A Study on the Protection of the Creditors’ Interests in the Corporate Reorganization: Pursuing the Balance Between the Interests of the Creditors and Others
- Alternative Title
- 회사정리에 있어서의 채권자 이익 보호에 관한 연구
- Abstract
- 시장에 있어서의 경쟁은 필수불가결한 요소이며, 이러한 경쟁으로 인하여 기업의 경영의 실패 가능성은 항상 존재한다. 특히 기업의 파산과 그에 따른 채권자의 권리보호 제도는 전체적인 시장의 발전을 유도하는 중요한 요인이 되고 있다. 세계 각국은 자국에 맞는 파산제도를 가지고 있고 이러한 각국의 파산제도는 채권자보호절차를 보다 명확하게 규정함으로써 시장의 위기를 관리하고 있다. 결국 파산제도는 기업의 잔여재산이 얼마나 존재하는지의 여부를 묻지 않고 기업금융의 불안정을 방지하고, 국내외 투자자는 물론 기업의 채권자에게 어느 정도 경제적 신뢰를 마련하는 기틀을 제공한다
파산제도는 세계적으로 1970년대를 거치면 획기적으로 변화를 겪게 되었다. 미국, 프랑스, 영국, 독일 등 서방국가들은 계속해서 새로운 파산법을 제정하거나 기존의 파산법을 대대적으로 개정하였다. 이러한 파산법의 제정 및 개정은 회사정리제도를 중심으로 이루어졌고, 회사정리제도는 적극적인 파산의 예방적 기능을 충실하게 수행하여 왔다.
그러나 아무리 회사의 갱생을 목적으로 하는 회사정리제도라고 하더라도 회사와 채권자 간의 이익을 모두 충족시킬 수는 없는 것이 현실이다. 그러니까 채무자인 기업을 구제함으로써 사회이익을 보호하는 것과 채권자의 이익을 보호하는 것은 사실상 모순이라고 할 것이다. 즉, 채무자의 입장에서는 채무를 연기하거나 경감함으로써 재정상의 부담을 줄이면서 기업을 재건하고자 하는 반면에 채권자는 자신의 채권을 완전하게 확보하기를 원하는 것이 현실이라는 것이다. 그러면 이러한 채권자와 채무자 기업간의 이익의 충돌은 어떻게 조정하여야 할 것인가? 본 논문은 이러한 기본적인 질문에 답하기 위하여 회사정리 제도에 있어서의 채권자 이익보호에 관한 사항을 다루고 있다.
이 논문의 제1장 머리말에서는 파산법의 발전과정을 회사정리제도를 중심으로 살펴보고자 한다. 정리제도는 파산법의 발전 중 필연적인 결과로 나타나게 된 제도이다. 즉 정리제도는 청산제도 또는 화해제도가 채무문제를 적절하게 해결하지 못함으로써 탄생하게 된 것으로서 채권자의 이익을 보다 합리적으로 보호하는 수단으로서 작용한다는 것이다. 이러한 개념을 전제로 본 장에서는 파산 제도의 출현이래 여러 국가에서 나타난 변화들을 검토하고 있다. 특히 이러한 변화는 파산면책제도 전후를 구분하여 분석하고자 하였으며, 각국의 입법례를 영국, 중국 및 대만, 그리고 미국와 일본의 경우를 중심으로 살펴보았다.
이러한 검토를 토대로 정리제도에 있어 채권자의 이익과 채무자 기업의 이익충돌의 원만한 해결방안을 제시하고자 하였다. 이러한 해결방안은 구체적으로 회사정리제도의 궁극적인 목적이 채권자나 채무자의 이익보호에 있다기 보다는 제3당사자라고 할 수 있는 사회 전체적인 이익을 보호한다는 데에 있다는 것을 전제로 한다.
제2장은 회사정리 중 채권자 이익보호를 위한 이론적 기초를 다루고 있다. 실질적으로 정리채권은 정리개시 이전에 발생한 재산적 청구권으로서 법률에 의한 강제집행이 가능하다. 이 곳에서는 정리채권을 우선정리채권, 담보가 있는 정리채권, 담보가 없는 정리채권으로 나누어 각각의 법률적 문제를 검토하고자 한다. 그리고 각 정리채권의 이익평형의 필요성과 이익평형의 실행 가능성을 여러 각도에서 살펴보고자 한다.
