cross the border. To curb militancy across Pak-Afghan border, border fencing and check posts along demarcating line play a vital role to bring back regional peace and tranquility.

Moreover, this research has also identified causal and contributing factors behind counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan and the consequences of ‘do more’ strategy by the United States. In formulating policy responses, national and international stakeholders will be required to chart out a strategy collectively that deals with this problem of trust deficit and policy lag of both of the countries. To combat terrorism, international policy makers need to realize the importance of

regional discourse which plays a crucial role in dealing with militants. Further, to counter suicide terrorism in Pakistan and its expansion to other regions, there is a need to create an environment that counteracts militants' radical ideologies and misinterpretation of Islam. The United States need to work with local stakeholders. In this regard, the role of civil society, intelligentsia and religious clerics is of paramount significance. Soft approaches to the ideological battle against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan also demand an increased role of political actors to developing a national consensus on the issue of terrorism and explore alternative political solutions. In the absence of soft power approaches involving political, social, economic and ideological measures, terrorist groups always recuperate from physical losses in the battlefield because a vast pool of sympathizers and supporters in Pakistan and abroad continue to provide new sanctuaries, recruits and finances. For example, TTP sustained significant damages in the battlefield in major military operations since 2001, but reorganized its ranks and continued to launch attacks against both easy and difficult targets in the years since.

Notwithstanding, tactical gains against al-Qaeda-led insurgents, the use of drones had been much criticised. In case of Pakistan, there is a sizeable support for this weapon among people living in the areas infested by Taliban insurgency. A survey conducted by the New America Foundation in 2010 found that more than one in five in the Tribal Areas backed drone strikes, and a number of experts interviewed for this study termed them a better option than fighter jets or ground offensives. What is criticised and debated relates primarily to the legal and moral legitimacy of the U.S. employing this tactic in FATA. Against this backdrop, the strategic benefits of UAVs can only be reaped and maximised if strikes are carried out by the states with legal and moral claims of sovereignty to the land. To this end, Pakistan is developing its indigenous drone technology with the help of the Peoples' Republic of China. Western support for Pakistan's drones programme will

constitute an important step forward in combating terrorism, since drones will significantly reduce collateral damage produced by fighter jets' strikes in FATA.

6.3 Limitations and suggestions of study


The study has also contributed to building the first general comparison of document analysis and the results of surveys and interviews. These findings are, however, based largely on a limited number of interviews, surveys, newspaper archives, research articles and the result may vary a bit if researchers conduct survey of large number of people or if the government authorities in Pakistan decide to release relevant data. Moreover, among other respondents, there are interviewees from state institutions as well in surveys and interviews results which can be biased. The soldiers are working on the counter terrorism strategy devised by the government. It feels like that the element of patriotism can be found in the answers given by the respondents.

The study applied constructivist approach as regional discourse plays an important role in devising counter terrorism strategy in Pakistan while dealing with militants. Hence the research is applicable only when the neighbouring countries have same norms and culture as it happened in the case of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The Al-Qaeda-inspired global insurgency led by TTP continues to evolve beyond this study's conclusion. How Pakistan, the U.S. and the other key players including China, India, Iran and Saudi Arabia respond to this evolving threat will define the future of terrorism in the region and can be the great fruit for future research. Moreover, the United States is going for peace accord with Taliban but the history of peace accord with Taliban as mentioned in study is not reliable. Taliban are not well-founded customers as North Korea. Accordingly, researchers make comparative analysis of the United States dealing with Taliban and North Korea. As the findings are based largely on a limited number of

interviews, surveys, newspaper archives, research articles, hence, future studies may benefit immensely if the government authorities in Pakistan decide to release relevant data to academics.

In order to deal with evolving uncertainty in the region, a grand strategic consensus is also required to pave the way towards resolving the Kashmir dispute, stabilising Afghanistan and curtailing Shia-Sunni rifts in the region. Equally imperative is the delivery of good governance and sustained economic growth under democratic governments in Pakistan. Failure to do so will certainly lead to the further expansion and rise of the networks of militants in the country, which will have far reaching effects.



Appendix

Interviews from army persons

Interview No. 1

Interviewer: Does Pakistan army launch operation against all militant groups?

