모리타니어장의 한국 트롤어업 연구

Abstract

ABSTRACT This study examines the trajectory and eventual failure of fisheries cooperation between the Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania from the late 1970s through the 1980s. Set within the broader context of the post-UNCLOS maritime order and Mauritania's assertion of its Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ), this research highlights a critical yet underexamined case of South-South fisheries diplomacy. The main objective is to analyze the nature, structure, and political-economic dynamics of Korean–Mauritanian cooperation, focusing particularly on why it ultimately failed despite initial mutual interests and repeated attempts at institutional partnership. Following Mauritania’s proclamation of its EEZ in 1977, the country began asserting sovereignty over its rich marine resources. Korea, then among the world’s top distant-water fishing nations, sought continued access to these waters. In response, the two countries initiated bilateral- iv negotiations, resulting in Korea’s first formal fisheries agreement with Mauritania in March 1979. This agreement included licensing arrangements, financial compensation, and promises of technical assistance. Central to the cooperation was the creation of a joint venture, COMACOP (Compagnie Mauritanienne de Coopération et de Pêche), which operated from 1979 and involved Korean capital and vessels. The firm represented a hybrid model combining state-to-state agreements with commercial enterprise. Korea’s role centered on providing fishing vessels, technological expertise, and refrigerated storage, while Mauritania provided port access and quota allotments. However, despite repeated bilateral negotiations in 1982, 1984, and 1986, cooperation faced mounting difficulties: vessel infractions, insufficient technology transfer, under-fulfillment of promised infrastructure development, and diverging interests between government actors and private Korean firms. Many agreements remained short-term, lacked transparency, and were often renegotiated under pressure from both domestic and international actors. The breakdown of COMACOP around the late 1980s symbolized the broader dysfunction in bilateral cooperation. Korean fishing firms began relocating to more permissive environments, including Morocco and Guinea, while Mauritania increasingly turned to multilateral partners, such as the European Community, for long-term stability and stronger enforcement mechanisms. Mauritania’s fisheries diplomacy varied significantly depending on its partners. Japan, through the 1970s and early 1980s, engaged in access agreements characterized by stable financial compensation and direct government-to-government negotiations. Japanese fishing was largely limited to cephalopods and highly regulated, and the country did not invest in joint ventures or infrastructure. By contrast, the European Community (EC) pursued a more- v institutionalized approach. Beginning in the late 1980s, the EC signed long-term protocols with Mauritania involving substantial financial transfers (often exceeding USD 100 million per protocol), explicit sustainability clauses, and the creation of monitoring bodies. These agreements offered Mauritania predictable revenue and stronger regulatory tools. Korea, though initially among the first to enter Mauritanian waters post-EEZ, failed to develop a durable institutional framework. Korean firms operated through short-term licenses and joint ventures without consistent enforcement or long-term investment. Unlike the EC’s structural support or Japan’s predictability, Korea's involvement was marked by fragmented diplomacy, commercial opacity, and limited adaptation to the changing legal-political environment. Several structural, economic, and diplomatic factors contributed to the eventual failure of Korea–Mauritania fisheries cooperation. First, asymmetry in interests and expectations between the two parties played a major role. While Mauritania sought technological development, job creation, and long-term investment, Korean firms were primarily motivated by short-term fishing access and profit maximization. Second, institutional fragmentation within the Korean system weakened policy coherence. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Fisheries, and private distant-water firms operated with little coordination. Many agreements were signed without strong implementation mechanisms or follow-up procedures. Third, COMACOP’s organizational limitations—including poor transparency, lack of reinvestment in Mauritania’s port infrastructure, and reliance on Korean staff—led to growing dissatisfaction on the Mauritanian side. The expected transfer of knowledge and fleet modernization largely failed to materialize. Fourth, external competition and policy shifts also undermined the- vi partnership. Mauritania increasingly preferred relations with the EC, which offered more generous and predictable compensation and brought greater technical oversight. At the same time, Korean vessels were accused of violating quotas and misreporting catches, further straining trust. Lastly, Mauritania's broader strategic move to assert greater control over its marine resources reflected a shift away from bilateral, weakly regulated agreements toward more institutionalized and enforceable arrangements. In this new context, Korea’s model of cooperation proved unsustainable. The failure of Korea–Mauritania cooperation marked a critical turning point in Korea’s distant-water fisheries diplomacy. It revealed the risks of informal or underinstitutionalized partnerships and emphasized the need for a clearer alignment between commercial and diplomatic objectives. First, it triggered a reassessment within the Korean government of how to negotiate EEZ access in the post-UNCLOS era. Lessons were drawn regarding the importance of incorporating sustainability standards, legal enforcement, and long-term institutional commitment. Second, the case influenced later Korean negotiations in West Africa (e.g., with Guinea, Senegal, and Ghana), where more structured diplomatic engagement and environmental clauses were introduced, albeit unevenly. Third, within Korea's domestic fisheries sector, the Mauritania experience accelerated a shift toward larger corporate consolidation, discouraging smaller, undercapitalized firms from engaging in uncertain overseas ventures. Finally, the episode stimulated debates in policy circles about the future viability of the distant-water fishing industry, especially regarding labor practices, overcapacity, and Korea's international reputation in resource management.- vii This study contributes to the scholarship on global fisheries governance by providing an in-depth case study of a failed bilateral fisheries agreement between a rising industrial power and a newly independent coastal state. It highlights how divergent objectives, weak institutions, and lack of trust can undermine potentially fruitful partnerships. By comparing Korea’s experience with those of Japan and the EC, the study shows the strategic advantages of policy consistency, transparency, and long-term commitment. The Korea–Mauritania case offers broader insights into the challenges faced by middle powers navigating post-colonial resource diplomacy, and it underlines the urgent need for more equitable, sustainable, and mutually accountable fisheries agreements in the global South. Keywords: Korea–Mauritania fisheries cooperation, distant-water fleet, COMACOP, fisheries agreement, policy failure.