제3장에서는 회사정리의 구체적 절차에 관한 사항과 채권자의 지위를 살펴보고 있다. 사실 회사정리에 있어서 가장 중요한 문제가 채권자를 어떻게 보호할 것인가에 있다. 따라서 이 장에서는 회사정리 절차에 있어 나타날 수 있는 문제를 집중해서 다루고자 한다. 특히 정리과정에 있어서의 기관의 법률적 지위 및 권리와 그 제한, 감독기구의 권한, 그리고 채권자 자치기구의 조직과 권한에 관한 사항을 구체적으로 다루고자 한다.
제4장은 채권자 내부의 이익 평형에 관한 사항을 다루고자 한다. 회사정리 중에는 채권자와 다른 이익주체간의 관계는 물론이거니와 채권자 내부에 있어서도 상호간에 이익의 충돌문제가 발생한다. 따라서 이 장에서는 이러한 문제를 해결하기 위한 방안을 강구하고자 한다.
2005년 3월 21일에, 한국정부는 통합도산법을 반포했다. 이 새로운 법률은2006년 4월 1일부터 이미 효력이 발생한다. 제 5 장은 한국의 회사정리제도의 발전을 간단히 소개한 후에, 통합도산법의 돌출적 장점을 하나씩으로 소개한다.
제 6 장은 중국의 회사정리제도를 매우 구체적으로 분석하고 있다. 사실 2006년 중국의 기업파산법의 개정이 이루어지기 전까지 중국에는 현대적인 회사정리제도가 존재하지 않았다. 따라서 이장에서는 2006년 이전에 존재하던 유명무실했던 정리제도와 2006년 중국의 기업파산법의 개정으로 도입된 새로운 정리제도를 구체적으로 분석하고자 하였다. 사실1986년 중화인민공화국 기업파산법은 실제로 국유기업에게 적용하였고, 1991년의 수정 민사소송법에서는 국유기업 이외의 민영 기업에 있어서의 파산에 관한 사항을 다루고 있었다. 이후 다양한 법률의 제정 및 개정을 통하여 파산 관련제도를 정비하였다. 그리고 2006년 8월에 제10 차 전국인민대표대회 상무위원회 제23회 회의에서 기업파산법이 통과됨으로써 2007년 6월부터 새로운 정리제도가 그 효력을 발생하게 되었다. 이장에서는 이 새로운 회사정리제도를 살펴보고 또 그 문제점과 개선방안을 제시하고자 한다.
제7장은 결론의 장으로서 정리제도의 탄생에서부터 현재에 이르기까지의 구체적 내용 검토를 전제로 성공적인 회사정리제도의 지속적 발전 방안을 제시하고자 하였다. 특히 정리제도의 발전은 채권자 보호에 중점을 두고 이루어져야 할 것이며, 이를 위한 발전적 제언을 하고자 한다. 마지막으로 본 논문이 중국의 회사정리제도 발전에 기여할 수 있는 방안을 마련하고자 한다.
As business failure is the universal feature of competitive markets, effective insolvency and creditor rights systems are the fundamental building blocks of sustainable development. While there are a wide variety of national insolvency regimes, all effective systems provide clear proceedings to manage financial distress, facilitate predictable risk sharing and establish a binding, collective proceeding to maximize the value of a firm’s assets, whether as a going concern or in liquidation. The existence of such a framework facilitates access to credit and underpins contract enforcement. Hence, effective insolvency and creditor rights systems are important to both domestic and international investors and creditors, and are crucial to reducing the risks of financial instability and handling financial crises when they occur.
Since the 1970s a great reformation has sprung up in the field of the Bankruptcy Law. United States, France, England, Germany and other western countries established new bankruptcy laws to replace the old ones, or amended the old ones boldly in succession. The core of this bankruptcy law reformation is establishing and consummating the reorganization system. The reorganization system, as one of the important bankruptcy systems juxtaposing the bankruptcy liquidation system and the bankruptcy reconciliation system, is a preventive system that tries to help the debtors actively and urge them to revive. The emergence of the reorganization system indicates that the system itself changes from the liquidating model to the reconstructive model. Just because the new system can make up the shortcomings of the traditional bankruptcy system, people bestow quite effective estimates upon it.
But any legal system cannot absolutely balance the interests of all parties, so neither does the reorganization system. For example, in the system there are conflicts between the value of keeping the social interests by urging the debtors to revive and the aim of protecting the creditors’ interests. On one side, the debtors certainly hope to postpone and decrease their debts in order to abate their financial burden and reorganize their corporations as soon as possible; on the other side, the creditors also hope to receive sufficient compensations early. So, can such conflicts be conciliated? How can we conciliate them? With these questions I want to discuss the creditors’ interests and the protective methods with regard to their interests during the course of the corporate reorganization.