Interviewee: There is no doubt that army launched operation against all militants. One must understand when a person is challenging the writ of government then he must be penalized.

Interviewer: Why does army launch peace process with militants after terrorism hit tribal areas?

Interviewee: Initially during Musharraf era, army was not well trained for this kind of unique war and there were many hurdles to deal with militants like unfamiliarity with local routes, mujahedeen turning to militants, religious exploitation, etc. So, army made some peace agreement in order to restore harmony.

Interviewer: What is the difference between ‘Good Taliban and Bad Taliban’?

Interviewee: There is no such thing as good or bad Taliban. These are just media-derived terms. You can call Taliban before 9/11 as good one and Taliban after 9/11 as bad one. ‘Before 9/11, when these Taliban were funded by the United States and Pakistani government, they were in favour of Pakistan. After 9/11, they turned around and became militants after the United States operation in Afghanistan. So, the difference between good and bad is just the matter of time’.

Interviewer: What are actually the major hurdles faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: Well! Initially, Pakistani military was not well aware of this kind of war so they faced huge losses in terms of army personals. Secondly, the writ of government was not established in those areas since 1947, after partition. Moreover, people of tribal areas are very much attached with their roots. Hence, it became difficult for Pakistan military to displace people while launching military operation. They don't want to leave their belongings behind in operation areas.

Interviewer: Why the local people don't want border fencing on Pak-Afghan border?

Interviewee: Fencing is really challenging on border but it is mandatory to stop terrorism. Initially, yes, there came retaliation because there was no check and balance and people moved freely across borders. It was difficult to distinguish who is right and who is wrong.

Interviewer: What are genuinely the main problems of tribal people?

Interviewee: There were no elections to choose candidate in those areas and no concept to choose candidate. Powerful man can do anything. There were no institutions. They resolve their matters in *Jirgas* (A tribal council which has a legislative function) which are also biased.

Interviewer: Do you think that local affectees turn against Pakistan army after terrorism hit those areas?

Interviewee: Locals trust on Pakistan army. They have lost their employment as a result of terrorism. Army is providing skills to them to earn livelihood. They are building their homes and providing security that has life threat from militants.

Interviewer: How government can control cross border terrorism?

Interviewee: Terrorism affected locals in many ways; it engulfed whole families. People lost their loved ones in suicide bombing, girls could not go to school and local

business was destroyed'. There are many ways to restrict cross border terrorism i.e. border fencing, local awareness, military check post, understanding to local problems, etc.

Interviewer: Is there any kind of link exist between Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban?

Interviewee: Militants are existed on both sides and they work for their vested interests, so, it is impossible to say that there would be no contact. As they could move freely across border, so they might have links but Pakistan military got lots of success in destroying their network.

Interviewer: What kind of retaliation faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: Militants used different tactics to resist and tried to sabotage peace. Initially, when Pakistan army started operation, those militants used different tactics like suicide bombing, land mining, etc, to divert army's attention.

Interviewer: What kind of impact Pakistani military poses on local people?

Interviewee: We believed that we brought awareness among the masses. They had lost their employment, we provided skills to them. We provided incentives to them to start businesses.

Interviewer: Do you think that drone attacks spilled over into expansion of terrorist activities across the country?

Interviewee: Drone attacks was one of the tactic used by the U.S. military during first decade of this century and to certain extent, yes, it disturbed the counter terrorism activities of Pakistan military.

Interview No. 2

Interviewer: Does Pakistan army launch operation against all militant groups?

Interviewee: This was a unique kind of war. If we look at the history, we will understand the problem. Basically, these militant were termed as mujahedeen when they were fighting against Soviet Union and the United States funded and equipped them with modern weapon and Pakistan provided safe heavens and trained them to fight against Soviet Union. But after 9/11, those mujahedeen had become terrorists. So, initially it was difficult for army to fight against them.

Interviewer: Why does army launch peace process with militants after terrorism hit tribal areas?

Interviewee: There is no Peace process now. There was a time when army was not getting its targets and faced massive resistance from the militants then they went for option of peace process, but one should realize that no peace process was successful. One day, militants promised to stay calm and the next day they attacked on Army check post. They worked for their vested interest.

Interviewer: What is the difference between 'Good Taliban and Bad Taliban'?

Interviewee: All the militants are treated with iron hands and no such difference as good or bad.

