Introducing Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) in Allocation System of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs)

Abstract

Developing an allocation scheme for distributing rights in RFMOs remains one of the major obstacles to the development of stable cooperative arrangements to exploit international fish resources. As the membership of RFMOs increases and pressure to allow additional countries, particularly coastal developing countries to participate meaningfully in international fisheries intensifies, question arise as to whether existing allocation schemes are sufficiently robust and flexible to ensure the stability of the cooperative arrangements over time. Therefore, this study reviews existing allocation system in the eight RFMOs and shows that although they have adopted different approaches all have failed to prevent new entrants problem and also overcapacity and, for some stocks, over exploitation. As an alternative, it is proposed that each RFMO to introduce developing ITQ in RFMOs’ allocation system to Member countries. Each country would be free to use or sell its annual allocation of fish, but the sales could be only to fellow member countries. Beside will be able to give several benefits, the implementation of ITQ in RFMOs assumed offers possibly overcoming the new entrants and overcapacity problems in the highly migratory and high seas fisheries.