Chapter Ⅰ talks about the evolution of the bankruptcy law and points out the change of the value of the bankruptcy law system. The reorganization system is a certain outcome with the development of the bankruptcy law. When the liquidation system or the reconciliation system cannot resolve the problem of the debtors’ debts felicitously, the reorganization system is devised. It is a new approach to protect the creditors’ interests and rights. Only with a successful reorganization can the creditors acquire enough indemnity. However, with the development of the society, we have to pay more attention to the social interests and other similar things besides the creditors’ interests. So in my this dissertation I want to expatiate that the development of the reorganization system cannot deviate from the protection of the creditors’ interests because that only by protecting the creditors’ interests can the reorganization plan get the creditors’ assistance and can the purpose of the reorganization plan be achieved.
Chapter Ⅱ discusses the theoretical foundation of protecting the creditors’ interests during the course of corporate reorganization. This dissertation considers that the theoretical foundation should be the Interests Balance Principle. This chapter discusses 3 aspects: 1) the basic point of the balance―the confirmation of the reorganization claims; 2) the necessity of the interests balance and; 3) the possibility of achieving the interests balance.
Chapter Ⅲ demonstrates the exterior balance between the creditors and the reorganization proceedings. As to the startup mechanism of the reorganization proceedings, the most important thing for us to know is how to put the corporation with the necessity and the possibility of the reorganization into the reorganization proceedings, and how to exclude the corporation with no hope to revive. The startup mechanism is the first phase to protect the creditors’ interests, and this phase is also the most important and significant one. If we are off our guard at this phase, maybe there will be a lot of future trouble and the creditor will come a howler.
Then the dissertation discusses the important problems about the supervisory mechanism of the reorganization proceedings, such as: 1) the legal position, the rights and the restrictions of the business institution during the course of reorganization; 2) the significance of the supervisory institution and its authority and; 3) the foundation and the authority of the creditors’ self-government institution. As to the core of the reorganization proceedings―the reorganization plan, the establishment and enforcement of the reorganization plan are the things that impact the creditors’ interest the most. So the proceedings of establishing should be exoteric and transparent, and the content of the plan should incarnate the creditors’ will. To achieve such purposes, the reorganization plan should be up to the best interests of the creditors’ principle, the fair play principle and the utterly priority principle. And the reorganization laws should also use the interest balance principle to conciliate the interest conflicts among the different creditors.
Chapter Ⅳ discusses the interior balance among the creditors. In the corporate reorganization, there are a lot of conflicts not only between the creditors and other interested parties, but also among the creditors in the interior. Every creditor has the motivation to be discharged fully and on time. Thus the reorganization laws and regulations also have to conciliate the interests conflicts among the different sorts of creditors. In my opinion, the automatic stay system and the right of rescission are both systems of protecting the creditors’ interests equally and show the adjustment and balance to the whole creditors and to the individual creditor.
Chapter Ⅴ introduces the Korean reorganization system. On March 21, 2005, the Korean government finally promulgated the examined draft and named it as the “Act on Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy of Debtors,” and the original three insolvency laws were all combined into one. This new unified law has come into practice on April 1, 2006. After introducing the evolution of the Korean reorganization system in brief, the outstanding points of this new enacted law are introduced one by one.
Chapter Ⅵ reviews the corporate reorganization system in China’s mainland. Strictly speaking, there was no modern corporate reorganization system until the amended the People’s Republic of China, Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of August 27, 2006. The reorganization system in this fresh amended law has great significance both in the theoretical and the practical sense.
Finally, chapter Ⅶ ingeminates that since the reorganization system appeared, the problems such as how to go along with an effective reorganization and how to ensure the successful reorganization have always been the jurisprudents’ purposes, and the creditors’ best hopes at the same time. The purpose of the reorganization system is promoting the debtors to revive and then the interests of the society can also be maintained. This kind of purpose shows the modern society is intervening in the economy with its public power, but “public intervention” has to be restricted within a certain boundary―that means, the creditors’ interests should not be damaged. Therefore, the development of the reorganization system cannot deviate from the protection of the creditors’ interests. I hope and deeply believe that the reorganization system will surely take root in China and thrive in the future!