Interviewer: What are actually the major hurdles faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: There were many difficulties in those areas. One and the foremost problem was lack of awareness. Locals were unable to differentiate between good and bad. Most of the people blindly support Taliban. One of the reasons, you can say, is fear of militants.

Interviewer: Why the local people don't want border fencing on Pak-Afghan border?

Interviewee: People don't want fencing as relatives of locals are living across borders. But it is important to fence border in order to stop illegal activities across border like smuggling, drug trafficking, etc.

Interviewer: What are genuinely the main problems of tribal people?

Interviewee: Locals were getting fed up with those militants, there was no political writ, 'Might is Right', those who have power can do anything and nobody can stop him.

Interviewer: Do you think that local affectees turn against Pakistan army after terrorism hit those areas?

Interviewee: No, this perception is not right that locals are against Pakistan army, only Taliban and other militants are against army. Local people trust army and realize that only Pakistan army can eradicate terrorism from their land.

Interviewer: How government can control cross border terrorism?

Interviewee: Border fencing is much needed job which we need to do at any cost.

Interviewer: Is there any kind of link exist between Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban?

Interviewee: It is impossible to comment on links between Pakistan and Afghan Taliban.

Interviewer: What kind of retaliation faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: We lost our soldiers during operations.

Interviewer: What kind of impact Pakistani military poses on local people?

Interviewee: Well! People of the affected areas acknowledge the services rendered by army personnel and the change prevailed by their presence. They give full credit of establishment of peace to Pakistan army.

Interviewer: Do you think that drone attacks spilled over into expansion of terrorist activities across the country?

Interviewee: Not really, militants are the target of drones. It is obvious that there come reaction from their side.

Interview No. 3

Interviewer: Does Pakistan army launch operation against all militant groups?

Interviewee: Pakistan army do not differentiate militants who are destabilizing the peace of the country.

Interviewer: Why does army launch peace process with militants after terrorism hit tribal areas?

Interviewee: Pakistan army do not have enough resources to deal with number of terrorists groups.

Interviewer: What is the difference between ‘Good Taliban and Bad Taliban’?

Interviewee: There is no difference between good or bad. These are just media-oriented terms.

Interviewer: What are actually the major hurdles faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: The displacement of locals to another place before launching operation was one of the main hurdles as they don’t want to leave their homes behind.

Interviewer: Why the local people don’t want border fencing on Pak-Afghan border?

Interviewee: They have their vested interest. One of the obvious reasons is that they don't want to establish hurdle to meet up their relatives.

Interviewer: What are genuinely the main problems of tribal people?

Interviewee: There were no elections to choose candidate in those areas and no concept to choose candidate. Powerful man can do anything. There were no institutions. They resolve their matters in *Jirgas* (A tribal council which has a legislative function) which are also biased.

Interviewer: Do you think that local affectees turn against Pakistan army after terrorism hit those areas?

Interviewee: Locals trust on Pakistan army. They have lost their employment as a result of terrorism. Army is providing skills to them to earn livelihood. They are building their homes and providing security that has life threat from militants.

Interviewer: How government can control cross border terrorism?

Interviewee: Terrorism affected locals in many ways; it engulfed whole families. People lost their loved ones in suicide bombing, girls could not go to school and local business was destroyed'. There are many ways to restrict cross border terrorism i.e. border fencing, local awareness, military check post, understanding to local problems, etc.

Interviewer: Is there any kind of link exist between Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban?

Interviewee: Militants are existed on both sides and they work for their vested interests, so, it is impossible to say that there would be no contact. As they could move freely across border, so they might have links but Pakistan military got lots of success in destroying their network.

Interviewer: What kind of retaliation faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: Militants used different tactics to resist and tried to sabotage peace. Initially, when Pakistan army started operation, those militants used different tactics like suicide bombing, land mining, etc, to divert army's attention.

Interviewer: What kind of impact Pakistani military poses on local people?

Interviewee: We believed that we brought awareness among the masses. They had lost their employment, we provided skills to them. We provided incentives to them to start businesses.

Interviewer: Do you think that drone attacks spilled over into expansion of terrorist activities across the country?

Interviewee: Drone attacks was one of the tactic used by the U.S. military during first decade of this century and to certain extent, yes, it disturbed the counter terrorism activities of Pakistan military.

Interviews from media persons

Interview No. 4

Interviewer: Does Pakistan army launch operation against all militant groups?

Interviewee: The story is completely different now. Initially, they were carrying a legacy of Soviet-Afghan War, so it was difficult for army to launch aggressive counter terrorism strategy against all militants. Peace processes were also part of their strategy but most of the peace processes were unsuccessful due to stubborn attitude of militants.

Interviewer: Why does army launch peace process with militants after terrorism hit tribal areas?

Interviewee: This all is due to scarcity of resources. There are seven agencies in FATA and the strength and resources of Pakistan army are not enough to meet the requirement. Hence, in one part where army is doing operation, and then they try to engage militants in other part through different means whether it be peace process, involving locals or through other means.

Interviewer: What is the difference between ‘Good Taliban and Bad Taliban’?

Interviewee: There was a perception that Taliban who are in Pakistan, they are good and those who are in Afghanistan are bad but according to my opinion, there is no such thing good or bad, only the militants who drop their weapon and endorse military ideology to rebuild peace and harmony are termed as good and those challenge writ of state can be termed as bad.

Interviewer: What are actually the major hurdles faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: Some of the locals think that these Taliban are the custodian of their lives, so they can easily convince locals to take one or two young ones of the families along with them. Those Taliban used to train them and locals found no problem by doing this.

Interviewer: Why the local people don't want border fencing on Pak-Afghan border?

Interviewee: Residents of those areas are scared because after fencing, they cannot activate their illegal activities as most of the people earn money through smuggling and other illegal means and it would be end of their employment.

Interviewer: What are genuinely the main problems of tribal people?

Interviewee: Among many problems, religious misguidance is one of them. Little knowledge is dangerous and some local religious persons distorted the real shape of religion and secondly the exploitation of haves to haves not.

Interviewer: Do you think that local affectees turn against Pakistan army after terrorism hit those areas?

Interviewee: Not all, but few believes that Pakistan army may destroy their values. This is because of religious misguidance. They thought that check posts in their areas are not meant to protect them but disrespect their values.

Interviewer: How government can control cross border terrorism?

Interviewee: Border fencing is a good measure in this direction.

Interviewer: Is there any kind of link exist between Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban?

Interviewee: Before 9/11, there was not much difference between Afghan and Pakistan Taliban. There is least possibility that these people do not exchange dialogues. They must work for their vested interests to destabilize the region.

Interviewer: What kind of retaliation faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: Locals try to create every resistance which is going towards change. They resist border fencing as well. This may stop the illegal activities across the border.

Interviewer: What kind of impact Pakistani military poses on local people?

Interviewee: There are many changes as a result of Pakistan army presence, i.e., eradication of terrorism, revival of sports, revival of life, elimination of Kalashnikov culture, creation of infrastructure, provision of basic facilities to locals, etc.

Interviewer: Do you think that drone attacks spilled over into expansion of terrorist activities across the country?

Interviewee: In case of Pakistan, these attacks were launched by the U.S. government. So, the situation became more worsened after attacks as even locals don't like this attack as the attacks violated the sovereignty of Pakistan.

Interview No. 5

Interviewer: Does Pakistan army launch operation against all militant groups?

Interviewee: Pakistan army launches operation without any distinction.

Interviewer: Why does army launch peace process with militants after terrorism hit tribal areas?

Interviewee: Peace process should always be the part of military strategy to avoid inevitable loss. Pakistan military tried to follow the strategy but was not getting fruitful results.

Interviewer: What are actually the major hurdles faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: People were misguided. When one person of a family was killed in bomb blast or drone attacks, other members became rebels and got involved in illegal activities. Militants got benefit by brainwashing their minds. In return, few of them turned out to be militants.

Interviewer: Why the local people don't want border fencing on Pak-Afghan border?

Interviewee: Local people do not take border line seriously. It runs through local towns and villages of Pashtuns community who have common culture, norms,

traditions, language, etc. They live on one side of the border and their agriculture lands are present on the other side of the border. Similarly, the relatives of Pashtuns community live on both sides of the border.

Interviewer: Do you think that local affectees turn against Pakistan army after terrorism hit those areas?