- Author(s)
- Yijun Zhang
- Issued Date
- 2007
- Awarded Date
- 2007. 8
- Type
- Dissertation
- Keyword
- corporate reorganization protection creditor balance 회사정리
- Publisher
- 부경대학교 대학원
- URI
- https://repository.pknu.ac.kr:8443/handle/2021.oak/3722
http://pknu.dcollection.net/jsp/common/DcLoOrgPer.jsp?sItemId=000001953654
- Affiliation
- 부경대학교 대학원
- Department
- 대학원 법학과
- Advisor
- 김광록
- Table Of Contents
- Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION = 1
A. OVERVIEW = 1
B. BRIEF INTRODUCTIONS TO DIFFERENT COUNTRIES = 3
1. ENGLAND = 3
2. UNITED STATES = 5
3. FRANCE = 7
4. JAPAN = 8
5. TAIWAN DISTRICT OF CHINA = 8
6. KOREA = 9
C. REVIEW = 11
Ⅱ. THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF THE INTERESTS BALANCE = 15
A. OVERVIEW = 15
B. BASIC POINTS: CONFIRMING THE REORGANIZATION CLAIMS = 16
1. THE REORGANIZATION CLAIMS = 16
2. THE PREFERENTIAL REORGANIZAITON CLAIMS = 21
1) Overview = 21
2) The Employees’ Stipend Claims = 23
3) The National Tax Claims = 26
3. THE SECURED REORGANIZATION CLAIMS = 28
1) Overview = 28
2) The Assessment of the Secured Property = 30
3) The Confirmation of the Claims Secured by the Mortgage up to a Maximum Amount = 31
4. THE UNSECURED REORGANIZATION CLAIMS = 35
1) Overview = 35
2) Claims Subject to Conditions or Having a Term = 35
3) Claims Incurred as a Result of the Continued Supply Contract = 36
4) Claims with Several Debtors = 38
C. THE NECESSITY OF THE INTERESTS BALANCE = 39
1. OVERVIEW = 39
2. THE MULTI PARTIES AND THEIR INTERESTS IN THE CORPORATE REORGANIZATION = 40
1) Overview = 40
2) The Social Interests = 40
3) The Debtors’ Interests = 42
4) The Creditors’ Interests = 42
5) The Shareholders’ Interests = 43
6) The Employees’ Interests = 44
3. REVIEW: THE CONFLICTS AMONG THE INTERESTS PARTIES IN CORPORATE REORGANIZATION = 44
D. THE POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING THE INTERESTS BALANCE = 46
1. OVERVIEW = 46
2. VIEW FROM THE POINT OF THE PURPOSE OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATION = 47
3. VIEW FROM THE POINT OF PROTECTION OF THE CREDITORS = 48
Ⅲ. THE EXTERIOR BALANCE BETWEEN THE CREDITORS AND THE REORGANIZATION PROCEEDINGS = 50
A. OVERVIEW = 50
B. THE CREDITORS AND THE START-UP MECHANISM OF THE REORGANIZATION = 52
1. OVERVIEW = 52
2. THE REORGANIZATION APPLICATION = 52
1) Overview = 52
2) The Debtor = 53
3) The Creditor = 53
4) The Capital Contributor = 54
5) The National Institution = 55
3. THE EXAMINATION OF THE COURT = 56
1) The Status of the Court in the Corporate Reorganization = 56
2) The Examination of the Court to the Reorganization Application = 57
3) The Prevention to the Company’s Abuse of the Preservation Measures = 60
C. THE CREDITORS AND THE REORGANIZATION INSTITUTIONS = 64
1. OVERVIEW = 64
2. THE BUSINESS INSTITUTION DURING THE CORPORATE REORGANIZATION PERIOD = 65
2) The Legislation Modes of the Business Institution and the Analysis = 66
3) The Legal Status of the Business Institution = 73
4) The Rights and Relative Restrictions of the Business Institution = 76
3. THE SUPERVISORY INSTITUTION DURING THE CORPORATE REORGANIZATION PERIOD = 83
1) The Significance of the Supervisory Institution = 83
2) The Rights of the Supervisory Institution = 85
4. THE CREDITORS’ SELF-GOVERNMENT INSTITUTION DURING THE CORPORATE REORGANIZATION PERIOD = 87
1) The Status of the Creditors’ Self-government Institution = 87
2) The Establishment and Rights of the Creditors’ Self-government Institution = 89
D. THE CREDITORS AND THE REORGANIZATION PLAN = 91
1. OVERVIEW = 91
2. THE FORMULATION OF THE REORGANIZATION PLAN = 93
1) The Framer of the Reorganization Plan = 93