Interviewee: People were scared of change. They thought their norms, traditions and values might be destroyed through revolution by Pakistan army.

Interviewer: How government can control cross border terrorism?

Interviewee: Establishing border fencing is a great step.

Interviewer: Is there any kind of link exist between Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban?

Interviewee: Before 9/11, there was not much difference between Afghan and Pakistan Taliban. There is least possibility that these people do not exchange dialogues. They must work for their vested interests to destabilize the region.

Interviewer: What kind of retaliation faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: Locals try to create every resistance which is going towards change. They resist border fencing as well. This may stop the illegal activities across the border.

Interviewer: What kind of impact Pakistani military poses on local people?

Interviewee: There are many changes as a result of Pakistan army presence, i.e., eradication of terrorism, revival of sports, revival of life, elimination of Kalashnikov culture, creation of infrastructure, provision of basic facilities to locals, etc.

Interviewer: Do you think that drone attacks spilled over into expansion of terrorist activities across the country?

Interviewee: In case of Pakistan, these attacks were launched by the U.S. government. So, the situation became more worsened after attacks as even locals don't like this attack as the attacks violated the sovereignty of Pakistan.

Interview No. 6

Interviewer: Does Pakistan army launch operation against all militant groups?

Interviewee: In recent times, Yes! Pakistan military is doing operation against all militants. There was a time before Zarb-e-Azb when peace process and military operation were going side by side.

Interviewer: Why does army launch peace process with militants after terrorism hit tribal areas?

Interviewee: Pakistan military did not have enough resources to fight against militants. Secondly, they did not have proper military strategy to fight against mujahedeen turning to terrorists.

Interviewer: What is the difference between 'Good Taliban and Bad Taliban'?

Interviewee: Taliban which surrender to Pakistani military are considered as 'Good Taliban' while those who challenge government writ are noted as 'Bad Taliban'

Interviewer: What are actually the major hurdles faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: Terrorists' attack on cops and loss of lives of brave soldiers.

Interviewer: Why the local people don't want border fencing on Pak-Afghan border?

Interviewee: There are many reasons i.e., earning livelihood through smuggling of drugs as well as weapons, relatives and people having same culture living on both sides of the border.

Interviewer: What are genuinely the main problems of tribal people?

Interviewee: There were no polling stations and no law and order situation before Pakistani military took over the control of those areas.

Interviewer: Do you think that local affectees turn against Pakistan army after terrorism hit those areas?

Interviewee: Not really. If some of the people turn against army. This is just because of lack of awareness.

Interviewer: How government can control cross border terrorism?

Interviewee: In case of Pakistan, dialogues with Afghan government are the best solution to prevent terrorist activities.

Interviewer: Is there any kind of link exist between Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban?

Interviewee: Terrorists do not have any religion or nationality. They work in cooperation to inculcate terror among masses.

Interviewer: What kind of retaliation faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: Mining, suicide bombing, kidnapping to innocent civilians especially children and brainwash them into suicide bombers are some of the hurdles faced by Pakistani military against militants.

Interviewer: What kind of impact Pakistani military poses on local people?

Interviewee: First military created awareness of rights among masses and secondly, they are vouchsafing skills to locals to earn their livelihood.

Interview No. 7

Interviewer: Does Pakistan army launch operation against all militant groups?

Interviewee: The story is completely different now. Initially, they were carrying a legacy of Soviet-Afghan War, so it was difficult for army to launch aggressive counter terrorism strategy against all militants. Peace processes were also part of their strategy but most of the peace processes were unsuccessful due to stubborn attitude of militants.

Interviewer: Why does army launch peace process with militants after terrorism hit tribal areas?

Interviewee: This all is due to scarcity of resources. There are seven agencies in FATA and the strength and resources of Pakistan army are not enough to meet the requirement. Hence, in one part where army is doing operation, and then they try to engage militants in other part through different means whether it be peace process, involving locals or through other means.

Interviewer: What is the difference between ‘Good Taliban and Bad Taliban’?

Interviewee: There was a perception that Taliban who are in Pakistan, they are good and those who are in Afghanistan are bad but according to my opinion, there is no such thing good or bad, only the militants who drop their weapon and endorse military ideology to rebuild peace and harmony are termed as good and those challenge writ of state can be termed as bad.

Interviewer: What are actually the major hurdles faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: Some of the locals think that these Taliban are the custodian of their lives, so they can easily convinced locals to take one or two young ones of the families along with them. Those Taliban used to train them and locals found no problem by doing this.

Interviewer: Why the local people don't want border fencing on Pak-Afghan border?

Interviewee: Residents of those areas are scared because after fencing, they cannot activate their illegal activities as most of the people earn money through smuggling and other illegal means and it would be end of their employment.

Interviewer: What are genuinely the main problems of tribal people?

Interviewee: Among many problems, religious misguidance is one of them. Little knowledge is dangerous and some local religious persons distorted the real shape of religion and secondly the exploitation of haves to haves not.

Interviewer: Do you think that local affectees turn against Pakistan army after terrorism hit those areas?

Interviewee: Not all, but few believes that Pakistan army may destroy their values. This is because of religious misguidance. They thought that check posts in their areas are not meant to protect them but disrespect their values.

Interviewer: How government can control cross border terrorism?

Interviewee: Border fencing is a good measure in this direction.

Interviewer: Is there any kind of link exist between Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban?

Interviewee: Before 9/11, there was not much difference between Afghan and Pakistan Taliban. There is least possibility that these people do not exchange dialogues. They must work for their vested interests to destabilize the region.

Interviewer: What kind of retaliation faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: Locals try to create every resistance which is going towards change. They resist border fencing as well. This may stop the illegal activities across the border.

Interviewer: What kind of impact Pakistani military poses on local people?

Interviewee: There are many changes as a result of Pakistan army presence, i.e., eradication of terrorism, revival of sports, revival of life, elimination of Kalashnikov culture, creation of infrastructure, provision of basic facilities to locals, etc.

Interviewer: Do you think that drone attacks spilled over into expansion of terrorist activities across the country?

Interviewee: In case of Pakistan, these attacks were launched by the U.S. government. So, the situation became more worsened after attacks as even locals don't like this attack as the attacks violated the sovereignty of Pakistan.

Interview from political analysts

Interview No. 8

Interviewer: Does Pakistan army launch operation against all militant groups?

Interviewee: To avoid maximum loss, Pakistan army follows 3Ds policy; Dialogue, Destroy, Development. First engage people through dialogue, they may follow and understand what you are saying. If it is no happening then adopt aggressive strategy against militants. After that, rebuild the destructed area.

Interviewer: What is the difference between 'Good Taliban and Bad Taliban'?

Interviewee: After 9/11, when Pakistan army launched operation against militants, they faced difficulty to tackle infiltration due to scarcity of resources. They divided their targets into categories. Against certain militant groups, they opted only strategy to launch military operation, but they opted peace process as well as military operation strategy against certain group. Taliban who took part with Pakistan army in building peace can be termed as good Taliban.

Interviewer: What are actually the major hurdles faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: Mullah (religious person) was very strong in those areas and people used to believe whatever he said irrespective of the fact whether it is right or wrong. Those mullahs used to exploit religion to misguide people.

Interviewer: Why the local people don't want border fencing on Pak-Afghan border?

Interviewee: There was no writ government in those areas, so challenge to border fencing can be described as; on one side it will affect their culture and their daily routine as they can't move freely across border and on other side they are scared that their employment would be finished by doing this as they don't know other skills to earn their livelihood.

Interviewer: What are genuinely the main problems of tribal people?

Interviewee: Major resistance to Pakistan military came from top level hierarchy. Those people have their vested interest. They used to exploit the people under them and no one to stop them. As there were no elections, those people don't want Pakistan military to come and establish government writ over there.

Interviewer: Do you think that local affectees turn against Pakistan army after terrorism hit those areas?

Interviewee: Before military operation, locals had to leave their homes and their belongings. It was obvious reaction from them to resist. They were scared that their belongings might be stolen or their houses might be destroyed, etc.

Interviewer: Did there lie any trust deficit between army and locals?

Interviewee: Pakistan army was careful while launching operation. They tried to engage people through dialogues in order to avoid trust deficit and those who joined

hands with Pakistan army, they were provided security and army gave training to them to live a better normal life.

Interviewer: How terrorism affected local people?