2) The Contents of the Reorganization Plan = 94
3. THE ADOPTION OF THE REORGANIZATION PLAN = 97
1) The Grouping = 97
2) The Vote = 100
4. THE APPROVAL OF THE REORGANIZATION PLAN = 101
1) Overview = 101
2) The Natural Approval = 102
3) The Compulsive Approval = 104
4) The Efficacy of the Approval = 105
5. THE EXECUTION OF THE REORGANIZATION PLAN = 105
1) The Executor of the Reorganization Plan = 105
2) The Principles of the Execution of the Reorganization Plan = 107
3) The Supervision to the Execution of the Reorganization Plan = 107
Ⅳ. THE INTERIOR BALANCE AMONG THE CREDITORS = 109
A. OVERVIEW = 109
B. THE AUTOMATIC STAY SYSTEM = 111
1. THE FOUNDATION OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY SYSTEM = 111
2. THE LEGISLATIONS OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY SYSTEM = 113
1) Overview = 113
2) The Mode of Automatic Effect = 113
3) The Mode of Adjudicated Effect = 115
3. THE APPLICATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY = 115
4. THE EXCEPTION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY = 120
1) Overview = 120
2) Criminal Proceedings = 120
3) Some Administrative Behaviors of the Government to Perform the Administrative Laws and Statutes = 120
4) Some Particular Behaviors that will not Decrease the Debtor’s Possessions = 121
5. THE RELIEF OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY = 121
C. THE RIGHT OF RESCISSION = 123
1. THE FOUNDATION OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE RIGHT OF RESCISSION = 123
2. THE COMPOSING ELEMENTS OF THE RIGHT OF ESCISSION = 125
3. THE APPLICATION SCOPE OF THE RIGHT OF RESCISSION = 126
1) Overview = 126
2) The Preference = 126
3) The Fraudulent Transfer = 127
Ⅴ. THE REORGANIZATION SYSTEM IN KOREA = 129
A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE KOREAN REORGANIZATION SYSTEM = 129
B. THE VALUABLE POINTS OF THE REORGANIZATION SYSTEM IN THE UNIFIED INSOLVENCY LAW = 134
1. OVERVIEW = 134
2. THE OUTSTANDING CHARACTERISTICS = 134
1) The Abandoned Territorial Principle = 134
2) The Introduced Stay Order System = 135
3) The Possibly appointed representative of the debtor corporation = 135
4) The Creditors’ Committee = 136
5) The simplified procedures = 136
6) The Guaranteed Liquidation Value = 136
7) The Extended Scope of the Exempted Assets = 137
8) The Rehabilitation Procedures to Individuals = 137
3. THE REGULATIONS ON PROTECTING THE CREDITORS’ INTERESTS = 138
1) The Principle of Guaranteeing the Liquidation Value of Reorganization Claims = 138
2) The Creditors’ Collegium (The Creditors’ Committee) = 141
Ⅵ. THE REVIEW AND SUGGESTIONS ON CHINA’S REORGANIZATION SYSTEM = 144
A. OVERVIEW = 144
B. THE NOMINAL “REORGANIZATION” SYSTEM IN CHINA’S ENTERPRISE INSOLVENCY LAW = 146
1. THE RECTIFICATION SYSTEM AND THE REORGANIZATION SYSTEM = 146
2. THE ANALYSIS ON THE DISUSE OF THE RECTIFICATION SYSTEM = 149
C. THE INTRODUCED REORGANIZATION SYSTEM IN CHINA’S NEW BANKRUPTCY LAW OF 2006 = 152
1. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INTRODUCING THE REORGANIZATION SYSTEM TO CHINA = 152
2. THE ATTENTION TO THE CREDITORS’ INTERESTS OF THE NEW BANKRUPTCY = LAW153
1) Overview = 153
2) Outstanding Characteristics = 154
3. SUGGESTIONS = 157
1) Overview = 157
2) The Adequate Protection of the Creditors = 158
3) The Small Claims = 158
4) The Protection of the New Capital = 159
Ⅶ. CONCLUSION = 160
REFERENCES = 167
ABSTRACT IN KOREAN = 177
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS = 181
- Degree
- Doctor
-
Appears in Collections:
- 대학원 > 법학과
- Authorize & License
-
- Files in This Item:
-
Items in Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.