Interviewee: People were double-minded. They were unable to decide whether to go to army camp or militants' camp. One of the main reasons was that the area was underprivileged since the establishment of Pakistan and government never paid attention towards it. So, they were unable to believe army. Most of them were facing pressure from militants also and got life threats if they share any information with army.

Interviewer: Is there any kind of link exist between Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban?

Interviewee: You can't ignore the link and they might work for their common interest to destabilize the writ of government.

Interviewer: What kind of retaliation faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: The important retaliation which Pakistan army military was facing in shape of loss of army personals. Terrorists target not only the families of army persons but also innocent civilians.

Interview No. 9

Interviewer: Does Pakistan army launch operation against all militant groups?

Interviewee: It was really a tough war for Pakistan army. If I can say that putting one hand on your right eye and see the militants as mujahedeen from your left eye then putting one hand on your left eye and look at the militants as terrorists from your right eye. This happened with Pakistan army. Before 9/11, these people were fighting in

Afghanistan and the United States and Pakistan supported them but story changed after 9/11. Now they had become terrorists. So, peace process was one of army's strategies to engage them.

Interviewer: Why does army launch peace process with militants after terrorism hit tribal areas?

Interviewee: Pakistan military launched peace process due to many reasons. Two of the main causes were scarcity of resources and novelty of unique kind of war between mujahedeen turning to terrorists and military

Interviewer: What is the difference between 'Good Taliban and Bad Taliban'?

Interviewee: There are certain peace committees who are already working in the area where Pakistan army launched operation. Due to unfamiliarity of local routes and culture, Pakistan army took the help of those committees to launch operations. Some people termed those peace committees as good Taliban but actually it is not.

Interviewer: What are actually the major hurdles faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: The problems were two fold; before military operation and after military operation. Before military operation, locals don't want to leave their belongings behind. When Pakistan army launched military operation, militants used to hide themselves in those vacant houses, so in due course of operation, these houses were bombarded. After operation when those locals came back, they were unable to accept that their houses had been destroyed which were constructed by their forefathers.

Interviewer: Why the local people don't want border fencing on Pak-Afghan border?

Interviewee: The bread and butter of Pashtuns rely mainly on trade occurring between Afghanistan and Pakistan through Pak-Afghan border. They will stay jobless as they no other skills to earn money.

Interviewer: What are genuinely the main problems of tribal people?

Interviewee: There are many problems of tribal people. Since 1947, they haven't given even basic rights. Stronger one has the greater power and he can do anything. There were no elections in the area. *Jirga* are much popular as judicial committee for decisions.

Interviewer: Do you think that local affectees turn against Pakistan army after terrorism hit those areas?

Interviewee: When one member of a local family joined militant group and Pakistan army arrested or killed that person in military operation that person then there came a strong reaction from that family.

Interviewer: How government can control cross border terrorism?

Interviewee: Government can control cross border terrorism through dialogues with Afghan government. Installation of fencing is also a vital step in the same direction.

Interviewer: Is there any kind of link exist between Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban?

Interviewee: There are no established links between Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. Both are considered terrorists having same agenda to disrupt peace and harmony.

Interviewer: What kind of retaliation faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: There are different kinds of setback which Pakistani military faced in war against terror. Attacks on children and loss of army personals are also among them.

Interviewer: What kind of impact Pakistani military poses on local people?

Interviewee: One of the major impacts is to create awareness among masses. People are more informed of their rights here than before.

Interview No. 10

Interviewer: Does Pakistan army launch operation against all militant groups?

Interviewee: There is no question to distinguish militants. Anywhere and everywhere, militancy should be treated with iron hands. Pakistani army is doing the job with devotion.

Interviewer: Why does army launch peace process with militants after terrorism hit tribal areas?

Interviewee: Everywhere in the world, dialogues are the part of government strategy to bring the opponents on negotiation table. In case of Pakistan, there were many reasons which convinced Pakistani government to negotiate with Taliban like scarcity of resources. Pakistani government do not want to open another front on western border when they do not have good relation with eastern neighbour, India.

Interviewer: What is the difference between ‘Good Taliban and Bad Taliban’?

Interviewee: Both the terms are media-oriented.

Interviewer: What are actually the major hurdles faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: Religious leaders are very strong in affected areas. They have the ability to mould people’s mind through manipulation of religion.

Interviewer: Why the local people don’t want border fencing on Pak-Afghan border?

Interviewee: They are scared that fencing may stop their business which they are doing through porous border.

Interviewer: What are genuinely the main problems of tribal people?

Interviewee: There was no writ of government in tribal areas. People have to rely on small household business to earn their livelihood.

Interviewer: Do you think that local affectees turn against Pakistan army after terrorism hit those areas?

Interviewee: Locals are not against Pakistani military. Militants in those areas try to wash the brain of innocent people and turn them against army.

Interviewer: How government can control cross border terrorism?

Interviewee: Transnational terrorism can be controlled through check and balance. Pakistani government need to establish permanent check posts on that border of borders where there are frequent movements of people.

Interviewer: Is there any kind of link exist between Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban?

Interviewee: It is impossible to comment on the links between Pakistani and Afghan Taliban. You totally cannot totally negate it.

Interviewer: What kind of retaliation faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: Terrorists launched suicide bombing on innocent people.

Interviewer: What kind of impact Pakistani military poses on local people?

Interviewee: The greatest achievement of Pakistani military is the creation of awareness among masses.

Interview No. 11

Interviewer: Does Pakistan army launch operation against all militant groups?

Interviewee: Just like every military force, Pakistani army keep their vested interest safe. But at the same time, they launched operation against all the militants whose sole interest is to destabilize law and order situation and create chaos in the country.

Interviewer: Why does army launch peace process with militants after terrorism hit tribal areas?

Interviewee: Pakistani military is busy on both the fronts - eastern as well as western border. It became difficult to make sure the availability of such large number of soldiers and fight on both borders.

Interviewer: What are actually the major hurdles faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: There are many hurdles which Pakistani military faced due to novelty of this kind of war. One important difficult was evacuation of local citizens from operation area and the resettlement process. The locals don't leave their belongings behind. Also, the love and affection, which they have for their city, prevent them to evacuate.

Interviewer: Why the local people don't want border fencing on Pak-Afghan border?

Interviewee: The locals don't want to bring change in their life. They resist any kind of outer change. They believe that fencing may affect their culture and restrict them to move freely across borders.

Interviewer: What are genuinely the main problems of tribal people?

Interviewee: Due to unavailability of law and order situation, people are not getting basic rights in those areas.

Interviewer: Do you think that local affectees turn against Pakistan army after terrorism hit those areas?

Interviewee: Initially, they believe that presence of military may disturb their culture. But with the passage of time, they think that army is playing the role of caretaker for them. Only certain groups in the community spread negative vibes against army.

Interviewer: How government can control cross border terrorism?

Interviewee: Government can control transnational terrorism through check and balance. Fencing is a step, which you can say, taken in a right direction.

Interviewer: Is there any kind of link exist between Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban?

Interviewee: Both Afghan and Pakistani Taliban are working like a company. As company make collaboration for vested interests and to generate profit. Likewise, these organizations work in a similar fashion.

Interviewer: What kind of retaliation faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: The resistance was two folds i.e., Resistance from militants and resistance from locals. Militants attacks on soldiers through suicide bombing or using other alternate ways, while locals don't want to bring change in their lives.

Interview No. 12

Interviewer: Does Pakistan army launch operation against all militant groups?

Interviewee: To avoid maximum loss, Pakistan army follows 3Ds policy; Dialogue, Destroy, Development. First engage people through dialogue, they may follow and understand what you are saying. If it is no happening then adopt aggressive strategy against militants. After that, rebuild the destructed area.

Interviewer: What is the difference between ‘Good Taliban and Bad Taliban’?

Interviewee: After 9/11, when Pakistan army launched operation against militants, they faced difficulty to tackle infiltration due to scarcity of resources. They divided their targets into categories. Against certain militant groups, they opted only strategy to launch military operation, but they opted peace process as well as military operation strategy against certain group. Taliban who took part with Pakistan army in building peace can be termed as good Taliban.

Interviewer: What are actually the major hurdles faced by Pakistani military in operation areas?

Interviewee: Mullah (religious person) was very strong in those areas and people used to believe whatever he said irrespective of the fact whether it is right or wrong. Those mullahs used to exploit religion to misguide people.

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